THE

PAPERS

OF

ANDREW JACKSON

Volume 83

1833

January 13—May 9

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

1913

Lebanon January
13th AD 1833

Dear General

Through your kindness I received the Proclamation shortly after it was issued and have read it over and over again with a satisfaction inexpressible. no State paper was ever better timed and surely none ever met with such universal approbation many men who have hitherto been opposed to you with an enmity that seemed irreconcilable, have on the appearance of the Proclamation yielded their opposition and have pledged themselves to support your administration. we had an unusually large meeting of the Citizens of this County at Lebanon on the 8th of January a Preamble and Resolutions were adopted expressive of the views the people here entertain of the movements of the dominant party in South Carolina and the determination on their part to support you in your exertions to check the spirit of disunion. at the request of the committee I drew the Preamble and Resolutions — and I have felt so much on this subject that I fear that they may be deemed too strong. at the request of the Committee your neighbours and friends, I send you inclosed the proceedings of our meeting in our Village paper which I hope you can find time to read. you will perceive that Maj Bice Martin was a member of the committee and William L Martin Esq son of Col. Martin Secretary both warm in the cause. in fact I have not seen but one Nullifier since the Proclamation reached us and he is Jimy Sanders Esq of Sumner he and two or three of his neighbours pretend to think

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that way but they are small and harmless.

When shall I have the good fortune to receive a letter from you? but — for the Proclamation you inclosed me I had good reason to believe that you had forgotten me. I am undetermined as to my course off in becoming a a candidate for Congress — I am strongly solicited both in Davidson and my own County but I dislike to run against Bell because he has been useful in the support of your administration; is there no place that you can send him off to, so that he can be out of my way — I could not be driven to Congress after your term of service expires I could easily have gone in the old district, but it was changed by those who dreaded me in a future contest.

It is reported that some provision would be made for Mr Grundy — this session so as to put an end to the contest between him and Maj Eaton. What is this? if Maj Eaton is a gain before the Legislature he can and must be elected — and it is proper to know with whom he will have to contend

I have written you a longer letter than I intended for I am aware that you have too much business before you to devote much time to your friends — Martha joins with me in the kindest wishes for your health and happiness.

Very sincerely your friend

Robert M Burton

LEBANON
JAN
13
TEN.

FREE

answered
30th Jan 1833

Genl. Andrew Jackson
Washington City
District of Columbia

Mail

16484-5

A Due Mr. Shelton three dollars for
Carryall — pr. 07- dollars — Jany 15th 1833
A. Jackson

16486

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, Washington, } January 15th. 1833

PAY to The droft of Andrew Jackson
pr. in favor of H. R. W. Hill, Nashville T. — or bearer,
nine hundred & fourteen — dollars, $\frac{\ }{100}$

914 DOLLS. $\frac{\ }{100}$

Andrew Jackson

16487

Rec^d Nine dollars for
[illegible] by [illegible] Jany 1 1833
[illegible]

A. Jacobs
3.00

OFFICE OF BANK OF U. STATES,
[illegible] January [illegible] 1833
PAY to [illegible] or bearer,
[illegible] dollars, 100
DOLLS. [illegible]

Gallatin January 15th 1833

Dear Sir—

Your letter of the 30th Nov was received by me on this morning, and I trust that I shall be excused for troubling you again in relation to the enmity that elicited it — this I deem necessary in order to efface the slightest impression, if any, that may remain in your mind of my having so far violated any rule of decency and propriety in using any remarks opprobrious or disrespectful to you — During the session of Congress of 1830 a letter was addressed by Gen Desha to a friend of his in this place, stating that Gov Houston was then in Washington, and that he Desha had been waited on by Mr Grundy and Mr Isaacs with the view of ascertaining from him whether he would sanction the nomination of Houston for some important office, if one should be made by the President, and that he warmly opposed it — This letter was exhibited whether by authority or not I am unable to say — but the impression made on my mind was that you intended to confer on Houston

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some office of responsibility and dignity if the delegation
from Tennessee would sanction it — At that time
Gen Desha and myself were personally friendly and
I wrote him in reply to his note, commenting
with some severity upon Houston, and lamenting
the effect which his elevation to office by executive
sanction, would have upon the character of the unfortunate
female that he had taken for wife — That I
should have thus expressed myself upon a subject
at that time of much interest to me, and that
I should have felt an interest in the character
of a woman connected with me by the closest ties
of consanguinity, who had been made to drink
the cup of bitterness, and who was then under the
gloomy reflections of her situation rendered disconsolate,
and broken hearted hearted by the idea, that
the dearest and most sacred ties that connected
her with time, had been widely severed, and
her peace and happiness destroyed forever, I say
for having thus written, (when it is remembered too
that I thought I was writing to friend) needs
no apology to him whose bosom has
felt the full flow of that generous tide of feeling
that binds a husband to the partner of his bosom,
and who would resist even unto death any
unholy alliance to traduce her reputation —
At the same time I addressed an anonimous
communication to the Editors of the Intelligencer
but in neither of the letter written to Desha, or the

way of a private confidential letter, or in the commu=
=nication to the Secretary — have I used
one word or expression, that I would not have
used to yourself in conversation, without the
least fear of exception on your part —

Genl Desha now says [in his] letter to me written
in answer to one that I had previously addressed
to him upon this subject "I laid before the Presid=
=ent your letter and communication, after
reading them he appeared to be much irritated
and excited, and used many harsh epithets in
relation to you, among others the following

"Dam scoundrel a contemptible puppy does
he think to presume to regulate my intercou=
rse with my friends — does he think to make
me renounce an old tried friend Gov Houston
who has fought by my side, whose shoes the
contemptible puppy is not worthy to clean or
black" or words to the same import — and in that
conversation said and used many other epithe=
ts of you about the same nature, the particu=
lar phraseology of which is not now recollected
by me" — This conversation he alleges as an
apology for repeating it, is disclosed at this time for
the purpose of injuring me as the friend and
supporter of Major Eaton, and for the purpose
of letting me know what was the opinions
entertained of me by those [illegible] [illegible]
was warmly espousing — My reply to this
apology was that even admitting his state=
=ment

to be true which I could not take for granted, that
I did not conceive that Majr. Eaton ought
to be held responsible for the opinions that
the President might entertain of me, and
that if he thought by making the disclosure
that he made, that any effect was to be produ=
=ced either upon my feelings towards the
President, or upon the course that I was
pursuing as a citizen of the country he had
mistaken the character and quality of the
materials which he hoped to operate on—
My public history since I have been actor in
the stage of life gives a most unqualified
contradiction to the statements made by
Eaton. I have been a warm supporter of
the President and his administration, and
my confidence in the head of this great nat=
=tion has increased, ~~and~~ with the develop=
=ment of events in which it has been his
proud fate to control, and my open and
decided stand in favour of the course pursued
at the dissolution of the cabinet, and in repelling
the thousand false and slanderous char=
=ges circulated against Majr Eaton and
his lady brought me in collision with
~~the~~ my own family, and with those who
I had believed would have adhered
to you with a pertinacity proportioned
to the difficulties by which you were surro-
=unded, and would have suffered the

against pains and penalties, in the defence
of him who had been to them all that
one friend could be to another — The fear
of some unpleasant consequences growing
out of a heated contest for office which arose
relation against relation induced me at the
instance of some my friends to permit my
name to be placed before you as an appli=
=cant for office — At the time this sugg=
=estion was made to me I was not appri=
=sed that any report had ever been made
to you of any thing that I had said,
But I am happy to find from your letter
That the statements reported by Dishas had
no effect upon your feelings, of which fact
I was perfectly satisfied of the very friend=
=ly reception that I met with from
you, when I visited you in Washington
while you were last in this state —
I have deemed it due to myself, in order that
you might understand the subject in all
its bearings, and for the purpose of
entering a most solemn disclaim=
=er against even having used any
opprobrious epithets in relation to
you that I have written this letter.
I fear that I have thrown myself too
much upon your time and have

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evinced the kindness displaid towards me in your very very friendly letter—

With sentiments of respect and high regard I remain your friend and obt servant

J. M. Saunders

To the President of the U. S.

D. Sanders Esqr
apply to [illegible] that
the facts detailed
is a further proof
of the perfidy of
Deshea &c A. J.

Concerning
Deshea's [illegible]
Genl. Houston [illegible]
Eaton

1832

To The
President of the
United [illegible]

To the President of the
United States
Washington

Charleston
16th January
1833

(Private)

My dear Sir

I transmit herewith a Circular addressed by the Governor of this State to the Officers of his staff, instructing them to make conditional contracts and other dispositions for the transportation of troops from the interior to Charleston. No troops have yet been moved, but the Governor's aids are already actively engaged in making the necessary arrangements in conformity with the instructions contained in this circular.

I am somewhat at a loss how to act — I appointed some time ago a Committee

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consisting of the ablest lawyers in the State for the purpose of taking into consideration the operation of the laws passed by our Legislature in conformity with the ordinance, for the purpose of communicating to you the opinions of these Gentlemen drawn from an intimate knowledge of the law as well as a familiar acquaintance with the characters and intentions of those who may raise the question and those charged with executing the laws. They have not yet reported to me, and I regret this the more because I do not believe the revenue laws can be carried into effect by legal process framed as the laws of the Nullifiers now are, and I do not fully understand how the issue is to be brought about whereby we may stand forth in defence of the laws of the United States—

I ought not to disguise from you, that even if the case should arise of the Posse Comitatus being called out by the U. S. Marshall, there exists a disinclination on the part of a majority of the Union party in Charleston to join in mortal conflict with their adversaries as a part of the Posse. There is scarcely a family wherein some member is not in the opposite ranks, and it is certain in such a contest father would be arrayed against son and Brother against brother. The opinion appears to prevail among them, that in taking this stand without any further authority from the federal government than a summons from the federal marshall, they would render themselves amenable to the laws of the state, should they fail and be taken prisoners. In my frequent conferences with my coadjutors I

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find, that they would prefer that the Marshal should signify to the judge, that he could not execute the law, and the judge so certify to you whereupon you could issue your order calling out the militia and we would promptly obey the call. I know, that you would prefer and so would I infinitely, that the union party in the state should put down the rebellion themselves; but if I find, that the majority of the party are not disposed to aid me in this effort - I cannot expose a few brave men to the certainty of defeat - I shall leave nothing undone to bring them to this determination; but I have my doubts of success. The parties are so equally divided in the city - our opponents have the advantage of being able to organise and drill openly, and in the opinion of the multitude have the law on their side; so that our men are many of them intimidated - They fear too the arrival of troops from the County

and being overpowered by numbers I think it proper to inform you of the objections made by a respectable number of the party in this city - I would not for the world you should ever suppose we had resolved upon a certain course of action and had not courage to carry it out - I shall go on with my preparations and it may be, that the consciousness of strength may give them resolution to act in support of the law, and save the State from disgrace.

Would not the raising, embodying and marching troops to Charleston be an act of overt treason? Would it not be humanity to prevent the accumulation of these force in this city?

We must be either basely submit to be trampled upon by these tyrants, or resist the arrogance and contumely we should have to suffer from

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Satellites of Hamilton & Hayne if they do
occupy Charleston in any force — Some of us
never shall submit to the tyranny & oppression of
these arrogant and presumptuous men; but we
shall have to contend against fearful odds
if the federal government folds its arms and
looks on without taking a part in the contest.
I am very desirous government should
determine what course it will pursue in
such emergencies — not with a view of hastening on
any conflict, for we will avoid that as long as
it is safe and honorable to do so; but in order to
be prepared to cooperate with you.
The recruiting in town goes on slowly — In the country
we understand five thousand volunteers have offered
their services to the Governor — They have been assured
however, whenever they showed any backwardness

to sign the articles, that there would be no fighting if they did so - That they had only to put on a bold front and the government of the union would at once yield to their demands. There are it is true some rash and violent men, who desire to bring on a contest with us or with the general government. I almost wish they could be gratified -

I shall I hope in a few days send you the opinion of my legal committee and some more correct account of the number and disposition of our forces -

I am Dear Sir,
very respectfully
Your Obedt. Servt.
J. R. Poinsett

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to adopt the article, that there would be no difficulty

in the details - that they had only to put a little

point and the government of the Union would at

their demands. There are, it is true

a few ardent men, who desire to bring

[illegible] to a rupture with the present government

[illegible] could be gratified -

I shall I hope in a few days send you the

opinion of the legal committee and some more

correct account of the number and disposition

of our force -

I am Dear Sir,

very respectfully

your obed. Servt.

J. R. Poinsett

Poinsett
16th June 1832
Union men reluctantly
to fight as a [illegible]
[illegible]
8000 [illegible] the country

Baltimore Post Office
17 January. 1833.

Dear Sir:

I am anxious to procure, for a friend, a negro boy weighing not exceeding 90 pounds - of constitution character and habit, qualified to make a race rider; and would give a liberal price - can you put me in the way of getting such an one - you know he should be a reckless, bold, stubbed sort of an old fielder; such as, in the country, can ride horse or mule, bare back; with no bridle in his mouth and a ches-nut burr under his tail - Your aid in this matter would particularly oblige

Yours with great respect
J S Skinner

J S Skinner 1833

16496

Baltimore Post Office
17 February 1833.

Dear Sir

[illegible]

Yours with great respect
J. S. Skinner

J S Skinner 1833

To the President of the United States
Private,

Charleston
19th January
1833

My dear Sir

I have this instant received the accompanying opinion drawn up by the first legal talents of our bar and hasten to transmit to you by express - I think it well digested and suited to our circumstances. It is however very doubtfull whether any course the government can adopt will effectually prevent a conflict in the streets of our city - In my opinion, nothing will prevent that, but the certainty on the part of the Nullifiers, that we are prepared to meet them - And I shall be able soon to give them that assurance - I transmit you herewith a statement of the armament lately moved to

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the Citadel — Five waggon loads of arms and ammunition were sent off into the interior today, which renders it absolutely necessary I should take some precautions for arming the friends of the union in that quarter — I propose to send arms to given points in Soth Carolina & give orders to our friends to retire upon Spartanburg & Greenville — An order for arms upon the arsenal near Augusta would be important for the protection of our party upon & near the Georgia frontier — A brig arrived from New York yesterday loaded by an agent sent from this state, with arms among them are 20 heavy guns —

I am forming a Legion in the city independently of the organisation of the Citizens — It is composed of the young and I hope & believe the brave. To complete it I want 4 Six Pounders mounted on travelling carriages — There are many such at York

Moultrie; but Col. Bankhead thinks he will require them in case the Island is attacked or the town to be occupied - I cannot well do without them if are as many as I can manage effectively - I should then have a Squadron of Cavalry 80 men - two companies of flying artillery - two companies of Riflemen and a battalion of Infantry between 6 or 700 in all - and the armed Citizens organized as well as such troops can be, will complete about a thousand to 1200 effective men.

The Nullifiers are extremely active and do keep up the excitement in very extraordinary manner - They drill & exercise their men without intermission I saw today in the streets of our City several of the Leaders of that party from the County strutting about with Cockades in their hats - blue with a button; the Palmetto stamped upon it -

16498

I hope something will be done for Major Champlin He is deserving and shall not want; but I do assure you I require all the funds I can raise, which are devoted to the uses of the party — I dislike to touch on this subject; but just now I cannot well manage to transport the means of defence by the circuitous route they must travel without the aid of government. We understand that the Nullifiers have offers of services from some revolutionists in No. Carolina & especially in Georgia — I send you a Greenville paper, which will show you the spirit of our friends near the mountains & what I have been able to effect there —

Very respectfully

I am, Dear Sir

Your most Obt. Servt.

J. R. Poinsett

Poinsett
19th Jany 1833
preparations on both sides for civil war
Force of nullifiers [illegible]
in the city of Charleston

Charleston
20th January
1833

My dear Sir

I had prepared a letter to be sent to you by express, when yours was brought to me by the District Attorney — The Message is admirable and you will perceive a coincidence between the views taken of the subject by the Committee appointed by me and yourself, as well as the course recommended to be adopted by Congress —

With respect to the applications made to you by Mr. Graham, Harrison and others. I will attend to their being supplied with the means of defence whenever necessary — They all want to have arms to put into the hands of the men immediately, to

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which I object as such a measure will have the effect of provoking a contest and of putting us in the wrong

I think that govt. ought to be prepared to strike the moment the troops of the interiour are moved towards the city - You will see by the governor's general orders that preparations are making for that purpose - If they allowed to occupy the city - It will cost much blood to dislodge them - We shall be exposed to their insult, which I much doubt if with all the christian forbearance we can exercise, we can long brook - You may rest assured, that these reckless men will not be put down by any moral influence we may be able to exert over them - They are desperate and believe if they can bring on a contest with the federal government they will excite the sympathy and

receive the aid of the neighbouring states - nothing keeps them in check and foils them so much as the steady opposition of the union party throughout the state - It must be made to appear, that this is a contest between the friends & supporters of the Govt. & the laws and rebellious faction, which has by the most deceptious means obtained possession of the power of the state. The government would not discharge its duty if it did not sustain the former, and we will I trust so act as to merit its support - I expect the next move will be secession and we must be prepared to resist it - I cannot but think that we, the union party, ought at once to declare our firm determination to bring the state back into the Union and call for the aid of the

16500

General government to put down the rebellion of a faction and restore order and tranquillity - And that the general government ought to be ready to sustain us - I never will suffer these men to withdraw the State of South Carolina from the union - I will raise the standard against them instantly - but to do so with effect and with the united action of the union party they must act with the countenance of the federal government. The threats of the Nullifiers that the air shall be darkened with our carcases as traitors appal some, who I believe, would have stout hearts if they believed themselves safe from such an ignominious death -

I observe what you say about the head of the Monster Nullification - We must avoid

avoid making this man of too much importance - You are aware that in our country a man may be persecuted into consequence and I verily believe, that to treat this bad man with merited contempt will kill him morally, physically and politically - whereas to attack him as the arch Rebel might enlist in his favor a feeling he is totally unworthy of - He deserves punishment and I am disposed to inflict it in its most cruel form - Let him walk through the world with the mark of reprobation upon him as a man who for his own unhallowed ambition would have involved his country in Ruin & disgrace Commodore Elliott is here and I have already had a conference with him - [illegible] shall act in perfect

16501

concent -

If any military movements are to take place then Genl. Scott ought to return.
Bankhead is a good officer; but our people and myself have more confidence in the skill, activity and experience of Genl. Scott -

I do not wish to delay the Express any longer. I have seen ____, the friends of order and the Union, will receive the proclamation with universal approbation - and aid with heart & hand the constituted authorities in carrying out the measures recommended in that able document -

I am Dear Sir,
with great respect
Your very obt. Servt.
J. R. Poinsett

Poinsett
20th Jan. 1833

Apprehends secession — is resolved to resist it.
Arrival of commanders for Nullifiers.
Sending munitions into the country.

Nullification

Mr Poinsetts of the 16th 19th 20th of January 1833.

To,

The President

Private

L. McLane.

16503

Washington January 21st 1833

My son

your letter of the the 1st instant was recd on the 19th, and your draft in favor of Mr Hill for nine hundred & fourteen dollars, had been recd, honored, & paid, some days previous all which, would have been communicated had I not been confined by a bad cold which produced a severe pain in my left side which for the last three days prevented me from business. medicine, & a copious bleeding, with the smiles of that all seeing superintending providence, who gives & takes away, I am perfectly restored & free from pain.

I am anxiously waiting for your promised letter, giving me a detailed account of all matters & things, including the amount of the cotton crop, the health of the family, & your progress with your mills, and how Mr Holtzclaw gets on with the negroes &c &c &c - and last, what you are doing or intend doing with the Citizens, & whether Alexander has taken away his stud.

I wish you to say to Mr Holtzclaw that I shall have confidence in him that my brood stock, & colts, will be atten=ded to by him.

I would be happy to hear when you intend visitting me, what amount of acres of cotton you mean to plant, & where you have selected to plant it. if we have a good season, it will behove us to endeavour to make a good crop of

16594

of cotton, as the present I fear, will not pay the expence of the farm.

Give my love to Sarah and kiss little Rachel for me, say to Sarah, I have recd but one letter from her since her confinement. I had the pleasure thro judge Catron to hear from you all, & many encomiums upon her & Emma, with a lively discription of the beauty of the sweet little babe. It would give me much pleasure to see the sweet little cherub, with Sarah, & yourself. Still I do not wish you to risque ice, or bad weather for this gratification to me, as it might endanger the health of both Sarah & the child.

Mr Breathett, Col Earle, Genl Coffee with Andrew Emely & the two Marys all request to be presented to you, Sarah, Emma & Thomas, with all the connection, to which you will add, and accept of mine, with my prayers for the health & happiness of all.

believe me your affectionate father Andrew Jackson

Andrew Jackson jnr

16505

Andrew Jackson Esqr
Hermitage
Davidson County
Tennessee

Norfolk Jany 22d 1833.

My dear Sir,

I have just read a second time your message of the 16' Inst. & cannot refrain in justice to my civic feelings and to my relations to you, from expressing the entire satisfaction and I may add the pride I feel in all you have done on the subject to which it refers; To express all the admiration your course has excited would not entirely comport with delicacy or propriety— Your views of the principles of our Government are those alone on which it can be administered & preserved— And allow me to say from a very careful search after public opinion as expressed by individuals; by the Public papers; by meetings, & by the public functionaries, Govern & legislatures of the different States. They are the views of the Nation— notwithstanding the faint Echo of former opinions which a small Majority perhaps of the Virginia Legislature are struggling to give out—

I regret, deeply regret, that our Legislature should not have acted on this subject. It was due to you emphatically; to the rank of the State, and to the feelings of the Citizens that Norfolk should come forward in her strength—

With that freedom & intimacy I have been accustomed to commune with you I say, that I deeply regret that any consideration of any kind whatever should have induced this restraint at such an epoch as this. I know no party, or interests or feelings, but such as belong to the Country— Her permanent Interest and Glory ought to be the Polar Star of every man connected in any degree with Public affairs— Some of the Virginia doctrines as to State rights I mean those which can directly or even remotely sanction the right of secession resulted from a state of feeling and of interests not the most propitious to the

most

16506

most enlightened views of the origin and character of our Government — They have not outlived with the great Public the occasion which produced them & they ought not now to be reiterated; And yet I fear there are some among us who wait for a voice from Virginia And who fear if they acquiesce in your views which are those of the nation that the influence of their Party will be diminished This is a radical Error — That party in this country which thank God can alone permanently succeed is one whose principles are founded in an Enlightened Patriotism having for the object of its whole exertions first The Preservation of the Union and next the administration of our happy form of Government in Simplicity and truth —

I write to you with freedom and in confidence and yet I do not express half I feel or think — Before I close this too long letter allow me to say knowing as I do the harrassing extent of the engagements of yourself and your confidential friends at this Juncture That if I can be of use to you in any even the most subordinate situation I will immediately repair to Washington and pass a month at least devoted to a service which may promote the public good I do not seek a participation in suggesting or advis-ing but merely to executing under your directions I can so arrange my business as by my absence not to impair my official usefulness here

With the truest attachment your friend
James A Hamilton

To
The President
Washington.

Col Hamilton
on the position
of the day & regret
that the Legislature
of N.Y. should not
have come forth
with her voice
in support of the
administration

16508

Elizabeth City N. C. January 22d 1833.

Sir

The undersigned have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency a copy of the proceedings of a Union meeting held at the Court House in this Town on the 19th inst: agreeable to a resolution then adopted.

The undersigned avail themselves of this opportunity of assuring Your Excellency of the high consideration they entertain for You

John C. Ehringhaus

Isaac P. Freeman

His Excellency Andrew Jackson
President of the United States.

16509

UNION MEETING
Held at the Court House in Elizabeth City, N. C., January 19, 1833.

At a large and respectable meeting of the citizens of the County of Pasquotank, held pursuant to public notice at the Court House in Elizabeth City on Saturday the 19th Jan. inst. for the purpose of expressing their opinion on the subject of Nullification as held out by the State of South Carolina, and of the Proclamation recently issued by the President of the United States—

Colonel Carter Barnard was unanimously Chosen President, andStephen Charles Esq. vice President; and Mr. John C. Ehringhaus and Dr. Isaac P. Freeman Secretaries.

On motion the following gentlemen were appointed a Committee to draft resolutions proper to be submitted to this meeting; Edward A. McNally, Charles R. Kinney, Exum Newby, William Charles, Edmund Blount, James M. Grice and Hezekiah Lockwood.

After an absence of about half an hour Edward A. McNally, Chairman of the committee, reported the following Preamble and Resolutions.

Whereas we view with a becoming pride, undiminished patriotism and gratitude the strong and flattering testimony which every successive year exhibits of the unprecedented prosperity of our country, the increasing wealth and happiness of our fellow citizens in every condition and location throughout this great and powerful nation; a condition which we owe to the fostering care and protection of our blessed Union. And whereas we believe that any act or circumstance calculated to dissolve or even to impair that Union would be the greatest of all calamities, not only to the happy citizens of this confederacy, but to the subjects of despotick rule thoroughout the world, who fondly look to these United States as the bright Constellation that imparts its benign rays to their gloom of bondage, and that at last will guide their steps to the state of freemen. Whereas it is with sincere regret and deep sorrow that we perceive, amidst this unparallelled prosperity, a discontent and discord in our neighbouring and sister state, South Carolina, that greatly disturb the peace of that hitherto gallant and patriotic State, and threaten the dissolution of our beloved Union. And whereas the discontented portion of the citizens of that unhappy State have recently assembled a Convention, and made and published an Orninance declaring certain acts of the United States Congress, passed in the years 1828 and 1832 imposing duties on imports, unconstitutional, and further declaring, that the State of South Carolina posses ses the power naturally and constitutionally to nullify the said acts and to prevent their execution within her own teritorial limits: and directing that laws be made in the said State to carry the provisions of the said Ordinance into effect; which laws have in pursuance thereof been made, and ordered to be put into operation on the 1st day of February next.

And whereas on the appearance of the said Ordinance, the President of the United States issued a Proclamation dated the 10th day of December last, amongst other things denying the right of such nullification in any one State—declaring the nature and integrity of the Federal compact, and the efficiency of the laws to carry themselves into execution under a prompt and fearless administration of them—and that if the execution of the laws should be resisted by armed force, it is Treason; and the said Proclamation being addressed generally to the people of the United States, and apparently as an appeal to their opinions, and a request for the aid of their wisdom and Patriotism in so extraordinary and perilous a crisis.

We therefore, a portion of the citizens of Pasquotank County, (and confidently believing ourslves expressing the opinion of the whole county excepting five or six individuals) convened for the purpose of taking into consideration the important subjects contained in the Proclanation of our distinguished and patriotic Chief Magistrate, resolve, and it is by us herein.

Resolved, That having lived in unexampled prosperity under our present happy form of Government, which is the admiration of the world; and perceiving that our Constitution is assailed, our Union threatened with disruption, and that we are on the verge of a civil war, we, in the language of the immortal Jefferson,pledge our lives,fortunes, & sacred honor to support the government in the execution of its laws, and to sustain and preserve the constitution and the Union.—[Passed Nem con.]

Resolved, That at the present crisis in our public affairs, when our Constitution and Union are so seriously menaced, the Proclamation recently issued by the President of the United States, is both timely and patrotic, and a manifestation of that firmness and dicision which have ever characterised his conduct in maintaining and supporting the laws and the integrity of our Union.—[About 9 dissenting votes.

Resolved, That we view the Ordinance recently passed by a Convention in South Carolina, as revolutionary in its character, subversive of the Constitution and the dearest rights of our citizens, and that we deprecate Nullification, as held out by that state, and embraced in the spirit and provisions of the said Ordinance; but that we hail the Proclamation of the President of the United States, issued on the 10th Dec. 1832, as in accordance with our views and opinions, and being so, we pledge ourselves to sustain him therein. [9 dissenting votes counted.]

Resolved, That we view the present high Tariff of duties as inexpedient and unnecessary, and as partial and oppressive in its operation; and we will use all lawful means to procure its reduction—*Nem con.*

Resolved, That we admit the right to which every citizen of this free and happy country is entitled, of forming and freely expressing his opinions on subjects of religion and politics, yet that we regret the zealous advocacy and support given to the principles of Nullification in the recent session of our Legislature by our Senator, and one of our Delegates in the House of Commons, lest that it might be taken as according with, or in any way encouraged by the opinions and wishes of their constituents. [The dissentients not counted—but apparently a few more than on the third Resolution.]

Resolved, That the citizens of our neighboring counties are respectfully requested to convene Union Meetings as early as practicable, and that copies of these proceedings be addressed to the Sheriffs of the said counties, to be laid before such meetings when convened.

Resolved, That copies of the proceedings of this meeting be addressed to his excellency the Governor of this State, our Senators and Representatives in Congress, and to the President of the United States.

Resolved, That the proceedings of this meeting be published in the North Carolina Advocate, Elizabeth City Star, Raleigh Constitutionalist, Washington Globe, National Intelligencer, and Charleston Courier.

Resolved, That the thanks of this meeting are justly due and cheerfully tendered to Col. Barnard and Stephen Charles, Esq. for the able and impartial manner in which they have presided over its deliberations.—[This Resolution, with the 6th, 7th, and 8th, passed unanimously.]

CARTER BARNARD,
President.
STEPHEN CHARLES,
Vice President.

JOHN C. EHRINGHAUS, } Secretaries.
ISAAC P. FREEMAN, }

16510

Resolutions of the citizens of Pasquotanck County E. City. N.C. Approving proclamation

to be filed A.J.

Private

The Secretary of the Treasury presents his respects to the President & encloses him a letter from Judge Johnson of the Supreme Court. The suggestion respecting the Martello Tower is worthy attention, and the provision as to Jurors will suggest to Judge Wilkins & Mr. Bell.

Jan 25. 1833.

16511

Mr McLane inclosing
judge Johnstons
letter — answered
& orders to be of
wor— A. J.

1833

Private

The President.

Sullivans Island
28th January - 33

Dear Sir

All I have written you is more than realised. A battery just about commenc^d on the wharf the nearest point to Castle Pinkney, Secession the order of the day. I have advise that my ships ~~is~~ are to be the first attack^d. The crew in anticipation have been and will continue at exercise both for offence and defence. The army is almost ready. I shall embark myself.

Very respectfully
&
Thos Jones

Mr John Boyle
Washington

16513

Elliot–
Commodore

Genl. Andrew Jackson

(Private)

Charleston
January 28
1833

My dear Sir

I have this instant received your letter of the 24th Inst. by express. The assurances it contains are cheering; but as all your plans are formed upon the probable acts of the Nullifiers in relation to the execution of their Ordinance I still think it necessary to send on Mr. Smith in order that with a full view of the whole ground you may resolve on the proper course to be pursued to oppose secession - I can have no doubt of the passage of the acts you require to enable you to cause the laws to be executed; but am glad to learn, that you stand prepared at all events to put down these men - In this determination you will be sustained by the whole nation, and its execution will add another to the many claims you have upon

16514

the

the gratitude of your Country - If the union party could be made to act under the orders of the Federal Government they would do so efficiently and unhesitatingly; but I am bound to state to you, that they cannot be brought out by any persuasion unless attacked, or authorised by you - They think to take up arms against the Nullifiers would be to violate the law and we are a law abiding people - If the State or the dominant party in it should assemble the Convention and declare S^o Carolina out of the Union, how shall we proceed? We will of course assemble our Union Convention and protest and remonstrate and all that; but what active measures shall we take? They will accompany their declaration of secession by bills of pains & penalties, definitions of treason and so forth, which will appal the timid, and I fear prevent the majority of the Union party from

opposing them with arms - My plan would be
, if the city were safe, for I cannot abandon my
fellow citizen for an instant in the hour of peril, to
go up to Greenville or Spartanburg, assemble the
Convention and authorised by a call from you declare
against the faction which now tyrannises over the people
and in the name of the State of South Carolina
march against them - I am not certain whether
the people of those districts ~~would array themselves~~
against the Nullifiers without your orders, except
for self defence - In the city the union party will
not move ~~without~~ the authority of the Federal govt. -
I have conversed fully with Mr. Smith upon this
subject - He knows the feelings and disposition of
the people in the state, and after conferring with
him, I will pursue any plan of operations you
suggest to the best of my ability fearlessly & zealously -
I have been represented by the Nullifiers to be a

16515

Desperado, who would hurry the Union party to acts of lawless violence — I am obliged therefore to be very cautious or I should lose my influence over them. The indisposition to act does not arise from timidity, but an habitual respect for the laws, which distinguishes our party — I shall await with great impatience your suggestions, and orders, which I hope to receive by the return of Mr. Smith —

I am, my dear Sir,

very truly and respectfully

Your obt. Servt.

J. R. Poinsett

Poinsett
[illegible] Jany 1833
Union Party [illegible]
at present without the authority
of the Genl. Govt.
[illegible] where to depend
in case of [illegible]

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES,
Washington, } January 29th 1833

PAY to William Hebb — or bearer,

one hundred — dollars, $\frac{}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

100 DOLLS. $\frac{}{100}$

16516

Near Haddonfield Jany the 29th 1833

Genl Andw Jackson

D Sir I received yours of the 15th instant this afternoon (inclosed to Camden) and was astonished to find that the 1500 D. to be given for Bolivar had not been paid. ~~for~~ long since, by my ~~my~~ last letter to you, relative to and inclosing the receipt for a Conditional transfer of Bolivar to the Company. they then had nearly all the money (or wholly) paid by me, I then informed them that I should not hold the Certificate longer and should send it on the next day and did so ~~and~~ also received your answer to the letter, and expected the money had been paid ~~to~~ until the annual meeting of the Company at Mount Holly on the last wednesday in December when Mr Shinn informed the company that the money was ready. and I think said deposited to your credit. I was astonished at the delay and asked him the cause of it, when he said that there was a few shares that he could not get the money for, and the time had run out in which they was to deposit the money. and that they would have to get a new transfer ~~and that it would be necessary to have a new transfer~~ and he would get Mr Cannon to draw one up and send immediately on, I informed them to send on the money and the President would do any thing that might be thought proper to confirm the title of the horse if not already done — ~~and~~ my health being such that I left them for home - supposing the money would be paid immediately and all things satisfactorily arranged

Respectfully your friend &

B. B. Cooper

16517

I will see Mr Sheinn in a few days and inform you how things ~~stands~~ are, the money has all been paid by me to him for every share in Glouster and Phila months ago except Mr Slones Eighteen Shares that was paid on sight before the time expired in the certificates — and transfer conditional by you.

As to Bolivars earnings of last season I cannot give you any information except Mr West when I asked him about the season some time since said most of the mares was in[illegible] and the money would not be paid until in the spring or Summer. I have not received one Dollar for my fourth and when ready to be paid I will inform you of it or you can direct Mr West to deposit it to your credit in the Bank. It is with much regret that I see such delays & it must be without any default on the part of the stockholders

B. W. Dobson

Jany the 30th. I send you a Copy to Mr Sheinn of this morning ~~of this morning~~ and hope he will not cause further delay in taking over the amount paid by me with the 18 Shares of Mr Sloan that with my fourth Mr Sheinn [illegible] to the first of [illegible] 1420 Dollars — from this County and Phila 580 Dols to be collected and paid by him in Burlington that he took charge of

I at the date of their certificate to you
I paid them for the principal part
of the amount. and requested them
to make out the certificates for
the Balance in our County and
I would pay every dollar out of
my own pocket. that I did.
without calling upon any man, and
I do most sincerely regret that you
have had such delay in payment.
I have saved the honor of you as I
was ashamed of the pitiful course
and conduct of the committee appoi-
nted with me, and would not
join them in their unjust treat-
ment towards you — I have
had to encounter all kinds of
opposition with Bolivar, and
met it without a murmur
until his enemies have
become his friends:- in a great
measure, and the committee
ashamed for their conduct and
want of judgement: excuse the
length of this letter as I wished
to give you some idea of the
concern —

B. W. Cooper

1651 8

Wm B. Cooper
The mony not
paid into Bank
but will inform
me when it is—
await his answer
a short time and
if it is not paid then
write him, and
claim a delivery of
my horse— A. J.
Recd. 2d February
A. J.

Free
Andrew Jackson
President of the
United States
City of Washington

16518

January the 30th 1833

Mr Shinn Esq

Sir

I was quite disappointed when I found the money was not deposited for Col Jackson when we met in Philadelphia, and more so when at our annual meeting ~~at our anniversal meeting~~ to find it had not been recd by him on the last saturday in Jany. and was astonished to find from his letter to me on the 15th instant that it had not yet been paid; I do sincerely hope you will not permit any further delay, months have elapsed since I paid to you for every share in Gloucester and Philadelphia with the exception of Mr Sloan. that was paid to you before the time stipulated in the Presidents transfer, with my fourth of the horse amounting to about three fourths of the whole amount (say 1420 Dollars) leaving but about one fourth of the stock in your rich county with the advantage of a horse purchased at your ? by three fourths of the stockholders residing out of the county - and yet a Burlington County association for improving the breed of horses without a payment of their hittance of the stock. I therefore beg that you will attend to the payment of the horse without further delay.

Respectfully your friend

(Copy)

Benjn Hooten

16519

Charleston
30th Jan.
1833

My dear Sir

My Cousin Ferguson will prevent my doing more than directing your attention to two subjects — Enquire particularly if the President has or will have under the laws passed or in their passage any power to accept or call out volunteers; or whether he must do so through the governors of the states — I mean the enquiry to apply to our case — It will make a great difference if the Companies

16520

men rousing can be assured of being
received by government as volunteers
and enrolled into the forces of the U. S.
upon any emergency —
What objection can there be to have
a thousand men peaceably encamp
on the neck, in the event of the
troops above being put in motion
to march toward the city —
I believe a thousand men peaceably
encamped about the lines, or even
at the arsenal with a few field pieces
would prevent the effusion of blood —
The passage of the bill of powers &
the rejection of the tariff will produce

an explosion; not however until the troops come in from the country - This would be prevented by an exhibition of force on the part of the Govt. - and there could be no Constitutional objections to encamp the U. S. force on the Neck - It would tend more than any other measure to give security to the Union party - They will otherwise be very much exposed if the Richland & Fairfield Volunteers come down -

Ever my dear Sir
Yours truly
J. H. Poinsett

16521

an exploration. Not however until the
troops come in from the country. The
[illegible] the [illegible] D. P. an exhibition
of force [illegible] the [illegible]
[illegible] would [illegible] constitutional
[illegible] the [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] to you
[illegible] - They are
[illegible]
the Resolves of [illegible] Volunteers
come down -

[illegible]
Yours truly
J. R. Poinsett

James H. Smith Esqr.
Washington
D. C.

Poinsett to Smith
30th Jan. 1833.

Philadelphia. January 30, 1833.

Dear Sir — I received, this evening, the letter, which you had the goodness to write to me on the 27th inst. and cannot but chide myself, for having, by my silence, rendered such a letter needful: I pray you, however, to mention, to the President, what I wrote to you on the 28th inst. so that he may be aware of my anxiety: how, indeed, could I be otherwise than anxious? although very doubtful of my qualifications and pretensions, I desired to comply with the wishes of the President and with your own; I wished to have an opportunity, by a faithful devotion to public duty, to justify the choice, and to evince my grateful sense of the unexpected honor conferred on me: and yet, I dreaded, lest, in obeying these inclinations, I should affect injuriously the claims of my large family: Do not, then, wonder at my embarrassment.

If I were to say, that the difficulty, mentioned in my note to you of the 10th ult. is removed, it would be incorrect: I have, however, so assiduously labored to overcome it, that, success must soon follow: Consequently, I shall be prepared for the future. Be pleased, then, to say to the President, that, if he shall continue to think it for the public interest, that I should occupy the designated station, I will, if appointed, endeavor so to execute its duties, as to retain his confidence and merit the public regard.

In asking you to accept my thankfulness for your own great kindness, I cannot but add my hope, that you will bear in mind my heart-felt hesitation; so that, if at any time I may be found less competent than supposed, I may not have the sin of presumption coupled with the sorrow of disappointment.

With the utmost consideration, Yr obt St W. J. Duane

Hon. L. McLane.

16522

Private.

To The hon. L. McLane

Secy of ye Treasury

1833

Charleston
30 January
1833

My dear Sir

So much anxiety is expressed by the members of the Union party on the subject of the advance of the States Rights forces from the interiour that you must pardon me for troubling you so often on the subject. In my opinion if one Thousand men (Regulars) were encamped on the Neck or at the U.S. Arsenal, as a point for the Union men to rally

16524

upon in case of an attack from
the opposite party, they would be
compelled to respect us - There is
no constitutional objection to
this measure - I make this
suggestion at the solicitation of
my friends, - I think we will
make a good defence any how,
altho' if the volunteers of this
Excellency pour down upon us we
shall have to contend against
great odds - Contracts are made
and depots forming all along
the Road leading to Charleston.
Have you the power, or will

you have it to call out or accept volunteers otherwise than through the Governors of the States? I believe so; but am not certain — and should like to know for our government

The Nullifiers have made no further movements. They blister as usual — (I am suffering with a lame finger, which compels me to conclude.

I am Dear Sir
respectfully
Your most Obt.

J. R. Poinsett

16525

[illegible] have it to call out a [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] through
[illegible] of the State [illegible]
[illegible] but are not certain
[illegible] like to hear [illegible]
[illegible]

The Methodists have made no
further movements. They listen &
wait — I am engaged with
a [illegible], which I expect
to conclude.

I am Dear Sir
Very respectfully
Your obt. St.
J. H. [illegible]

[illegible]
30th Jany 1837
[illegible]

New York Feby 2. 1833

My dear Sir

It seems to be very generally understood here that the Government deposits will be ere long withdrawn from the United States Bank - Should this be the case it will become a matter of importance to determine as to the most suitable institutions to select as substitutes

Presuming you may have an opportunity of giving an opinion on this subject I have thought it well to suggest to you that none could be selected which would be more acceptable to our community than the Mechanics Bank -

Its large capital, liberal & popular management, extensive correspondence & long establishment give it many advantages, while the circumstance of its capital being subdivided into shares of small amounts and distributed among

16526

the Mechanics of this City, added to its extensive loans to the Government during the War and its general patriotism in all financial operations with the County & City have given it as many friends as any other Bank in this State -

I have not the most remote interest in the Institution, but my situation on the Finance Committee of the Common Council has made me acquainted with its great liberality & utility in subserving the fiscal interests of this City for a long course of years & give me a feeling of interest in its receiving a share of the government patronage, both of its principal officers having been uniform & staunch supporters of the President -

I have procured & forward herewith an authentic statement of its situation & relations, & should be glad

if you can with propriety place them
under the eye of the Secretary—

With great respect
Dear Sir
Your friend & Servt
Wm. B. Conway

16527

Thos L. Smith Esq

of your own with propriety place them
under the eye of the Secretary
With great respect
[illegible]
Your friend & Servt
[illegible]

Thos. L. Smith Esq

Washington City

Thos. L. Smith Esq

Washington February 2nd 1833

Sir.

Jesse Lester Esqr formerly resided at a place called Richmond in Surry County North Carolina — It was the seat of justice in the County and many years ago you attended there as a Lawyer at the County —

Lester is now dead, but his Heirs say that you stand charged on his Books for the amount of your board &c at one of the County you attended — The amount is about ten dollars and the Heirs are in reduced circumstances so as to need the money —

They have authorized me to make application to you for the money, and think they are entitled to interest as well as the principal —

It is not in my power to call on you personally today, and I must therefore take the liberty to trouble you with a letter — I should be glad to hear from you on the subject as soon as your convenience will permit —

I am Sir your most obt
and very Hble Servt.

Lewis Williams

Andrew Jackson }
President of the U States }

16528

answer with respects acknowledges
the receipt of his note — expresses
surprise that Mr L. had not applied
in 1828, as he passed his House on
his way to the West — still more
of the demand was just. that he had
not called for it in his life time
assures him that it is not a just debt
— that the whole history of his life

shews his punctuality in meeting
all his engagements of this kind

February 2d. 1833 —

L. Williams
note & reply —
Feby 9th 1833.

Mansfield 3 Febury 1833

My Dear General

I rec'd three or four days since your very friendly and most kind favours to Mrs Love and Myself

I assure you My dear General I feel greatfull beyond any thing I can express to you for the liberallity you expressed towards me in your letter If I was in pecuniary want I know of no person I should sooner apply to ~~you~~ than your Self, for I feel confident it would be done with pleasure; I propose to sell My land on account of My having a large family and the Tract is a very small One I can get from one to One hundred and fifty dollars per Acre which will enable me to purchase a Much larger One and by doing that Make Much better provision for My Children

16530

which is the object we all have in view It is also very scarce of Wood & Timber and think the Spring will be good time to sell as the new Bank will soon go in to Operation I have thus given You my views for selling, and I think you will agree I am correct

Mrs Loves health is something better than it was when we last wrote but she is still very feeble and has not been out but once since, (we have had a very wet Winter) at this time there is a prospect of some good weather, The health of John Dixon is rather improving, Tom is much as he has been;
The Cholera is at this time in Nashville, I do not think it very bad; It has taken off some of the dissolute & Intemperate and pretty much confined to that discription of persons with some few exceptions. It has not yet got much in the country with proper care I think our servants may be kept clare of it
I hope My dear General your health is good for you have enough on your hands to wey down more than

an ordinary person could bear, I assure you you have our prayers not only for your health but that you shall so manage those misguided people of the South to save the union without blood shed; I am one that would go all lengths to preserve it, be the consequences what they might you have nine teen twentieths of the Citizens of the United States with you

You will find Inclosed a justification of the Georgia business written by our friend Dat Brown of Smith Co. He writes frequently in defence of the Administration and is warmly attached to you Mrs Love & Elizabeth desire to be most kindly remembered to you and there best wish to Major Earl & Lewis I wish you many happy new years and believe me

My dear General
Your devoted friend
Ch J Love

16531

Private

General Andrew Jackson

Washington

D C

Mr. Love — Recd. Feby 4th 1833 & answered same day A. J.

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, Washington, } February 5th 1833

PAY to M. A. Guesta — or bearer,

Eleven hundred & one — — — dollars, $\frac{23}{100}$

1101 DOLLS. $\frac{23}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

16532

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, Washington, } Feby 5th 1833

PAY to or bearer,

One Hundred dollars, $\frac{}{100}$

$100 DOLLS. $\frac{}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

16533

Feb 5th 1833

Know all men by these presents that I William Jackson of Williamson County and State of Tennessee for and in consideration of the sum of forty dollars to me in hand paid the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged have granted bargained sold aliened enfeoffed released and confirmed and by these presents do bargain sell grant aliene enfeoff release and confirm unto Henry Baldwin Jr of the County of Davidson and State aforesaid all and singular my right to ten acres of land situated in the County of Williamson being part of Andrew Tuits land and joining William Williamson on the East beginning at a cedar about twenty poles from the old Lebanon road near a small glade running west 40 poles South 40 poles East 40 poles then North 40 poles to the place of beginning to have and to hold to him the said Henry and his heirs or assigns so long as may be necessary for him to cut and carry away the Cedar timber now thereon standing And I will truly warrant and defend the same to the said Henry against all and every other claim whatever

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 5th February A D 1833

Enfeoffment of

Wm Chappell

William Jackson (Seal)

16534

Recd from
William Jackson
to 1804
Henry Middleton Jr
for 10 ac [illegible]

1.
5.
19.56
1.04
$26.60
13.48
$40.08

Paid 2 bushels wheat at 50 cts per bushel — $1
Paid $5 — Feby 5th 1833
Paid Feby 23d 1833
326 lb bacon at 6 cts per lb $19.56 & 26 lb of beef at 4 cts pr lb $1.04

Dear Sir

New York Feby 6th 1833

The kind interest you have on several occasions, expressed for my welfare, has emboldened me, somewhat too often perhaps, to trespass upon your patience.

I understand that the friends of at least two or three candidates, are pressing you for the Post-office of this City —

I have had the pleasure of a long acquaintance with Gouverneur, and was in daily observation of him and his exceedingly interesting family, during the last six weeks of Mr Monroe's life —

He is a frank honourable man, and has faithfully discharged the duties of his office. He was I have no doubt originally appointed at the request of Mr Monroe with the expectation that the fruits of the office would be permitted to stand between his Daughters, and that severe distress, to which his removal

16535

would, Iknow, subject that highly interesting family. I would simply entreat those who advise this measure, to consider whether they are quite sure, that the situation to which it would reduce this family, could complacently be beheld even by themselves — And whether our Nation has not too many remeniscences of the virtues and services of that one of the few Presidents of the United States (God grant they may be countless) not to make this a single exception, perhaps to a good general rule —

— I have, I fear, too obtrusively pressed this matter — But as I live, and love your fame, if I myself desired this office, I would rather dwell in my necessity, than ask you to strike such a blow. It would reach those, to whom I am sure you would not permit harm to happen —

I am most sincerely yours

General Jackson —

William M. Price

Dear Sir, Feby 8th 1833

Notwithstanding I dislike to trespass on your time, when you have not a moment to spare from the great and pressing duties of Office, yet I cannot refrain at times from saying a word – will however, be short – your Message at the opening of the Session, your Proclamation, and late Message, inclosing it, and the S. Carolina Ordinance &c, upon Mr Calhoun's instance called for, are, both Message and Proclamation, expressive of my own sentiments, on those subjects they touch on, and am thankful to you therefor – they say just enough, and no more, and I approve every word therein, and am glad I do – your works are my joy – and I must at times express it, for I am not so selfish as to keep it wholly to myself –

On my return from Nashville, whither, I had been, to attend the electoral College & to give a vote for President and vice President, it so happened, that Mr. Isaac Lands, merchant of Hopkinsville, Christian County, Kentucky, and I, travelled together – He is an old, and a very warm, and decided, as well as active friend of yours, as he said, and as I, and others, believe – among other things, we spoke of the then late result of the vote of Kentucky, and I asked, how it had happened, that it was different from that of the preceding vote for President, when, you obtained the vote of that State: his answer was, that it was in part owing to State pride, one of her citizens being a Candidate; in part owing to the fact, that in his County, and he believed in many others, several hundreds of votes were given, in each, for Clay, more than there were resident voters in those Counties; that in Christian, he knew the number of persons entitled to vote, & how they were expected to vote for electors, to a man, and that in that County, Clay recd from 200, to 300 votes, more, than there were resident voters in the County; & he added, in very respectful terms towards you, that in the opinion of some, and he feared you would not take it well to mention, that many of your first, and warmest and active friends were of opinion, that sundry eleventh hour friends of yours had recd. appointments, when sundry of your first and constantly uniform & active friends had been, as he termed it, overlooked; and instanced, among others, Doctor Sharpe, & Doctor McCarroll, of his vicinity, who were first firm, and still continued to be, warm and active friends of yours, and never ranked among the grumblers; for they were fast friends from principle, and supporters of the good cause of your faithful & useful administration; & he repeated, that he feared, that you would not take well the mention of such an opinion – I told him that no opinion, decorously expressed, ever was in the least offensive to you; that you were guided by principle, and listened with respectful attention to any thing from any quarter, or to any recommendation to office, reserving to yourself, however, at all times, and on all occasions, the right and duty of judging and deciding, for yourself, on principle how to act for the best, and at the same time, in manner, acceptable of choice, but, as you might think for the greatest public good, under any circumstances: he added, such was his own opinion of you and of your course, and had so maintained, on all proper occasions: but he nevertheless believed, that the appointment & appointments of eleventh hour friends, in preference, as it were, to old friends, had so operated on the minds of some of the latter, as to produce a luke-warmness, with them, in the late election, and as your old & continued friend, he thought it right to mention it, to a known friend, to the end, that you might be apprized of such an opinion: And he expressed a hope, that in future, appoint-

16537

appointments, qualification of candidates being equal, a greater number of old friends would be regarded, in preference to eleventh hour ones - He appeared to be aware of the great delicacy of thus plainly speaking, but observed, that as he spoke from what he considered correct, & from what he knew to be friendly motive, free from selfish alloy, he hoped the hint would be recd. as intended, in friendship, of which reception, I said, he might rest assured - best friends are so, on principle, only -

I am glad that the Georgia and Missionary affair is put to rest - hope, that the S. Carolina difficulties will soon be amicably adjusted, by a reduction of the Tariff, as recommended by your message - and that for the future, all opposition, fire brands, will be thrown into the water, thro' the force and effect of the mild, but firm and determined operation of the good sense of the people of the U. S. on the conduct of their Repts. and Senators - it appears from the resolutions of the legislatures of Maine, N. Hampshire, and Mississippi, that they are picking the Tickes off their opposition Senators - I think the course pursued by the U. S. bank, about the three per cents, amounted to something like a slippery trick - As usual, this letter is long -

your friend

Willie Blount

Andrew Jackson

President, U. S.

Recd 1st March 33.
To be answered
A.J.
answered 4 March
1833 - but under
the pressure of the
severe attack of
my daughter
interrupted - sent
him two of my
Inaugural addresses
A.J.

Blount

1833

Andrew Jackson
President of the U.S.

Free

To the President of the United States –

Charleston 9th February 1833

(Private)

My dear Sir

The arrival of Mr. Leigh from Richmond changed the plans of the Nullefiers. They did not wish to give an immediate answer to Virginia, which they would have been compelled to do if their convention had been in Session – After much negotiation, they yesterday informed him, that they would assemble the convention directly after the adjournment of Congress – the second Monday in March / Mr. Leigh says he hopes they will listen to the voice of Virginia if the tariff bill passes; but if the bill granting the powers asked for by you should pass and ~~not~~ the tariff not be modified he fears they will go on – Mr. Leigh acknowledges, that

16539

if they do go on Eastern Virginia will remain
neutral and western Virginia take part
against them - so that the legislature of that
State can pledge ~~itself~~ the State to no course
which this State desires it to do - I believe
it will be found, that when the leaders desire
to stop, they have not the power to do so. They
have raised a storm beyond their power to
control - I intend to call the convention of the
Union party together as soon as Hamilton
issues his proclamation - I shall fix on three
days later, so as to see their hand, and
determine our course accordingly.
It is rumoured, that the British Consul has
assured his friends the nullifiers that he has written
to the Commander of B. M. Squadron in the
West Indies to send some vessels of war off this

this harbour in order to protect the persons & property of H. B. M's subjects — whatever may be the pretext of such a measure, the appearance of such a force here would encourage the nullifiers, for their leaders have all along led them to believe, that in a contest with the federal government they would receive the aid of Great Britain — This Consul is a nullifier and if I can detect him in doings as well as sayings I will give you instant information, and think he ought to be deprived of his Exequatur —

I transmit you herewith a letter in relation to the Post office in Columbia That P. M. ought to be dismissed — The Union party recommend Mr. Chapman to be appointed in his place — McLean the mail

16540

Contractor deceives the P.M.G. Government has not a more determined or more mischievous Enemy. He sported the revolutionary cockade and has I presume volunteered his services to fight against the Government which pays him.

All my accounts from the Country are Cheering. The Union party are decided and firm. They will I believe oppose secession to a man.

I am Dear Sir

very respectfully

Your most Obt. Servt.

J. R. Poinsett

Poinsett
9th Feb. 1833
Mr. Leigh's Mission
Plans of Nullifiers
Ragged
Nul. Convention to be called together
Union convention three days later

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES.
Washington, } February 11th. 1833 -

PAY to Mr Fowler - - - - — or bearer,

Sixty four — — — dollars, $\frac{}{100}$

64 DOLLS. $\frac{}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

16541

On these incidents, I have not time, to enlarge, I shall simply remark, that if in a spirit of amity for Genl Jackson, and in a desire to protect his honor, and advance his fame, I incurred great responsibility, and exposed myself to severe attacks from his enemies, it would be hard, if those instances, of accomodation, and friendly regard for him, should be urged as proofs, of error in the executive, and to my discredit. Unless the real ground, and principle, on which I acted in each instance, is seen, and respected, it is impossible, that justice should be done, to me, or to him. Knowing however, all the circumstances, in each instance, by a view of the private correspondence, and documents refered to, you may do justice to him, without imputing any thing injurious to me.

With great respect I am your
very obt servant

James Monroe

Major H. Lee — a copy —

Paris 10th Feby 1833

dear Genl

I now enclose the copies of Mr. Monroe's two letters to me — which I informed you in my last were in my possession and should be transmitted both to you & to Mr. Gouverneur of N. York. In my last letter I announced & returned yours of the 17th Decr — 1832 — ever yours H. Lee

16862

Recd 27 March at 3 P.M.

Genl Jackson
President of the
United States
Washington

Major Lee —
Br. Monroe's cor-
respondence with
him, & reference
to this [illegible] Mr.
Monroe, a [illegible]
one [illegible] the
[illegible]
[illegible]
by [illegible]
[illegible]

Private

16853

Washington City
To the President of the
United States, Sir: 11th February 1833

It is with profound respect, that I beg leave to call to your attention, to an allowance that was recently made by the Secretary of War to Col Reynolds Indian Agent, for the sum of eighteen hundred and fifty dollars for the purpose of two Delegations of Chickasaws who conceived that they had business of a public nature at this place. In the distribution of this money, I am left out of this number, and left to bare my own expenses.

I deem it only necessary for you, to know the facts relative to this matter, in order that equal Justice should be done to each Individual concern=ed. I was ~~invited~~ induced to visit this place for two reasons, first; because I could not get my accounts settled, and paid for near three years back, when in fact there is no fault on my part. My accounts has been regularly rendered, and I believe has been allowed since my arrival in this place. Secondly I was

16542

specially invited by the Chiefs to accompany them to this city, on their business relative to their Nation. It is true, I was not ordered here by the Department, but, from the delay of the Department in settling my accounts, I found it necessary for the sustainance of of my family that I should have my accounts, Audited, and paid if possible. It, is also true that those persons to whom the allowance has been made, were not invited here more than myself. Therefore it is with the most profound respect to your Judgment, and sense of Justice, that I bring matter before you for your action

I have the Honor to be
with sentiments of the highest
political esteem and person
al regard, and friendship.

John L Allen
Sub Agent

PS Major G. W. Long is provided for who is neither an officer of the Government, nor is he interested or connected

with the Chickasaws either by affinity or
consanguinity because he is a white man and
has a white woman for his wife. L. A.

16543

Those who come on
with the agent were
directed to come on
to debut the charges
made, about the
unfavorable of the
conduct of the Com-
-missioners who made
the treaty which has
been so warmly &
cruelly slandered
by the statements
made, & to combat
the force & views
adopted there, com-
-menced to defeat
the treaty & destroy
the Cherokees &

8

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, Washington, } February 12th 1833

PAY to William Hebb — — or bearer,

four hundred — — — dollars, $\frac{}{100}$

400 DOLLS. $\frac{}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

16544

1831. Decr. 29th	1. Set Eardrops & Pin	$ 17.
1832. Febr. 15	1. Gold Neck Chain	47.
		64

Recd. Payment of the above

Chas. S. Fowler

By C. Fowler Fravy

Feby 12th 1833

16545

Philadelphia
No. 964
1833

Lebanon February 16th
AD 1833.

Dear General

Your kind favour in reply to mine was received on yesterday, I was pleased to be more directly informed of the entire ability on the part of the General Government to put down nullification and to sustain the majesty of the laws under any state of circumstances. it is highly gratifying to your friends in Tennessee to see with what unanimity you are sustained at home men that have hitherto been your political and personal enemies are now your warm supporters and publicly declare that there is no man now alive so well calculated to manage the affairs of this Government at such a crisis. Colo Martin of Smith was at my house a few days ago, he remarked that on reading the Proclamation all his former opposition to you ceased and that he was forced to the conclusion that it was most fortunate for the fate of this Republic that you had been elected President of the United States. from every quarter we see the proud acknowledgement that your efforts in the course of freedom will be cherished in recollection by the votaries of Liberty over the whole world when all that is valuable in this Republic shall perish away and live only in song. I returned from the Gallatin

16546

Court on yesterday at which place I heard a full history of the late rupture between Deshea, his wife and his neiphew this case has not a paralel in ancient or modern times, this woman whose high sense of female virtue would not allow her (as she had often boastingly said) to be introduced to Mrs Eaton was at that very time and ever since in the constant habit of a criminal intercourse with her husbands own neiphew who had been raised by them. the evidence of her infamy is complete she is driven from her home and set out last week in a little baggage for Missouri—leaving all her children behind, it is a question difficult of solution about Gallatin who is the basest the husband, wife or nephew, the evening before Deshea shot Bunton he applied to David Saunders for a copy of your letter, it seemed to set uneasily upon him and that very night he at a late hour went to the room of Bunton with an intent to assassinate him in his bed but was driven from his purpose by being discovered. Bunton has eleven buck shot and slugs in his thigh that cannot be extracted—it is said however that he

will recover and is determined to return to Gallatin — when you may expect to hear that the tragedy will be again played over Desha shuts himself up at home with his gun by his side and seems constantly to apprehend danger — it proves what I have always believed of him that he is a coward fit only for a cowardly opposition — I thought it proper that I should give you this brief history of Desha and company & I confess this is the last time I shall condescend to notice them — my family joins with me in the kindest wishes for you and yours

Very Respectfully
Your friend
Robert M Burton

1823

Robert M. Burton

16547-8

LEBANON
FEB
16
TEN.

FREE

Genl Andrew Jackson
Washington City

Answered
20th of June
1833

Friendly

Robert M. Burton
1833

Robert M. Burton
Feby 16. 1833

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES.
Washington, } February 16th. 1833.

PAY to Andrew Jackson — or bearer,

Fifty — — — — — — . dollars, $\frac{}{100}$

50. DOLLS. $\frac{}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

16549

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES. Washington, } February 16th 1833.

PAY to Andrew Jackson — or bearer,

Fifty — — — — — . . dollars, $\frac{}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

50. DOLLS. $\frac{}{100}$

16549

Norfolk July 18 1833

My dear Lewis

I enclose paid our friend Miss Easton now Mrs Polks bill as you requested me to do. I pray you not to send me the money. The amount is too small to make it the subject for Draft or Special "Business transaction" but leave it until we meet which must be in the month of March.

We hear now and then from my good mother. The Pleasure the President has given to her is a new source of gratitude towards him from me. She is indeed delighted by his marked attention.

We have nothing new.

Mr Brown will be with you as I understand him the last day of this month

farewell

your friend
James A Hamilton

To
Major Wm B Lewis
Washington

16550

A. Jackson Esq

President of the U States

16551

From
W B Lewis
Esq 2 Aud.

A. Jackson Esqr
President of the U States

FREE
Maj Wm B Lewis
2d Auditor
Washington

New York Feby. 20. 1833

To the Honorable

Martin Van Buren

Sir

The President & Directors of the Bank of America having heard it stated that the public deposits and business of the general government would probably be withdrawn from the Bank of the United States and transferred to some of the State Banks during the present year, feel very desirous that in such an event the Bank of America may be selected as the government agent in this City to perform all those trusts and duties that are now assigned to the Bank of the United States, and the undersigned Directors of the Bank of America having been appointed a Committee to endeavour to secure its selection, beg leave respectfully to address you on the subject, and altho' not unmindful of the fact, that it is the particular province of other officers of the government to superintend and regulate these interests of the Treasury department, yet we cannot but be sensible that your opinion and sentiments on the subject, especially in relation to this City and this State must be regarded as both appropriate and important, we shall therefore esteem it a favor if we shall obtain your good will & wishes in our behalf, and with this view we desire to place in your hands

16552

a Summary Statement of the Situation of the Bank showing it to be in a Safe and Sound Condition, and to give you briefly such further information respecting it as will enable you to judge of our fair Claims to the favourable Consideration of the government in Case it shall be determined to make the transfer referred to —

The Capital of the Bank of America is Two Millions of Dollars which is Sound and entire with a Surplus of Profits reserved after the last dividend on the 1st ultimo — The business of the Bank is safely and prudently Conducted, and its loans which are almost all made upon Commercial Paper, are within the limit of a reasonable and moderate amount in proportion to its Capital, so that the ability of the Bank to meet its engagements may be at all times safely & Confidently relied upon — The Charter was renewed in 1831 for a period of 21 years, and the Bank is Subject to, and has the benefit of the provisions of the Safety fund Law — The State of New York has a direct interest in the Bank, being a Stockholder for a Considerable amount, and the other Stockholders being about 700 in number and almost all American Citizens, there being not more than Eighty thousand Dollars of the Stock held in Europe — No Person Can be a director of the Bank who is not a Citizen and resident of this State and the Stock of the Bank which may be held by foreigners Cannot be Voted on or represented in the election of Directors or for any other purpose —

1655

The Bank has been at all times disposed to aid the general government and the State authority in their fiscal operations, and whenever the opportunity has presented, has promptly and liberally done so — in confirmation of this we may refer you to the fact that during the last war this Bank made large loans in aid of the public service, among which, were loans to the Secretary of the Treasury of the US, and at his request and in aid of his financial operations to various individuals who were contractors for loans to the government, a loan to the late Governor Tompkins as an officer of the general government, and a loan to Genl. Swartwout as pay master in the army, — also a large loan to the State of New York, and another to the Corporation of this City for the Committee of defence —

Since the resumption of Specie payments soon after the close of the war, the Bank has been managed and its business conducted with a steady reference and anxious solicitude for the promotion and preservation of a sound currency and the protection of commercial credit, interests of the highest importance for all Banking institutions to uphold & sustain —

We beg leave to hand you with this a copy of the recent report of the Bank Commissioners to the Legislature of this State, and to refer you to the tabular statement thereto annexed for the official statement of the condition of this Bank on the 1st Ult. and a view of its relative condition as compared with the other Banks in this City and in this State —

16553

A letter has been addressed by the President of this Bank to the Secy. of the Treasury on this Subject, and it will afford him pleasure to give the Secy. whatever information he may desire respecting the Bank whenever he may be pleased to request it —

We have only to add that in offering this Bank as an Agent of the government we feel a perfect Confidence that the trusts and duties which may be Confided to it would be faithfully performed, and the business transacted in a manner Satisfactory to the Treasury department, and as fully in accordance with the interests of the government as they Could be executed by any other Bank in this City, we therefore hope, if the transfer should be made that the Bank of America may be Selected and employed as said Agent.

We beg of you Sir to excuse the liberty that we have taken in making this Communication and to believe us to be

with great respect

Your obt. Svts

Geo. Newbold

Peter Crary

Geo. Griswold

Benj. L. Swan

Corn. W. Lawrence

Jon. Goodhue

Jonathan Goodhue

Feb 20th

Lancaster, February 12th 1833.

Andrew Jackson Esquire, President U.S.

Sir,

In forwarding to you the paper herein enclosed, I consider that I am but discharging a solemn duty; but, at the same time, I feel it to be due to myself, to set forth the manner in which it came into my possession. A short time since, business called me to Harrisburg, where I put up (as usual) at the Hotel of Mr Wilson, by whom I was placed in an apartment which had just been vacated by Mr Ingham. The drawer of the table, forming a part of the furniture of the room was appropriated by me to the reception of a number of papers and documents connected with the object of my visit to Harrisburg. When about to arrange these papers for my departure I found mingled with them a number

16554

of letters directed to Mr Ingham, which that
gentleman had carelessly left in the drawer,
& among the rest, the letter enclosed, from Mr
Calhoun. That being undirected, as you
will perceive, I glanced over it hastily
to satisfy myself that it did not form
one of my own documents and I found
the contents to be of a character which
not only warranted me in completing its
perusal, but which, I humbly conceived
rendered it my duty to forward it to you
as the President of the United States that
the developments it furnishes may
place the administration the better
on its guard, and enable it the
more effectually to judge of the
extent of the scheme in which the
late Vice President is involved and
from what quarter he expects aid
in his projects of treason and disunion.
If, in the course I have adopted, there
is aught of error, I intreat that my
fault may find shelter in the sound-
ness of my motives – if approved of,

my greatest reward is, that I have done my duty to my country, and to the President of my choice.

I have the honor to be
with great respect your friend

Geo: Louis Mayer

The President's answer.

Washington February 20th 1833

Sir. I received yesterday your letter of the 12th instant enclosing to me a letter addressed by Mr. Calhoun to Mr. Ingham, and explaining the manner in which it came into your possession. Not feeling myself authorised to make any use of a private letter conveyed to me under the circumstances by which you became possessed of this, unless the public interest imperiously required me, I take the liberty of returning it and would recommend that it be forwarded directly to Mr. Ingham

Not doubting that your motives in forwarding this letter to me are patriotic and just, you may rest assured that as such they are properly appreciated by me.

signed. Andrew Jackson

16555

Mr. Geo. Louis Mayer

Feb. 21st 1833

Mr Mayo [illegible]
enclosing a letter of
Wm. L. B. — to Mr. Ing-
:ham recd from
Genl Muhlenberg
Feby 19th 1833 —

Washington

[illegible] inclosed to be
returned to the
writer, with the
remark, that I do not
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] returned
that you may send
it to Mr Ingham
a copy ought to be taken
A. J.

The reply at the foot of
this letter on the same
page forwarded there
Mr [illegible]

New York 20th Feby 1833

dear Sir

We beg leave respectfully to inform you that we have been for many years past, and now are Directors of the Bank of America, in behalf of the State; and having read the letter signed by a committee of directors & which will accompany this; feel pleased in assuring you that we fully concur in the sentiments and representa=tions contained therein, and we shall be happy to be instrumental in obtaining for the Bank the patronage of the Goverment in the business refered to.

With great respect we remain
Your friend and very
Humble Servants
Jeromus Johnson
John Targee

Hon.e Martin Van Buren
Vice President

John Targee

16558

16557

The Bank of America

This to be consider[ed]
A. J.

These to be placed
with other papers
on Banks. A. J.

Honorable
Martin Van Buren

30

Senate Chamber
20 Feby 1833

My dear Sir

I have no disposition to interfere with any arrangement you may have made in your own mind in the nomination for Commissioner ~~and~~ under the Convention with Naples - I have mentioned to you my son as well qualified. If however you should think that a merchant would be wanted and should think it an office that I could perform to your satisfaction I will hold myself at your disposal. But do not permit this to have any influence on any previous determination. I have the honour to be

your Obed Servant
S. Smith

General A. Jackson
President
of the U. States

16558

Charleston
February 22
1833

My dear Sir

I have had the pleasure to receive your letter of the 7th by the hands of Mr. Smith and am perfectly satisfied with the assurances it contains – The party with which I have the honor to act would prefer encountering any risk, rather than see the executive take measures for their protection, which are not warranted by constitution & laws of the United States. I do not wish even to see measures adopted, which might be calculated to irritate or provoke a conflict. You may rely upon it that we will remain firm at our posts and steadfast in our attachment to the union – All the accounts I receive from the upper districts are very cheering. Those situated along the North Carolina boundary are strongly attached to our federal institutions, several thousands are enrolled and

16560

and organised and their numbers increase daily – My latest accounts give one thousand men in Greenville – Fifteen hundred in Spartanburg in York Eight hundred – In Chester seven hundred and fifty – Cheraw Five hundred – Lancaster seven hundred Horry 487 – Chesterfield three hundred – Marion four hundred and fifty – In the minority districts we have a very respectable force and the number of men enrolled in the whole state excluding Charleston amounts to very nearly 7000 men – In the City I have enrolled and officered and drilled as well as time and circumstances would permit in the 4 wards of the city 865 men

In the 4 wards of the city	865 men
on the Neck	150
a troop of Cavalry	62
a light Infantry Company of young men under 21	80
	1157
To these are to be added five volunteer Companies – Washington light Infantry	65
German Fusileers	75
Blues	45
French Fusileers	40
Northern Volunteers	75
	1457

I do not think therefore I over estimate the force of the Union party in the city at One thousand men I should be much disappointed not to find this number, at least, at their rendevous in case of an alarm

16561

The Nullifiers estimate their force in the City at 1600 men - we consider our strength equal to theirs here. In the state they report 16.000 volunteers. The greater the number of these disorderly troops they have the worse for them - They could not maintain this force two months - The chief leaders are willing to take Mr. Clay's bill as a peace offering; but the people in the middle districts are infuriated and it will be difficult to persuade them to remain quiet - Cooper and Preston in Columbia and Turnbull in Charleston will not be satisfied until they attempt Secession - Hayne will be very happy to find an excuse to stay proceedings; but Hamilton talks oracularly and will continue to do so until he ascertains the temper of the people. The state convention will meet in Columbia on the Eleventh March and I have called the Union convention together for the Eighteenth, to give us time to know what they are disposed to do and suit our action to their resolves - It is rumoured, that if they do secede, which I verily believe they will do if the enforcemt. law passes and the tariff is not modified, the act of Secession will be submitted to the people for their approbation - Now it is an important matter

16561

for us to decide whether we will go to the ballot box and vote on this question – I am decidedly of opinion, that upon the passage of such an act, we ought at once to act vigorously against the Seceders. Most of my intimate friends think differently – They all agree with me, that we will not submit if even a majority of the people should be induced to vote in favor of secession: but think it possible we might have a majority against such an act – I am of opinion that if they agree to submit the question to the people they will have the appearance of being supported by a majority, and I fear if we do vote upon the question, the people will be governed by the decision of that majority – at all events I think it a hazardous experiment – I have addressed a circular to the union members of the State convention urging them not to join that body in any act violating the constitution of the united states and not to go to the convention at all – This storm may yet pass off and not burst upon us, but we will be prepared to encounter and to resist it like men –

I am Dear Sir,
ever your truly Obt Servt

J. R. Poinsett

Genl A. Jackson Dr

To H. L. Crop

1833			
Feby 23d	To Repairing 2 Pair of Shoes for Adam		$1.50
May 15th	To 1 Pair of Shoes --	do	2.50
			$4.00

May 16th 1833 Recd Payment H. L. Crop

16562

Rectt for
Solomon
Shoes May
16th 1838 -
to be filed

(Private)

Baltimore 25 July 1833
1833 -

Dear Sir

My father is tempted by Mr. Irving (whose persuasions it must be confessed are almost irresistible) to leave his quiet home and visit your busy city and as I am anxious he should not be disappointed in seeing you I take the liberty to apprise you of his intended call.

My object now is to let you know that I believe my father (tho he may suspect) does not know of my name having been before you - and I have no fear that he will annoy you with any business.

On a recent occasion I expressed to you my willingness (under peculiar and interesting circumstances) to relinquish all advantage I might have in your too favorable regard for me and to give way in favor of one individual, Col Heath, provided some suitable appointment in Baltimore can be given to him - At same time however I feel it is due to myself not to give way to any other man in Maryland and I now venture to express my reliance on your justice, and my confident hope that you will not heap favors either on those of my competitors who have already been noticed by you

16563

(Private)

or on those who have sought your favor for themselves
after uniting as they did with the entire Jackson party
[illegible] in recommending me to your attention in
1828 -

I spoke this language in a letter to Mr Taney twelve
months ago when I considered myself insulted by an offer
from him of a Directorship in the Bank of the United
States [evidently suggested by some of my worthy friends
in Baltimore for the purpose of getting me "disposed of"].
but I have never heard whether Mr T submitted my
letter to you or held any communication with you
[illegible] and I shall not seek an explanation
from him -

I remain Dr Sir
very faithfully
Your friend
G H Steuart

To The President
of the United States -

16564

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES,
Washington, 183

PAY to or bearer,

dollars, /100

65 DOLLS. /100

16564

Genl Stewart B.
private - on the
subject of appoint:
:ment to Mr Heath
an exception - A.J.

The President -

(Private)

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, } Febuary 26th 1833
Washington,

PAY to Major William T. Berry — or bearer,

Sixty five — — — — — dollars, $\frac{}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

65 DOLLS. $\frac{}{100}$

16665

Private

New York July 28/33

My dear Sir.

I had the pleasure yesterday to address a letter to you from which I inadvertently omitted the subject of this letter

I am informed by a Gentleman whose knowledge of the views of the US Bank is only second to that of its President (& I therefore repeat it to you with the assurance that you may rely upon it) That the Bank counts upon being rechartered — Its purpose is for the next two years to fortify itself beyond all hazard by calling in its responsibilities gradually, to an amount at which they will be entirely manageable, and also by securing its debts — This operation will be performed under the avowed Idea that it is necessary & preliminary to winding up its concerns — The State Banks old and new & particularly the latter it is believed will consequently extend their discounts — The US Bank will employ a part of its means in purchasing exchange and thereby securing a large credit in London — And at a proper time about the expiration of the Period referred to, it will by withholding bills and other means within its Power cause exchange to advance so as to cause the exportation of Specie & thus occasion a run upon all the Monied Institutions — This it will be [illegible] prepared for; And the affairs of the State Banks will consequently be so deranged as to compel them to stop Specie Payments — The immense injury to the whole nation resulting from that event it is believed and not without

foundation

16566

Bank

foundation will induce a strong public feeling in favor of a recharter of the Bank as the only means of restoring a sound Currency and that will be pressed by the friends and advocates of the Bank upon a new Congress and upon your successor with a force that they hope he will be unable to resist — The Project is feasable and must if attempted whether successful or not be productive of infinite mischief because by it the whole monetary system of the Country will be deranged —

The first state of things resulting from this attempt and the multiplication of State Banks which is going to an unequalled extent, will be, that Money will be abundant that is to say that discounts will be freely made and that from these facilities prices will rise and there will be excessive overtrading The reduction of the Tariff will cooperate with the other circumstances to induce this excess — The next state of things is the reaction which will not be far removed from its cause and is as certain as fate It will be pushed by the U.S. Bank to the consequences and for the end to which I have referred —

Having as I hope you have settled the Southern difficulties this subject seems to me to come next in order for consideration as it is in consequence — The Serpent is scotched not Killed It has power as long as it can winde and move its unmeasurable ~~long~~ length along Its exertions will be violent because its ~~existence~~ is a struggle for existence in which there will be no regard paid to the

16567

interests of the Country which gave it life and should this be seriously involved the reputation of your adminis:tration now so generally conceded to be brilliant beyond all former example may not escape un:questioned —

Should I hear any thing more or should any new thoughts occur to me I will write to you without reserve

with the truest attachment
Your friend & servt
James A Hamilton

To
The President
Washington

16567

To

The President

Private

Washington, Feby 28th 1833

Genl Andrew Jackson

Bought of **TUCKER & THOMPSON,**

MERCHANT TAILORS, NORTH SIDE OF PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE,

One door East of Brown's Hotel,

	Blk cloth Coat, for Servt,	$ 20.00
May 10th	Blk bombazine Coat. Self,	18.00
"	Blk " Pants "	9 —
	Blk silk Vest "	5.00
		$ 52.00

1833
May 16th Recd Pay Tucker & Thompson

By G. W. Stevenson

16568

Washington, July 28, 1833

Bought of TUCKER & THOMPSON,

MERCHANT TAILORS, NORTH SIDE OF PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE,

One door East of B[illegible]'s Hotel.

[illegible]

Charleston
28th Feb. 1833

My dear Sir

I had the satisfaction to receive your letter of the 19th instant and am glad to learn, that the enforcing bill will pass. With regard to the tariff bill I am disposed to believe that it will be better for the country, that it should not pass during the present session. It is doubtless just and politic that the tariff should be modified; but to do it now would have the appearance of yielding to threats, and might affect the character and diminish the strength of the government — I am satisfied that the Leaders of the nullification party are determined to go on.

16369

in their mad career – If the Tariff is not modified & the enforcing bill passes, which I presume will be the State of the case when congress rises, they will enforce their ordinance and proceed to make a new constitution and do all things, which a Sovereign State may do – There is a rumour among them that they will submit their proceedings to the people for their approbation; but what part of their proceeding they will lay before them for that purpose I am at a loss to understand. The existing ordinance places them, as far as their own act is concerned, out of the union, and it may be their intention to submit to the people merely the new constitution – As I am aware that it is the determination of these men to proceed

in their lawless career I have addressed a letter to the union members of that convention, the virtuous minority of 25, urging them not to be present at the meeting of the 11th March; and I have convoked the union convention on the 18th of March in Charleston in order, that we may be prepared to act as promptly as we are ~~prepared~~ determined to do decidedly if they declare the state out of the union. I have taken measures to have the earliest intelligence of any military array or act of hostility against the laws of the U. S. and you may depend upon receiving advices of every movement, which it is important you should be acquainted with.

I have the honor to be
very respectfully your sincere friend
and humble serv.t

J. R. Poinsett

16690

Mr. Bennett
Rec. 6th of March
1823

Mrs Edmond G Edrington

Mrs Dr Edrington's compliments to the President, and respectfully and earnestly requests of him to do her the pleasure to favour her with a lock of his hair, to be preserved in connection with a similar relic of the venerated Carroll, and many endeared friends.

Mrs E would do injustice to her own feelings, were she to omit this occasion of tendering to the President her congratulations on the recent manifestation of confidence in his administration of the government of our free and happy country, and of affection for his person and character awarded to him by his fellow citizens. Nor can she fail to express her hopes that the latter days of a life marked by so many interesting incidents, and distinguished by such important services, may be as peaceful and happy as the former ones have been brilliant and useful—.

Baltimore March 1st 1833.

16570-a

President of the United States

Washington

16571

The President of the United States

Washington

Favored by
Mr Barry

Mrs. D. Edmunds
requests a lock
of hair to be
sent by Mr Barry
when applied
for by him.
A. J.

Washington 1st March 1833

My dear Sir,

I inclose to you a letter which I have just received for you from Mr. Poinsett.

I am, with great respect & esteem,
your obedt. servt.
Wm. Drayton

The President

16572

16573

Mr Everett –
Rec.d 1st of March
1833 —— A. I
& 6th of March – A. I
answered 6th March

Force & firmness of the
Union men
Feb. 22 1833

The President of the United States.

Vera Cruz 1 March 1835

Dear Sir;

The accompanying likeness in Wax of Genl. St. Anna, has been forwarded me by Col. Butler with a request that it might be forwarded at the same time stating that he should hand me a letter to accompany it — This he has omitted to do & I place the parcel in charge of Mr Dumas who goes passenger in the Virginia to sail for New York this day & has kindly undertaken to place it in safe train of delivery —

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

with great respect,

Your most Obedient,

humble Servant,

J. Stone

His Excellency,

Andrew Jackson Esqr.

President

U. S. A.

To His Excellency

Andrew Jackson Esqr

President U.S.

Washington

16675

To. His Excellency,

Andrew Jackson Esq.

President U. S. A.

Washington

1833

March 1st 1833

Fellow Citizens

The will of the American people, expressed through their unsolicited suffrages, calls me before you to pass through the solemnities preparatory to taking upon myself the duties of President of the United States for another term of four years. For their approbation of my administration through a period which has not been without its difficulties, and for this renewed expression of their confidence in my good intentions, I find no adequate terms to express my heartfelt gratitude. It shall be displayed to the extent of my humble powers, in continued efforts, so to administer their government as to preserve their liberty and promote their happiness.

So many incidents have occurred within the last four years which have necessarily called forth, sometimes under circumstances the most delicate and painful my views of the principles and policy which ought to be pursued by the general government, that I need but touch upon them now.

The foreign policy adopted by our government soon after the adoption of the present constitution, and very generally pursued by each successive administration, has been crowned with almost complete success, and has elevated our character among the nations of the earth. To do justice to all, and submit to wrong from none, has been during my administration its governing maxim, and so happy have been its results, that we are not only at peace with all the world, but few causes of controversy, and those of minor importance, are left to be adjusted. Our discussion with foreign powers will hereafter relate

—to—

6676

to little else than commercial treaties and arrangements, having in view the advancement of our trade on terms of perfect reciprocity with all maritime nations.

In the domestic policy of this government, there
which especially deserve the attention of the People & their Represts &
are two subjects which have been, and will continue to be, the objects of my increasing solicitude. They are the preservation of the reserved rights of the several states and
The integrity of the union.

A My experience in public ~~life~~ concerns, and the observation of a life somewhat advanced, confirm the impressions long since imbibed by me, that the destruction of our State governments, or the annihilation of their control over the local concerns of the people, would lead directly to revolution and anarchy, and finally to despotism and military domination. In proportion, therefore, as the general ~~govern~~ government encroaches upon the rights of the states, in the same proportion does it impair its own power and detract from its ability to fulfil the purposes of its creation. Solemnly impressed with these considerations, my countrymen will ever find me raising my voice, & if need be, exercising as I have already done, the power they have placed in my hands, to repress any measures which may, directly or indirectly, encroach on the reserved rights of the states ~~or tend~~ or tend to consolidate all political power in the general government.

[Rather than to create discontents and heartburnings among the people, or the states, I deem

it far better to refrain from the exercise of doubtful powers, unless it be necessary to the preservation of the government or the safety of the people.]

Equally important is the preservation of ~~the~~ our union and the support of the general government in the exercise of its essential powers. Without union our independence and liberty would never have been achieved, without union they can never be maintained. Divided into twenty four or even a smaller number of separate communities, we shall see our internal trade burdened by numberless restraints and exactions, communication between distant points and persons obstructed or cut off, our sons made soldiers to deluge with blood the fields they now till in peace, the mass of our people borne down and impoverished by taxes to support armies and navies, and military leaders, at the head of their victorious legions, becoming our lawgivers and judges. The loss of liberty, of all good government, of peace, plenty and happiness, must inevitably follow a dissolution of the Union. In supporting the union, therefore, we support all that is dear to the freeman and philanthropist.

The time at which I stand before you is one of portentous im=portance the eyes of the world are fixed on our Republic. The event of the existing crisis will be decisive in the opinion of mankind of the practicability, or impracticability of the federal system of government. Great is the stake which mankind have in

in our

16577

our hands; great is the responsibility which must rest upon [the people] our heads. Let us realize the interesting attitude in which we stand before the world. Let us exercise forbearance and firmness.

Let us extricate our country from the dangers which surround it and learn wisdom from the lessons they inculcate. That people is not best governed who have the most laws. Legislation which is partial in its objects or effect, which depresses one man or interest at the expence of another, or is supposed to do so, will ever lead to discontents, murmurings, dissentions and revolutions. Government should treat all alike, and the surest means of attaining that end, is to let all alone as far as is compatible with the publick justice, peace and safety. To bring the our government to the adoption and practice of this principle in its legislation as well as its general administration, and thereby to preserve it as a blessing to America and an example to the world, will continue to be the object of my unceasing solicitude.

In the mean time, misguided men must not be permitted, in efforts to correct existing abuses or in pursuance of less worthy ~~motives~~ designs, to impair or overthrow a system of government which is the pride of our fathers, and the only hope of ourselves and our posterity. If in madness or delusion, any one should lift his parricidal hand against this blessed union, which, like Heavens canopy, spreads

spreads over us all, and if it does not make us all happy, protects us from unnumbered ills, the arms of tens of thousands will be raised to save it, and the curse of millions will fall upon the head which may have plotted its destruction. For myself, when I approach the sacred volume and take a solemn oath to support and defend this constitution, I feel in the depths of my soul, that it is the highest, most sacred and most irreversible part of my obligation, to preserve the union of these states although it may cost me my life.

Finally it is my most fervent prayer to that almighty being before whom I now stand, Him who has hitherto protected our country in war, and so signally blessed it in peace, that He will teach us justice and moderation, allay excited passions, lead back the misguided to the path of reason and duty, and spare me the painful necessity of resorting to these terrible powers which are vested in me by the constitution and acts of Congress, to execute the laws, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion.

16578

16579

Rough draft
of inaugural
address — March
1st 1833 — A. J.—

March 22nd 1833

Dear Sir/ I called twice to seek your advice, and to express to you, if I could find words emphatic enough to do it so, the grateful sense I entertain of your kindness towards me. — Thro' you I have been relieved from a burthen which otherwise would have attended me through life, and I am now enabled to avail myself of some remaining years of energetic exertion, to provide for a fine family whom I will teach to bless you. — I intend going in the stage at 2 o'clock. — When I was last in Philadelphia, I made enquiry respecting the service of Silver — The weights are usually as follows.

Tea urn	100 ounces
Tea pot	40 "
Sugar dish	32 "
Cream pot	14 "
186 oz @ 187½	$348 75/100

After the 8th inst. you may perhaps find time to write me a line respecting them. — I intended if I had seen you, to have recommended my old school fellow, Mr Charles Biddle, for some situation — He tells me that his pecuniary situation

16580

is very distressing, and as he is a man of undoubted
talents and fidelity, I hope you may be pleased to consider
him. With the most affectionate respect I remain,

Yours &c

Henry Ward

City of Washington 2nd March 1833

To / Genl Andrew Jackson

&c &c

165-81

165-81

Mr Toland—
recd. 2d March 1833
to be answered
A.J
answered 5th of
March 1833—
requesting the
plate to be sent
to Nashville care
of Mr Nichol: A.J
plate ordered, cost
$348— check to be
sent when [illegible]
for Nashville— A.J
additional order for
a [illegible] table & 2 other
[illegible]— to be filled
A.J

Washington March th 9.d 1835

Major A. J. Donolson

To John B. Hutton Dr

For refreshments furnish.d 2d. East Committee Room

2: Bottles pale Sherry	@ 2.00	$	4.00
1 do Champagne	@ 2.50		2.50
1 do Champagne Brandy do whiskey			3 00
1/2 gal Hot punch			1.00
1/2 gal cold punch			1 00
For Beefstakes oyster coffee &c			5.00
			$16.50

Received payment John B. Hutton

16582

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES. Washington, } March 5th 183

PAY to M. A. Giusta or bearer,

nine hundred & fourteen dollars, $\frac{00}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

914 DOLLS. $\frac{00}{100}$

16583

Major A. J. Donelson

$16:50

Refreshments at the Capitol 2nd of March 1833 — $16.50 —

gave a check for the above 11th of March 1833 — A. J.

March 6th 1833 I Received you letter

March 2d

De Sir I now inform you that your famileys ar
well at presence and we or doing well but
Lamzon is ded your mares and coltz all looks
well but the colte wich Andrew bought of ~~to~~
~~Mr. Mr.~~ Mr Robson is ded the case I can not
Tel he live 9 dayss after he came Home I
Cuttingn open and on his side I fond a not
or a lump and lys ~~after~~ looking I found Two of his Ribs
Broke but waze well and on this not
waze a corde ~~was~~ went from his Harte
to this corde as bige as his wine pipe colte
waz sold to save his life I Git alonge
with you Negroes Verey well indeed
I have not woulde to give all a Suite
March 2d we had a Snow and verry cold
I have a bout one 100 and 50 acres of lande ~~plant~~ for corn
and cotton last yeare you made 36 Bales of
Cotton but Ship 41 Bales

Burnard W. Holtzclaw

Andrew Jackson

16584

[illegible] Health [illegible] Free

[illegible]

The Honble Andrew

Jackson

President of the U. S.

Washington City

answered 17th

March 1833

[illegible] since day

Genl. Jackson — Pittsburgh — March 8th 1833

1832 — To Bakewell Page & Bakewells

Feb. 2. — For 3 doz best diam^d cut Tumb^s — $ 2.25 — $144.25
3 doz do Wines & Dec^s

March 8th 1833 Rec^d. a check in full
for Bakewell Page & Bakewells
M Campbell

16585

March 10th 1833

Andrew Jackson Jr.

1833. — To Drs. Bohrer & Magruder Dr.

March 10th — To prof^l. Services rendered Mr. J. in consultation with Dr. Thomas — $37.50

1835 Jany 21. Rec^d. payment.

Bohrer & Magruder

16586

Wm Bakewell
to
A. Jackson
Recpt in full
for glassware
April 8th 1833.
A. J.

New York 12 March 1833

My Dr Sir

I take the liberty to mention for your Consideration at an leisure moment, a [illegible] outline of a plan touching the [illegible] of the public [illegible] which seems a subject just now occupying the public mind —

I am one of those who think that a parent should do much for his Children, but not every thing. I dont think that a man should materially [illegible] that his Children may wallow in idle affluence — I have always thought it bad policy for the present generation to pay for the Erie Canal, that the next should enjoy it toll free — a Century distant say as the present generation had the risk of the Experiment the most that should be asked of them is to pay just toll enough to keep it in repairs — Leave the next generation to pay for it because they will be better able to do so.

These might be my views of the present & the future —

16587

Now as regards the Public Lands. As regards their Value - who can predict the amt they may be worth 20 years hence, when by the united progress of internal communications which makes Remoteness today Contiguity tomorrow - the rapid increase of the population, what may be a wilderness now may then become Cultivated fields.

As to Cons ten Dollars cents what may be worth one Dollar now may be twenty Dollars then - the amt swells to a point beyond our present days Comprehension - reason but rejects the Conclusion -

I could not better illustrate the subject better than to call attention to almost any day occurrence here in this City - where we see farms of old Dutch families - the present occupants not willing to realize and what a expend a Dollar in improvement, communication or educating their children - but relying on absolute indolence, depend on advances made by modern improvements, and the march of improvement is at their door. [illegible] die [illegible] dead, then the farm is cut up into lots & becomes [illegible] incapable of knowing how

to Enjoy so sudden an augmentation [illegible] rich & all goes to other hands without a partn of benefit to those who were entitled to it.

The great difficulty under which our Country labors is want of Capital

The elements of Security are here in abundance but no development in a taking [illegible] nearly the whole of this possessions

One hundred millions w^d come to us from the money markets of Europe And applied as it w^d be — w^d give such additional value to the object pledged for its redemption — as to pay the debt back again out of that increment of price — thus giving ~~present~~ generation all the advantages of its possession & enabling it to transmit a vast inheritance to the coming race —

I am aware that the subject is met by many objections but I am not aware that any of those objections are sustainable

Similar plans may frequently have been suggested and the whole subject is no doubt so familiar to you that no feature is new to you — I give it however in a way which as far as I know it is original — & seems to take with our people.

16588

I trust to the goodness of you Disposition in pardoning the informality of this Communication — Assuring you that I am with very high feeling of personal regard & esteem

Yr. friend & obt. Servt.

Ch. [illegible]

To Honbl. M. Van Buren
Secy. of State
Washington

A plan for realizing the [illegible] which it enables the present generation to enjoy its advantages will enable it to transmit almost [illegible] to posterity —

First. Let Congress grant an issue of scrip to the amount of One hundred [illegible] of Dollars, bearing an interest of four per cent [illegible] the principal redeemable [illegible] fifty years — [illegible] the system of Government [illegible]

Second. The entire Public Domain to be [illegible] to the payment of the debt — the gradual sale of lands to meet the interest to be regulated by Congress.

Third. The President of the U.S. by & with the consent of the Senate to appoint three boards of commissioners each board to consist of one individual from each State — one board to be called [illegible]

16589

Commissioners for internal improvement & another Commissioners for Colonization & another for general Education —

Fourthly — the entire amount of the surplus of 100 millions to be applied as follows —

Twenty five millions to be placed at the disposal of the board of Commissioners for internal improvement for purposes of a system of national intercommunication connecting the Atlantic States with the Regions of the country where [illegible] are located and other national objects to the [illegible]

Five millions to be placed at the disposal of the board of Commissioners for purposes of Colonization of Negroes.

Twenty millions — to be placed at the disposal of the board of Commissioners for purposes of general Education

And the balance of Fifty millions to be divided among the States pro rata with representation —

Fifth. These several boards to be appointed for three years and each body at their first meeting to determine their continuance in office 1/3 of their number to go out at the termination of one year — 1/3 at the termination of two years & 1/3rd at the termination of 3 years the vacancies to be filled by new appointments or reappointments by the President & Senate as aforesaid —

Sixth — An annual report of their proceedings to be made to Congress whose duty it shall be to pass such laws & regulations in the premises as its wisdom shall dictate without annulling or defeating the main object for which said boards were created —

16590

Wilson County Tennessee | March 14th 1833

Dear Sir

Mr John Donaldson Requested me to write to you that he was very much in want of money and I have ~~and~~ indeavoured to get the money for him and I Cannot for their is no money in the Banks is the Cry of Every Body in Nashville he Requested me allso to Send my Acount that perapps you would be able ~~f~~ to Remit the money here is the acount acordin to Mr Donaldsons Request

to Contract for monument	$720 .. 00
To flagin the Front Portico	190 .. 00
one ~~tomb~~ Slab for Mrs Jacksons vault	18 .. 00
one Stone for macking Biscet Daugh	2 .. 50
to Contract for alteration in Small Monument	80 .. 00
one door Sill 5 feet 6 In	2 .. 40 ¾
money paid Gorge Ament for you	9 .. 25
	$1022 .. 15 ¾
Amount of Credits	869 .. 00
A Ballance Due me ~~off~~	$153 .. 15 ¾

from your Humble Servant with Respect

Thos J. Harrison

16591

Mr Harrison

A. Jackson

The instrument has been con=sidered [illegible] there was no contract but as the Mr Harri=rison and [illegible] they have paid a [illegible] of fifty cents of a thousand -

A. J.

OFFICE OF BANK [illegible]

PAY to [illegible]

dollars

250 DOLLARS

16692

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, } March 15th 1833
Washington,

PAY to Andrew Jackson jnr — or bearer,

two hundred & fifty — dollars, $\overline{100}$

Andrew Jackson

250 DOLLS. $\overline{100}$

16593

Washington 16th March 1833

Dear Sir,

The course now to be adopted in relation to the Bank of the United States appears to me of so much importance, that I am constrained to ask your indulgence while I submit to you the views I take of the subject and the conclusions to which my mind has arrived in relation to the removal of the public deposits.

The first point to be considered is, whether it be right in itself, the second, whether it be prudent, and the third what will be its political effects.

If the Bank has been a faithful Agent of the Treasury – has been always able and always willing to pay over the public deposits when required for the purposes of the Treasury – always ready to aid the government in its fiscal operations, – if it has been managed with such integrity and prudence that it may be safely trusted with the public moneys – then a removal of them to other Banks is unjust. But in my opinion, facts have been disclosed which prove & tend to prove the very reverse of these positions.

By its own accounts and its own conduct in secretly negotiating with the government creditors, it has furnished strong evidence that it was not able to make the payments required from it during the year 1832.

Having in March a public deposit of about $9.000.000, it commenced a negotiation to postpone a payment of a large amount of the public debt which might be advertised for payment, before any advertisement was issued. This was in anticipation of its inability [illegible]

When it became notified of the purpose of the government to advertise a payment of about $6.500.000 for the 1st July it [illegible] of the Bank and procured a postponement of the payment until the 1st October, agreeing

to pay the interest.

Conscious of not being able to meet the payment at that time, although as yet ignorant how great it might be, an agent was despatched to Europe secretly to negotiate with the government creditors for a postponement of the payment of five millions for at least one year.

Having succeeded by means which not only thwarted the purposes of the Treasury by keeping back the certificates and holding the government still responsible, but directly violated the Charter in the purchase of Stock; and being by the accidental publication of the Circular of the Barings detected in its secret operations; it then disavowed the original arrangement and formed a new one on such terms as to procure the control of the certificates without paying the money.

These operations have been accompanied by a series of disgusting subterfuges and falsehoods sufficient to shake the confidence of any one in the integrity of those who manage the Bank.

As a subterfuge for the measure pursued in March and the negotiations which immediately grew out of it, the Bank alledges that it was simply to enable the Bank to accommodate the merchants and prevent the displacement of a large amount of Capital.

It alledges that the postponement solicited of the government in the months for which the Bank paid $18.000 in interest, was desired by the government itself to save the merchants paying duties from pressure [illegible] and neither [illegible] nor sacrifice on the part of the Bank. When it was granted, the Bank went on [illegible] from the merchants whom it proffered a [illegible] for their accommodation.

It was alledged that the mission to Europe was represented to oblige the Treasury Department

and enable the Bank to make an advance to it for the purpose of supplying a deficiency which was expected in the means to pay the public debt heretofore for payment in and at the close of 1832, when it was projected, the instructions given and the agent on his voyage before the Bank knew what amount the Treasury would desire to pay.

It was again pretended that the Mission was instituted to raise a fund to guard against the effects of the Cholera then stated to be raging in New York and Philadelphia, when it was projected before that disease appeared in either City.

In addition to these groundless reasons for resorting to these measures, they have been attended by concealments and other circumstances which show the Board of Directors to be not the watchful and intelligent sentinels of public and private interests in the bank, but mere machines moved they know not why, by the representations of a single man.

This whole negotiation in all its stages was concealed from the government and from the Board of Directors.

On the 21st September 1832, the President of the Bank called the Board of Directors around him, and by representations of the Strong position of the Bank, procured their sanction to instructions afterwards issued authorizing certain of their western branches to check on the principal bank, when the real reason, which was the alarming run upon the Lexington Branch, was entirely concealed from them.

Having, on the 1st October, received information of Gen. Cadwalader's illegal arrangement in Europe, he again calls his Board around him and by a set of reasons altogether different from that which influenced him, induced them to change the whole

16595

policy of the institution, concealing in his own bosom the fact that a fund of five millions has been procured in Europe, which, as he has since admitted, constitutes the real cause of that change.

Again on the 21th November, he even calls in the government directors to take a view of the whole management of the institution for the past year, makes his explanations to them at large, but wholly conceals this important operation in Europe.

What confidence can be placed in a directory who are thus moved to change the policy of the Bank by false reasons, while the only reason which makes it proper or safe, is entirely withheld from them?

Is not a directory which is not permitted to know the reasons of its own acts a mockery and a sham? Can the government have any confidence in an institution the policy of which is thus changed, its chosen managers know not why?

To the last the delusion is maintained. It was the President of the Bank, undoubtedly, who drew up the recent report of the Exchange Committee and palmed it upon his colleagues as true. It repeats all the subterfuges for the acts of the last year, conceals the new debt recently contracted in Europe, and makes representations in relation to the Western branches, particularly that at Nashville which the President and Cashier of the Bank have in their possession the evidence to prove wholly deceptive and false. The President of the Bank permits his deluded colleagues to come to Washington and swear to this tissue of misrepresentations as true to the best of their knowledge and belief.

Is it possible, that the government, if satisfied of all these facts, can think the public deposits secure in

that institution, or that it is any longer worthy to be trusted.

Is there not ground to apprehend, that men who are guilty of such misrepresentations to cover their own unauthorized acts, are capable of doing any of those things, which are recorded in the history of broken banks?

And is not the fact, that the managers of this institution are driven to such means to evade the payment of the public dues and to such subterfuges to conceal the true reason of their conduct, very strong evidence tending to prove the weakness of the Bank and its inability to pay its debts, or at least to pay them on demand?

If all are satisfied, as I think they must be, that there is neither integrity nor prudence in the management of the Bank; that it has not been and is not now able to pay the sums required of it by the government months ago, it remains to inquire what obstacles there are to a removal of the public deposits.

The first that presents itself is Mr Tolands Report. It is evident, that he had only such information as the Bank chose to give him. He was not informed of the new debt contracted in Europe; nor was he told that probably more than half of the domestic Bills of Exchange in the West would have been protested last fall had not new bills been taken in payment, which must yet be protested unless they are again renewed. These facts disclosing the weakness of the Bank and of the precarious character of its Western debt, have come to the knowledge of the government since this Report was made.

If the Treasury had been satisfied then, which I apprehend was not the case, it does not follow that

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that it should be satisfied three months afterwards upon the development of new and startling facts. If that Report have been conclusive upon the Treasury then, it cannot be at any time thereafter upon a change of circumstances. It does not appear to me, therefore, that this Report constitutes any obstacle to action.

The resolution of the House of Representatives is perhaps more imposing, if not intrinsically more worthy of exercising a controlling influence. There are considerations, however, growing out of that proceeding, which, in my mind, rather urge to action than counsel delay.

The President at the commencement of the session expressed his doubts of the safety of the public deposits, and to confirm or remove them recommended a thorough examination of the principal bank and branches.

The Majority Report itself tells us they have made no such investigation: and they have, therefore, not taken the necessary steps to remove those doubts.

The Report of the Exchange Committee of the Bank was printed by its order and put, I presume, into the hands of every member of Congress to forestal their opinion before the Committee of Ways & Means made their Report.

The Majority of the Committee of Ways & Means in framing their Report, took only such parts of the evidence as are favorable to the Bank, and not only pass over all that was unfavorable but positively declare there was none in the documents.

Notwithstanding this assertion, they have the proof in their possession, that the most favorable evidence contained in the Exchange Committee's Report

and in the testimony of the Directors, was totally unfounded and the reverse of truth.

None of that evidence was printed or has been read to the House.

The Minority Report was neither printed nor read to the House.

All the House had to form its judgement upon, was the Report of the Exchange Committee and the Report of the Majority of the Committee of Ways and Means.

Is it surprizing then that they gave such a vote? Can it be expected, that not only in the absence of the truth, but with a denial of it by a majority of one of their Standing Committees, they should come to a just conclusion?

Ought a resolution thus sustained and adopted to be conclusive on the Executive? Ought not the fact that the Bank daringly published its own false expositions before the Committee which was investigating its conduct made their Report, and placed it in the hands of the members of the House to forestall their judgments, rather to urge the Executive to crush, if possible, an institution which accomplishes such ends by such means, than to give it time to collect its means and concentrate its power?

With the public and with the next Congress, I verily believe an exposure of the means by which this resolution was obtained, backed by decisive executive action, will be sure to have twice the weight against the Bank that its adoption can have in its favor.

Can any of us say, that there is not more reason to doubt the soundness of the Bank and the safety of the public deposits now, than there was at the commencement of the late Session of Congress? My doubts are converted into certainty. And if the resolution binds the Treasury

16697

now, when will its obligation cease? It has in fact no obligation. The discretion and power of the Treasury Department belong to each moment, and cannot be bound for an hour by any resolution of Congress. They must be exercised and used in accordance with the views and exigencies of the moment; and if it can be proved that the Secretary is influenced by any sinister or corrupt design, he is undoubtedly amenable to Congress as well as for any other abuse of his public station. The resolution can only be regarded by him as evidence, and in this instance it is entirely discredited by established facts.

An apprehension seems to be entertained, that in case the deposits are removed, the Bank of the United States would concentrate its power upon the State banks employed by the government and crush them. Nothing is clearer to my mind, than that the Bank of the United States in the event of a removal of the deposits, would be placed entirely at the mercy of the State banks which should receive them.

The extent of that institution which gives it strength, would then be its weakness. As the paper of all the Branches as well as the principal bank, is taken in payment of the revenue, and as the Exchange is every where in favor of the great Cities where the revenue is collected, the notes of the most distant branches naturally flow into New York and Philadelphia, where they fall into the hands of the Collectors and are deposited in the Bank. This creates constant and heavy balances due from the interior to the Atlantic Offices.

By the monthly statement of 1st January last, it appears that there was due from the various branches of the principal Bank on that day $[illegible]

Present amount due from the Bank to its branches $[illegible]

Net amount due principal bank $16,[illegible]

By looking at the accounts of the interior branches we shall see whence this balance arises.

The Natchez Bank owes the other branches and the principal bank — — — $3.1[illegible]1.57[illegible]
While there is due to it from them only — 2.869
Showing a balance against it of — — $3.138.702
The Specie in that Branch is only — — 75.095
The Nashville Branch owes other offices 1.6[illegible]3.326
There is due to it from them 2[illegible]8.139
Balance against it $1.36[illegible].187
The Specie in that branch is 205.988
So the Louisville Branch owes other offices 2.773.426
There is due to it from them 244.893
Balance against it $2.528.533
The Specie in that Branch is 33[illegible].1[illegible]

Now, it is apparent that if either of these Branches were suddenly called upon for but a small portion of these balances, it must stop payment.

It is not pretended, that the whole amount of these balances is due to the principal bank or the Atlantic Branches; but it is not doubted that two thirds of it is.

If the government deposits were placed in State banks, at New York, Philadelphia and other commercial points, the notes of all the Branches of the United States Bank would be receivable for revenue as they are now. They would, therefore, continue to flow to these points as they have done heretofore; but, instead of being deposited in the offices of the United States bank, they would accumulate in the State banks where the revenue shall be deposited. In a short time, the interior branches would be as completely within the power of these State Banks as they are now within that of the principal bank. If the State banks [illegible] to do so, they would in less than six months stop half of the interior branches. By a sudden

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run upon them one after another, with their paper, they
they would be as certainly ruined as that an adequate
cause produces its natural effect. Nor could any precaution
of the principal bank, in the present extended situation
of its concerns, prevent it. Not knowing on what point
the attack might be made and being unable to curtail
its business soon enough to guard all points, it would
place itself, with all its boasted power, at the mercy of
one or two State banks. Instead of attacking the State
institutions, it would be every where thrown on the
defensive and obliged to beg for mercy.

Indeed, Sir, if it be desirable to break up the
Bank of the United States at once, I have no more doubt
of the power of the Treasury to do it with the aid of
a few State Banks, than I have of my existence, and
in my opinion, if the deposits are changed, it will require
great forbearance in the State banks to prevent that
catastrophe.

That this result may follow the withdrawal of the
deposits and that the responsibility in public opinion
may rest upon the administration, appears to be one
ground of apprehension. That the Bank may stop
payment is very possible, and in its bearings upon
the future interests of the Country, I should not regret
the event. But whether any portion of the responsibility
would in public opinion, fall upon the government
or not, would depend, I think, on the manner in which
the deposits should be removed. If the government
were at once to order all the deposits of the Treasurer,
of public officers, and those for the payment of the public
debt, to be transferred to the State Banks, it would
be an unreasonable demand, and the Bank of the United
States would have plausible ground for complaint.
If it were then instantly to stop payment and set forth

the heavy burden, and it might say unexpected call of the government as the cause, it would consult only make some impression upon public opinion. But if the government were to make no actual transfer of funds from the U. States Bank to the State Banks, and simply to direct its future receipts to be placed in those banks, and draw out the sum remaining in the U. S. Bank, as it might be wanted for the service of the government upon the usual warrants of the Treasury, it would leave no ground to complain of an unreasonable demand; and if the U. S. Bank then stopped payment, the whole country would see clearly that it was produced, not by any act of the government, but by its own mismanagement. Such an event, under such circumstances, so far from weakening the administration, would prove to the whole people, that the doubts heretofore expressed were well founded, and that the withdrawal of the deposits was an act of prudence as well as of justice. If the Commissioner of Loans were directed to deposit to the credit of the Treasurer all money on hand for payment of the public debt not now applied, and notice given that the debt would thereafter be paid only at the Treasury, and if the other officers were instructed to transfer their accounts to the State Banks only when they received the final warrants, on those instructions, it would probably require four months to take from the Bank of the United States the whole of the public deposits.

If it be right to consider it as a political question, there is, in my opinion, every reason for prompt and decisive action. It may be assumed as certain, that the Bank is the uncompromising enemy of the party which has elected Gen. Jackson and will seek all

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its mighty power to distrust and destroy it. The only way to impair its influence is to lessen its power. That power at the present moment, consists almost entirely in its controle over the revenue of the government. The Exchange Committee boast, that on the first October last "the State Banks of Philadelphia, New York and Boston owed the Bank $2.331.000." On that day, the public deposites of all sorts at those three points, were $10.[illegible]. Had these been in the State Banks instead of the Bank of the United States, would the latter have had any cause to boast of its strength? I think it was in September or October last, that the New York Branch offered to lend the State Banks in that City a million of Dollars on interest. On the first of October, that Branch had in deposite $5.268.000 of public money. Had this been in the City Banks, could the Branch have shewn its superiority by offering this loan? It was your money, the money of the Treasury which it offered to loan — it is that only which gives it superiority and a controling power. Take it away and its power is instantly crippled — its influence vanishes.

The heavy collections of money particularly in New York, thrown into the U.S. Bank occasionally bring masses of the paper of the State Banks, which if instantly presented, they might not be able to redeem. They are in grain its enemies, but they dare not speak and act, because they are often in its power. The same power extends, more or less to all the State banks in the Country, and to thousands of individuals. No complaints are heard of a tyrant while in the height of his power. His oppressions are borne in silence, lest complaint should cause them to be doubled. But when the dread of his power is removed, men speak out. So will it be

with the State Banks, and the other dependents of the United States Bank. Thousands of tongues, which are now tied, will be unloosed, and the administration will find defenders, where it now looks for enemies.

The means of the Bank to corrupt men and the press by unusual loans would be diminished.

Those who have suffered by its overtrading in every direction, having nothing more to hope, and feeling its hand press heavily upon them, would abuse it for mismanagement.

Rival powers in new State Banks would spring up in every quarter, all interested in putting down this Bank as a common enemy and prepared to support those, who are engaged in the enterprize.

The measure would be supported almost by the entire South; in the West, it would strengthen the hands of our friends; in the North, they would hail it with delight; in New York, they would be united in its support; and if it produced any injurious effects in any quarter it would be in Pennsylvania.

But a pervading benefit would arise from it in the energy it would every where inspire among the true supporters of the administration. In every direction, they are now in a state of doubt, hesitation and discouragement. They do not understand the administration in reference to the Bank. They ask whether the government intends to succumb to its power, or continue to supply it with arms to destroy its friends. They need some decisive act to reunite and inspirit them.

If nothing be done the next Congress will come here also full of doubt and hesitation, open to all the insidious influences of this corrupting institution, and the administration will find itself embarrassed and finally thwarted

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in all its important measures. But if the leading question of the session shall be made beforehand; if the administration makes a bold stroke, if it throws itself upon the people, and those whom they have elected as its friends in the next Congress, with such an exposition as you can make out of the facts already known, many a man who would equivocate and trim, if a timid policy be pursued, will at once rally to your support. It is the nature of our race to support him who fearlessly defies danger and meets responsibilities with a face of conscious rectitude. But when leaders quail, what is to expected from followers?

Are further reasons for action wanted? They can be had. You already know, that the business of the Bank is chiefly done by Committees without the agency or knowledge of the Board of Directors. You also know, that all government directors are now excluded from these Committees.

It can be shown, that after discounts have been refused by the Board of Directors, they have been granted by the Exchange Committee.

It can be shown, that one of the government Directors has made an effort to restore the business to the Board and was defeated by the casting vote of the President of the Bank.

It can be shown, that the extraordinary loan granted to Messrs Webb and Noah, which the Bank took so much pains last year to prove to be sound, has for some time been under protest.—

It can be shown, that loans to certain members of Congress who suddenly changed their opinions in favor of the Bank last year, are also under protest.

It can be shown, that favored printers have been

permitted to replace good endorsers with bad ones and afterwards been protested.

It can be shown, that favored printers have been permitted to overdraw largely, and that their notes have been renewed, contrary ~~to all rule~~, without payment of the over-draft.—

There is scarcely an end to the reasons which may be adduced for speedy and decisive action.

The greatest difficulty, perhaps, is to find a substitute for the Bank of the United States which shall render equal facilities to the Treasury Department. I do not doubt the practicability of it, but it can only be secured and maintained by the utmost caution and prudence. In the Atlantic cities there are many Banks more prudently managed and more to be trusted than the Bank of the United States. In finding safe depositories at those points, there is no difficulty. It is otherwise in the interior. But it will not be necessary to trust the interior Banks to any great extent. The money received from sales of public lands may be drawn out in the West for Indian, army and land office expenditures almost as fast as it is received, and if there be any deficiency, it can be supplied by draft on the Atlantic depositories.

But it is practicable, I think, to combine some of the safest State Banks in every quarter of the Union under such an organization as will render them as efficient and as safe for government purposes as the Bank of the United States under the best management. Incidentally also, by an understanding among themselves, they might manage the ~~[illegible]~~ domestic exchanges of the country in a manner as beneficial to the community, as the U. S. Bank now does.

~~[illegible]~~

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There are many reasons in favor of attempting such an arrangement and at an early day. If a machine composed entirely of State Banks can be organized, and put into successful operation, it will cut up root and branch the whole ~~[illegible]~~ argument in favor of rechartering the present Bank of the United States by showing practically that it is not necessary. It is but three years to the expiration of the Bank Charter. To me it is quite evident that no institution upon a different plan will be establish[ed]. The present Bank will prevent it with the hope of getting a new Charter from the President & Congress which may come after Gen. Jackson. A new machine cannot be organized and put into operation in a day. Nor could the deposites be removed in a day from one Bank to another. It, therefore, would seem necessary, without regard to the present question, to put on foot at no distant day a measure with a view to this result.

Pardon me for a few words in relation to my own views and feelings. I have, with all my might, labored to put down this institution with no other motive than because I believe its prolonged existence fatal to the purity of our republican institutions. The deep-rooted popularity of Gen. Jackson has enabled him to set it at defiance, while he has fearfully encountered other corrupting systems, which ambition had built up. A new combination is now formed of which the Bank is the nucleus and the Citadel. It looks to a period beyond Gen. Jackson's service and anticipates an easy victory over those who, without his popularity, may attempt to perpetuate his principles. The Tariff question [illegible], and it has been postponed. The Land project is expected to buy up whole States, and sections of the Union. Internal improvements are to be revived. The Bank [illegible] and its

life blood through the arteries of the whole combination
From an overflowing Treasury, as well as a corrupt
Bank, the props and instruments of this new scheme
are to be fed and rewarded.—

If the government will use its power, the head of this new-born and illformed dragon may be at once crushed, and all its efforts entirely paralized. But if the administration feed him until he acquire consistency and strength, whom can they expect to fight him for their benefit? I confess I shall despair of any good in continuing the war. If, with the proofs displayed of all the abuses and corruptions of this institution, the people do not sustain their government in an honest act of retribution, there is more corruption abroad than I suppose, and we may give up all hope of the republic. I know that many of our best friends feel as I do. They are willing to contend as long as there is hope; but they say it is useless to buffet the Bank with our left hand, so long as we feed it with our right. Nothing can induce them to continue the war, but some decisive demonstration of its policy on the part of the ~~government~~ administration—Something which shall promise a beneficial result.— Something that holds out to them a more cheering prospect than that of being the last to be devoured.—

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Washington 16th. March 1833

Dear Sir Amos Kendall

The course now to be adopted in relation to the Bank of the United States appears to me of so much importance that I am constrained to ask your indulgence while I submit to you the views I take of the subject and the conclusions to which my mind has arrived in relation to the removal of the public deposits.

The first point to be considered is, whether it be right in itself; the second whether it be prudent; and the third what will be its political effects

If the Bank has been a faithful Agent of the Treasury - has been always able and always willing to pay over the public deposits when required for the purposes of the Treasury - always ready to aid the government in its fiscal operations; - if it has been managed with such integrity and prudence that it may be safely trusted with the public moneys - then a removal of them to other Banks is unjust. But in my opinion, facts have been disclosed which prove or tend to prove the very reverse of these positions.

By its own accounts and its own conduct in secretly negotiating with the government creditors, it has furnished strong evidence that it was not able to make the payments required from it during the year 1832

Having in March a public deposit of about $9.000.000, it commenced a negotiation to postpone a payment of a large

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amount of the public debt which might be advertised for payment, before any advertisement was issued. This was a confession of its weakness.

As soon as notified of the purpose of the government to advertise a payment of about $6.500.000 for the 1st July, the President of the Bank solicited and procured a postponement by the government until the 1st October, agreeing to pay the interest.

Conscious of not being able to meet the payment at that time, although as yet ignorant how great it might be, an agent was despatched to Europe secretly to negotiate with the government creditors for a postponement of the payment of five millions for at least one year.

Having succeeded by means which not only thwarted the purposes of the Treasury by keeping back the certificates and holding the government still responsible, but directly violated the charter in the purchase of stock, and being, by the accidental publication of the Circular of the Barings detected in its secret operations, it then disavowed the original arrangement and formed a new one on such terms as to procure the control of the certificates without paying the money.

These operations have been accompanied by a series of disgusting subterfuges and falsehoods suf=

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ficient to shake the confidence of any one in the in=
tegrity of those who manage the Bank.

As a subterfuge for the course pursued in March and the negotiation which immediately grew out of it the Bank alledged that it was simply to enable the Bank to accommodate the merchants and prevent the displacement of a large amount of capital.

It alledged that the postponement solicited of the government in that month for which the Bank paid $48,000 in interest was desired by the government itself to save the merchants paying Duties from pressure and neither needed nor wanted on the part of the Bank. When it was granted, the Bank went on curtailing from the merchants whom it professed a desire further to accommodate.

It was alledged that the mission to Europe was originated to oblige the Treasury Department and enable the Bank to make an advance to it for the purpose of supplying a deficiency which was expected in the means to pay the public debt advertised for payment in and at the close of 1832, when it was projected, the instructions given and the agent on his voyage before the Bank knew what amount the Treasury would desire to pay.

It was again pretended, that this Mission was instituted to raise a fund to guard against the effects

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of the Cholera then stated to be raging in New York and Philadelphia, when it was projected before that disease appeared in either City.

In addition to these groundless reasons for resorting to those measures, they have been attended by concealments and other circumstances which show the Board of Directors, to be, not the watchful and intelligent sentinels of public and private interests in the bank but a mere machine moved, they know not why, by the representations of a single man.

This whole negotiation in all its stages was concealed from the government and from the Board of Directors.

On the 21st September 1832, the President of the Bank called the Board of Directors around him, and by representations of the strong position of the Bank, procured their sanction to instructions afterwards issued authorizing certain of their western branches, to check on the principal bank, when the real reason, which was the alarming run upon the Lexington Branch, was entirely concealed from them.

Having, on the 1st October, received information of Gen. Cadwalader's illegal arrangement in Europe, he again calls his Board around him

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and by a set of reasons altogether different from that which influenced him, induced them to change the whole policy of the institution, concealing in his own bosom the fact that a fund of five millions had been provided in Europe, which, as he has since admitted, constituted the real cause of that change.

Again on the 20th November, he even calls in the nonresident directors to take a view of the whole management of the institution for the past year, makes his explanations to them at large, but wholly conceals this important operation in Europe.

What confidence can be placed in a directory who are thus moved to change the policy of the Bank by false reasons, while the only reason which makes it proper or safe is entirely withheld from them?

Is not a directory which is not permitted to know the reasons of its own acts a mockery and a sham?? Can the government have any confidence in an institution the policy of which is thus changed, its chosen managers know not why?

To the last, the delusion is maintained. It was the President of the Bank, undoubtedly, who drew up the recent Report of the Exchange Committee

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and palmed it upon his colleagues as true. It repeats all the subterfuges for the acts of the last year, conceals the new debt secretly contracted in Europe, and makes representations in relation to the western branches, particularly that at Nashville, which the President and Cashier of the Bank had in their possession the evidence to prove wholly deceptive and false. The President of the Bank permits his deluded colleagues to come to Washington and swear to this tissue of misrepresentations as true to the best of their knowledge and belief!

Is it possible, that the government, if satisfied of all these facts, can think the public deposits secure in that institution, or that it is any longer worthy to be trusted?

Is there not ground to apprehend, that men who are guilty of such misrepresentations to cover their own unauthorized acts, are capable of doing any of those things, which are recorded in the history of broken banks?

And is not the fact, that the managers of this institution are driven to such means to evade the payment of the public dues and to such subterfuges to conceal the true reason of their conduct, very strong evidence tending to prove the weakness of the Bank and its inability to

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to pay its debts, or at least to pay them on demand?

If all are satisfied, as I think they must be, that there is neither integrity nor prudence in the management of the Bank, that it has not been and is not now able to pay the sums required of it by the government months ago; it remains to inquire what obstacles there are to a removal of the public deposits?

The first that presents itself is Mr. Toland's Report. It is evident, that he had only such information as the Bank chose to give him. He was not informed of the new debt contracted in Europe, nor was he told that probably more than half of the domestic Bills of Exchange in the West would have been protested last fall had not new bills been taken in payment, which must yet be protested unless they are again renewed. These facts decisive of the weakness of the Bank and of the precarious situation of its western debt, have come to the knowledge of the government since his Report was made. If the Treasury had been satisfied then, which I apprehend was not the case, it does not follow that it should be satisfied three months afterwards upon the development of new and startling facts. If that Report had been conclusive up=

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None of that evidence was printed or had been read to the House.

The Minority Report was neither printed nor read to the House.

All the House had to form its judgement upon, was the Report of the Exchange Committee and the Report of the Majority of the Committee of Ways and Means.

Is it surprizing then that they gave such a vote? Could it be expected, that not only in the absence of the truth but with a denial of it by a majority of one of their standing committees, they should

16607

come to a just conclusion?

Ought a resolution thus sustained and adopted to be conclusive on the Executive? Ought not the fact that the Bank <u>daringly published</u> <u>its own false</u> <u>exposition</u> before the Committee which was investigating its conduct made their Report, and placed it in the hands of the members of the House to forestal their judgement, rather to urge the Executive to crush, if possible, an institution which accomplishes such ends by such means, than to give it time to collect its means and concentrate its power?

[Margin note: This is the most presumptious act of [illegible] intended imposition & fraud upon the govt. -]

With the public and with the next Congress, I verily beleive an exposure of the means by which this resolution was obtained backed by decisive ~~execution~~ action, can be made to have twice the weight against the Bank that its adoption can have in its favor.

Can one of us say, that there is not more reason to doubt the soundness of the Bank and the safety of the public deposites now, than

there was at the commencement of the late session of Congress? _My_ doubts are converted into certainty. And if the resolution binds the Treasury now, when will its obligation cease? It has in fact no obligation. The discretion and power of the Treasury Department belong to each moment, and cannot be bound for an hour by any resolution of Congress. They must be exercised and used in accordance with the views and exigencies of the moment; and if it can be proved that the Secretary is influenced by any sinister or corrupt design, he is undoubtedly amenable to Congress as well as for any other abuse of his public station. The resolution can only be regarded by him as _evidence_; and in this instance it is entirely discredited by established facts.

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would be placed entirely at the mercy of the state banks which should receive them.

The extent of that institution which gives it strength, would then be its weakness. As the paper of all the ~~Banks~~ Branches as well as the principal bank, is taken in payment of the revenue, and as the Exchange is every where in favor of the great cities where the revenue is collected, the notes of the most distant branches naturally flow into New York and Philadelphia, where they fall into the hands of the Collectors and are deposited in the Bank. This creates constant and heavy balances due from the interior to the Atlantic Offices.

By the monthly statement of 1st January last it appears that there was due from the various branches to the principal Bank no less than $17.901.588

Deduct amount due from the Bank to its branches — 1.156.621

Net amount due principal bank $16.744.967

By looking at the accounts of the interior branches we shall see whence this balance arises.

~~The Natchez Branch owes the other branches and the principal bank~~

4. The Natchez Branch owes the other branches and the principal bank ——— $3.141.571

While there is due to it from them only 2.869

Showing a balance against it of $3.138.702

The specie in that Branch is only —— 75.095

The Nashville Branch owes other offices 1.653.326

There is due ~~to it~~ from them ——— 294.139

Balance against it ——— $1.369.187

The specie in that Branch is — 205.988

So the Louisville Branch owes other offices 2.773.426

There is due ~~from it~~ from them ——— 244.893

Balance against it ——— $2.528.533

The specie in that Branch is — 335.142

Now it is apparent that if either of these Branches were suddenly called upon for but a small portion of these balances, it must stop payment.

It is not pretended, that the whole amount of these balances is due to the principal bank or the Atlantic Branches but it is not doubted that two thirds of it is.

If the government deposits were placed in State banks, at New York, & Philadelphia and other commercial points, the notes of all the Branches of the United States Bank would be receivable for revenue as they are now. They would

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therefore, continue to flow to those points as they have done heretofore; but, instead of being deposited in the Offices of the United States Bank, they would accumulate in the state banks where the revenue shall be deposited. In a short time, the interior branches would be as completely within the power of these state Banks as they are now within that of the principal bank. If the state banks used as depositories chose to do so, they could in less than six months stop half of the interior branches. By a sudden run upon them, one after another, with their paper, they would be as certainly ruined as that an adequate cause produces its natural effect. Nor could any precaution of the principal bank, in the present extended situation of its concerns, prevent it. Not knowing on what point the attack might be made and being unable to curtail its business soon enough to guard all points, it would find itself, with all its boasted power, at the mercy of one or two state banks. Instead of attacking the state institutions, it would be every where thrown on the defensive and obliged to beg for mercy.

Indeed, sir, if it be desirable to break up the Bank of the United States at once, I have no more doubt of the power of the Treasury to do it with the aid of a few state Banks, than I have of my existence; and in my opinion, if the deposites are changed, it will require great forbearance in the state banks to prevent that catastrophe.

That this result may follow the withdrawal of the deposits and that the responsibility in public opinion may rest upon the administration, ap=pears to be one ground of apprehension. That the Bank may stop payment is very possible; and in its bearings upon the future interests of the country, I should not regret the event. But whether any portion of the responsibility would in public opinion, fall upon the government or not, would depend, I think, on the man=ner in which the deposites should be removed. If the government were at once to order all the deposites of the Treasurer, of public offi=cers, and that for the payment of the public debt, to be transferred to the state Banks, it would be an unreasonable demand, and the Bank of the United States would have plausible ground for complaint. If it were

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then instantly to stop payment and set forth this heavy, sudden and it might say unexpected call of the government as the cause, it would undoubtedly make some impression upon public opinion. But if the government were to make no actual transfer of funds from the U.S. Bank to the State Banks - were simply to direct its future receipts to be placed in those Banks, and draw out the sum remaining in the United States Bank as it might be wanted for the service of the government upon the usual warrants of the Treasury, it would leave no ground to complain of an unreasonable demand; and if the U.S. Bank then stopped payment, the whole country would exclaim that it was produced, not by any act of the government but by its own mismanagement. Such an event under such circumstances so far from weakening the administration would prove to the whole people, that the doubts heretofore expressed were well founded and that the withdrawal of the deposits was an act of prudence as well as

of justice. If the Commissioners of loans were directed to deposit to the credit of the Treasurer all moneys on hand for payment of the public debt not now applied, and notice given that the debt would hereafter be paid only at the Treasury, and if the Public Officers were instructed to transfer their accounts to the State Banks only when they received the first warrant on those institutions, it would probably require four months to take from the Bank of the United States the whole of the public deposites.

If it be right to consider it as a political question, there is, in my opinion, every reason for prompt and decisive action. It may be assumed as an axiom, that the Bank is the uncompromising enemy of the party which has reelected Gen. Jackson and will exert all its mighty powers to distract and destroy it. The only way to impair its influence is to lessen its power. That power at the present moment, consists almost exclusively in its control over the revenues of the government

16691

The Exchange Committee boast, that on the first October last, "the State Banks of Phila=delphia, New York and Boston owed the Bank __ $2.280.000."

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On that day, the public deposits of all sorts at those three points, were $10.768.000. Had these been in the State Banks instead of the Bank of the United States, would the latter have had any cause to boast of its strength? I think it was in September or October last, that the New York Branch offered to lend the State Banks in that City a million of Dollars on interest. On the first of October, that Branch had in deposite $5.768.000 of public money. Had this been in the City Banks, could the Branch have shown its superiority by offering this loan? It was your money — the money of the Treasury — which it offered to loan — it is that only which gives it superiority, and a controlling power. Take it away, and its power is instantly crippled — its influence vanishes.

The heavy collection of revenue, particularly in New York, throws into the U.S. Bank occasionally heavy masses of the paper of the State Banks, which, if instantly presented, they might not be able to redeem. They are in grain its enemies, but they dare not speak and act, because they are often in its power. The same power extends, more or less, to all the state banks in the country, and to thousands of individuals. No complaints are heard of a tyrant while in the height of his power. His oppressions are borne in silence, lest complaint should cause them to be redoubled. But when the dread of his power is removed, men speak out. So will it be with the State Banks, and the other dependents of the United States Bank. Thousands of tongues, which are now tied, will be unloosened, and the administration will find defenders where it now looks for enemies.

The means of the Bank to corrupt men and presses by unusual loans would be diminished.

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Those who have suffered by its overtrading in every direction, having nothing more to hope, and feeling its hand press heavily upon them, would abuse it for mismanagement.

Rival powers in new state Banks would spring up in every quarter, all interested in putting down this Bank as a common enemy and prepared to support those who are engaged in the enterprize.

The measure would be supported by almost the entire South; in the West, it would strengthen the hands of our friends; in the North, they would hail it with delight; in New York, they would be united in its support; and if it produces any injurious effects in any quarter, it would be in Pennsylvania.

But a pervading benefit would arise from it in the energy it would every where inspire among the true supporters of the administration. In every direction, they are now in a state of doubt, hesitation and discouragement. They do not understand the administration in reference to the Bank. They ask whether the government intends to succumb to its power, and continue to supply it with arms to destroy its friends? They need some decisive act to reunite and inspirit them.

If nothing be done, the next Congress will come here also full of doubt and hesitation, open to all the insidious influences of this corrupting institution, and the administration will find itself embarrassed and finally thwarted in all its important measures. But if the leading question of the session shall be made beforehand; if the administration makes a bold stroke; if it throws itself upon the people, and those whom they have elected as its friends in the next Congress, with such an

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exposition as you can make out of the facts already known, many a man, who would equivocate and trim if a timid policy be pursued, will at once rally to your support. It is the nature of our race to support him who fearlessly defies danger, and meets responsibility with a face of conscious rectitude. But when leaders quail, what is to be expected from followers?

Are further reasons for action wanted? They can be had. You already know, that the business of the Bank is chiefly done by Committees without the agency or knowledge of the Board of Directors. You also know, that all government directors are now excluded from those Committees.

It can be shown, that after discounts have been refused by the Board of Directors, they have been granted by the Exchange Committee.

It can be shown, that one of the government Directors had made an effort to restore the business to the Board and was defeated by the casting vote of the President of the Bank.

It can be shown, that the extraordinary loans granted to Messrs Webb and Noah, which the Bank took so much pains last year to prove to be secure, had for some time been under protest.

It can be shown, that loans to certain members of Congress who suddenly changed their opinions in favor of the Bank last year, are also under protest.

It can be shown, that favored printers have been permitted to replace good endorsers with bad ones and afterwards been protested.

It can be shown, that favored printers have been permitted to overdraw largely, and that their notes have been renewed, contrary to all rules, without payment of the overdrafts. —

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There is scarcely an end to the reasons which may be adduced for speedy and decisive action.

The greatest difficulty, perhaps, is to find a substitute for the Bank of the United States, which shall render equal facilities to the Treasury Department. I do not doubt the practicability of it; but it can only be secured and maintained by the utmost caution and prudence. In the Atlantic cities there are many Banks more prudently managed and more to be trusted than the Bank of the United States. In finding safe depositories at those points, there is no difficulty. It is otherwise in the interior. But it will not be necessary to touch the interior Banks to any great extent. The money received from sales of public lands may be drawn out in the West for Indian, army and land office expenditures almost as fast as it is received; and if there be any deficiency, it can be supplied by drafts on the Atlantic depositories.

But it is practicable, I think, to combine some of the safest State Banks in every quarter of the Union into such an organization as will render them as efficient and safe for government purposes as the Bank of the United States could be under the best management. Incidentally also, by an understanding among themselves, they might manage the *bona fide* domestic exchanges of the country in a manner as beneficial to the community, as the U.S. Bank now does.

There are many reasons in favor of attempting such an arrangement and at an early day. If a machine composed entirely of State Banks can be organized and put into successful operation, it will cut up root and branch, the

whole argument in favor of rechartering the present Bank of the United States by showing *practically* that it is not necessary. It is but three years to the expiration of the Bank charter. To me it is quite evident, that no institution upon a different plan will be established. The present Bank will prevent it with the hope of getting a new charter from the President and Congress which may come after Gen. Jackson. A new machine cannot be organized and put into operation in a day, nor could the Deposits be removed in a day from one Bank to another. It therefore would seem necessary, without regard to the present question, to put on foot, at no distant day, measures with a view to this result.

Pardon me for a few words in relation to my own views and feelings. I have, with all my might, labored to put down this institution, with no other motive than because I believe its prolonged existence fatal to the purity of our republican institutions. The deserved popularity of Gen. Jackson has enabled him to defeat it designs, while he has successfully encountered other corrupting systems, which are to be built up. A new combination is now forming of which the Bank is the nucleus and the citadel. It looks to a period beyond Gen. Jackson's term and anticipates an easy victory over those who, without his popularity, may attempt to perpetuate his principles. — The Tariff question could not be used, and it has been postponed. The Land project is expected to buy up whole States, and sections of the Union. Internal Improvements are to be revived. The Bank is to support its supporters,

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and send its life blood through the arteries of the whole combination. From an overflowing Treasury, as well as a corrupt Bank, the purses and instruments of this new scheme are to be fed and rewarded. — .

If the government will use its power, the head of this new born and illformed dragon may be at once crushed, and all his efforts entirely paralized. But if the administration feed him until he acquire consistency and strength, whom can they expect to fight him for their benefit? I confess I shall despair of any good in continuing the war. If, with the proof display of all the abuses and corruptions of this institution, the people do not sustain their government in an honest act of vindication, there is more corruption abroad than I suppose, and we may give up all hope of the republic. I know that many of our best friends feel as I do, they are willing to continue as long as there is hope; but they say it is useless to buffet the Bank with our left hand, so long as we feed it with our right. Nothing can induce them to continue the war, but some decisive demonstration of its policy on the part of the administration ~~[illegible]~~ something which shall promise a beneficial result — something that holds out to them a more cheering prospect than that of being the last to be devoured. —

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Washington March 17th. 1833.

My Dr Sir:

presuming that the gentleman who is preparing for me the four pieces of silver ware ordered, ~~[illegible]~~ at the prices named in your letter, I have to request to add two dozzen table ~~plates~~, have added tea spoons, places and two dozzen, letters A. J. on each - add them with the bill and have them forwarded to the care of Josiah with the others Nichol merchant Nashville, forwarding to me the bills, for which I will send you a check for the whole. I have to tender you my thanks for the elegant present # with which you ~~[illegible]~~ It gives me great pleasure to learn that your appointment has given such general satisfac-tion, and I shall always rejoice to hear of your prosperity

with my respects to your amiable family I am with great respect

yr mo, obdt. servt,

Andrew Jackson

This your friend, & son elegant specimen of the arts, will be preserved by me as a memento of your kindness.

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White House. Near Gallatin Tenn.
March 17th 1833.

To President Jackson,

Dear Friend,

In these two Words much is expressed, and still more implied. Your friendly letter of the 20th ult. was received by due course of Mail, the perusal of which impressed me afresh with those increasing reflections which should ever keep up in mind of the fraternity that exists between man and his "brother & Companion" in this Vale of human misery — I should have written you frequently but I knew you were unceasingly engaged in watching & planning for the safety of the republick — O! those [illegible] Jacobins! of the South — [illegible] — that would raise the Whirlwind of revolution — which might shake down the Temple of Liberty & demolish the altars of piety in our American Canaan — they now feel as the Devil did — when rebuked by the Saviour, with a "get thee hence Satan" — They feel that they are looked at by the Eye of Authority, which vigilantly guards the interests of the gr^t^ American family — I think all good Citizens should ever pray in accordance with the instructions of the Apostle of Gentiles — "I exhort therefore that first of all supplications, prayers, intercessions & giving of thanks, be made for all men — For Kings (Rulers) and for all that are in authority, that we may lead quiet & peaceable lives — (how different from the boiling pot of Nullification) in all godliness & honesty — For this is good and accep-table in the sight of God our Saviour" — I humbly trust, that the fair fabrick of our political & religious liberty will endure till Sun, Moon & Stars shall fail — when the tribes & kindreds of the whole earth shall see the light, by virtue of which every man shall behold in the face of his neighbour the features of a former brother — I enclose you two documents — One written & the other printed — The written one is a fac simile of Dr A. Clarke's letter to certain brethren of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States — This paper was presented to you, through me by the [illegible] Friend & Father Bishop M^c^Kendree, as a token of respect & good will towards you Sir — Once the expression of American [illegible] that flowed in the heart of "the learned Irishman" lately the ornament of the Scientific & religious world — File this paper among the archives of your most invaluable State papers — The venerable Clarke now sleeps in the peaceful Tomb. Close by the side of [illegible] Wesley — [illegible] with Cholera — [illegible] — The printed paper relates as you will see to a very tender subject — it needs no [illegible] to you [illegible] pleasure! Show this letter and the printed paper to [illegible] — & to any of your family or friends — and then [illegible] it [illegible] — for my sake — the sake of the dear Mother of such a [illegible] — [illegible] as a little one in lieu of the beloved Martha —

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and we call her "Malcom Rosa". She was born on the 19th of Nov. 1832. If you have leisure, please to write me on the reception of this — and as often as leisure and inclination will permit — Mrs Cryer is in rather a shattered State of bodily health — the mental excitement consequent on our Martha's affliction & death then lying in So Soon afterwards — & since, a violent attack of pleurisy — all in close succession have well night worn her down — but I still trust She may be Spared to me and her little ones — all whom are well — and little Rachel is both cheerful and Smart — & grows finely — please to accept the tender expression of the same best wishes for your happiness in this life — and more especially your safe & triumphant entrance into the Everlasting Kingdom of our Lord & Saviour Jesus Christ — who suffered the Just for the unjust, that He might bring us to God" —

Your friend & brother
H. M. Cryer

P.S. You ask for some information relative to the report of the Hero Dyke & his Nephew Gander I do not give him a place in the body of my letter, he is only entitled to P.Script notice. It is true Sir — Young Mr. Bunton was called to the door of his boarding house after supper — by the voice of Genl. Dyke's little negro boy — saying "Mass Jonny Mass Jonny, a gentleman here wants to see you" — Young Bunton got up from the table — presuming of his Sweetheart — to whom he was to have been married in a week — and as he stepped out of the house — looking he saw no man — nor boy — and taking two steps from the door — He received a Shower of Leaden Slugs. 15 or 16 of which hit him — & 13 or 14 I am told penetrated the weatherboarding of the house — Doubtless the Hero of the Breach & Marriage Conspiracy Shot — him — He has since sent his Wife adrift — and I am creditably informed has filed a Bill for a divorce — charging his fair lady with the Crime of A...ty — with John Bunton his Nephew — So the Wound Women of — Some say — she seduced the young man — Some say. She was So badly treated by the "Russian Boar" — her husband — that she has suffered him to think her guilty in order to get loose from him — I am of the opinion they are all three rather "Currish" in nature and perhaps — have eaten the dog in the dark — more ways than one — Bunton is well — & it is said — Dyke is rather "Skittish"! — Some say — he has been "Snapp'd at" at his own Window —

H. M. C. —

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Revd. Mr Conger —
answered and to
be carefully pre
=served — A. B.

My dear Sir

I submit for your perusal the enclosed papers. If they will be of any service at this particular juncture, I shall be pleased.

With the highest
Respect. Your Obt. St.
[signature] Smith
18th March. 1833.

To the President.

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(Confidential)

Washington March 18th 1833.

Dear Sir

The other evening you inquired, the best Bank in Philadelphia. I avail of the occasion to repeat what I then replied. The Girard Bank. This Bank was incorporated by an act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania in 1831-2. with a Capital of One Million and a half of Dollars. nearly the whole of which has been paid in, and the remaining installments called for and to be paid immediately. James Schott President, Wm. D. Lewis Cashier, this latter Gentleman Mr McLane is personally acquainted, being a Delaware man. One accommodation this bank has over almost any other in Philadelphia, for any confidential purposes of the Government is, that it is not tinctured with Biddleism, while most of the others are.

That you may be able to judge, of the

16622.

(Confidential)

Washington March 18th 1833

Dear Sir

The other evening you inquired, the best Bank in Philadelphia. I avail of the occasion to repeat what I then replied. The Girard Bank. This Bank was incorporated by an act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania in 1831–2. with a Capital of One Million and a half of Dollars, nearly the whole of which has been paid in, and the remaining installments call'd for and to be paid immediately. James Schott President, Wm. D. Lewis Cashier. this latter Gentleman Mr McLane is personally acquainted, being a Delaware man. One recommendation this bank has over almost any other in Philadelphia for any confidential purposes of the Government is, that it is not tinctured with Biddleism, which most of the others are.

That you may be able to judge, of

the

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facility with which the financial operations of the Government may be conducted through the medium of the State Banks, in case of a transfer of the deposits from the Bank of the United States, I hand you the enclosed; which will give you the view of their safety, their extended correspondence and connexions throughout the whole of the United States, of their consequent ability to make collections and transfers, upon and to almost any part of the Union. This gives you the condition and capacity of one Bank only. In each of the large cities there are a number, of equal responsibility and ability.

It appears to me that facts enough, have come before the public in relation to the condition of the Bank, to convert what was doubtful a few months since into certainty; and that it is now clearly established by those facts, that the Bank cannot be longer considered as a safe depository of the monies of the people.

If such an opinion be established, no other motive can be required for action on the part of the Government. The effect of the measure of transferring the public monies from the United States Bank to the State Banks, will in my opinion (besides being Justified by the Law) be as popular throughout the country, as any one, which the present administration has ever adopted. If a political impulse was desired, that will be obtained in an eminent degree by the measure. By it you disenthral millions whose lips are now sealed. By it you relieve the State institutions from the power, which the Bank of the United States exercises over them, (particularly in the large cities) derived entirely from the collection of the revenue. By it, you enable the payers of the public revenue to receive such accommodation as they may wish, during the period the Government does not call for their money, which the State Banks, will grant, and which the United States Bank, cannot grant owing to their own

embar.

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embarrassments, which is in proof in their own statements. The Report of the Bank to the Committee of Ways & Means states, "the month of October was regarded as a month of great embarrassment" and that the "Revenue to the Government" payable in New York in October and November was $3.225.277— and it is also in proof from the Bank that between the 26th September and 3d of October the Branch at New York curtailed their discounts $1.008.302. and during the two months while collecting and accumulating this large sum on a/c of the revenue, they further curtailed their discounts more than $600.000— Their own necessities were evidently such that instead of aiding, they were driven to oppress, the payers of the revenue to the Government.

In 1811, upon the expiration of the charter of the old Bank of the United States, and transfer of the public accounts to the State Banks, the Government was very particular that they should grant facilities to the payers of the Revenue; this was a very popular measure, & it would be so again.

The

The removal of the public deposits from the Bank of the U. States will expose its true condition and its extreme weakness, and in place of bringing censure upon the Government, excepting from its present implacable enemies, it will command the admiration and applause of the people, for the foresight and wisdom of a measure which has preserved and secured millions of their property.

I have the honor

Very Respectfully
to be
Your Mo: ob: Sert.

R. M. Whitney

To
The President

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To/ The President

1833, Mar 19.

The relation in which the Government stands toward the Bank of the United States renders it desirable if not indispensably necessary, that a decision should be now made covering the whole ground, and which will establish rules for our Government during my administration.

With this view I invite the attention of my cabinet to a full consideration of the following points, viz

3 The propriety of acquiescing in the renewal of the charter of the present Bank, under any circumstances or with any modifications? and if with any modifications, what ought they to be?

4. The propriety of assenting to the establishment of a new Bank — and if a new Bank, when and in what manner ought the suggestion to be made of my views on the subject? and upon what principles, and under what limitations and with what privileges ought a new institution to be formed?

1 whether any thing has occurred to lessen the impression at the commencement of the late session of congress, as to the safety of the Bank of the united States, so far as regards the public deposits.

2 whether the management of the institution is such that the government can rely upon it as an agent in carrying into effect the fiscal arrangements of the treasury, as well as whether it has been heretofore a faithful agent in that respect.

3 —

34-a

5. What system ought to be established for the future disposition of the public moneys; so far as relates to the places for their deposit, and the manner of their distribution? And if the deposits are withdrawn from the Bank of the U S would it be necessary to receive the public dues in the notes of all the Banks, or to limit the payments to the notes of those Banks that may be selected as the places of deposits & the agents of the fiscal concerns of the Government?

The results of my own reflection are

1. That the charter of the present Bank ought under no circumstances and upon no conditions whatever to be renewed

2. That the ground gained by the veto ought to be firmly maintained, and that my assent ought to be withheld from any bill authorising the establishment of a Bank out of the District of Columbia

3. That if my assent is given to the establishment of a new Bank it ought to be

to one located in the district of Columbia, having the right to establish Branches in the different states and in such places thereof only with the permission of the different States upon the application of the Bank for that purpose, and under such restrictions as the several States may think proper to impose: And even with these restrictions that the Government shall have the right to appoint the President and as many directors of the Principal Bank & the Branches thereof as will secure fidelity, and a thorough knowledge by the proper officers of the Government of its transactions: And also that Congress should retain the right to repeal or modify the charter from time to time as it may deem proper, as a security against the corruptions and evils which are now experienced from the uncontrollable authority of the present Bank.

4 That such an institution ought not to be recommended until a full and fair experiment has been made to

carry on the fiscal affairs of the Govt. without a national Bank of any description.

3. If this last view of the subject be adopted it will be necessary now to devise and settle a system for the deposit and distribution of the public fund thro the agency of the State Banks to go into operation at such a time as shall upon a careful consideration of the subject be thought most advisable.

These suggestions are submitted to the consideration and free discussion of the members of the cabinet, giving, each, their opinions in writing.

Andrew Jackson

March 19. 1833.

Questions &c on the Bank of the United States, submitted to the Cabinet, March 19th 1833

The relation in which the Government stands towards the Bank of the U. States renders it desirable, if not indispensably necessary, that a decision should be now made, which will cover the whole ground and furnish rules for the Government during the residue of my administration.

With this view I invite the attention of my Cabinet to a full consideration of the following points viz

I The propriety of acquiescing in the renewal of the charter of the present Bank under any circumstances.

2^d. The establishment of a new Bank —

3^d. The ~~state~~ disposition of the deposits belonging to the Government now in Bank —

4th. The establishment of a system for the future disposition of the public funds, so far as relates to the places of deposit, & the manner of their distribution.

The results of my own reflections are as follows.

1st. That the charter of the present Bank ought under no circumstances

and upon no conditions to be renewed.

2.° That the ground which has been gained by the Veto ought to firmly maintained, & my assent withheld from any bill proposing to ~~est~~ establish a Bank any where out of the District of Columbia,

3.° That if my assent is given to the establishment of a new Bank, it should be to one ~~established~~ located in this district, without the right of establishing branches in the States, but with permission to apply to the Legislatures of the several States for permission to carry

on Banking operations in the States under the State laws upon the same terms that are allowed to others, or such as the State may think proper; and that once in such course a right to repeal or modify the charter ought to be reserved to Congress, as a security agst. the abuses which are now experienced from the uncontrollable authority of the present Bank.

4. Such an Institution ought not to be recommended until a fair experiment has been made to carry on the affairs of the Government without a National Bank

of any description

5th If this view of the subject be adopted it is necessary to devise & settle a system now for the deposit & distribution of the ~~present~~ public funds through the agency of the State Banks, to go into operation at such a time as shall upon a careful consideration of the subject be thought most advisable.

These suggestions are submitted to the ~~[illegible]~~ consideration & free discussion of the members

of the Cabinet

[illegible]
As to Bank U. S. sup-
posed in March 1833

Culpeper Ct House } March 19th 1833
Virginia }

Dear Sir,

Upon my leaving Washington for this place to visit my relations, I addressed to you a few lines expressing my obligations for your friendship and kindness whilst in your city, and handed them to General McCarty; I have thought since that I would explain to you a little more fully the circumstances and the motives which induced me to solicit some employment under the general government. — It is well known to every person who knows me in Kentucky and Indiana that I have been the uniform and untiring advocate of the present President since 1826, and that I have made some efforts in behalf of Mr Van Buren. We all know that the public expect the meritorious friends of a successful party to be countenanced and occasionally sustained by those in power, and that when they are entirely neglected and overlooked it is prima facie evidence that they are not meritorious. It has appeared to me peculiarly unfortunate that I should not succeed in any application when my whole people are willing to manifest and have frequently an unlimited confidence in and enthusiastic to me, and when my Senators and Representatives select me as the only individual upon whom they can all unite in recommending to the President, that still I should fail —

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There are some other circumstances which render it almost necessary for the continuance of my political character and influence, that I should be sustained at present by the government. —
It is known in Indiana that I received letters from our Senators, some of which you saw purporting to detail conversations with the President in regard to me in which they say the President assured them that he designed to "serve me on the first opportunity;" whether their statements be correct I know not, but the effect is bad on me and the President; if their statements are true they make the President hold out false inducements to his friends, which, by the by, I believe he never does — and if they are not true, they slander him and the public ought to be disabused. —
I have been and am embarrassed in my pecuniary affairs in consequence of paying money as security, and in consequence of having my library, wardrobe and furniture consumed by fire, and it was very inconvenient for me to leave home which must increase my difficulties; five hundred dollars however would relieve me from the whole of them for they all do not exceed that sum, but even that is difficult to be obtained in my State where the sole dependance is upon the practice of the law. —
There must be certainly various modes by which in rendering service to the government I could in a few months acquire that amount, by being bearer of despatches, visitor of the land offices in the West, or any other agency at home or abroad. I do not mention any of these

things as constituting any claim or qualification on my part, nor do I wish them to be so con-sidered, but I mention them that, in cases where my qualifications are equal to those of others, they may have that influence to which they are entitled and which truth, justice and liberality will accord to them. —

Let me hear from you shortly; your friend & svt

William B Slaughter

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Wm. B. Slaughter,
Culpeper C. H. Va.
19 March 1833.

Free
W. McCarty
M.C.

Wm B Lewis
City of Washington
D. of Columbia

Referred to the Secretary of the Treasury for enquiry [illegible] A. J.

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, Washington, } March 20th 1833

PAY to Francis & Boardman or bearer,

twelve — — — dollars, 50/100

Andrew Jackson

12 DOLLS. 50/100

2 10

15. 16629

Andrew Jackson Prest. U.S.A.

To Francis & Boardman Dr.

To subscription for 5 copies Life Writings & opinions of Thos. Jefferson @ $2.50 pr. in Coll. — $12.50/100

Recd. Payment Francis & Boardman

By R H Toomer

Washington March 20. 1833

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Washington 20th March 1833

Dear Sir,

I duly received your note of the 18th inst. in which you do me the honor to request my opinion upon certain points connected with the public revenue and the Bank of the United States.

"1. The propriety of agreeing to the rechartering of the present Bank of the United States under any circumstances."

I entirely concur with you in the opinion, that it ought not under any circumstances to be rechartered. Its abounding corruptions are too notorious and too flagrant to entitle it to the least favor, and much less to a renewal of its privileges and immunities. But if its management had been unexceptionable, the power it concentrates, the encroachments it covers on the rights of the States and its incompatibility with the Constitution, constitute insurmountable objections.

"2. The establishment of a new Bank."

"3. The disposition of the public deposits now in Bank."

"4. The establishment of a system for the deposit of the public funds and the disposition of them and manner of distribution."

These three points I propose to consider together.

The conduct of the managers of the present Bank; their interference with the payment of the public debt; the subterfuges and falsehoods resorted to by them to palliate their own illegal conduct; their base attempts to make the Government responsible for their acts; their notorious corruption of the press and of public men; the part taken by them in the political conflicts of the Country; the extravagant and mischievous extension of their loans, particularly in the West, prior to the late presidential election, and the character of the debts

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there contracted; the exclusion of the government directors from all Committees and consequently from all participation in the principal business of the Bank — constitute an irresistable mass of evidence proving those who control the institution to be destitute of just principle, of prudence and truth, and consequently unworthy to be trusted with the money of the people. At the commencement of the late session of Congress; you expressed doubts of the safety of the public deposits in their hands; and so far from being removed these doubts must have been strengthened and confirmed by developments since made.

A few days ago I took the liberty of ~~[illegible]~~ submitting to the Secretary of the Treasury somewhat at large, my views on this and other points, a copy of which I send herewith for your perusal. I will only add on this point, that if the people of the United States are so corrupt or deluded, that they will not sustain their government in taking the public money out of the hands of an institution proved by indisputable evidence to be guilty of almost every crime which a Bank can commit, they are prepared for the yoke of a master. But we have no right, notwithstanding the resolution of the House of Representatives, to distrust the purity and intelligence of the people. If, however, I knew that the measure would lead to a doubtful conflict, I would take the public deposits out of that Bank. It is better to fail in an attempt to put down corruption and preserve the purity of our institutions, than enjoy ease and office under a heartless Bank government.

I The more I see of the present Bank, the less I like a National Bank of any sort. It impairs the morals of our people, corrupts our Statesmen and is dangerous to liberty. If it can be effected, therefore, I would prefer the employment of the state institutions in the service of the Treasury

5. That all public officers be instructed to transfer their accou-
-nts to the State banks when they shall receive the first
warrants on those institutions;

6. That there be an understanding with the State banks
~~when they shall receive the first warrants~~
employed by the government, that they shall extend all
reasonable and safe indulgence to the other State banks
and such accommodations to the debtors of the government
as necessity and sound policy may from time to time
require.

Perhaps it would be impossible altogether to prevent
some degree of jealousy among those State banks which
may not be employed by the government, but by a
liberal policy it can be allayed. In places where large
masses of public revenue are collected, it might be
politic to employ more than one bank, and if these
pursue a policy towards the rest which would make the
public favor in some degree a common benefit, little
or no complaint will be heard.

If, as I verily believe is practicable, such a system were
organized and put in successful operation, it would prove
to demonstration, that the Bank of the United States is
not a necessary means of ~~[illegible]~~ executing the delegated powers of
this Government and entirely overthrow the only argument
upon which the Constitutionality of the institution is
maintained.

I look upon this as a critical moment. Upon the deter-
-mination at which you and your Cabinet shall now
arrive, depends, in my opinion, the character of this
government for years to come. A new scheme to govern
the American people by fraud and corruption, has been
matured. The means of execution are the Bank, the Public
Lands, an overflowing Treasury and Internal Improvements.
Its projectors can do nothing but arrange their plans and

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to the reestablishment of any national bank. I have great confidence, that, through the agency of a few State banks, the revenue may be collected, the moneys transferred and every necessary aid afforded to the Treasury as cheaply and as safely as by the present bank of the United States. Entertaining this belief. I suggest the following outline of the policy which I think would at this moment most redound to the interest of the country and the honor and strength of the administration.

1. That steps be immediately taken to ascertain what State banks are best managed, most safe and most willing to aid the Government in effecting its views and policy; and that such an understanding be formed between them as will produce in the collection and distribution of the public revenue the same beneficial results as are now produced by the Bank of the United States and Branches.

2. That as soon as an arrangement can be matured with a few Banks at the most important points, the Collectors and others receiving public money be directed to deposit them in the selected Banks.

3. That the Commissioners of Loans be forthwith directed to deposit to the credit of the Treasurer all moneys set apart for the payment of the public debt and not now applied, forward their accounts and Books to the Treasury Department, and that notice be given that the public debt will hereafter be paid only at the Treasury.

4. That the public money now in the Bank of the United States be drawn upon by the usual warrants of the Treasury for the ordinary expenditures of the government and the payment of the public debt until it be exhausted, before any warrant shall be drawn on the new deposit in the State Banks.

marshal their forces while you hold the veto power. But they look beyond your term of service and expect to elect as your Successor some one and any one who will agree to be their creature and instrument. To you, Sir, the friends of a good and pure government look to settle the remaining great questions of national policy and strike from the hands of Corruption its means to do mischief. The most effectual blow which can now be struck is, by a removal of the public deposits, to cripple the Bank of the United States and deprive the conspirators of the aid which they expect from its money and power. By one act you would weaken if not destroy a powerful enemy and raise up powerful friends; the Bank managers would have full employment in maintaining their own defences instead of affording the administration any annoyance; and I doubt whether their utmost exertions could save the institution from a sudden ruin. Deprived of this powerful auxiliary, I think the other weapons of the corrupt league might easily be parried or turned against them.

The public mind is now completely at a stand. The events of the last session of Congress have thrown it into a state of hesitation and doubt in relation to the future course of the administration and arrangement of parties. Men do not know where to find their political principles and friends, and the pure men of the Country are watching the course of the administration with intense anxiety. If the Bank, that great enemy of republicanism, now so completely within your power, shall not only be spared but continued to be armed from the Treasury with means to destroy those to whom we look for support, they will abandon the contest in despair, satisfied that the administration is wanting either in the courage or in the good faith to support its supporters. They will justly conclude, that to contend further with

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an institution, which, though proved corrupt to the core and its mortal enemy, the administration is determined to foster, would not only be unavailing but an act of folly; and they will settle down in the painful conviction, that after thwarting all your efforts for the public good during the current four years, it will elect your successor, secure a new charter and be forever thereafter the controlling power in the nation. But if the future course of the administration be distinctly marked out, if the first blow shall be to cripple the Bank, and if it be followed up by an exposure of the corruptions of Mr Clay's land bill and the abandonment of all principle in the recent coalition of two desperate leaders and its first acts, the true men of the country will rally around the administration with new enthusiasm, and it will find in Congress and among the people a strength and a power which the combined factions will find it impossible to withstand. All the vital questions of national policy may then be settled during your continuance in office; and, by depriving ambitious men of the means of corruption, you will relieve the country from its greatest dangers and bequeath to your grateful fellow citizens a long period of happiness and prosperity.

I pray you to excuse the freedom with which I write. I should not have felt satisfied with myself if I were to do less than give you my convictions of the importance of the present crisis. Having done so, I resign myself to any course which may be deemed best, careless of its consequences to my own interests or hopes.

With the highest respect

Your Obt. Servt.

Gen. Andrew Jackson } Signed Amos Kendall

President &c

Copy
Amos Kendall
To
Gen. Jackson
20th March 1833.

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1

Washington 20th March 1833

Dear Sir,

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by developments since made.

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~~debtors~~ of the government as necessity and sound policy may, ~~seem~~ from time to time, ~~to~~ require.

Perhaps it would be impossible altogether to prevent some degree of jealousy among those state banks which may not be employed by the government; but by a liberal policy it can be allayed. In places where large masses of public revenue are collected, it might be politic to employ more than one Bank; and if these pursue a policy towards the rest which would make the public favor in some degree a common benefit, little or no complaint will be heard.

If, as I verily believe is practicable, such a system were organized and put in successful operation, it would prove to demonstration that the Bank of the United States is not a necessary means of executing the delegated powers of this government and entirely overthrow the only argument upon which the constitutionality of the institution is maintained.

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beyond your term of service and expect to elect as your successor some one and any one who will agree to be their creature and instrument. To you, sir, the friends of a good and pure government look to settle the remaining great questions of national policy and strike from the hands of corruption its means to do mischief. The most effectual blow which can now be struck is, by a removal of the public deposites, to cripple the Bank of the United States and deprive the conspirators of the aid which they expect from its money and power. By one act you would weaken if not destroy a powerful enemy and raise up powerful friends; the Bank managers would have full employment in maintaining their own defences instead of affording the administration any annoyance; and I doubt whether their utmost exertions could save the institution from a sudden ruin. Deprived of this powerful auxiliary, I think the other weapons of the corrupt league might easily be parried or turned against them.

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watching the course of the administration with intense anxiety.
If the Bank, that great enemy of republicanism, now so
completely within your power, shall not only be spared but
continue to be armed from the Treasury with ~~means~~
to destroy those to whom we look for support, they
will abandon the contest in despair, satisfied that the
administration is wanting either in the courage or in
the good faith to support its supporters. They will justly
conclude, that to contend further with an institution, which,
though proved corrupt to the core and its mortal ene-
my, the administration is determined to foster, would not
only be unavailing but an act of folly; and they
will settle down in the painful conviction, that after
thwarting all your efforts for the public good during
the current four years, it will elect your successor,
secure a new charter and be forever thereafter the
controlling power in this nation. But if the future
course of the administration be distinctly marked out;
if the first blow shall be to cripple the Bank; and
if it be followed up by an exposure of the corruptions
of Mr. Clay's land bill and the abandonment of all
principle in the recent coalition of two desperate leaders
and its first acts, the true men of the country will

rally around the administration with new enthusiasm, and it will find in Congress and among the people a strength and a power which the combined factions will find it impossible to withstand. All the vital questions of national policy may then be settled during your continuance in office; and, by depriving ambitious men of the means of corruption, you will relieve the country from its greatest dangers and bequeath to your grateful fellow citizens a long period of happiness and prosperity.

I pray you to excuse the freedom with which I write. I should not have felt satisfied with myself if I were to do less than give you my convictions of the importance of the present crisis. Having done so, I resign myself to any course which may be deemed best, careless of its consequences to my own interests or hopes.

With the highest respect

Your Obt Servt

Amos Kendall

Gen. Andrew Jackson

President &c.

Washington March 21st 1833—

Dear Sir

your letter by Mr Clay was handed me on his arrival, and has lain by me ever since for a conveyance, and the determination of Mr Clay whether he would return to you added to this cause of delay, the pressure of public business with which I was surrounded, nulli=fication, supported by the corruptions influence of the Bank, with the union of Calhoun & Clay, which collected around them the corrupt & wicked of all parties, engaged all my attention to counteract their combinations, and defeat their wicked projects — I met nullification at its threshold — my proclamation was well timed, it opened the eyes of the people to the wicked designs of the nullifiers, whose actings had been carried on in silence, whilst its osten=sible object, which deluded the people, were "a peaceable & constitutional modification of the tariff" — The tariff was made the ostensible object, when a separation of the union by the potomac, & a southern confederacy, was the true one — The proclamation drew the attention of the people to the subject, and from Maine to Louisiana, the united voice of the people repu=diated the absurd & wicked doctrine of nullification & secession, and the accounts of to day inform us, that South Carolina has repealed her ordinances, and all the laws based upon it — Thus dies nullification and the doctrine of secession, never more to be heard of, only in holding up to scorn and indignation its projectors and abettors, and handing them down to posterity as traitors to the best of governments.

The treaty is as good a one as we could expect or desire — and if you can close the other as satisfactory it will be a happy

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result, and place you in the highest rank
of an able and fortunate diplomatist.

Mr Clay has conversed with me freely, & has concluded under all circumstances to return to you - had he not rest assured I should have endeavoured to have selected one that would have capable and trust worthy - one who would not have carried a fair exterior of friendship, whilst in the dark, he was undermining you and acting the part of an opposer. I assure you the place would have been difficult to fill, & I had turned my thoughts to Mr Vail charge de affairs, at London, had not Mr Clay agreed to return, Mr Vail having signified as soon as relieved by a minister ~~has signified~~ that he would remain as secretary abroad

The determination of Mr Clay to return to you, has relieved me from the enquiry, he is attached to you, and can be left as charge de affairs when your duty to your aged mother ~~think~~ may make it necessary proper ~~for~~ to return to your country

Knowing as I do, that you will not leave your station until you bring to a close ~~your~~ the negotiation now under discussion, I have said to the secretary of State to grant you permission to return whenever you may ask it - I now give you mine, that should the emergency arise & make it inconvenient for you to remain until you could write & get an answer, that you may take the benefit of this.

I must refer you to the papers which I have directed the secretary of State to send you for the news, ~~and~~ politics of the day, and of this country - barely adding that in the late congressional election

good old Democratic Pennsylvania
stuck by me — I was well sustained by
the people, and my debt of gratitude
is heightened, and my exertions must
and vigilance must be doubled to
~~to~~ continue the administration of the government
to their prosperity & happiness —

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(Private) Copy — A. J.

Washington, March 21. 1833.

Dear Sir,

Your letter by Mr. Clay was handed me on his arrival. The fact of there being no means of conveyance, my not having ascertained Mr. Clay's determination in regard to his return to you, and the immense and heavy pressure of public business have caused me to delay my reply. Nullification, the corrupting influence of the Bank, the union of Calhoun and Clay supported by the corrupt and wicked of all parties engaged all my attention. The liberty of the people requires that wicked projects and evil combinations against the government should be exposed and counteracted. I met Nullification at its threshold. My proclamation was well timed as it at once opened the eyes of the people to the wicked designs of the nullifiers, whose real motives had too long remained concealed. The people ceased to be deluded by the promise of securing by nullification "a peaceable and constitutional modification of the Tariff." They investigated the subject, and saw that, although the Tariff was made the ostensible object, a separation of the confederacy was the real purpose of ~~many of the distinguished~~ its originators & promoters ~~men of even our happy Republic~~.

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The

The expression of public opinion, elicited by the ~~issuing~~ ~~of the~~ ~~solemn~~ proclamation, from Maine to Louisiana has so firmly repudiated the absurd doctrines of Nullification and Secession that ~~I think~~ it not probable that we will shortly be troubled with them again.

The advices of to day inform us that South Carolina has repealed her Ordinance and all the laws based upon it. Thus die nullification and Secession, but leave behind the remembrance of their authors and abettors which holds them up to Scorn and indignation, and will transmit them to posterity as traitors to the best of Governments.

The Treaty is as good a one as we could expect or desire, and, if you can close the other as Satisfactorily, it will be a happy result and place you in the highest rank of our able and fortunate Diplomatists.

Mr. Clay has conversed with me freely and determined, under all the circumstances, to return to you. If Mr. Clay had not taken this determination ~~announced~~, be well assured that your request in respect to his successor would have received my anxious attention. You should have had one in whome you could with safety Confide. I had thought of Mr. Vail now at London, who has signified his inclination to remain abroad as Secretary of Legation when relieved by a Minister.

Mr. Clay can be left as Chargé d'affaires, when

Your

your duty to your aged Mother may make it necessary and proper for you to return to your Country.

Knowing, as I do, that you will not leave your post, ~~or station~~ untill you bring to a close the negotiation now under discussion, I have said to the Secretary of State to grant you permission to return whenever you may ask it. But should an emergency arise which will render it inconvenient, if not impossible, for you to write ~~to~~ and receive an answer from the State Department before, from your mothers health, it may be necessary for you to return, you will consider yourself as being hereby authorised to leave the court of Russia for return leaving ~~to return~~ Mr Clay in charge of our affairs there. I must refer you to the newspapers, which I have requested the Secretary of State to send you, for the news and poletics of the day. I must, however, add that, in the late election, good old Democratic Pennsylvania has greatly increased my debt of gratitude to her, which I can only attempt to discharge by renewed and unceasing vigilance and exertions in so administering the govern=ment as to perpetuate the prosperity and happiness of the *whole* people. Make my best respects to Lt. Barry and believe me to be Your friend.

To
James Buchannan Esqr.
Minister P. &c. &c.

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copy to J. Buchanan
Envoy Extraordinary
& Minister Plenipoten-
tiary at Russia
March 21st
1833

Genl. Andrew Jackson

(private) Charleston

21 March 1833

My dear Sir

I had the pleasure yesterday to receive your letter of the 6th March by the hands of Col. Drayton, who arrived here in tolerable health.

I congratulate you and the nation on returning tranquillity, and I may be allowed to express to you the gratitude I feel for the wisdom and decision of your counsels on this trying occasion. The tariff bill is certainly not exactly what we could have wished, nor such as we might have obtained at the next session of Congress. but it has served as a pretext to the nullifiers to assume a pacific attitude and we are satisfied - I did not write to you during the sitting of the Convention at Columbia because Mr. Mc. Creddy was instructed to write daily to Mr. Mc. Lane and give you an exact and detailed account of the proceedings of that body. He may not have informed you of what I have since learnt - The movement party are not satisfied with the decision of the Convention - S. L. Wilson once Governor of the state, Turnbull and others of the same character were anxious to go on, and continue the

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the agitation in the state. The Leaders were compelled to yield in some measure to this disposition, or they would have lost all influence over their party. The silly ordinance with which they closed their labours is the fruit of that compromise. The proposal to pass a test oath was abandoned, and the union party is not called upon to resist any new act of tyranny. I told them, that they might make any declarations of their political faith they thought proper, assert any abstract rights they pleased, and so long as they did no more and did not attempt to carry them out into practice, ~~that~~ should remain quiet. I think it now important to remain quite tranquil, for there are so many causes of discord among them, that they will break into pieces as soon as opposition is removed. Our action now must be directed to the states around us. There is a party in all these states in favour of Mr Calhoun and his heretical doctrines, and this faction will every where be increased by Mr Clay's personal adherents, for the nullifiers, who will soon assume some more popular title, have broke ground already in this state in favor of Mr Clay. Mischief is ever a most active principle and must be counteracted with activity. I am disposed to form a party in all the states for the preservation of the Union against all such combinations. A party which may be called in to the

aid of the friends of the Union in any state where the Monster Disunion may show his head, whether in the form of nullification or in any other hideous shape. If we had been so succoured in the first instance all this trouble would have been spared and the disgrace of the State avoided. The objection which is made to this proposal by some of my friends here, that there will not be enough of opposition to it to make such a party efficient, has no weight with me. If the object were to exalt any individual the objection would be valid: but as the only object would be to aid the Union party in maintaining the Union in any state, where it may be endangered and to sustain the measures of the administration to promote the same object without any regard to party politics I cannot think opposition necessary to its existence.

I read with great interest the advice you give as to course we ought to have adopted. It should have been followed implicitly, except the general attendance of our members in the nullifying convention, had the conduct of the Nullifiers justified resistance to their enactments. We will now exert ourselves to heal the wounds, which their rashness has inflicted upon this community, and spare no pains to wrest the power from the hands of men, who have so wantonly abused the trust confided to them by the people.

As I have kept in safe deposit the

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few arms I drew from the forts I shall be able to restore them all in the condition in which I received them. I watched the course of events vigilantly and altho' every measure was taken to forward them to their destination if circumstances should render it necessary they were not sent from the city.

I shall write to you tomorrow on a subject of great interest to the success of our party in this state.

I am, dear Sir,

respectfully & faithfully

Your friend & humble Servt.

J. R. Poinsett

Private

Washington. 23. March 33

Dear Genl

Major. Barry & myself called to see Mr McLane, in the hope of procuring for Col. Biddle the examination of Western land offices, until it should be in your power to do something for him. McLane observed he could not now act upon the subject. I have said so, to Col Biddle to day. He seems greatly hurt, & indeed mortified & disappointed. The cause is, & I mention (it to you in confidence) that his pecuniary condition is to him quite an unpleasant one. He seems to be greatly hurt with you, & complains exceedingly of hopes deferred; & of expectations entertained, not to be realised. His feelings are quite acute; & indeed severe; and it is thence, that I take the liberty of thus privately naming it to you, that you may be ready for the subject, when he shall bring the matter to your consideration; as he no doubt will do. If it be at all possible, do I pray you do something for him. Biddle is a worthy man, & is suffering exceedingly at his disappointment Yrs J H Eaton

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Genl. Alex Hunter of Alexa desired
me to mention to you that if Mr
Elgar (as rumor says) is to be removed, he would
be greatly obliged to you for the place. I need
not say, because you know, that Genl Hunter
is an old & long tried friend of yours — an
honest - honorable, & capable man. No man
is more esteemed by those who know him —

Very truly yours

J. H. Caton

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Genl. A. Jackson
President of
U States

Major Eaton
on the subject
of [illegible]
private
1833

Ans 3

Washington March 24th 1833-

My dr sir.

There can exist no doubt now in the mind of any one who takes an impar-
=tial view of the passing scenes, of the combina-
because there object
=tion between Calhoun & Clay, ~~in con-~~
by their influence & ~~and by its~~
=~~nection with~~ the Bank, ~~and by its~~
which they have ~~expressed~~ to have it re-
~~corrupting influence~~ which by its corrupting
=chartered, ~~and~~ (and) to carry into effect their
splended scheme of internal improve-
which was once a splendid but now secretly hoping
=ments, by the large surplus of the
which must
revenue arising from Mr Clays, late
these large deposits to be
tariff, ~~and by~~ the Bank
will
enabled ~~it~~ to survive its present de-
their corrupt
=pressed state, and wield by its corruption
influence over
the legislation & destinies of this union.

The late proceedings in congress
on the subject of the Bank, declaring
without hearing the report of the minor-
=ity read, which exposes its mismanage-
=ment. its violation of its charter, by
buying in the 3 percents, and the misrule
of its direction, by prohibiting the Gover-
=nment directors from having any
share in the direction, or knowledge of its
situation give us full evidence of its superi-
=ority over

over the government by its influence over
congress- we have been trying to obtain some
information of its real situation and
solvency, but in vain- an exposure of
its real situation would shew, that
many members of congress who voted
in favour of its stability & solvency
were at the time largely protested at Bank,
that the press of Gales & Seaton is the
property of the U. States, & altho insolvent
and largely indebted to the Bank, he had
been permitted to overcheck to the
amount of 10,000$ that Greens esta=
=blishment is mortgaged to the Bank, &
the situation of many of the debtors, insolvent, as
are all the members whose notes have
been protested- The influence of the B.
united to the influence of Calhoun
& Clay elected these men printers
to Congress to continue their abuse
of the executive & weaken his influence
& with a positive pledge that they will
use all influence to recharter this
hydra of corruption- Clays land bill
enters into this bargain & is intended
to buy up the States, & aid by their influence in rechartering
the Bank, by a vote of 2/3. Here is the pic=
=ture then & to the remedy- I see and will

meet the crisis fearlessly, but in meeting
it, care must be taken, that we weaken
not strengthen its power or its friends-

The question then is, can the fiscal con-
cerns of the government be carried on, thro
the agency of the State banks, upon
which I religiously believe, what would
be the best system for our deposits with
the State banks, and whether, as to the
time, would it not be best to com-
=mence before the next meeting
of congress, communicating the reasons
for the change - these, from the facts
made known from the testimony
reported by the committee, can be set
forth in an imposing & striking
point of view.

If the distribution & deposits
cannot be safely transacted thro the
State Banks, the question arises, what
kind of national Bank ought to be
chartered - some place of deposit, and
system of distribution being necessary

The present Bank under no cir-
=cumstances can meet my appro-
=val - and you candid answer is re-
=quested to this letter and at as early
a day as possible - as I must take some stand & make

same communication to our next
Congress - By taking the deposits from it
the present Bank becomes harmless
to the Government and the feeders
of this corrupting monster will cease
to legislate, to create a surplus, to
strengthen the State banks, who they
cannot wield to corrupt congress.

A. Jackson
letter 1833
the corruption
of Calhoun
& Clay - the
removal of
the Deposits
&c. A. J.

Gen. Jackson to Judge White 24th March 1833

(Private) (Copy,

Washington, March 24. 1833. —

My Dear Sir.

The time in which we live and have to act is fraught with consequences = good or evil = of the most serious import to the future destiny of our country. It, therefore, becomes the duty of every patriot to look well and constantly to passing events, and to acquire all the additional lights he can on the important affairs connected with the government.

Strong and confident hopes by the friends of the country were entertained that it would be permitted to enjoy at least some repose upon the overthrow of the principles of Nullification. But before nullification had received its death blow a new combination between Clay and Calhoun, is discovered by those who view with impartiality the passing events, and their whole conduct since has only served to give confirmation of its existence. Their object, plainly is self aggrandisement, which they expect to attain by the corrupting influence of the Bank of the U.S., the anticipated effect of Mr Clays land project on the old States,

42

and various other schemes which I will not now detain you by mentioning. I am very strongly impressed with the opinion, if not confident in it, that one object, in so arranging the Tariff Bill as that it should produce a large surplus, was to enable, thereby, the Bank to survive its present depressed condition. These men are bound, I have no doubt, to have it rechartered and all their efforts will be directed to that end=having however other purposes.

When we look into the late proceedings of Congress on this subject, and see that they have declared the government deposits safe, without even hearing read the report of the minority, which exposes its mismanagement by buying up the 3 pr. cents, by prohibiting the Government directors from having any share in the direction of many of its most important transactions, and other things which you will find in it=, we have evidence of the power of this institution over the government so strong as naturally to excite some important and deep reflections on the subject.

We have been endeavouring, as you know, to

to obtain information of its real situation and solvency, but in vain. I have no doubt an exposure of its true condition would discover that it was not competent to meet its engagements if required thereto, that many members of Congress who voted it to be solvent were, at the time, ~~time~~ lying under protest, that the press of Gales and Seaton is the property of the Bank and, although insolvent and ~~then~~ largely indebted to the Bank, he [[?]] was permitted to overdraw $10:000, that Green also is bound, as fast as he can be, to the Bank. In the election of these men a discerning man may perceive much. They are to continue their abuse of the administration and use all their influence in favour of the Bank, &c. Their abuse &c. you know I scorn, but it will have some effect upon the people, being printers to Congress. It is important to meet the crisis fearlessly, but, in doing so, care must be observed that we do not stregthen, instead of weaken, the corrupting influence against which we contend.

Heaving Confidence in the general correctness of your opinions, and the subject of the Bank now under consideration and desireing all the light possible, I have determined to

address you a few enquiries which I hope you will answer as soon as practicable

Can the fiscal concerns of the government be carried on through the agency of State Banks? If they can, as I believe, wh[at] then would be the best system to adopt in respect to our deposits with State Ban[ks] and would it not be best to commence the plan before the meeting of next Congress and communicate the reason of the change?

If the fiscal operations of Government wo[uld] suffer by a connection with State Ban[ks] then what character of national Bank ought to be established?

The present Bank, under no circumstances, can meet my approbation, nor any that will connect the Govt with it, by being instrumental to

Nothing of interest has occurred since you left here - Please do me the favour to present my kind respects to Mrs White and the family -

As heretofore Yr friend

Signed - Andrew Jackson

The Hon,
Hu L White,
of U. S. S.
Knoxville;
Ten;

Coxes Creek near Florence
Monday 25th. March 1833—

Dear Genl.

I reached home on friday the 22nd. Inst. with my daughter Mary—we parted with Col. & Mrs. Polk & Mary Whereat at the mouth of Cumberland, they ascended that river to Nashville, and we went to the mouth of Tenn, and ascended that to Florence all well except myself—I wrote you from Pittsburgh which I suppose you recd. informing you of my bad health there—by copious bleeding there, and again at Wheeling, and some medicine I was relieved from pain and all other difficulty except extreme debility and reach home without any difficulty—I have consulted with our Physicians here, and they are

16643

of opinion that the disease is not yet fixed to any precise point, that the Chest is in the general diseased, and if permitted to run, would finally rest on some particular part, such as dropsy of the Chest, Asthma, or perhaps settle on the lungs - but they are also of opinion, that there will be no difficulty in relieving me in a few weeks, and have commenced with a course of treatment, which I hope will result in producing a cure - the only difficulty I labour under is extreme debility and shortness, or difficulty of breathing, when I take the least exercise - I now set, and lye down with ease, but if I walk 50. yards I am all in a palpitation - excitement of pulse &c - I hope in a few days to be able to write you that I am getting well -

I hope very shortly to hear from you and learn that Mrs Sarah Jackson has recovered her health, we all left her with regret, and the

girls are very anxious to hear from her —

I found my family well, although Mrs Coffee had been much affected during the winter with a bad cold and cough, but had entirely recovered her health before I reached home —

I am delighted to find our people here united in their approval of your course towards the nullifiers — many of your former opposers have turned to you & say they will in future support you — McKinley is a candidate for Congress, and goes the whole in your support — I expect he will be elected, our district does not include Madison County & Clays district — I have not seen McKinley as he is from home —

Polley and our little ones all unite in love to you & the family — dear Genl. yours

Jnº. Coffee

Genl. Jackson

16644

Private, but in the absence of Genl. Jackson, may be opened by Major Donelson —

Genl. Andrew Jackson

Washington City —

answered 9th of April 183[illegible] on 6th —

Genl. Coffee of Florence Ala.

Private

March 26th 1838

Dear Uncle

I received yours of March 6th and the and the letters to John as I was leaving home to survey a piece of land, that I had sold on Stoners River, I was absent two days, when I returned, John was at my house as good luck would have it, he will inform you by this mail his intentions — owing to the indisposition of Uncle Leven who has been living with me a few days, I have been hindered from writing you earlier, as well as sending a letter to A. S. D. previously written, the old man is dangerously unwell, the disease, supposed to be Dropsy of the chest, he seems to be firmly impressed with the belief that he will not get over the attack so much so, that he has consented to live with his relations till he gets better

16646

or dies, you may know that he deems himself in danger, when I inform you that he has made his will, a thing that I never expected he would do, he has devided it equally between John and Samuel, without any reservations.

Holtzlaw has your farm in considerable forwardness for the reception of the crop notwith the unfavourable season, for plowing and cleaning up but this is a small matter when compared to your loses, whether they are owing to neglegance or inhumanity I am not able to say, but fear it can justly be imputed to both, at least the death of Amica and Jotia seems to justify this opinion. the first was taken at A J D's farm where they were sent to pick cotton on the shares, and was caught in a shower of

rain in the field, and was immediately taken sick
and remained at Andrew's farm the ballance of the
day and that night, till some time next day very
sick, when he was taken home by whos direction
I have not ascertained, and in three or four days
after died — Titus died in three or four days after
he was taken, I have understood that on the
day that he died, (which was sunday) that
Holtzclaw rode by McCorkles in wilson co
called at the Doctor's and requested him to go
and see Titus, adding at the same time
that he did not believe much was the mater
with him, McCorkle got there and found him
dying — for correct information I refer you
to McCorkle ——

The final settlement of the great questions
that agitated and disturbed the tranquility of the
nation I would suppose will give you more
leasure than you have yet enjoyed of so

16646

I advise you seriously to spend the summer at home, you can then see and jude for yourself — The ballance of the family are well — Elizabeth desires to be affectionately remembered to you and family —

I Remain Sincerely your
Friend
William Donelson

answered 8th of April 1833. see [illegible]

Wm. Donelson

Genl. Andrew Jackson
President of the U.S.
Washington City D.C.



OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES.
Washington, } March 27th 1833

PAY to Andrew Jackson — or bearer,
two hundred and fifty — dollars, $\frac{}{100}$

250 DOLLS. $\frac{}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

16647

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES.
Washington, } March 27th 1833

PAY to Dr H. Hunt — or bearer,
fifteen dollars — dollars, $\frac{}{100}$

15. DOLLS. $\frac{}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

16648

A. Jackson Esqr

To J M Thomas Dr

1833 To Bill for attending Mrs Jackson	$25.
To Bill for prescriptions for servants &c	5
To vaccinating Negro & Girl	6
	$36.

~~Recd payment~~

Recd payment

March 27 1833 J. M. Thomas

Dr Sir

I do not know the amount of Dr. H's bill for attending Mrs J.

Will you please present my compliments to Mrs J. and be assured of my regard for yourself

J M Thomas

A Jackson Esq

16649

Dr Thomas &
Dr Hunts accts
for attendence
on Mrs Jackson
infant & servant
march 27th 1833—
A. J.

A. J. Donelson
Present

New Orleans 27th March 1833

Sir

I hand you herewith Two Letters addressed to the President of the United States; they are left open for your perusal, after which be pleased to hand them in person.

You will find what will much astonish you that a petition will be transmitted (if it has not already been done) to remove me from Office; Upon what grounds I have not as yet been enabled to ascertain. The immediate Agents in this business are, the late District Attorney The present Surveyor of the Port (Saml Spotts) and John Nicholson Marshal of this District. Respecting Mr Slidell he has been actuated by the principle of revenge against me, for being the cause of his not being again nominated for appointment. his bitter animosity towards me will be harmless here, but may in all probabilities have some effect in other places, particularly where the circumstances are not known and understood.

In a former communication to the President of the United States I recommended the same course with respect to the Surveyor namely that he ought not again to be nominated for that appointment and earnestly recommended our very worthy and true friend Col H. D. Peire, to succeed him.

Respecting Mr Nicholson I will remark that he has never given the President that support which he ought to have done; I have always considered him as a disguised enemy, and I may say with great truth, that he has opposed the present Administration, as far as he dared to go. He never has, nor has Captain Spotts ever contributed one cent towards the Support of our Cause: they have always been found associating with our most vindictive, and malicious

16601 – 2

political enemies.

A crisis in the affairs of the Officers of the Customs at this Port has arrived by which it becomes indispensably necessary that I should be removed or that the Marshal and Surveyor should be removed; If they are continued any longer in Office, I must resign, because it is impossible for us to continue in Office together. Upon this Subject I speak with feelings of the greatest delicacy towards the President, and would beg leave not to be understood in the most distant degree as dictating to him as to whom he may or may not appoint; I cannot act with any such feelings toward him, I only mean to say that I can no longer continue in Office, if those officers are to be retained. I come to this conclusion from this principle and that alone, that if we continue in Office together, the interest of the Government must suffer and I am unwilling nay I am determined not to be the cause of any such a State of things.

Acting under those feelings be pleased my Dear Sir, to communicate my views to the President in the most delicate way and to assure him whatever may be the result, that it shall never occasion one moments of unpleasant and disagreeable feelings.

I have heretofore given him my sincere warm and undisguised support that from the purest principle and I shall continue to do so as long as it may please Divine Providence to spare me on this Earth.

I will again address you by the mail of to morrow, in the mean while believe me to be

Your undisguised friend

Martin Gordon

Wm. B. Lewis Esquire
Washington

Mansfield. March the 27. 1833

My Good Friend.

I have just heard. by a letter. from Sister Watson of Mrs Jacksons illness. and am extremely anxious to know how she is, Pray write immediately, if only one line. and let me know particularly how she is. My affection is not feigned. I thank my Heavenly Father that I am now able to ride out. and the ballance of the family are well. Give my most affectionate love to Sarah and Andrew. and to enquiring friends,

And Believe me your very Sincere

Friend. Francis P Low

16653

Recd April 6th 1842
answered same day
by return mail

[postmark:] ...VILLE MAR 26

Wm. F. P. Love

Private.

FREE

General A. Jackson
Washington City



Andrew Jackson Jr. Esqr.

To H Huntt

For medical attendance on Mrs Jackson & yourself. } $15

Washington March 27th 1833.

Received payment in full

H Huntt

16668-7

Near Haddonfield
March 24th 1833

Col Andrew Jackson
Sir
Enclosed I send you four of the Copys of the Constitution of the Burlington County Association for the improvement of the Breed of Horses. Also an advertisement.

I expect to see Mr Rose in a few days and ascertain the state of Bolivars earnings as soon as possible and inform you of the result of my inquiry —

I hope Bolivar will be able to get along in good credit, and advantage to the owners — he is in the hands of men of great wealth and influence for the most part, that will give him an undue advantage over any horse in the country — except Eclipse Lightfoot & Mark Anthony that are in the hands of Company. other horses have to contend single handed with him and them. we are surrounded by Eclipses, and other good blood at about half the price of Bolivar and the other Company

16658

hours — notwithstanding I trust the Bolivar company will sustain him in credit and to their interest [illegible] what at one time was entitled

Respectfully yr

Friend

[illegible]

Hd
Haddonfield
April 1st

Mr. Cooper— inclosing advertisement of Bolivar— & informing that he will soon for=ward, the account of Bolivars, Spring season of 1832— To be filed with private papers A. J.

Written to on the 18th of May and requests to close the account

16669

8

Phila. March 30th 1833

To His Excellency
Genl. Andrew Jackson

Sir

I have purchased a very fine Gray Horse for One Hundred and Sixty dollars which I think will match with One of yours of the last Pair I sent to you

Should you have not made other arrangements and desire to have this Horse I will send him on immediately —

I can recomend the Horse to you as One of the first order and One gentle which I think you would be well pleased.

Very Respectfully
Yr Obt Servt
Jno. Reeside

16660

Wm Reinders, a
horse match for
Mine #168. price
answered, that if
matched the horse
would be taken
at $320
April 3d 183

To His Excellency
Andw Jackson
President [illegible]
Washington

from Mr. Reinders

Raleigh Mar. 31st 1833

Dear Sir

Our City was yesterday much excited in consequence of a rumour that our Post Master Wm. G. Scott Esq. was or was about to be removed from his Office; and a certain Jos. B. Hinton to be his successor— Be assured that such a measure will greatly impair the confidence of the people of this City & its vicinity, towards the President, and those having the gift of Office.

I speak with confidence when I say that the incumbent, is honest capable & a friend to the powers that be and always has been, from 1826 to this day— not so his reported successor— the people here have no confidence in him; and I am satisfied (if the sayings of honorable men ants be

16662

"luded if he is not is not deserving of confidence; the puff in the Globe to the contrary notwithstanding - not one words of which is true.

I hope for the good of the Government & the People here this contemplated appointment may be averted - I would write the Genl myself on the subject, but I fear my standing with him is in the [illegible].

Believe me to be sincerely
& respectfully &c.
[illegible]
W. H. Polk

RALEIGH APR 1 N.C.

FREE

Wm B. Lewis Esq

Washington City

Headed A word for the Union

Sign'd a voice for the Union

The president with his respects to Mr Blair, Editor of the Globe, requests that he would give a place in the Globe to the pieces, in the Richmond Enquirer, in Nos. headed & signed as above. They are, as I am confidentially advised, from the pen of one of the first characters in virginia - one who is opposed to the absurd doctrines of nullification, & secession - one who may be confided in, - these pieces are well calculated to follow the expose in the Globe of this morning, "of the bloody bill."

April 1st 1833 —

16664

(private,

Francis. P. Blair Esqr
Editor of the
Globe -

President
1833
April 1st

Free -
President Jackson

Francis. P. Blair Esqr
Washington
D. Columbia

April 1/33
1833
Cypamm

16665

Washington 1st April 1833

My Dear Sir

I have latterly been perusing a discription of all that part of the Isthmus of Panama and Guatimala, where it is thought a Ship [illegible]al could, & would at no distant day be cut, so as to unite the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean— This subject has for a long time much agitated and interested, the courts of Europe— And latterly, the Brittish gov=ernment has taken up the subject in earnest, & a Bill is now in progress in Parleament, to or=ganize a company and raise funds in order to effect this great work— That it is practicable, all will admit, who will only take the pains to examine the map and topography of the Country

The most eligable place for this ~~plan~~ pro=posed canal, is through the Lake Nicaraugua, & it will be seen, that only twelve miles of digging will unite these two Oceans— If this canal be opened, and the Brittish Government has the con=trol of it, it is almost impossible to tell, how far her influence and power may extend, in regulating all the commerce of the world— Ought not our government, if possible, to be interested in this work? All that part of the U. S. which borders on the Gulph of Mexico, is immediately concerned— It would change the current of trade, shorten the distance to the East Indias ~~ten~~ five or ~~twelve~~ six thousand miles— This canal would be the great thoroughfare of all nations, and the Stock would be more valuable to all the Stockholders, than any other Stock on earth— The Brittish company calcu=late to clear all expenditures in ten years

16666

I have read and thought no little on the prac=
=ticability of this work, and am well satisfied
it can be accomplished for much less, than
many wild schemes, now in progress in our
country — ~~but~~ This work would be of in=
calculable advantage to the present, and all
future generations — It would immortalize
any man who would effect it —

As the Brittish Government are making
advances in this great work, would it
not be well for us to have an interest
in it? for you may rest assured if
they have the entire control over this
canal, her power will be immense —

I hope you will excuse these views
from an humble individual — if
you choose, you may submit them
to Our worthy President

You can have the Book when you wish
to see it

your friend

Maj Donelson   Jno. Overton

Maj Donelson

At the Presidents

Jno. W. Overton
On the Canal
project to unite
the Atlantic &
Pacific oceans

1833

Washington 2d. of April 1833-

My son,

A few hours after Mr George Breathet left me this morning I received your kind and affectionate letter, of the 30 ultimo giving the pleasing intelligence of your safe arri=val, and the improved health of Sarah, & the dear little Rachel.

I should have wrote you by Mr Breathett, but having wrote you the day before giving the news of the Colera having reached the Hermitage, destroyed Peter & Hanna's child I had nothing to com=municate, excepting the burning of the Treasury House, the particulars of which will be related to you, by Mr Breathett- as the investigation progresses, it becomes more apparent, that it could not have proceeded from accident, but must have been the act of an incendiary. But what limb of Nullification has done the wicked deed, has not as yet been discovered, and perhaps never may.

Doctor Breathett of Franklin is with his Brother George, I wish you to pay some attention to him, as well as Mr Weatherall - let him see Sarah & my dear little Rachel, & if convenient I

16668

would like to hear that George & the Doctor
had dined with you at Mr Weatherells

To day my health has been better
than it has been for some time, &
I trust in a kind providence that it may
continue to improve. I am very lone=
=some since you left us, and will
rejoice to see you & Sarah with the
little pet, safe here again. I am
anxious about Sarah's health, and have
sent on by Mr Breathett an introductory
letter for you & him to Doctor Physik
whose advice on her situation I am very
desirous should be had. his skill and
experience, if any thing is wrong, will,
by taking it in time, perfectly restore
her, when if neglected now, it may des=
=troy her health in time. Therefore
it is, that I wish you to take Doctor
Physic's advice in her case. and I pray
you not to neglect it.

I shall want, so soon as my funds will
permit me to make the purchase, two
spring bottom settees and one Dozzen
of good chairs, or one Dozzen & a half.
before you leave the city, make en=
=quiry what the two settees & the Dozzen
& a half of chairs will cost & where they can be had of good quality
and also to examine for carpenting
view those East India matts or carpetting and see whether.

these recommended by Mr Toland will answer, better for the pasage than oil cloath - and whether Sarah would prefer these to common carpets for the bedrooms - I intend having finished the room next to the garden, & furnished - The paper got for Sarah's room, if yet on hand, will paper that - This room when papered, & furnished, will be a very convenient lodging room, & being on the lower floor, more convenient, than those up stairs.

Give my complements to Mr & Mrs weatherall, to Emma, and Miss Lippencot - to Mr Breathet & the Doctor Toland, & Sceper, & all enquiring friends say to Mr Breathet I will write him soon, when the enquiry about the burning is over - Kiss Sarah & my little Rachel for me, and write my prayers for your healths & safety & speedy return, I am affectionately yrs

Andrew Jackson

A. Jackson junr.

It is now 11 oclock - good night -

16669

A. Jackson jr.

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES.
Washington, } April 2d. 1833 —

PAY to Andrew Jackson or bearer,

forty four ———————— dollars, 7/100

44 DOLLS. 7/100

16670

Andrew Jackson

Philad^a Apr 2. 1833

Major W. B. Lewis

Dr Sir

On my return this evening from New York I found your letter of the 29th March enclosing Mr Jarvis's letter upon the subject of the floor Cloth if the desire is to have american Cloth we can get a better article near this city. I know that floor Cloth made only one or even two years is not an article suitable to put on the president's hall.

I am authorized to say by Mr Hare's agent that he never allows a piece of Cloth to leave his factory unless it is at least five years old and it is frequently painted ten years before sent to this Country. (Mr Hare is the great manufacturer of floor Cloth at Bristol England) and from my own observation that there is no Comparison in point of Quality and durability of Colour in fact I have known the american Cloth

16671

to be worn out in 2 Years. and I will refer You to Mr Elgar who has one of the best American on his passage and the paint is worn off and in many places the Cloth is worn through and it will not lay flat on the floor, in Conversation with Mr Elgar he said he hoped I would not put an american floor Cloth in the Hall I said there was no such intention, We then went to examine the Cloth on his passage and found it as above described, the English costs more than the American but there is no Comparison in point of quality, I will write to Mr Jarvis if you desire. but I have sent the order to Bristol England by the Packet which sailed from New York Sunday

The Colour of the Curtains as agreed upon was pure white hanging with blue and straw Coloured drapery and very long and splendid fringe the Carpet to Correspond in colours as near as can be

I risk nothing in saying the Curtains will be the handsomest sett in this Country

I have ordered all the Silk fringe and the
Gallon & Laces for them with the most particular
instructions in fact orders for all the goods
have been sent forward to insure their arriv-
ing in good season next fall. I have insured
the Silver in the office at which Mr. Toland
is a director and as soon as it arrives
Shall get Mr. Toland to look at it and forward
to you Mr. Moor's Certificate of the value of the
Silver. I am pleased to learn that the papers
forwarded you through the post Office was
satisfactory, it was my intention to make it so

In order to obtain the Sheetings at the
Package price I was obliged to take the Case
which will increase your quantity only a few
pair; Mr. Toland took a piece for his own
use and one piece I keep for myself
I have also purchased a few table Clothes
And Napkins for the Presidents House. Mr
Toland also took part of them. for the price
is so different from the retail price, I
have also ordered the twelve requested by Mr.
Gueista and Napkins to match for the large
table. I had several interviews with the
Baron Krudener. and after much Conversation
upon the of the purchase of his plate. he at last

16672

offered to Sell the Sets 2688 oz for $4500
which is about $1.69 pr oz I made him
an offer of $1.60 pr oz which he refused
the Estate as appears by the Invoice. the
the Sets Cost 5500 $ at the price he
proposes to Sell it is very low. he has no
Suspecion that the Silver is wanted for
Washington I told him I would advise
him upon the Subject from Philada.

Please to write me upon the
Subject and how I Shall act for you
in the Case if you want the Silver
it is Cheap and 35 to 40 Cts per oz less
then it Can be imported for

Also please say whether I Shall
Write to Mr Jarvis if you say I Shall
I will do so with pleasure

Please say to the President
that the Silver plate for him entrusted
to me by Mr Poland it is a Estate
of forwarding

With great respect I remain
Yrs truly
Geo W Smith

Private   Washington April 3d 1833 –

1

Dear Sir

I wrote to Capt Henry a few days since, and stated, that it was charged upon him that he had been making Bets that the Deposits of the Government would be removed from the Bank United States. He replied to me, and declared, upon his sacred word of honor, that he had not made a Bet of a dollar. In another letter he says. "I would feel myself very much hurt if I had have permitted myself to have entered into a bet; but as they have accused me of that which I have not done, I care not." – and appears to think hard that his "standing should be affected by Reports or exparte state-ments" – Believing that it will be gratifying to you to hear what Capt H. has said, I take the liberty of communicating it to you in this manner

Most Respectfully

Your Mo: Ob: Sert

R M Whitney

The President

To/ The President

Dear Sir

The enclosed, which I have collected during the past week, will enable you to arrive at a pretty correct conclusion, as to the cause of Biddles collecting his forces and stifling the investigation into Gales & Seatons accounts at the Bank, on Friday last, which on the Tuesday previous, had been authorised unanimously by the Board of Directors present on that day—

Very Respectfully

Your Mo: Ob: Svt.

R. M. Whitney

Wednesday 3d April – 33–

The President

2

To/ The President

[1833, Apr. 3]

On the 8th July 1817 Jos. Gales conveyed in trust to R Wallach to secure the indorsements of John Law in certain Banks or Bank on Notes to be discounted Sq. 461. Printing office, types materials and Stock, and all the profits of the National Intelligencer and the debts due and owing thereto; and in case of Non payment with power in trustee to sell.

On the 29 June 1818. R Wallach and J Law release this property &c. upon an arrangement made with the office of the B.k U States, to take W W Seatons note indorsed by Mr. Law amounting to $6500, with Gales's note for the same amount as collateral security substituted, and as subject to the trust declared in former deeds. ___

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On 24 June 1818_ Jos. Gales deeds to R
Smith Cashier, in trust, the property af-
-terwards (29 Inst) released, to secure
the payment of two notes $5000 & 1500_
and as a consideration of removing his
name out of said Office B. U. States, and
as security for such notes that may
be hereafter discounted, it was agreed
between said Bank, Gales, Seaton
and Law, that Seaton shall draw
and Law indorse as stated in the
foregoing deed, (which recites from this deed)
and Gales's note given as collateral
security, as evidence of the original debt.
He conveys said Lot 461. Printing Office
and every thing thereto belonging, all
debts due and owing thence; and in
4, default of payment, gives power after due

due notice to sell. But reserves possession and use until such sale.

On the 1st December 1820. Gales & Seaton again conveys the property to R Smith Cashier in trust, with Printing Office, Paper, debts now due and hereafter to become due, and all the appurtenances of said Office and establishment of whatsoever nature. Also Lot 377. This is mentioned to secure as well their individual debts, as the debts of the firm. Note. There is no personal property conveyed by this deed excepting the fixtures in the Office types &c.

On the 6th January 1826 Gales & Seaton again deeds to said Smith in Trust, the same property (because as stated) the deed 1st December 1820. was not recorded in due time required by Law to

pass-

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pass personal property — and further states that, Whereas since that time Gales & Seaton have acquired better titles to some of the property conveyed 1 Decr 1820 — and concludes with power to sell in case of default and possession untill such sale. Mrs Gales & Mrs Seaton relinquished their dower 20 July 1822. They again relinquish it in this deeds. In case the notes remain due and unpaid for 60 days then said Smith may advertise and sell upon giving 30 days notice in some newspaper.

On the 18th August 1829 R Smith Trustee of Gales & Seaton, by virtue of certain deeds of trust (Reciting deeds 1 December 1820 & 6 Jany. 1826) conveys the Square 377 — where Gales resides. Sold on the

4th —

4th day of May 1829 – to S. H. Smith Agent of the B U States in fee, and the proceeds of Sale $8500 was credited the debt of Gales & Seaton.

On the 15th August 1829 R Smith Trustee of Gales & Seaton, conveys to S. H. Smith Agent of the B U. States (by virtue of Deeds 1st December 1820 & 6th Jany. 1826) Lot 4 in Square 461 – on which the Office of the National Intelligencer stands, with all improvements, and the whole establishment connected with the said National Intel-ligencer, comprising Buildings which compose said Office, and all the Debts or accounts thereof, which may be now due to said Gales & Seaton, or which may hereafter become due or be created, and with all the appurtenances of said

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said Office and establishment of whatever nature — (To have and to hold the said buildings &c as is more fully described in the recorded Deeds). And States. The said debt having remained longer unpaid than specified, ~~in~~ the said Smith at the request of the President and Directors of the BR. U.S. did on the 11th June 1829 sell to S. H. Smith agent, the highest bidder, for the sum of $18.600. This sum after deducting expenses was credited to the debt of Gales & Seaton.

R Smith Trustee, Deeds to the Bank in Fee.

In the same year (1829) the whole

whole property is assessed in the name of the Bank United States upon the Books of the Corporation.

By these ~~the~~ from Public documents, it will be seen that the National Intelligencer, the whole Printing establishment, and all the profits on future work belong to the Bank—Therefore, it is the Bank, who was elected Printer to the next Congress—

In 1824 The Debt of G. & S. to the Branch in Washington is known to have been over ——— 36.000

In April 1832 Mr Biddle states it to be ——— 10.095

		25,915
Gales's House brought	8.500	
G & S. Printing Office & appurtenances	18.600	27.100

The expences deducted, and some interest added would probably make up the difference of the above two sums—

on

Now. after the Bank had taken to account all the property of Gales & Seaton there remained unpaid a balance of $10.000.!- with all these facts. the Bank has loaned them since 1831, upwards of $50.000- at Philadelphia. where they are now under Protest, and are also, now- as they have frequently been before over- =drawn.—

During the last month the Intelligencer <u>secretly</u> issued an Extra filled with Electioneering Bank matter and assailing the Government with bitter invective. In other words the Bank did it through Gales & Seaton.

[R.M. Whitney]

Official Data

Gales & Seaton and the Bank

Washington 3d Apl. 1833.

D. Genl

The enclosed letter is from Mr. Ritchie. I should like very much that you would read it. He is wrong in some things, but still I think he is a sincere friend, and feels gratefull for the many and important benefits you have conferred on the South. He is an honest man and possesses talents certainly of a high order. I would hear him, tho' of course I should pursue, notwithstanding, the dictates of my own judgements. After reading, I will thank you to enclose it to me.

Wishing that I may find on my return to Washington your health entirely restored, I am my dear Sir,

Truly & sincerely
Yours.
W. B. Lewis

16673

Mr E. Livingston
will read the in:
:closed & then re:
:turn it. he must re:
:collect that the opinion
of the Cabinet was taken
on the points suggested
& Mr Hoss's, nominated
change of officers to re:
:examine the [illegible] I
have suggested A. J.

Genl Jackson

1823

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OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, Washington, } April 4th 1833—

PAY to M. A. Giusta or bearer;

seven hundred & seventy two dollars, 08/100

772. DOLLS. 08/100

Andrew Jackson

16675

Paris 4th April 1833

919

My dear General

I have been hoping to hear
from you for some weeks, but I sup-
pose you have been very much occu-
-pied with the multiplied demands of
Congress — as well as with the grave
and important duties of your office.
I therefore wait without impatience
and bear the disappointment which each
successive packet causes, without des-
-pair. The packet of the 24th Feby is the last
which has come in — that of the 1st March is
daily expected. Our latest intelligence gives
us reason to hope that nullification, the
spawn of that great modern crocodile Tom
Jefferson — though hatched in the hot

16676

and guarded terms. But the spirit of both
productions is the same and their object
was the same - to excite a clamor against the
administration of the general govt. and to [illegible]
the people with discontent and [illegible]
them for the step into violent resistance
Still I believe Mr. Madison acted in this
only as he was prompted by Jefferson
This correspondence if ever published entire will
shew this fully. as far as Jefferson has himself already
published it satisfies me of it. Mr. Madison in
the 2nd paragraph of his letter to Mr. Livingston
says that the nullifiers have confounded what
is declaratory with what is operative &
have therefore lost every view of the ma[illegible]
he aimed at by his resolutions. But I ma[illegible]
ask a more contemptible evasion than
this attempted - what is a declaration of rig[illegible]
which one does mean ~~[illegible]~~ inoperative
and not to be executed - [illegible] any society

~~Can~~ possess or retain, or any individual can create or define such right. The British govt. said they had a right to tax us by a parliament in which we were not represented. This declaration was [illegible] until it was followed by the act enforcing it - by the enacting part of the Law. And so far from its being been any thing if it had not been executory in its nature they had been allowed to be ~~must remain~~ a mere declaration of opinion, we as well as the world at large would have considered the right there declared given up as an untenable pretension. The fact is every political right ~~[illegible]~~ asserted by a political body capable of giving existence & form to legal acts is in its nature executory. Even a resolution or act declaring

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the meaning of an existing act, is intended
for nothing more nor less than to shew
how that act is to be ~~understood and~~
executed. This absurdity is so very obvious
that Mr. Madison accustomed as he has
long been to pass off obscure involutions
of phrase for oracular [opinion] explanations,
must not have ventured on it, but
in this particular in reply to Mr. Livingston
who had sent him his speech containing
the same absurdity in rather more
naked terms. Hear Mr. L at the bottom of the 4th
column of this oration — which has no resem-
blance to any thing I ever read in Cicero or
Demosthenes — says he understands the doctrine
of Mr. Madison in 98 to have gone no farther than
asserting the right of a State "in a case palpably
unconstitutional and dangerous to remonstrate
against it, to call on the other states to cooperate

in procuring its repeal, and in doing this they
must of necessity, call it unconstitutional and
if so in their opinion null & void." Now it may
be asked who could deny this right not only
to any state - or any legislature - but to any
body of citizens in any state or even
in any territory of the union - at any
time and respecting any law. If this
were the extent of the Virginia doctrine
it could have created no opposition,
produced no excitement, occasioned
no controversy, nor conferred the smallest
possible glory. This too Mr Livingston
says is all he sees in the words "inter-
pose for arresting the progress of an evil."
what is the evil? the Alien & Sedition law ~~the law and the sedition~~
that is the rule of action prescribed by
a superior to an inferior in those cases
and which Congress declared this inferior
16679 was bound to obey - and did cause to obey

in the cases of federal abuse - and in the person
of Matthew Lyon among other citizens. Now
could a mere declaration of opinion have
arrested the progress of this evil - that is
the operation of these Laws in Virginia
or any other State. To repeal the act
was to remove the evil - not to arrest
the operation of it. that could only be
done by measures of superior legal
or ~~by~~ of physical force. As no supe
legal force could be found - it would
have terminated - as the process ~~of~~ of
"nullification so called" was going to ter-
-minate, in civil war. "Arresting the
~~operation~~ progress of the evil" - is only as Johnson
shows - a more general and guarded
phrase for "nullifying the law". I am
not sure that the word nullity was

used by Mr. Jefferson. I have an indistinct im-
-pression that it was used first by Geo. Nicho-
-las at a legislature of Kentucky subsequent
to the one to which he [illegible] Mr. Jefferson's
draft. Mr. Livingston is right in saying therefore, that
Mr. Jefferson did not really venture further in
this dignified walk of hypocritical treason
than Mr. Madison did. He is also right in saying
that nullification is inconsistent with the constitution
of the U. States and with the nature of our govt.
But he is palpably wrong — I meant to say for I
do not mean, treasonably wrong in saying
that the doctrines of South Carolina are not
the logical & necessary consequence of the doctrine
of 98 — whether traced to Jefferson or his instrument.

Playing the same game of chicanery and
evasion, Mr. Madison charges the Proc[illegible]
-fiers with confounding the rights of the
parties and of a single party — Here his

16680

terms though studiously general, can only mean that the nullifiers have not distinguished between the right of a majority of the states, and the right of a single state, for his whole scheme was founded on the idea of considering the states (an idea which I do not certainly at present dispute) the parties to the constitution. Now can the rights of any one state under the constitution be increased or diminished by any other state – or by any number of states except in the express mode laid down in the constitution – and for the purpose therein described. The mode there laid down is certainly not the one adopted by Mr. Madison – nor is the purpose it describes that which he aimed at or professed. "arresting the progress of the evil – that is the operation of a law palpably unconstitutional

The object or purpose aimed at by the
Convention is to procure amendments
of that instrument. And an attempt to have
this amendment made would have been
so far from being consistent with Mr.
Madison's doctrine & resolutions in 98
that it would have frustrated or nullified
it altogether for it would have admitted
that the Alien & Sedition laws were
Constitutional. He goes on then to affirm
that the nullifiers - his faithful disciples -
have failed to distinguish "between rights
within the purview of the constitution, and
the ultima ratio which appeals from a
constitution cancelled by its abuses, to origi-
-nal rights paramount to all constitutions."
Again we have a collection of words
as abstract and technical as possible

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the only meaning to be got out of these harangues
is this that the poor unhappy apostles of
Mr. Madison—who have been treading in
his footsteps from the beginning to the end
of their political pilgrimage—have con-
founded the right of declaring a law to be uncon-
-stitutional in their opinion—with that
of rebelling against it—the right of
peaceable remonstrance, with that
of forcible resistance. Now this charge
is as false as the probability of such a confu-
-sion of ideas on the part of any body
of men is remote. I have already shown
that no evil of the kind complained of by
Mr. Madison in 98—could have been
<u>arrested</u> in its progress—by a remonstrance
or could have been supposed to be capa-
-ble of being arrested by the inter-
-position of a remonstrance

4

That such a declaration ^as a mere remonstrance^ on his part and on that of his party in the Virginia assembly would have occasioned being little more than either in or out of the State, ^with the danger of^ is a little nearer the truism — that when the oppression of a Government becomes intolerable the citizens have a right in original principles of justice & self preservation to revolt from it. Neither of these were the doctrines of 98. Neither would have been either disputed or dreaded. The minority in the assembly might have considered either the one or the other as unnecessary and might therefore have declined voting for ~~them~~ it; but they would not have debated them day after day — even night after night as they did & disputed every proposition in support of them inch by inch.

1662

Mr Madison says the doctrine of nullification is new to him. It is possible he did not foresee the exact degree of deformity which his doctrine might grow to — but it is impossible that he could shut out from his view the pretension of a state to the right of arresting the operation of a law of Congress within her limits when ~~she~~ a majority of her legislature and citizens should think it unconstitutional. He could not have meant less than affirming that the state of Virginia would have been justified in shielding Volney or Maggie from the alien act. —

To prove that nullification is new to him — he says it derives no support from the debates on those resolutions in the Virginia

assembly. Unfortunately for the truth, and perhaps unfortunately for his truth (as otherwise he might not have hazarded the assertion) those debates were not preserved. No record of them exists — and the principal speakers in answer to him were dead long before he wrote his letter to Mr. Livingston.

To oppose these [illegible] doctrines which he now pretends were nothing more than the assertion of a right in the state Legislatures to remonstrate against a law & endeavour to have it repealed. and the equally innocent right derived from original principles of revolting against intolerable oppression — the friends of the administration of the general govt ~~[illegible]~~ delegated the ablest men of their party to the House of delegates in Virginia. ~~Among~~ At the

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mind of there was no hope save from there
Patrick Henry. who though he had refused
to go to Congress, and had declined a number
of executive offices consented on this occasion
to serve in the state legislature in order as he
thought to prevent the adoption of measures
which would endanger the Union. Unfor-
-tunately though elected he was prevented
by death, from performing this great
service to his country. By his death my
father became the leading advocate
of Mr. Madison & he was seconded by
a very able and eloquent man now
dead also George Keith Taylor. It is
well known they were defeated by Madison
with Giles & John Taylor of Caroline
I was then a boy of about 10 years old.

~~the~~ and was sent from Westmoreland to join
my father in Richmond, and thence to be
dispatched with the son of a friend of
his to school in Albemarle. I remember
perfectly well hearing my father say
to a friend of his that he had told Mr.
Madison ~~that~~ that he would "deluge the
country in blood". These expressions, uttered
as they were with great solemnity and
feeling, made a deep impression on
one young as I was — and I remember being
frightened to think how such a little
dry looking man as Mr. Madison
was to spill so much blood. ~~After~~
I grew up I found out the meaning
to be that these resolutions meant
lead to civil war. My father made
the remark to Col. John Walker of Albemarle,

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whom I have subsequently conversed with
about it, but who is long since dead. What
I am certain the debates had they been
preserved would have sustained the
Nullifiers in their assertion that their
doctrine is not new to Mr. Madison.

So much for this involved evasive and studi-
-ously obscure epistle × The oration to which
it is prefixed seems to me to be as diffuse
and inconclusive as the letter is turgid
and incoherent. Mr. Livingston deduces abso-
-lutely the meaning of the federal constitu-
-tion as it now stands from the prepi-
-tory condition of the states. ~~[illegible]~~
Now if one of the states or 5 or 6 or all had
been French ~~or~~ instead of English Colonies

× The editor ironically, I suppose, calls it "beautifully concise." -

and had adopted the same constitution which the 13 states did adopt- they would have enjoyed precisely the same rights and have come under the same obligations which the states now enjoy and are liable to. The whole speech seems to me to be a weary portion of thought diluted unmercifully with words- intended to support the constitution and Mr. Madison too- to maintain union and disunion at the same time- to flatter the nulli-fiers in the person of Hayne the federalists in that of Webster- and to befriend & be praise every body. Nothing can be in worse taste than the phrases "My learned & honourable friend". (This is stolen from the British parliament.

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where if a man happens to be a lawyer he is called learned. But if he happens to be a General he is called gallant. So Mr L. ought to have called Hayne his learned gallant & honorable friend. [the learned & honourable chairman.]

Why Grundy is not [illegible] for the attention & pleasure he excites. & Woodbury is luminous in argument Webster eloquent & justly admired. It is a pity that Noble. Robbins &c did not speak, that we might have seen to what extent the narration of this nauseous stuff would have been carried. This is not the worst part of the speech + the reasoning or rather the want of reason [illegible] [illegible] more alone than [illegible] [illegible] the

doctrine of nullification is not justified by
Mr. Madison in the Federalist. It is not justified
by his report & resolutions in 98. Now the
very thing asserted by the nullifiers in
claiming the sanction of Madison's authority
is that his opinions have been incon-
-sistent or rather his declarations of
them.

It would be better for Mr. Madison's
fame both now & hereafter if he were to
confess rather than try to conceal
his sins. I admire his argument and in
the report of 99 - and when I read it - which
was but once - thought it conclusive. It
has so been spoken of by me - but I have
no doubt it justifies nullification
which makes me believe my opinion
of his argument was wrong. He ought

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to say either that he finds his argument
was fallacious as that and that he
gives it up - or that he still considers
it conclusive and adheres to it -
and he ought not by such equivocal
and involved disclaimers as that
contained in his letter to Mr. Livingston
attempt to make the Nullifiers of Caro-
-lina the scape goat for the sins of
himself & Mr. Jefferson.

Washington April 5th 1833—

My dear Sir,

I have this moment recd your letter of the 3rd & Sarahs of the 2nd. am happy to learn that you are all in good health & that Sarah & the little pet, is increasing in flesh - I have wrote to Sarah which I inclose under cover to you with this which you will please deliver to her.

As to the Colera, let us not be uneasy, that it has reached the Hermitage the Lords will be done, & it is our Duty to be ready to submit to it with humble hearts - he giveth & he has a right to take away, & we ought always be ready to say blessed be his name.

I have wrote to Mr Holtzclaw to have every attention paid to them - he says this is done, & the Doctor attentive - the Doctor was with Peter untill he died.

After you return here we will consult on your going out & when. I have recd no letters, since I wrote you, from Tennessee.

I sincerely regret that Thomas & Sammuel did not pass this way - I was anxious to see them both, & rouse Thomas to proper energy & action - he has doubtless

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the property I had when I commenced house keeping, and I had no one to give me one cent of aid. I determined by my own exertions to become independent. I succeeded - so will they, with the same industry that I used. Please say to Emma with my respects to please ... desponding, cheer up, & with affectionate & united energy & industry, they will soon be wealthy & happy - Rather say not being contentment or happiness beyond an independence, wealth is a perfect bubble, & some times a curse instead of a blessing - all we get for all our struggle here Below. is what we eat & wear - this is but little, & we want that little but a few short years -

We are all well here, my health improving, & all join me in our love to your Sarah & the pet - & to Mrs Brother - all & family & Emma. say to Emma we will be happy to see her here with you & Sarah, when you return, which I hope will be before long - I wrote to Mr. Breathitt by this mail -

I am affectionately yrs.

Andrew Jackson

Andrew Jackson jr.

A. Jackson Jnr.
Philadelphia

Baltimore April 6. 1833

To the

President of the United States

Since my return to Baltimore, I have examined with much care the law passed in the year 1816, entitled "an Act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States" for the purpose of ascertaining the probable effect which would be produced upon the currency of the Country, and upon local Banks, by the substitution of State Banks as the agents of the government in the collection, deposit, and distribution, of the public revenue. I had previously been under the impression, that as the Bank of the United States would view the adoption of such a policy as unfriendly, it would possess a power, which it would probably exercise, of throwing suddenly upon the Banks which might be selected as Agents of the Government, very large amounts of the notes of the Bank of the United States, payable at distant Branches, in payment of the revenue, and thus embarrass them with funds, which they could only convert into legal money, at considerable expence and loss of time. The examination has led me to a different conclusion, which is, that the effect would be to put it in the power of the

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Secretary of the Treasury to compel the Bank of the United States to redeem _all_ its own notes either at the mother Bank, or at any one of its branches, at his discretion. If I am correct in the view I have taken, it would not be possible, even if it were proper, to discredit any description of the notes of the Bank of the United States by refusing to accept them in payment of the revenue, because the 12th fundamental article in the Act of Incorporation, seems to place beyond doubt the right of the Bank to issue Notes and Bills signed by the President and countersigned by the Cashier, payable elsewhere than at the mother Bank; and the 14th section of the Act renders it obligatory upon the Government to accept in payment, "unless otherwise directed by act of Congress", _all_ Bills or notes which the Bank may have so issued, and which were originally made payable, or which shall have become payable on demand.—

The power which the Secretary of the Treasury will possess over the Bank, is derived from the 15th Section of the Charter, which imposes upon the Corporation the duty of giving the necessary facilities for transferring "the public funds from place to place within the United States or territories thereof" upon his requisition, and this obligation does not seem to depend upon the fact of the Bank being

either the Collector or depository of the funds, but only upon the fact of their being public funds; that is funds belonging to the United States.

The practical operation of collecting the public revenue by State Banks, would doubtless be, that the debtors of the government would pay, in that description of the circulating medium of the Country, which they could not use for other purposes without loss, but which the Government must accept under the provisions of the Charter of the Bank of the United States. They would therefore pay in the notes of the Bank of the United States, redeemable at its most distant Branches, or in other words, of those Branches which were at the greatest discount at the points where the payments were to be made. For instance at Boston and New York, they would pay in the United States Bank notes which were redeemable in coin, only at St. Louis or Mobile, or some other of the Western or Southern Branches, and thus would be imposed upon the collecting Bank the burden and expense of procuring the redemption of such notes in legal money, if it were not for the obligation the Bank of the United States is under, to transfer "from place to place" these funds, when required to do so by the Secretary of the Treasury - But the Bank cannot as I suppose

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absolve itself from the obligation to transfer the public funds, from place to place, without charging commission or claiming allowance, on account of difference of exchange", and consequently it must, whenever the public funds are presented to it, or to any of its Branches, upon the requisition of the Secretary of the Treasury, transfer them to such point as he may designate: a refusal would seem to be a violation of its charter.

Let it be supposed then that a State Bank in Boston or New York, has received in payment of the public revenue, the notes of the Bank of the United States, payable at twenty different Branches, they would in fact be the "public funds" and precisely such funds as the Bank of the United States is required by its Charter to transfer "from place to place", when thereto required by the Secretary of the Treasury, and therefore his order to the Bank of the United States is all that is necessary to impose upon that Bank this duty.

The consequence of this proceeding would be that all the notes of the Bank of the United States, wherever payable, would be currently received by all persons and by the local Banks, because they would be taken by the State Banks selected to receive the public deposits, and as they become debtors to the government to an amount equal to the whole revenue collected by them, not only in the notes of the Bank of the United States, but in

the notes of local Banks also, they might in payment of this debt to Government, place in the hands of the Bank of the United States, all its own notes of every discription, which they had received, for which the Bank must give its draft for payment, at any point where the Secretary of the Treasury might require. The obvious effect of this state of things would be to raise all the notes of the Bank of the United States to a par Standard at all places, where either the Bank of the United States or its Branches could be reached, with the "public funds" and speedily to limit the quantity of United States Bank notes to an amount, which the Bank could at all times redeem at such places.

If I am correct in this view of the subject, it would seem that the power of controling that portion of the currency which is composed of the notes of the notes of the Bank of the United States would pass from the hands of that Bank into the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Banks which he may select as his Agents in the collection and distribution of the revenue, and that the Bank of the United States would stand in great need of the clemency of the Government to enable it to protect all its Branches from demands arising out of the collection of its notes in the hands of a few rival institutions, who for their own common interest might be disposed

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to exercise the power they would acquire, in this way, to an extent that might endanger its credit: This however it must be presumed would be controlled by the Secretary of the Treasury to the limit required by a due regard for the general welfare—

It will naturally occur, that a change in the administration of the finances of the country which would produce a rapid and extensive diminution in the quantity of the circulating medium, by withdrawing from circulation the notes of the Bank of the United States, would produce an injurious effect upon the community at large, if a supply of currency be not afforded to an equal extent and of equal value, with that which may be withdrawn, from some other source. Perhaps this cannot be effected in a better way than by an order of the Treasury Department making all notes issued by the Banks which may be selected as Depositories of the public funds receivable in all payments to the United States, and thus give to their notes the same general credit which is now accorded to the notes of the Bank of the United States; they would then be enabled to supply the currency required in consequence of the withdrawal of the notes of Bank of the Bank of the United States from Circulation. Thus it seems probable the Bank of the United States would be permitted to glide out of existence on the 3d of March 1836, without

disturbing the general relations of a community, where it has hitherto exercised so important an influence.

For the purpose of affording to the Government and the public the same facilities which are now enjoyed in the transmission of funds, and regulations of exchanges, it will be necessary for the Banks which may be selected in the several States, as the Collectors of the public funds, to adopt, under the advice and instruction of the Secretary of the Treasury, a system of well defined regulations, to govern their intercourse with each other; a measure that will be of easy accomplishment when the designation of the Banks shall be made, and the Secretary shall have assigned such duties to them as will best suit the exigencies of the Treasury, and promote to the greatest extent the public convenience. In the adjustment of these regulations, and execution of any plan in relation to the collection and distribution of the public revenue, which the government may think proper to pursue, I will, not less from inclination than duty, perform any portion of the service that may be assigned to me.

As the purity of the currency of all countries is of vital importance to their prosperity, and as the actual currency of the United States is the evidence of contracts to pay money, made in virtue, and under the Authority of laws

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of the several States, over which the General Government appears to possess no other controul than that of the power to pass laws in relation to Bankruptcies, I feel unwilling to omit the opportunity which is now presented, to suggest to the President of the United States whether it might not be expedient to enact a law under this power, which shall be applicable to Corporations and individuals issuing that description of notes which constitute the circulating medium of the Country, and imposing such penalties and forfeitures as shall restrain them from making issues which are not justified by their ability to fulfil their engagements.

I am
with great respect, thy friend

Thos Ellicott
Thomas Ellicott

Mr. Elliott - Treas.
The powers of the Secretary, after the deposits are removed to State Banks, to compel the United States to transfer the funds, her paper being receivable for revenue, to be considered. A. J.

President of the United States

12

16694

Washington April 8th 1833—

My d. son,

This moment your letter of the 6th was handed me by Mr Leeper, and I rejoice to learn the improving health of Sarah & the dr little bat— still I wish Sarah to see Doctor Physic & have his advice on her situation & cause of her occasional debility.

I have just received a letter from your cousin William who writes that he is fearfull that Letus & Anna's child died from the want of attention— that Letus had been sick some days without a Physician— that on Sunday as Mr Holtzclaw rode by Dr McCorkles he called & told the Doctor Letus was sick, but he did not believe there was much the matter with him— When Dr McCorkle got there he was dying & refers me to Dr McCorkle for information, & fears that he has been deceived in the character of Holtzclaw and advises me to visit the Hermitage this summer &c.

Mr Donelson also writes that your Uncle Levin lies dangerously ill at his House, believes he will die & has made his will and left all his estate to John and Samuel— he must believe he is about
16695-6 to die or he would not have made a will
and his will

would have been just had he included Thom
with John & Saml - and if your uncle
dies, I hope Saml & John will liberally
divide with Thomas. when you return I will
write them on this subject, should your uncle die.
All here join in kind salutation
to you, Sarah, Emma, Mr & Mrs Weathers
and all friends - present Sarah & little
Rachel with an affectionate kiss for me
Emily is unwell, & John has been sick
his teeth has appeared thro the gums, & he
is better. I am your affectionate
father
Andrew Jackson

Andrew Jackson junr

P.S. I am very lonesome, and
will rejoice to see you all back -
say with my compliments to Mr
Breathett I wrote him last evening
& rejoice to find his health improved
A. J.

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES,
Washington, } April 8th 1833

PAY to A. C. Campbell — or bearer,

one hundred and forty four dollars, $\frac{25}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

144 . DOLLS. $\frac{25}{100}$

16697

April 8th 1833

Sir

We have received a letter from Mr Kendall conveying to us your wishes that we should communicate to you in the most authentic form, information relative to various proceedings of the Bank of the United States, & we need hardly say how readily we shall perform all the duties of the office you have confided to us. Our efforts have hitherto been honestly directed to promote what we believe the true interests of the country in this institution, to ascertain its situation, and to alter or prevent every thing in its operations which we have deemed to be disadvantageous or incorrect. In this course, whatever success may attend us, we shall resolutely persevere. It is less easy than is generally supposed even for Directors, especially Government Directors, to possess themselves of all the facts and there are difficulties in

16698

in the way of any inquiry, other than a formally official one, not readily to be surmounted. We are at liberty it is true to inspect the private accounts of those whose paper is submitted to us, and we might do so no doubt occasionally and casually. But we could not, without a breach of trust, make the situation of those accounts known to others, except under such circumstances as would render the act one of representative duty or in obedience to explicit requisitions. The Secretary of the Treasury being expressly recognized in the charter as the agent between the Government and the Corporation as well as the official manager of the finances of the country, instructions from him would afford us unanswerable authority and justification for scrutinizing the accounts thus situated, insisting upon their full development, and reporting the details. Without something of this sort to back our movement we feel certain

that

that we should be repelled with prompt distrust, our attempt would be defeated, and we should have to bear all the odium attached to a volunteer inquisition not pursued according to the mode prescribed by law, & necessary to sustain it with success. In an investigation so directed we might also be assisted (which we should greatly desire) by the other Government Directors acting immediately under the same instructions and repairing here at such times as we might agree upon. It is possible that in time we may gradually acquire a pretty correct knowledge of the loans that have been made to printers and members of Congress, and we shall not hesitate to inform the Government of any improper proceedings with which they were attended — this too we believe would meet your wishes more fully than less perfect information transmitted now. That we anxiously watch the course of proceedings with a view to protect the principles

and

16699

and interests of the government we trust it is unnecessary to assure you; but it cannot be pronounced to what results or extent our investigations may lead till we shall be able to conduct them in the thorough and official form we have mentioned & with the advantages it will give us. Submitting these views to you with a full sense of our responsibilities and a sincere anxiety faithfully to discharge our duties to the government which we represent,

We remain with great respect

Yr. obt. Servts

John T Sullivan

Peter Wager

H. D. Gilpin

Philadelphia 8 April 1833.

To

General Andrew Jackson

President of the United States.

Washington April 9th 1833 –

My dr Sir,

I have recd on yesterday and today a number of your letters, memorials, & letters protesting against the ~~superseding~~ removal of Mr Slidell as attorney for the District of Louisiana in which you are not spared, ~~[illegible]~~ for, as they ~~[illegible]~~ They censure you for ~~alledging~~ giving some secrete information against his moral or political character, and calling for the secrete charges thus made.

I have not yet answered these letters, but as they are among the memorialists many of my friends, such as Genl Plauche, Col. M. White &c I ~~mean to give~~ shall answer them, and ~~meet~~ place the matter upon its true ground – I shall say to them that I was informed by you that such was the personal [illegible] between you, that it rendered your situation ~~[illegible]~~ unpleasant & made it necessary for the Govt, that the interest of the Govt ~~Mr Slidell~~ that Mr Slidell should go out and [illegible] the interest of the government could not be [illegible] as it ought [illegible] therefore that a separation of the two incumbents became necessary for the public interest – The collector had so well performed his duty, that we could not think of superseding him by another his duties being of the greatest importance to the Govt

16700

Mr Gordon having performed his duty equally with Mr Slidel; and as the term for which Mr Slidel was appointed had expired, no charges against his moral character having been made, and no enquiry on that score could [illegible], and as it was im=portant, nay absolutely necessary that harmony should exist between the collector and attorney for the District it was determined to appoint another in the room of Mr Slidel - not remove Mr Slidel from office as is alledged by the memorialist, and no odium could or can be attached to Mr Slidel moral character from this act, nor was any intended.

Mr Cotton it is true was named by by your colleague as a fit person, one with whom you, & he, could act in perfect harmony and he was therefore appointed.

This explanation will I trust be satisfactory to them, but that I may be pre=pared for defence if assailed, send me a copy of your letter on which I acted with such a justification for your application for Mr Slidels being superceded as you have in your power, shewing the want of harmony between you & in what it consisted - and do this as early as you can.

Mr Blair has this day com=municated to me the liberal donation

16701

you & nine other gentlemen has
made him. The thing, & the manner
in which it has been done, is hono=
=roble to you, & to him, and to the cause
you so nobly support. This is truly
grateful to me, and an ample remu
=neration for the $1000 fine im
=posed upon me for defending
your city, with the beauty, & booty,
it contained. Receive my thanks
for the handsome manner in which you have
presented this boon to Mr Blair.
he deserves it.

with a tender of my sincere
respects to your amiable lady &
family believe me your friend.

A. J

Morton Gordon Esqr
Collector N Orleans

16701

Rough draft to
Martin Gordon
N. Orleans April
9th 1833 - A. J.

Knoxville April 11th 1833.

My dear Sir,

Yours dated 24th ult. reached me a few days ago, and I embrace my soonest leisure moment to answer its contents.

Sometimes I incline to the opinion that our race is growing worse but a little reflection satisfies me that as I grow older I only become better acquainted with men, and that probably those of my own day are neither better nor worse than those who preceded them would have shewn themselves to have been under the like circumstances — In such a government as ours where the highest offices are accessible to all we must expect continual struggles for power, and the means employed for its attainment will not always be the most honorable. The true patriot should never wish the accomplishment of any object by which the interest of his country would not be promoted, and to effect his ends ought never to employ any means which a virtuous community would not approve if made fully acquainted with them, but it is vain to expect all aspirants to become patriots, therefore in many, we must expect deviations from the path of correctness, contenting ourselves with being as useful as we can in our respective stations, always hoping that an enlightened people will judge correctly of the motives and acts of ourselves,

16702

as well as of our fellow men.

I now proceed to answer the specific inquiries submitted in your letter.

1st "Can the fiscal concerns of the Government be carried on thro "the agency of State Banks? If they can, as I believe, what would be the "best system to adopt, with them, with respect to our deposits & transferring our "funds?"

To the first of these interrogatories I answer, that I have no doubt, all the fiscal concerns of the Federal Government can be safely and conveniently ~~be~~ carried on, thro the agency of Banks chartered by the respective States. The mode in which this shall be accomplished can best be fixed on by those who have the aid of past experience - Possessing very little of this I now say, that were it my duty to adopt a plan, I would select some one State Bank, in the solvency of which I had entire confidence, for example one of the Virginia Banks, and make the whole arrangement with that Bank, and let that Bank make an arrangement with some other Bank in each State, thro which the whole operations should be carried on. The deposits would then be all made in that Bank and in those designated by it, and thro them the whole disbursements would be made.

The notes of such Bank, and those designated by it, should be receivable every where in discharge of debts due to the government, and this of itself would give gene

-ral credit and currency to all such notes.

To secure the government, the Secretary should require a weekly statement of the actual condition of each Bank in which deposits were made, and should have power to rescind the agreement whenever he doubted the safety of the public funds.

If such arrangement cannot be made with some one Bank, then an arrangement must be made with some in each State, upon the plan formerly pursued, with such improvements as past experience may suggest.

2nd "As to the time to commence our deposits in the State Banks, Would "it not be best to commence the plan before the meeting of next Congress, "and communicate the reasons of the change, or when?"

To this inquiry I answer, We ought not only to do that which is for the public interest, but we should do it under circumstances which will enable us to satisfy the people whose business we transact that the change was necessary to promote their interest.

When the Bank of the United States failed to obey the directions of the government in paying off its debt, and negotiated with the creditors for indulgence, I think the deposits ought to have been immediately

16703

withdrawn, and every federal officer instructed not to receive any of those small drafts or checks, now used as substitutes for five ten and twenty dollar notes. Public opinion I have no doubt would then have sustained the Executive in such a course: but the Government, from motives which all ought to approve, wished to be certain of the insolvency of the Bank before it withdrew the public deposits, therefore appointed an Agent to examine and report, its condition – That Report is before the world, and is as flattering, as the Bank could wish, as to its' solvency – Since then the matter has been brought to the notice of Congress, a committee has been created by the House of Representatives, and a majority of that Committee has made a Report more favorable to the Bank – The minority of the Committee has also submitted their view of the solvency and management of the Bank, in such terms, as if it stood alone would create a well founded belief that the public money was unsafe, where now deposited. But the question recurs what opinion will society form from these documents taking them all together – The opinion of the confidential Agent of the treasury and that of a majority of the committee one way, and that of the minority of the Committee the other places the question of the solvency of the Bank in such attitude before the public that I do not believe the Executive would act wisely in ordering a

withdrawal of the deposits from the Bank of the United States and place them in State Banks, at this time — Public opinion will in my judgment best sustain the Executive in permitting them to remain with the Bank of the U. States, until its charter expires, or some future developement shall shew that the Bank is so managing its concerns as to make it necessary to the public interest that the public money should be withdrawn from the power and control of the Bank.

I think the fiscal concerns of the Government can always be managed thro State Banks, and that a Bank chartered by the U. States will never be indispensable to the collection or disbursement of the public money; but I am at the same time of opinion such a Bank will be a convenience to the government and a great benefit to the Commercial community —

This charter I would not renew, even if the government were not a Stockholder.

The only One, to which, with my present impressions, I would agree, should be chartered in the district of Columbia, with a power to connect itself with some Bank in each State, chartered by the respective States, and to use notes bearing the signatures of the officers of the

16704

Federal District Bank – Such a Bank would be constitutional, the Federal government could receive, have faithfully kept and promptly paid out, all its money, through its agency, and the community would have an uniform paper medium, a safe substitute for specie.

I have now, My dear Sir with frankness, and in the least possible compass, given you my opinion, upon the several points suggested by your letter – I have lived long enough to distrust my own opinions, upon almost all subjects, thinking them of but little value I seldom obtrude them, even upon my best friends. When asked by you, they never have been, they never shall be withheld.

I wish, I could indulge the hope, that the close of your public life would, in its comforts, furnish some adequate return, for the toils, hardships, perils and privations which have fallen to your lot, since the commencement of our acquaintance.

I am,

as I ought to be

your friend

H. L. White

Andrew Jackson Esq.

President of the United States.

Private

Andrew Jackson Esq

President of the United States

City Washington

Judge White on
the deposits &
Bank—

Gentlemans Bill

	To 3 Dinners @ 50 .	$ 1.50
	2 Servants Dinners .	.50
1833	4 Horses to Hay & oats	50
		$ 2.50

April 1st Rec'd payment

Wm Gibbs

18709

Nashville April 13th 1833.

Dear Sir,

Its with unfeigned sorrow I inform you of the death of your sincere and much attached friend Judge Overton. He departed this life at half past three oclock on yesterday after a serious indisposition of about eight weeks. He died calmly and with the assurance of a happy immortality, and seemed to be perfectly reconciled to his fate. I was not with him at the time, though I had been with him previously during his illness two weeks. He often spoke to me of you in the most affectionate and devoted terms, and enjoined it upon me to communicate his death to you. He spoke to Dr Hogg a few moments before he died, and told him to inform you when he saw you that he died as he lived your friend and as became a brave man and a soldier!

16708

He remarked to Mr Barry he wish me to write, that you and your happiness were amonge his last thoughts and the dearest wishes of his heart! He constantly spoke of you and talked about whatever concerned you, during the whole time of his indisposition; and nothing seemed to animate or revive him so much as the mention of your name. His greatest pride and happiness consisted in being honored with your friendship, and in proving himself worthy of that distinction. He called me to the bed side the morning I was compelled to leave him to go to Rutherford Court, and observed, that you & he had been dear friends on this earth, and if it was destined you never should meet here more, that he had no doubt, you would again be united in a better and a happier world! He prayed God to bless you, with long life, increase of happiness & honor, and a glorious hereafter! His greatest anxiety and wish was to see you once more, and I do sincerely believe if any thing would

have prolonged his existence, it would have been your presence. He often remarked if he could but start to Washington by the way of Orleans the hope of seeing you, and the exercise of travelling might restore him: But alas! he was to weak for the attempt; and he has gone were neither the things or the cares of this earth will ever more reach him. To you, Dear and venerable Sir, his virtues and his talents were known and justly appreciated; and his loss will deeply deplored. To me his death will long be a source of bitter affliction. He was among the few relatives I have in this world and he always manifested the most lively concern in whatever affected my welfare or happiness. I feel I must ask pardon for being so minute; but you who sympathize with me in my sorrow, will excuse the tediousness of the narative.

If devotion to you, personally & politically, & admiration for your bright and exalted virtues & talents constitute a claim

16709

to confidence and affection, then you may be justly entitled to that honor, and I hope sharing the same feelings & entertaining the same sentiments, I may be permitted to offer my humble tribute along with his dying love and memory! ___

I would have been rejoiced to have written you my views of your public acts & messages last winter, but standing in the situation I did, I deemed it indelicate if not improper to trouble [illegible] on any subject. I will only remark, that Providence seems to have assigned you the most important and difficult duties in life to perform, ~~and~~ that you have discharged them in a manner, that has covered yourself, your country & posterity with imperishable renown. The blessings of millions are upon you; — and the happiness and applause of your own times and of after ages ~~constitute~~ [illegible] your fame and reward!

Permit me, Dear Sir to join with those love for your person, gratitude for your services and honor for your actions; and believe me to be your humble & devoted servant.

Thos. J. Lacy.

P. S. I should like to hear from [illegible] when at Washington. My wife desires to be remembered to your Lady & Miss [illegible] affectionately, & mention us to Mrs. [illegible]

Wm. Lacy

The death of my old & much respected friend judge J. Overton who died on the 12th April 1833. peace to his manes. A. J.

[illegible] 12th April 1833

Andrew Jackson,
President of U. S.
Washington,
D. C. —

Private

FREE

16709-a

Copy Washington 14th April 1833—

Gentlemen

Your letter of the 8th inst. has this moment been received. In reply I have to remark, that the information requested is for my own satisfaction, and I do not wish it extended beyond the personal knowledge of the government directors. In case of a gross violation of the charter, it ~~may~~ is my duty to sue a scire facias against the Bank. If the rumors I have heard be true, it will probably be incumbent on me to do so, and those rumors relate to proceedings which must have come within the personal knowledge or observation of some of you. If they shall be confirmed by your report, I shall not only be able to judge of my particular duty; but may, if thought proper, cause to be made through the Secretary of the Treasury that more formal and thorough investigation which you suggest.

In conclusion I would remark, that the discounts granted to individuals are not deemed to constitute those private accounts which by

16710

the charter are so carefully guarded; but that ~~that~~ provision only embraces the Debtor and Creditor accounts of ~~the Bank customers~~ individuals on the Books of the Bank. If any discounts be corruptly or improperly granted, it is not only deemed right, but in aggravated cases the duty of the government directors to communicate the facts to the government.

I am with great respect
your mo obt. servt.
Signed Andrew Jackson

Sullivan
Wager } Govt. D
Gilpen } B. Directors
Letter of the 8th &
reply of 14th 1833—
In answer to J's
call for informa-
tion on proceed-
ings of U.S. Bank—

30

Travellers Rest April the 14 = 1833

Dear Sir

It becomes my painful duty to anounce to you the death of our old friend Judge Overton who departed this life on friday the 12 about 15 minuts past 4 oclock in the evening after being confined to his room for about 6 weeaks during which time he was often heard to say that he never could get well Doct Overton is of oppinion that the curing of the stricture last summer which has for many years troubled him very probibably was his death as he has complained ever since that time of a drawing in of his bowels and a verry bad cough both of which increased on him until the very last moment the Judge retained his proper mind until the last and often said he was willing and prepared to die and for the last two days often told me he wished I could help him die and close his Eyes in eternity for he must go and that soon and prayed that the would take him out of his misery

16712

he requested Dact Hogg about two hours before expired that when ever he saw you that he would tell you that he died like a man & a soldier, he received your two last letters one of which he read the other he did not read but told me to read all of your letters that might come to him from time to time during his Illness I have done so and since his death have burnt them and will do the same with all that may come from any of his friends as I know that was all ways his rule some short time before his death he gave me a lease on the place he purchased from Lytle as he wished me to live near his children so I might attend to them and his other business in town and all of his correspondence with his different agents through the country as he had become entirely unable to attend to any business whatever and could not expect to live long and wished to have all of his business satisfactorily arranged during his life and that he had appointed in his will Maj Thos Edmiston & his nephew Mr John S Claybrook his Ex^rs and George White & myself guardians of his children and Maj M. B Winchester his agent at memphis, the Judge bore his illness with uncomm

fortitude and I believe he had a full hope of
future happiness Mr Hume preached his
funeral on yesterday Evening there was a good many
persons present he was carried and put in the
grave by his old friends Maj Edmiston Thos
Crutcher Wm E. Anderson & Judge Catron
he was extreamly anxious to talk for about 4
hours before he expired but his voice was feble
and failed entirely for one hour before he
died he said to me early the moring before
he [illegible] that the struggle between life & death
w[illegible]erate one and that he was the
[illegible] the Judges family and my
are all well and no doubt would [illegible]
glad to hear from you at any time
give my respects to Maj Barry & family
also to your son and Genl Overton

yours respectfully

R H Barry

A. Jackson President

16713

FREE

Andrew Jackson
President
Washington
City

pr mail

Wm Barry
Recd 26th 1833

Death of my old
friend
Judge Overton

29th
April 1833
A. J.

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, Washington, } April 15 1833.

PAY to George Templeman — or bearer,

fourteen — — dollars, 96 1/2/100

Andrew Jackson

14 DOLLS. 96 1/2/100

16714

April 15th 1833

President of the United States to George Templeman

		$
1832 August 3.	To one bunch of No 70 quills (25) @ 3.50 p 100	87 1/2
		12 1/2
1833 February 10	" box of sand	44
" " 22	" one bottle of black ink	5.30
" " "	" ream of best blue 4to post	50
" " 26	" 2 boxes of wafers	87 1/2
March 19	" 25 No 70 quills @ $3.50 p 100	5.50
April 6	" ream of best blue 4to post	40
" " 10	" 2 small bottles of ink @ 20 cts each	75
" " 15	" 25 No 60 quills @ 3 p 100	$14.96 1/2

Received Washington City April 15th 1833 of
the sum of
fourteen dollars and ninety six cents in full of the
above account

George Templeman

96715

Washington April 16th 1833 –

My son,

I have just received yours, & Sarahs kind letters, of the 14th instant, and am gratified to hear of both your good healths, and the little pets. Mine is not good, I am oppressed to day, with one of my disagreeable head aches.

I have heard nothing from home since I wrote you. It was not true as Holtzclaw wrote, that the cholera was at the Hermitage, or it would have been stated in some of the letters written to Andrew & Emily.

For the present it will be proper to omit purchasing, they shows a letter & Mr Nichols account, which I have just recd, for the cash recd for the cotton after a credit for the cash recd for the cotton leaves you three hundred & about 80 dollars in debt, therefore this debt must be met, before we make further purchases. You know my creed, never to be in debt, & in these days of pressure, those who do, will be sure to do ill.

Emily has recovered, & the rest of the family, except myself, are well. We will be all happy to see you & Sarah with my little Rachel, return in good health.

We are –

16716

we are very loansome here, tho' constantly pre[illegible]
with business.
I am glad to hear you have lard in the
Mother so well - I suppose the plate ordered, &
ready. I would like to hear of its being shipped
as I wish to remit the amount, and close
my accounts up to the first of may, that I
may know how much we have to ship
the present year. I shall not write Mr Jose[illegible]
Nichol until your return.
give my love to Sarah, & kiss the little
pet for me, & present me to Mr & Mrs Breat[illegible]
all, to Emma & all our friends, to Mr G. B[illegible]
thitt, the Doctor & his lady & to Major Eato[n]
& his. I sincerely regret that Samuel E[illegible]
not pass this way, as I wished to have seen
Ann & Thomas, & have got them to have
given us a just account of my farm
& farm. I have wrote to Mr Cockle, but
whether he will write, an answer, is more
than doubtful.

yours affectionately
Andrew Jackson

Andrew Jackson jnr.

Andrew Jackson junr
Philadelphia

Mr Weatherells — Arch St above 12th St
North Side

14717

Nashville 17th April 1833.

My dear Genl.

I reached here last evening in the Louisville stage, in good health and without the occurrence of any accident. I left Gov. Woodbury at Louisville, but he expected to leave the same morning I did, in the Hibernia, one of the Mail Steam Boats— She is a good Boat, and her commander a very clever, warm-hearted Irishman, and a friend of yours. I have no doubt his passage will be a pleasant one, and I hope also a safe one.

Your friends here, so far as heard from, are generally well. Before this reaches you the death of your old friend Judge Overton, will have been received. He had been lingering for some time, and, Mr. Crutcher informs me, was confined

16718

three weeks to his head before his death. He died on Friday the 12th Inst, and was apparently as well as he had been for several days previous; but was taken with a fit of coughing which collected the phlegm in his throat, and, not being able to throw it up, was strangled. Mr Crutcher informs me that Mrs Overton is well. I shall ride out to see her in a few days.

As I was on my way to the Steam Boat, at Wheeling, I saw Mr Williamson, formerly of Washington, who informed me that Mr Thomas Donelson and his brother were at his house, and the latter ~~[illegible]~~ had been, and was then quite indisposed. Gov. Woodbury and myself went up to the House, where they were, to see them. Mr Donelson told me he was some better, but was still too unwell to travel. He thought, however, that he would be able to commence his journey again in a day or two; but altho I was detained two days nearly at Cincinnati, and one day at Louisville,

I neither saw nor heard of them after
I left Ab Lebanon from this circumstance
I was apprehensive that Mr Donelson
had got worse again — He was attacked
he informed me, with something like
the billious cholic.

Mr McLemore has been in
the Western District, Mr Crutcher
informs me, for the last two or
three months, and it is not known
when he will return.

The enclosed letter is from your
old friend Col. Polk. I do not know
what better to do with it than to send
it to you, nor do I know what reason
he has to suppose his standing with
you is on the wane. So far as I have
any knowledge of the relations subsisting
between you, I presume it is there
imagination. But for the sake of
"auld lang syne", if you think it ne-
cessary to write to him, I would treat
him with great kindness.

I have not yet seen any of Col.
Loves family. I will get him if he is

16719

not too busy to ride up to the Hermitage with me in a day or two. I have not yet been out to Fairfield, but shall see it in the course of an hour or two. I fear it is in rather a bad condition, but from what Mr. Crutcher tells me, I am in hope the young man I now have will soon put it in pretty good repair — He thinks very favourably of him.

Please present my respects to all your family, and particularly Mr. Earl, and believe me truly,

Sincerely Yours

W B Lewis

P.S.

Mr. Crutcher sits by me and desires to be kindly remembered to you.

I also send you a letter this moment rec^d from Mr. Smith of Phil^a — you will see what he says about your silver Plate. L

April 19th 1833.

Dear General, I have defered answering your last Letter, until now, in order to give some information respecting your Negroes, many of whom at that time were very ill. There has been more sickness among them for some months, than usual. The cause I cannot well imagine. The diseases that have prevailed among them, have been something similar to an Epidemic. High Fever, headache, attended with cough and pain in the breast extending occasionally to the stomach and bowels. There have been about 20 cases of this character. One case, which terminated fatally (Titus) of which you have been informed, had many of the Symptoms of Cholera. He lived about 8 hours after being attacked violently. I was with him until he died; but our efforts were all in vain I have had 2 other cases of the kind in the neighbourhood One at A. J. Donelsons and one at Drakes Lick the latter a well marked case of Spasmodic Cholera both of which terminated favourably. There was another case in the bend of the River (Pryors) which died. Old Sampson (the gardener) fell a victim to the disease of an Epidemic character. His constitution could not bear its violent attack. The rest have all recovered, and now enjoy good health. I think I have been unremitting in my attention, both by day & night.

16720

The Cholera has again subsided in Nashville, and the general health of the country is good.

Your farm business goes on well under the management of Mr Holtzclaw. I think he is one of the best Managers I have ever seen, and considering the backwardness of the season, and sickness, he is quite forward in his business. He will I no doubt make a fine crop. What he does is well done, and done with judgement. I think the Negroes are becoming quite reconciled, and he tells me he finds no difficulty with them, having rarely to chastise.

I should be quite glad whenever you have a leisure moment, for you to drop me a few lines. I will write to you again ere long and after an examination of your stock, and espicially your blooded horses &c give you the particulars

Your friend

Genl A. Jackson

M. McCorkle

P.S. I prepared an immediate answer to your favour but did not send it for reasons already given. I have thought best to send it now with this.

M. M.

Free

Genl. Andrew Jackson
President United States
Washington City

Dr. McCorkle
private
Dom. Affairs

To of Health Tac. 20th Ap.

Key West April 20th 1833 -

Sir -

The three letters enclosed, were found by me among the papers of a Gentleman who lately died at this place, and I avail myself of the departure of Mr Simonton for Washington City to forward them to you -

With assurances of my high consideration and respect I have the honor to be

Sir, Yr Mt Obt Servant

W. A. Whitehead

Collector -

To his Excellency Andrew Jackson

Washington City -

16722-3

Fairfield Apl. 21st 1833.

My dear Genl.

I have this moment returned from a visit to the Hermitage. I left home after an early breakfast and got up there between ten and eleven Oclock where I remained untill after breakfast this morning. It is with pleasure I inform you that I found every individual big and little well except Hannah, Sallys eldest child and she, I was told by the overseer and her mother, was getting better. I had her brought to the house, so that I might see her myself, and ascertain, if I could, the nature of her complaint. I was apprehensive from what Mr. Holtzclaw told me that she was afflicted with the hip complaint such as Major Barry's son had, but on interrogating her and her mother as to the origin of her disease, I am inclined to think it is some thing else. Mr. Holtzclaw and some of the black people think it is the white swelling she has. Her mother told me when she first complained of a pain in the hip she examined her and found a large lump in her groin having the appearance of what is called a waxen-kernel. She also told me that she complained not only of pain in

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in the hip but also in the thick or muscular part of the thigh, and particularly the knee. As I do not know how those who have the hip-complaint are affected, I cannot say whether these are symptoms of that disease or not. When she was first taken Sally tells me she could not walk at all and suffered much pain — She can now walk a little, and her pains are not so distressing. Indeed she told me she suffered little or no pain except of nights. I thought this probably was owing to her taking too much exercise in the day, and I told her she must walk very little on her leg until it got better — I also charged her mother to keep her from exercising too much. She is a very pretty little girl and, as she will no doubt make a valuable servant if she lives and gets well, I have some thought of getting Dr Hogg to ride up and see her, for I am apprehensive Dr McCorkle does not understand the nature of her complaint. If she should require his personal attention afterwards she might be brought down and left with her grand mother who lives on Parsons lot, College Hill, and would take good care of her. The old woman (old aunt Nanny you know) was up to see her not long since, the overseer informed me, and was very anxious to take her down with her, but that he did not feel authorized to let her go. When next you write to me let me know your wishes with regard to this matter, and Hannah shall be 16

be treated in all respects as you may direct.

The farm is in pretty good order. The fences all look strong and good and particularly the outer ones. I was told by the negroes that nearly all the fencing on the Donelson lands had been repaired — most of it, also, around the Cany field — I did not see them but I have no doubt it is so. Some of the fences around the lots and stables have also been repaired as well as the outer fences north of your brick negro houses. I think there is no fault to be found with any portion of the fencing — some few of the fences about the lots which need it, have not yet been repaired, but the overseer says he intends giving his attention to them the first wet spell. He has made you some 10 or 12 new gates and hung them — they are well made and well hung.

The House looks, I presume, pretty much as it did when you were here last Summer. I thought perhaps it had not been sufficiently aired and directed Hannah who seems to have charge of it, to open the doors and windows when the weather is dry and pleasant. The yard and garden look badly — nothing is attended to as they should be. This however, is more Dick's fault than the overseers, as he has necessarily been much and constantly engaged

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in getting in his crops and withal I expect he has very little taste for gardening. I told Dick he must put the Garden in order forthwith and keep it so - that the walks, borders and squares must all be cleaned and kept so - The overseer promised me that in future he would pay more attention to Dick and the Garden, and yard.

Finding the yard pretty much grown up with weeds, indeed the back part of it entirely taken with the Green-planting, I directed the overseer to take his hoes into it the first rain that fell and scrape the whole of it over, not leaving a weed or spear of grass inside of the Paling in front or rear of the house, and to keep it so until the last of September, when he must chop it over lightly by and sow it down, thickly with good blue grass seed, unmixed with any other. These orders were given because I did not calculate on your visiting the Hermitage this summer, and by the next, if the blue grass seed comes up well, it will look much better than it now does or ever has done.

As you requested I looked also at the Monument in the Garden. Its appearance is very good, but I do not think it is finished entirely as it should be. The circular stone which rest upon the columns should also be plaistered on the interior as is the cove with the dome above. This is necessary in order to

hide the joints and rough appearance of the stone work. There are also many rough places and little ~~[illegible]~~ holes in the columns themselves owing to defects in the stones which should be filled up and nicely painted over. In addition to this I would suggest that a neat little iron railing be thrown around it at the distance of four feet from the base of the monument and paved all round with nicely dressed flagstones similar to those which cover the tombs. This would not cost very much and would give a handsome finish to the ~~tomb, which~~ monument which, I think, quite tasty and appropriate.

I sent for old Aunt Hannah who has charge of the poultry and told her that you had been very much mortified at finding on your return to the Hermitage, no fowls or poultry of any kind for the use of the table; and that you wished me to say to her that you hoped it would never be the case again. She assured me that she would do her best to raise a plentiful supply, but said her chickens and turkeys died very much with the gaps, which with every thing she could do, she could not prevent. The overseer she said had built her a good house, and she expected now, she would be able to take better care of them. She has a very good stock of turkeys to raise from. I counted 12 hens and four Gobblers; and, as I understand from her,

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she has also a pretty good supply of chickens &c.

I enquired of the overseer with regard to your horses, cattle, hogs and sheep. He told me his work horses were in very good order and were sufficient to tend his crop. He runs at this time, 17 ploughs but says if necessary he can run 19. I sent also for Ben, who I was told had charge of the plough horses, and enquired of him as to their condition. He said they were all in pretty good order, and were thriving. He informed me that they had lost a young mule, but did not seem to think that blame ought to attach to any one. I saw some of the plough horses myself and if the balance are in as good order they will do very well. The Overseer informed me that he had 60 grown cows and yearlings, and 22 young calves.× The cattle look as well as is usual for this season of the year. He has about 300 head of hogs, of this number there will be, he thinks about 80 or 90 large enough to kill next fall which he hopes will be sufficient, or nearly so, for the use of the farm. he further informed me that of the 300 head, 109 of them were pigs not more than a month old. Your flock of sheep look very well. I enquired of Mr. Hattyshaw the number. he told me there were 92 old sheep, and 59 lambs.

I paid Dunn a visit at his stables and looked at all his horses and colts, and I assure you I was much pleased and gratified at their appearance. The Horse, citizen, is in fine order, and condition. he is really a beautiful

× making altogether, of all descriptions, 82!

animal. The two 3 year old fillies are
also in fine condition. I think the one
by Stockholder much the finest of the
two but the other is also a fine animal.
His colts too (3 in number) are in good order,
and very playful. Indeed all his horses,
are quite fat, as much so as there is any
use for. One of your mares ~~fillies~~ the overseer
informed me, was in Williamson, and
as he would have soon to send for her
he wishes me to say to you that he would
want some money, 40 dollars I think he said,
to pay for her season and keeping.

Upon the whole, if Mr Holtzclaw will
hold out as he has begun I think he will
make you a good crop, if he has a good
stand of cotton and the season suits, &
take very good care of your stock. He
feels, however, considerable uneasiness with
regard to his cotton crop — he is afraid his
stand will not be a good one — his seed
he says were not good, nor could he get
those that were good anywhere. He finished
planting yesterday (20th) while I was at the
Hermitage. He says he could have plan-
ted a week earlier, but not having confi-
dence in the soundness of his seed he did not
like to risk them sooner. He will finish
planting his corn tomorrow — He tells me
he has 200 acres in cotton, considerably upwards of
300 acres in corn and something like 120, or
130 acres in oats. He has his sweet potatoes

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planted and in the piece of fresh land on the left hand, of the gate as you approach the House. I enquired of him particularly about your meadows and timothy. He says no hay he is afraid can be made off them. Indeed he says one piece (adjoining the lot Deans stables are in) was so taken with weeds that he found it necessary to plough it up and put it in corn. He thinks by tending it well this summer the weeds may be killed, and then, by sowing it down again in timothy, it might bring good grass. I looked at the ground, and from its appearance I have no doubt he done right in ploughing it up — it must have been very much taken with weeds. He has not ploughed up the other but he is afraid it will not make hay — he says it was badly rooted up by the pigs and hogs last fall, and has now more weeds than grass in it. Your two fields of clover look very well and a good deal of hay may be made off one of them (the one opposite the cotton Gin) & Mr. Holtzclaw intends mowing it — the other he says he is obliged to pasture.

I enquired of Mr. Holtzclaw about the sickness on the place in the early part of the Spring and the cause of so many negroes dying. He told me that he thought the Cholera had visited that neighbourhood, and that some of your negroes had died of that disease — particularly Titus, whose death he seems very much to regret, as he was a fine hand and a most valuable servant. He did not

not seem, however, to be satisfied in his own mind that either the girl, or the two Simpsons died with that disease. He says Dr. McCorkle saw Titus on the Saturday morning before his death, and said he was well again, and would be able to go to work on Monday morning — at 11 oclock Sunday night he was a corpse. Now my dear Sir, I doubt very much whether the cholera has ever been at the Hermitage or its neighbourhood. I heard of its being nowhere else except a reported case on Major Donelson's farm +, which I have no confidence in — I think Titus must have died of some other disease. I had heard at Nashville that Mr. Holtzclaw was very severe with the negroes but from my own observation and what the negroes themselves told me while there I think, probably he is not more so than is necessary. Where there are so many negroes, there must be a pretty rigid police. I told him what I had heard of his severity, but I hoped he had given no foundation for such reports about him. I added that you knew the necessity of keeping order on the place and among the negroes, but that I was sure that you did not wish nor would you permit your negroes knowingly to be treated with cruelty — I hoped therefore that he would not use towards them any unnecessary severity. He assured me that he had not, and would not. I told him if an overseer would be constantly himself, with his hands, every

+ Mr. Donelson's negro who was supposed to be attacked with the cholera, recovered and is now well.

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little whipping would be required. The best
way of managing negroes according to my
experience, was to treat them kindly when they done
well, and to punish reasonably when
they misbehaved, but that he might be
assured that no negroes would conduct
well who were left too much to themselves—
that some one for whom they had either respect
or fear, should always be near at hand.
He concurred with me in opinion, and
said that he scarcely ever was off the place
unless obliged by business.

Your negroes evidently are better clad
than they were under Mr Steele's admini=
stration. They informed me they all got
their quantum of winter clothing, and most
of them have already been furnished with
their summer ~~winter~~ clothing— I did not see a
single child, even ~~that~~ on the place that
was not well clad, and Mr Holtzclaw
informed me there were 58 of them.
He keeps his wheel constantly going, and
he informed me it spins 6 or 7 ~~cuts~~ yards
every day— besides the spinning jinney
he says he keeps some of the old women
spining by hand— and his two looms he
says are constantlly going.

I believe my D. genl I have given you
all the information I have with regard
to the Hermitage, its culture, and manage=
ment. If there should be any thing else you
wish me to attend to, let me know and

it shall be done.

My place, I believe, has fared worse by my absence than yours. My former over-seer made me nothing the last four years, and on my return this spring I found nothing scarcely on it — stript almost of every thing. I have got, however, I think a very fine young man who will in this and next year be able perhaps to restore things to what they formerly were.

Mr. McLemore has got back again. I saw him a few days ago at his own house. I never saw him look better, but Mrs. Mc Lemore has been unwell for some time; altho getting better she still looks badly. The rest of the family are well. Mr. McLemore informed me that Genl. Coffee was still quite unwell, and threatened with the dropsy in the chest. I trust this may not be so but really I have my fears. The Genl. did not by any means seem to me to be in sound health while in Washington.

Please say to Mr. Donelson when at the Hermitage I stopped over to his place, and enquired how they all were there. His overseer told me that there was not a sick person on the place. He said he had finished planting his cotton on the 15th (I think) and that he had all his corn planted except the new ground — every thing I thought looked pretty well — You can say to Mrs Donelson

16729

I understood they were all well at her mother — I had not time or I would[e] gone over to see the old lady — I will try and do so the next time I go up to the Hermitage.

I do not know yet when I shall be able to return to Washington. Mr. Crutcher and myself have done nothing yet towards ~~settling~~ arranging the accounts of the estate nor shall ^ I be able to attend to that matter before Mr. Pageot leaves here which will be on Wednesday morning the 24th. Inst. so that you may expect to see him in Washington in a very few days after you see this hasty scroll. If it should be necessary for me to be back earlier than the first or middle of June, write me and I will return at any time you may think it necessary.

Please present my respects to your family, not forgetting my good friend, Mr. Earl, and believe me to be D[ea]r Sir, sincerely yours,

W. B. Lewis

Genl. A. Jackson
Washington City.

P.S. The overseer, Dunn says, gives him every opportunity to take good care of his horses. He has logs [illegible] up for new Stables which he intends putting up in the course of the summer. — I forgot to tell you when speaking about your cattle that Mr. Holtzclaw said he had lost two very fine cows, which were drowned in the mill race. These he said was the only stock he had lost ——

Major Lewis- recd-
4th May 1833-

On Private
Affairs
home

On the file
AJ

The President.

Department of State.

16729a

My dear Sir Louisville Apl 21st 1833

Your kind letter, announcing my appointment as a visitor at West-point, was gratefully received. The commission for that purpose has not yet reached me. I presume that I shall receive it in a few days.

We have just had the pleasure of Gov. Woodbury's visit to our City. He reached here, on Saturday the 14th and passed through our Canal on Sunday the 15th inst on his way to New Orleans. I spent an hour in his company on Saturday, and went through the Canal with him on Sunday. He was free, to me, in his conversation, on public subjects. I obtained from him information, which I had much desired. I was highly pleased with his open and easy manners. There was, none of the Starch, of high station, about him.

My son is a Candidate for Congress in this District with probable prospects of success. Henry Crittenden of Shelby and Mr Graves, a lawyer of Henry are his opponents and on the Clay side. They vehemently [illegible] Mr Clay's Land bill at him. They spread much upon the [illegible]vantages to Kentucky, of a division of the money, for the public lands, amongst the states, to the purposes of Education and internal improvements. Gov. Woodbury informed me, that the application of this fund, to those objects and Colonization was stricken out of the bill; and by his advice I now request you, to send me copies of the bill and your objections. It will be understood, that the objections are to be given, in the strictest confidence, and not to be used, without your leave.

I consider it very likely that Crittenden or Graves will be ruled off the political track, an event I had rather, not see. If they both continue, I look, upon the success of my son, as certain. Lecount is not a Candidate, and I hope that he will exert all his force and influence in favor of my son. His friends are warm for Patrick. On this point a letter from Major Barry to Lecount will be highly important. It will induce him to be active, in favor of my son. Lecount's right arm was amputated, in lopping Gallatin, Owen, Franklin, Anderson from Shelby and

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and Henry. This ought to influence them to go the whole for Patrick H Pope.

The opposition are endeavoring to make this point the nucleus of their power in the West, but more particularly in Kentucky; and there your friends ought to be strengthened. If we get my son as the Repre=sentative from this District, it will be a death-blow to the opposition. I have much to say when we meet in private about the plans, objects, and actions of public men. "The proper study of mankind is man."

Mrs Popes health is still very bad, and nothing I believe will restore it, but travelling. With the highest respect and esteem, I am your friend sincerely

Worden Pope

Gen. Andrew Jackson

(Private) 25

PAID

Warden Pope 1833

Gen. Andrew Jackson

President of the United States

Washington

Mansfield 21 April 1833

My dear General

Some three days since your favor of the 6th Inst covering one to Mrs Doual, I can assure you it was gratifying to learn that Mrs Jacksons health was improving I hope ere this it has been perfectly restored

We regret to learn that your health is not so good, I am confident it proceedes from the great fatigue you were obliged to undergo before the rising of Congress. If you could spend a few weeks at the Hermitage this Summer I feel confident it would be of infinite service to your general health: you have now got matters settled in the South as well as all as our Relations in Europe, you have laboured hard to effect these objects and as they have been crowned with success

16732

I think you ought to take some repose your self, particularly when your health requires it so Imperitously

I will not say much about its being your Interest to be at the Hermitage at least once a year for that would not way with you where the publick was concerned but your health requires it and I hope and trust you will look some what to your own repose and come out this summer If you should visit the East you might come out by way of the Lakes and pass through the northern part of Ohio, The Cholera is not at the Hermitage nor do I think it has been more than that at this place or generally through the Country. our Servants have been subject to bowel complaints & pains in the Stomach but nothing serious when not exposed Poor

so un poor Shelcon caught cold but he had
been lingering for some time our country
is at at this time very healthy, our
Winter has been unusually wet and
damp which was the cause of so much
sickness, Mrs Love's health is fast improving
and the balance of the family are well
Mrs Love & Elizabeth the desire to be most
affectionately [remembered] to Mrs Jackson and your
self with my cordial wishes for your
health and happiness I am your
sincere Friend
Ch Love

16733

Private

General Andrew Jackson

Washington

District of Columbia

Col. Chas I Love
of Nashville
Tenn
1833

Nashville 26 Apl 1833.

My dear Genl

I received by yesterdays mail the enclosed letter from Martin Gordon. He speaks of two letters, accompanying the enclosed, to you. He must have forgot to put them [up] as I have not recd. them, unless he sent them under a separate cover, & they were opened at the office and taken to you. If this be not the case it is probable they will come to hand in a day or two, and I will then enclose them to you. I thought however, that it was important ~~that~~ you should understand the state of things in New Orleans, and have therefore sent you the enclosed without waiting for the others. Gordon, no doubt, is a good deal excited at the course of those gentlemen, but he is a true and sincere friend and worth a regiment of lukewarm, ~~and~~ [or] pretending friends.

I have heard nothing from your farm, or overseer since I last wrote you. I forgot to say to you in that letter that Mr. Holtzclaw was apprehensive his corn would be short. He will, however, he says use every economy.

We have nothing here, very interesting, except the electioneering now in progress. Bell has, as yet, no opposition — perhaps will have none. The Bank people are doing all they can against Polk, who is opposed by Theo. Bradford of Bedford County. Col. Walker Polks brother in law is now in Nashville and says there is no danger of his election. I saw Mr. Tho. H. Fletcher a day or two ago, who informed [me] that he had just returned from Cave Johnstons District and that he thought the contest there was entirely between Dr. Marable and Genl. Cheatham — that Johnston was completely down. The contest in this County for the Legislature is between Geo Yeager (for Foster) and Jos. Horton former Sheriff (for Grundy); and William Anderson (Foster) and Hickman (Grundy) — the two former for the Senate and the latter for the lower House. Eatons friends are looking on but taking no part in the struggle here. It would be better for Eaton if he were here, but absent as he is I think his prospects very good — better than either of the others. Newton Cannon, ~~[illegible]~~

16734

as well as others not heretofore counted on by his friends has come out openly for him — Cannon is running for the Senate without opposition I understand. Gov. Carroll Col. Armstrong & Hall think as supporting Eaton in good faith — Armstrong says he must not be appointed to *any office* before this election is over.

Wm. B. Lewis
Private
home affairs
&c

Private & confidential
Genl Andrew Jackson
Washington City
D.C.

I regret very much to hear of Genl. Coffee's indisposition. I fear he is considered dangerous. We wrote here for Dr. Hogg to ride out to see him — He has not yet returned. We can therefore know nothing *certain* with regard to Genl. Coffee's situation until we see him. — Remember me kindly to your family & Mr. Earle, and believe me to be

Sincerely yours. Wm. B. Lewis

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, Washington, } April 29th 1833

PAY to George Breathitt — or bearer,

one hundred — — dollars, $\frac{}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

100 DOLLS. $\frac{}{100}$

16735

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, Washington, } May 1st 1833

PAY to M. A. Guesta — — or bearer,

Eight hundred & sixty seven dollars, $\frac{79}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

867. DOLLS. $\frac{79}{100}$

16736

Geo. Breathitt

1834.

Hermitage, May 2nd 1834

My Dear Father

Since I last wrote you I have had the pleasure of receiving several of your kind, affectionate letters, but owing to indisposition before my confinement, and a confusion of ideas since, I have not been able to acknowledge them untill the present opportunity, I have since the birth of our fine boy been unusually smart and the baby is one of the largest and fattest I ever saw at his age, he is a charming fellow, I shall be very impatient to present him to you, he bears the name and I hope he may possess the virtues of his kind, affectionate grandpa, our dear little Rachel is well, and much pleased with her little brother, she is very fond of him, although a little jealous of him, she looks like a little fairy, along side of the boy, his hands and face are nearly as large as hers. I hope you may be able early to leave the city and

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make one of our family circle, please to present my kind regards to cousin Emily, I congratulate her upon the birth of her daughter, and hope both are quite doing well, remember me kindly to Elizabeth Martin, and all the family, also our friends Col^l. Earl, Mr & Mrs Blair, and all enquiring friends, My dear Sister and family expect to leave us next week, I shall feel quite lonely for some time, they are all well, and beg to be remembered to you, I have not been able to read the papers for some time, but heard of your triumph over your and our countrys enemies, I congratulate you my dear Father, and pray that your health may be restored and your life prolonged, and that your strength may increase, that you may be able to perform all the arduous duties of your situation, and have many years of happiness in retirement, at the delightful hermitage, sweet home, Mr Jackson continues in fine health, and intends writing to you this evening, he joins me in love to you, and our dear little Rachel sends a kiss. I now must

conclude, hoping we soon may meet, and for the future be able to hold verbal communication,
Your affectionate daughter
Sarah

16538

First letter to Genl J- after Colonel's birth

(Private)

FREE

NASHVILLE T. MAY 7

Andrew Jackson Esqr
President of the U States
Washington City
DC

Mrs. Sarah Jackson
after Andrew's birth.

16538-a

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, Washington, } May 2nd - 1833

PAY to Joseph Boulanger — or bearer,

one hundred & fifty — dollars, $\frac{}{100}$

150 DOLLS. $\frac{}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

16734

Philadelphia May 6th.
1833

My dear General

Mrs Barton informs me that she is about writing to you, and I could not allow her letter to leave this place, without joining the assurance of my personal esteem for your character, and gratitude for your services to our common country. Allow me to add (and I am sensible that this has more of selfishness in it) my thanks for your very kind intentions towards

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me. I speak the language of sincerity, Sir, when I say that I should be more happy if you thought me not unworthy of some small portion of your regard. I take the liberty of requesting a remembrance to Mrs Donelson, and with my earnest wishes that your life may be prolonged for the service of the country and your own enjoyment, I have the honour to remain,

My dear General,

your most obedient

and grateful humble servant

Thos P Barton

OFFICE OF BANK U. STATES, Washington, } May 6th - - 1833 -

PAY to Andrew Jackson ——— or bearer,

two hundred — — — — dollars, $\frac{}{100}$

Andrew Jackson

200 DOLLS. $\frac{}{100}$

1674 ia

Paris 6th May 1833

Dear Genl.

I have had a pleasure at your message which has reached us by the way of London - but I could only hold the paper 1/2 minute to look at the nullification. You can hardly conceive the anxiety that prevails even among foreigners on that subject. You appear to think the Union safe - at least the glorious [illegible] God grant you see that my prophecy - God be thanked - If the people will only feel the proper value of the Union to their interest honour respectability and peace - a million of men would follow you to extinguish the flame of incendiarism which has burst out around your cradle, and on the footsteps of Genl. Greene & my forgotten un-thanked and calumniated father. The first spark of this conflagration was struck by Jefferson and I trust it is reserved to you to put it out forever

16743

the southern people have a right to complain
of the tariff in that I join them - it is a
foolish as well as an unjust policy - but
has a ~~child~~ son a right to cut his mothers throat
to rip open the womb which conceived
him - because his mother may have
exhibited a momentary partiality for his brother,
especially when that mother shows a sense
of her injustice and is endeavouring to ad-
just the balance of her affections. The faction
of the Nullifiers will cover them with confusion
and unpopular odium - but their success
would consign them to eternal infamy
and endless execration. Forgive the warmth
of my language, but this nullification is a can-
cer in my heart, & I believe in that of every
citizen of the U. States who finds himself
absent from that dear country. I cannot
sleep for it - and I sometimes think of coming
home immediately - for if there should
be a civil contest I should feel myself bound
in honour to take my part in all its melancholy horrors

things however I trust will not come to that painful, tremendous extremity — your popularity your energy & prudence, and the good fortune which providence has hitherto permitted us to enjoy, assure me, that american hands are not yet to be stained with American blood — and that the metaphysical fallacies of a few conceited and disappointed men — who stimulate by mutual adulation their common extravagance of vanity & selfishness, will not succeed in frustrating the glorious work of Washington & his followers, in disappointing the hopes of all lovers of freedom on this planet, and in overwhelming themselves as well as their posterity with a flood of ruin, which may have consequences that ages of patriotic struggles would not be able to repair.

I am ever dear Genl. yr faithful servant.

H. Lee

16744

Please read & answer the enclosed —

16745

(private)

Genl. Jackson

&c &c &c

H. Lee.

Nashville, May 6th 1833

Confidential

Dear Sir,

Upon my arrival in Tennessee, I discovered, that Mr Fosters most popular friends, were up as Candidates, in almost all the Counties in the State — appearances were so formidable, altho I knew I had the strength with the people, that I hesitated some time, whether, I would engage actively in a controversy such as I foresaw it must be — my friends became very urgent, that Candidates on my side should be put up in opposition — I assented, & that with the exception of four or five (perhaps 6 or 7) Counties, the Candidates are pitted between us — he has in general the most popular Candidates, but my popularity is superior to his — In this County, Yerger & Wm E. Anderson are his Candidates, Horton & Hickman are mine — Balch runs at large, but will get no votes of account —

I am charged, with Nullification &c — you know, how this is and that it is wholly untrue — I have therefore written the inclosed to you — believing there would be no impropriety, in your answering it fully —

How far, I should use your answer, I wish left to my discretion — I shall be able perhaps to do, without publishing it — but in case of emergency, I should like to be permitted to do that —

I anticipate a very warm & doubtfull contest, — Foster I think had greatly the advantage, matters at this time are very equally balanced — perhaps, my chance not quite equal, — but I have great faith in the people —

The Armstrongs, McLemore, Donelsons &c are supporting my friends that is, Horton & Hickman — In Knox County, I am told there are none but Foster Candidates —.

yrs with great respect

Felix Grundy

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private

FREE

NASHVILLE
MAY
7

Genl Jackson
President of U States
Washington City

Mr. F. Grundy
Nashville Tenn
May 7 1830
Private & confidential

Catskill N. Y. May 9th 1833

Dear Sir I have just heard of the daring outrage committed upon your person by R. B. Randolph at Alexandria. I thought it possible that he might attempt to wreak his vengeance upon me, but I could not conceive him mad enough to commit violence on you. It will put the seal upon his infamy.

As you lately remarked to me, too much indulgence has been shown towards men in public station who indulge in wanton and causeless abuse of the public authorities. Had all clerks and men in subordinate stations who thus indulge their licentious tongues, been removed, and had every officer of the army and navy who thus violated the rules and articles of war been tried by a court Martial and inflexibly broke, and had none but friends been placed in vacated stations, this assault would never have been made. But so much abuse has been tolerated & so much violence overlooked, that one miscreant, having received countenance in heaping on you all sorts of epithets, has thought that he might go further, and yet escape unharmed. I hope this will induce our friends at the head of offices to see that they keep none around them who indulge in or countenance wanton abuse of those in power and take care with what sort of men they supply

16749

their places.

My health is improved, but not so much as it would have been, had I not taken cold on my journey.

I inclose herewith a letter from Mr. Yancey of Kentucky with a letter from Mr. Work accompanying it. His situation is undoubtedly very unpleasant; but I know not what you can do for him.

With the highest respect
I am your &c.
Amos Kendall

Gen. Andrew Jackson
President &c.

Mr Kendall on
removing the outrage
by R. B. Randolph
-some clerks
ought to be remo-
-ved — Note this
A. J

Andrew Jackson
President.

Philada. May 9th 1833

Honored Sir,

Mr John Sharpe one of the first Merchants of this city and a Member of the Society of Friends, commonly denominated Quakers, is anxious to have an introduction to your Excellency and I consequently have thus taken the liberty of introducing him to you. Mr Sharpe being a Merchant of great respectability and highly esteemed for his extensive knowledge of Banking transactions and honest in his views and intentions upon in relation to the all engrossing subject of the U.S. Bank I take great pleasure in giving him this letter.

I have the honor to be
most truly & respectfully
your obt St &

B. S. Bonsall

Benjamin S Bonsall

His Excellency
Andrew Jackson
President of the U.S.

16751

B. S. Bonsall
1833

His Excellency Andrew Jackson
President of the U. St.

Philad^a. 9 May 1833

Genl. Andrew Jackson
President of the United States

Sir

I have the pleasure to introduce to you, M^r. John Sharp, a very respectable Merchant of this City. I remain

very truly
Your friend
Henry Toland

Henry Toland

16753-4

Philad^o. 9 May 1833

Genl. Andrew Jackson
President of the United States

Sir

I have the pleasure to introduce to you, Mr. John Sharp, a very respectable Merchant of this City. I remain

very truly
Your friend
Henry Wang

Henry Toland

16753-4

2 Apl 1833

By the communication, of which a copy is annexed, the President of the United States having asked my opinion upon sundry points, growing out of "the relation in which the government stands towards the Bank of the United States", it will be my endeavour, in the remarks now submitted, to comply with his wishes.

Where my information concerning facts may enable me to do it, I shall express a decided opinion upon those points and where that information is defective I shall present such hypothetical views as the case appears to justify. —

The charter of the present Bank expires on the 3d of March A.D. 1836: – and though by the 21st section two years after that period is allowed for the collection of its debts – the settlement of its accounts and the sale of its property; yet it is expressly declared not to be allowed "for any other purpose" "whatever".

For the purpose of making discounts, receiving

deposits, or transacting any business whether for the government or individuals, the Bank must therefore be considered as having left, at this time, less than three years of its prescribed term of existence.

It is to be recollected, also, that having the last year applied for an extension of its Charter beyond that period, the application was refused; and has not again been renewed. –

Under these circumstances, it is believed by me to be the duty of the Executive to regard the present Bank as dead for all fiscal purposes after the 3d. of March 1836 and seasonably to take such steps as may seem proper and necessary for the due management of the monied concerns of the government after that time, without the aid or cooperation of the present Bank. –

In an examination of the enquiry, what those steps ought to be, it will become convenient to furnish answers on most of the points presented for my consideration by the President. –

I think one of those steps should be to

dis-countenance in every way either a new Charter, similar to that now existing; or a new one under any modifications whatever, to the proprietors of the Bank now in operation. —

It is believed by me, that a fair construction of the Constitution does not in the present state of the country - of our public debt - and of our revenue require or justify a corporation of such a character as the present one. —

I refer to my written opinion delivered to the President in July 1832 about the renewal of its charter as then contemplated, for a sketch of my reasons for this conclusion - and to the Veto Message of the President during the same month for other and fuller reasons

in favour of the same conclusion. Nor would any modification of the charter while in the hands of the present stockholders prove in my judgment the most judicious and useful course for the future operations of the government, in respect to the collection and disbursement of its revenues.

In the first place, no modifications could be made, leaving the Bank under private control and conferring any thing like its present enlarged powers as to amount of capital - number and location of its branches - exemption from taxation - exclusive privileges &c, &c, which would, according to my views, render the charter either constitutional or expedient.

In the next place, if further experiments should hereafter show, that some kind of a Bank incorporated by the general government and admitting private interest in it to a certain extent was proper and necessary for the due manage-

-ment of our fiscal concerns. I should be unwilling again to invest the present corporation with that authority.

The reasons for this are not with me its supposed insolvency or its intentional and injurious unfaith-fulness as a mere fiscal agent; but they are its long enjoyment already of a privilege which, when regranted, should be opened to all.. its known political hostility to the present ad-ministration of the government growing out of the Presdts veto and other circumstances which need not be recapitulated. its late questionable conduct as to the three pr cents.- its treatment of the government Directors, excluding them from a full knowledge of its business concerns and its extraordinary loans and gifts indicating in some degree political and party motives, derogatory to its connection with the government and dangerous, if not detrimental to the public interests in the stock.

For these reasons I think that under no modifications could it be most proper and wise to select the present Bank again as the fiscal agent of the government under any new charter, when different agents, if any kind of charter becomes proper could be chosen, who are free from many of these objections.

My own belief, however, is, that at the present time, the reduced debt and revenue of the government - the increased facilities of commercial intercourse between all portions of the country, the better acquaintance with banking principles which now widely prevails - and the greater number and safety of private Banks in almost every district where revenue is to be collected or disbursed, will enable the government to transact hereafter its monied concerns without the aid of any Banking corporation of any kind created by Congress for this purpose.

But after due inquiry should a safe and economical plan for this purpose not be able to be arranged with the private and local Banks, or if arranged and put into operation, should it not satisfactorily succeed, I entertain an opinion, that the government ought then to organise an institution as auxiliary to the Treasury Dept. to aid in the collection and disbursements of the revenue. But this institution should, if feasible, be entirely public in its character, officers and capital and have just so much power and no more than would be sufficient to accomplish the public ends designed.

If in that way found adequate to accomplish the ends proposed it would then clearly come within constitutional limits; being then existing under the exercise of an implied incidental power, proper and necessary to carry other express and principal powers

-into effect and would when so organized rest on similar grounds and be as constitutional as collectors and custom-houses and no more dangerous, or subject to abuse, than are they or the army and navy.

If such a scheme, on full examination should not be deemed feasible ~~or expedient~~ or expedient, the last resort should in my judgement be, to establish a Bank in this District, allowing some private stock and giving it such powers as might be thought necessary to accomplish the fiscal objects in view and requiring the consent of the States to any monied operations attempted within them, beyond the mere collection and disbursements of the public revenue.

Entertaining these general impressions on these portions of the inquiry, the first step in my opinion towards the transaction of the public business through-

-private Banks, at some future period is to ascertain the probable amount of revenue to be collected annually the ensuing eight or ten years - the principal places when it is to be collected and where ~~[illegible]~~ disbursed, and then to open a confidential correspondence with intelligent men in those places in which the large deposits and transfers are to be made for ascertaining the best terms as to safety and economy on which they can be effected. - Agents might be sent in some cases, where it is most important to obtain entire certainty on this subject.

Should it thus be ascertained that these deposits and transfers can be safely, promptly and economically effected through the private Banks I think that the government ought in the next place to commence the operations through them whenever the time left for the charter to the U.S. Bank to run-

-shall not exceed what as regards the com-
-munity and the government is proper for a
safe change of so great magnitude and what
is necessary for enabling the new agents gradu-
-ally but fully to become acquainted with the
management of our whole deposits and disburse-
-ments. I see no occasion or justification for
an earlier experiment on this subject, unless
the Bank of the U. States, which Congress
have in my opinion provided as the usual
organ for this kind of business, should be-
-fore that time, be believed to have become
insolvent, or should be shown to have con-
-ducted so unfaithfully and injuriously in its
agency for the government, as no longer to
justify a continuance of the deposits in its
vaults. Concerning these last points, which
depend mostly on matters of fact rather
than of principle ~~on which~~ I can speak
only from the limited information before

-ne. But with no very favorable prepossess-
-sion towards the Bank, I have not discov-
-ered in that information a decided pre-
-ponderance of facts rendering it probable,
that the deposits in said Bank are now
actually unsafe, or that its fiscal agency
has been so designedly unfaithful, as to justify
the government in not continuing to risk
the collections of the revenue in its possession
where the laws place them, till a new arrange-
-ment incident to the expiration of its charter
requires a change to be commenced in the
deposits on the ground of that new arrange-
-ment.

The present price of the Bank stock at 8 a 9 per
cent above par,- the report made by Mr Toland
the agent of the Treasury and the late resolution
of the House of Reps.- "that the Government
deposits may, in the opinion of the House, be
safely continued in the Bank of the U. States."
furnish a general presumption on this question, entitled to much weight.

In answer to an enquiry of the President about the impression, which may have existed against the solvency of the Bank at the commencement of the late session, derived from its conduct as to the 3 per cents owned abroad, I think that impression has in some degree been changed by the amount of certificates the Bank has since obtained and surrendered - by the report of the Treasury Agent, and by the subsequent decision of the House of Representatives. The investigations preceding that report and that decision were made by competent authority and on the suggestions of the proper Department - and though we may not coincide in all the conclusions of the Agent or of the majority in the House of Represent^s. - yet those conclusions must on questions of mere fact be entitled to a certain degree of respect till rebutted by further enquiry and fuller information:- Indeed I am ready to declare, that the nominal value of stocks can so easily and ingeniously be affected by other causes than its real value - that the agent for the Treasury might so much more judiciously have taken less on

trust from the President and Directors as to the condition of the institution and that the report of the minority of the Committee of the House of Representatives - shows an action on the part of the majority in some degree so hasty and superficial - and that the official conduct of the Bank the last few years has in sundry particulars been in my judgment so very censurable that it merits from the Executive no privileges beyond what strict chartered rights may entitle it to & what the interests of the public and sound policy may require. Yet most of these circumstances rather indicate the propriety of making further enquiries and obtaining facts more accurately and extensively than of directing a total and immediate removal of the deposits. -

Without making such an enquiry or obtaining such facts - or until they are effected - it will surely be safer to the Executive and the public, for the present, to act on the presumptions before named. - But a change of the deposits will on other grounds in my judgment

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soon become necessary with a view to the early expiration of the present Charter of the Bank - to my most decided objections against its renewal and to the commencement of a new system of managing the Revenue through private banks. I think this change should seasonably be commenced. - It should be begun gradually and not suddenly, and should be both begun and conducted at such a time and in such manner as to furnish the least ground to the public or to Congress for complaint on account of any consequent pressure or excitement in the moneyed market. -

On the facts now known to me - sometime in the summer of 1834 - when less than two years of the Charter will remain - if contracts shall have been then completed with the private banks, a change in the deposits might in my judgment be judiciously commenced - leaving the bank of the United States, unless hereafter found to be insolvent or as a fiscal agent clearly unfaithful - to disburse the funds then remaining in its vaults. - But on either of those last events, occurring or being made manifest earlier - I have no

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doubt, a total transfer of the deposits ought to be made earlier and indeed soon as practicable: while without those events the proposed change somewhat later and slower seems for many reasons to be preferable. It would then be so deferred and so gradual as to prevent any shock in the value of stock-property or funds and to furnish no just ground of censure.

by Congress against the administration for a precipitate and unnecessary movement. – It would furnish no apology to the Bank for causing distress to its debtors on account of the previous sudden and large withdrawal of our deposits; or for attributing to this circumstance any distress that may actually arise from other causes.

In this way its debtors could be prepared at the proper time to obtain new and increased credits at the local Banks, strengthened as they will then be, by the public deposits so as to enable the debtors gradually to meet all their engagements with the expiring institution. There will be no panic or suffering in the community at large consequent from such a change and it will be one justifiable on sound general principles; and on facts not controverted and hence will probably be approved by the public and by Congress as quite indispensable to meet seasonably the new state of things after March 3d 1836.

The revenue should thereafter in my opinion

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be received in specie or only such Bank bills, as the institutions holding the deposits circulate or are willing to consider as specie.

The above remarks are believed to cover the whole ground presented by the President's interrogatories and contain my deliberate opinions and views in relation to them, so far as the facts within my knowledge enable me to give them.

Levi Woodbury

22. April. 1833.
Navy Depart.

The relation in which the Government stands towards the Bank of the U. States renders it desirable, if not indispensably necessary that a decision should be now made covering the whole ground and which will establish rules for our Government during my administration.

With this view, I invite the attention of my cabinet to a full consideration of the following points, viz

1st Whether any thing has occurred to lessen the impression at the commencement of the late session of Congress as to the safety of the Bank of the U. States, so far as regards the public deposits.

2d Whether the management of the institution is such that the Government can rely upon it as an agent in carrying into effect the fiscal arrangements of the Treasury, as well as whether it has been heretofore a faithful agent in that respect.

3d The propriety of acquiescing in the renewal of the charter of the present Bank under any circumstances or with any modifications — and if any modifications what ought they to be.

4th The propriety of assenting to the establishment of a new Bank — and if a new Bank,

[illegible] tion and in what manner ought the sugges-
tions to be made of any views on the subject,-
and upon what principles, and under what
limitations and with what privileges ought
a new institution to be formed?

5th. What system ought to be established for
the future disposition of the public moneys
so far as relates to the places of their deposit,
and the manner of their distribution: and if
the deposits are withdrawn from the Bank
of the U. States, would it be necessary to
receive the public dues in the notes of all the
Banks, or to limit the payments to the notes
of those Banks that may be selected as the
places of deposits and the agents of the fiscal
concerns of the Government.

The result of my own reflection is-

1st. That the charter of the present Bank ought
under no circumstances and upon no conditions
whatever be renewed.

2d. That the ground gained by the veto ought
to be firmly maintained, and that my assent
ought to be withheld from any bill authorising
the establishment of a Bank out of the Dist.
of Columbia.

3d. That if my assent is given to the establish-
ment of a new Bank it ought to be, to one
located in the District of Columbia having

the right to establish branches in the different
states and in such places thereof only with the
permission of the different states upon the
application of the Bank for that purpose, and
under such restrictions as the several states may
think proper to impose: and even with these
restrictions the Government shall have the
right to appoint the President and as many
Directors of the principal Bank and the branches
thereof as will secure fidelity and a thorough
knowledge by the proper officers of Govt. of its
transactions: and also that congress should re-
tain the right to repeal or modify the charter
from time to time as it may deem proper,
as a security against the corruptions and evils,
which are now experienced from the uncon-
trollable authority of the present Bank.

4th. That such an institution ought not to be
recommended until a full and fair experiment
has been made to carry on the fiscal [illegible]
of the Govt. without a National Bank of
any description.

5th. If this last view of the subject be adopted
it will be necessary <u>now</u> to devise and settle a
system for the deposits and distribution of the
public funds thro' the agency of the State Banks,
to go into operation at such a time as shall
upon a careful consideration of the subject be

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thought advisable ... [illegible] suggestions and sub-
-mitted to the same for consideration & for
discussion of the members of the cabinet,
giving each their opinions in writing.

(signed) Andrew Jackson

March 19th 1833

Sec. Woodbury
Copy of the Message — [illegible] reply to the [illegible] [illegible] & deposits

W. T. Barry (1) (Apr 1833)

Having duly considered the subject presented to the members of his Cabinet by the President of the United States of the relations of the government to the Bank of the United States, I have the honor to submit the following remarks upon the several points embraced in his note to me of the 19th of March

1. Nothing in my judgement has occurred to lessen the impression at the commencement of the late session of Congress on the safety of the Bank of the United States for the public deposits. The Committee of Ways & Means it is true, reported in favor of the bank; which report was subsequently sustained by a majority of the House of Representatives. But an ability to secure the repayment at some distant day of the monies deposited for safe keeping, is not all that is requisite to constitute ~~to constitute~~ the bank a safe depository of the finances of the nation. The public monies are not raised for investment, but for current and immediate use,

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and they are not safe for these purposes, unless they are so placed that they shall at all times be within the reach and at the disposal of the government. The acknowledged fact that the public monies were not at the immediate disposal of the government, when directed to be applied to a redemption of a portion of the public debt, entirely countervails the report of the Committee. The determination of the government to apply its funds to the redemption of every description of the public debt had been so long avowed, that nothing but a want of ability or inclination could have prevented the bank from being in perfect readiness to meet the call; either of which is sufficient to impair public confidence in the safety of that institution as a depository of the public monies

2. The Bank has not, in my opinion, been a faithful agent in carrying into effect the fiscal arrangements of the Treasury; and therefore the management of it is not such

as can be relied upon for that purpose. The withholding of the funds, or attempt to delay a return of the certificates for a portion of the three per cent stock; adding to the default, factitious apologies, based upon misrepresentations, warrants the conclusion, that the bank is a faithless agent of the government, unworthy of future confidence.

3. I fully concur in the sentiments expressed by the President "that the charter of the present bank ought under no circumstances and upon no considerations whatever to be renewed."

4. In the sentiments of the President I also fully concur, "that the ground gained by the veto ought to be firmly maintained;" that no new bank ought to be established by Congress, until a full and fair experiment shall have been made, to carry on the fiscal concerns of the government — through the agency of the State banks, as

112 by immediate collection and disbursements

through offices of its own; and that should it eventually be found necessary to create a new bank, its location should be within the District of Columbia, without the right of establishing branches in any State, except by the consent of the State; that the government at the same time should retain such control over all the branches as would secure fidelity in its transactions, and should reserve the right of modifying or repealing its charter at the pleasure of Congress. Deeming it unnecessary to refer to the causes and reasons which have led to these conclusions, I shall proceed to the consideration of the question concerning the public deposits in the present bank.

5. The propriety at this time of devising a system for the deposit and disbursements of the public funds through the agency of the State banks and the period at which the operation should commence,

presents a subject of great importance.
Sensible of the delicacy of offering views
in relation to a matter that belongs espec-
ially to another Department, the head of
which is invested by law with the power
of controlling the public deposits, and who
will be held responsible for any executive
action in relation to them; I shall with
due respect to that officer proceed to give
my views to the President, and with
that diffidence which becomes one who
from the nature of his public duties
cannot be familiar with the subject
in many of its diversified relations.
The entire withdrawal of the deposits
from the United States Bank will
produce much excitement, and the
managers of the institution will do all
in their power to increase it. Though
the Bank has proved an unfaithful
agent, and the forthcoming of the
114 deposits confided to it, cannot with

certainty be relied on; yet as ~~the~~ decision
of a large majority of the representatives
of the people in favor of the reports of
the Committee of Ways & Means, will
be urged in behalf of the bank, and
as no benefit will be likely to result
from any sensation that may be
avoided, I should deem it expedient
to refer the act of the withdrawal to
other causes less liable to be disputed or
~~presented~~ perverted. The position may
with certainty be assumed, that as
the bank is not to be rechartered it
will of its own impulse turn its
attention to preparatory measures for
closing its concerns; and that the go-
vernment must in the mean time
of necessity provide for itself another
more suitable if not safer agents for
the continued transactions of its business.
The change can also be made gradually

with less inconvenience than suddenly; and it should commence at an early day that no time may be lost in preparing and arranging the plan of a future system and for introducing the permanent change. The offices for deposit can be most advantageously designated by the Secretary of the Treasury. It occurs to me to be necessary to stipulate that a weekly confidential report to the Treasury Department of the condition of each bank where deposits shall be made should be furnished by its officers; and that provision for transfering the public monies without commission should be made as a consideration in part for the benefit which will be derived to the banks from the deposits. The bank should not be required to receive in payment of revenue, any other than the notes of such banks as they receive ordinarily on other accounts; and notes

of the United States Bank; which last are
receivable by law. The reasons for my
suggestions on these points need not be
stated as they appear to be obvious.
The remaining question is at what
time should the action of the new
agent commence. If the deposits are
to be exchanged, not by a direct re-
moval, but by causing future pay-
ments to be made in the other banks
that shall be designated, which I should
consider the preferable course, it
would require some time before the
change could be effected. Two periods
have been suggested for the commencement.
The first of October and the first of
January next. The first before the
meeting of Congress, the other during
its session. In favor of the first period
it may be urged that public feeling
requires that the step should be taken
at the earliest period practicable. That

the bank is faithless to the government,
and is exerting all its influence, even
by the exercise of corrupt measures to
thwart the views of the government
in the performance of its duties, and
to obtain a renewal of its charter in
opposition to the will of the people as strongly
expressed in the late election of President &
vice President. That the public deposits
are used to this end and to deprive her
of them speedily would lessen her in-
fluence, diminish her power, and give
strength to the new agent to be employed
in counteracting the evil. That the
issue between the government and the
bank should be made before the meet-
ing of Congress; that the representatives
coming immediately from the people,
will the more readily sustain the act
of the President of their own choice and
the principles upon which they have
just elected him with this issue in view.
That delay will strengthen the bank

and furnish her with the power of
increasing her influence.

On the other hand it may be urged that a due respect to the decision of the House of Representatives of the last Congress makes it expedient to wait the meeting of the next before acting. That the power and influence of the bank will not be materially circumscribed by the measure as she is a creditor for more than sixty millions of dollars. That the measure on the part of the government would be made a pretext for acts of greater hostility on the part of ~~to~~ the bank. That having the power she would not hesitate to exercise it to the fullest extent, by merciless calls upon her debtors, by refusing her accustomed facilities to the commercial & other business of the country; by oppressing the state banks; and indeed by producing a general state of derangements and distress throughout the country. That the effort would be made

and in many instances successfully,
to cast the odium upon the govern-
ment, for having, by what would be
called a premature and unnecessary
measure, brought on the calamity.
That the excitement would prevent
Congress from giving that deliberate
and calm consideration to the reasons
assigned by the executive for the mea-
sure, which they would otherwise do;
and thus furnish the bank with
further means to perpetuate her
power.

The reasons on both sides appear
to me to be entitled to great consideration;
and without presuming to designate
the proper period for its commencement,
I refer this point to the President, and
to the Secretary of the Treasury, who is
directly responsible in law, and will
be so regarded by the people. I am
free to express the opinion that whether
an earlier or a later day be fixed on

the resolution should [be] definitively taken
by the next meeting of Congress. It may
not be improper to add, that indeed I
feel it incumbent on me to state that
in regard to the fiscal concerns of the
Post office Department, experience
has shown that they can be managed
through other branches more advanta-
geously to the Department, and
much more to the convenience of
post masters and contractors as to
the facility of the former and the
[illegible] payment of the latter, than
through the United States Branch
of [illegible] bank.

All of which is respectfully
submitted

W. T. Barry

[redacted]

R. B. Taney   Attorney General's Office
April 29. 1833.

Sir,

I have already had the honor of stating to you in writing my opinion that the conduct of the Bank of the United States appears to have been such that the Executive Branch of the Government may lawfully withdraw from it the deposites of the public money, and that the public interest requires it to be done - And also that the fiscal operations of the Government may be safely and conveniently carried on through the State Banks.

The most formidable objection to this measure arises from an apprehension of the difficulties which the Bank of the United States may throw in the way of its execution. It is supposed that the Bank of the U. States, by means of its immense capital and numerous Branches would be able to cripple the operations of the State Banks and perhaps to break them - and thereby derange the currency, embarrass the Government & produce great individual inconvenience & distress - And it seems to be believed that the Bank of the U. States

(would

would be disposed to use this power if the pub-
-lic deposites should be withdrawn from it.

If the Bank possesses this alarming power to do evil, the Government have a right to expect that the President and Directors of that insti-
-tution would be incapable of using it for such an unworthy purpose. It is difficult to imagine that a corporation which owes its existence to the Government & has received so many favours from it and so much indulgence, could under any circumstances be so forgetful of its moral as well as of its legal & political duties, as to use its powers for the purpose of inflicting injury on the community which it was created to serve.- One can hardly bring him-
-self to believe that the powers and privileges given to a corporation in order to enable it to confer benefits on the people of the U. States could in the spirit of revenge or of selfishness be wilfully abused for the purpose of producing public distress.- It must however be admitted to be the general sentiment that the Bank is prepared to act on such reprehensible motives.- And this prevailing impression is of itself a-

(-bundant

=bundant proof that the corporation has by its conduct forfeited the confidence & esteem of the public- and that it is now believed to be capable of violating its duties moral & politi=
=cal in order to advance its interests or promote the ambitious views of those who wield its power.

It would not therefore be prudent in the Government to count on the forbearance of the Bank or on its sense of duty to the public. And if it can be shewn that the Bank pos=
=sesses the power to break or to embarrass the State Banks selected by the government, and thus destroy the healthy state of the currency, it may well be doubted whether the measure ought to be adopted.- But the evidence or the argu=
=ment which proves that the Bank possesses this power ~~would~~ will at the same time shew that the corporation is dangerous to the liberties of ~~the~~ country and ought not to be longer tolera=
=ted. For if the measures of the Government are to be influenced by the fear of its resent=
=ment or opposition, the time will soon come when its power must be encountered in some form or other- or the government (be

be in effect surrendered into the hands of the Bank.

But does the Bank possess this power? Is there any reason to fear its hostility?

As I understand the argument on this point it is shortly this - The Bank of the U. States will refuse to receive from the selected State Banks, their own notes payable at their branches. The greater part of their notes in circulation are of this description - and they are payable for the most part at remote Branches. These notes will be paid into the State Banks in the commercial cities for duties and debts to the Government. The State Banks will not be able to convert them into specie, and they will remain an useless incumbrance in their vaults, unless they incur the ruinous expense of sending agents to collect them at the various & distant places where they are made payable. And the notes of the State Banks being collected at the different Branches of the Bank of the U. States and transmitted to the mother Bank that Bank will press for specie on the State Banks - and these Banks having an over proportion of their funds in these unavailable Branch notes, they would not

be able to meet the calls upon them, and still less to transmit the revenue to the points where the exegencies of the Government require it to be placed. This I believe is the outline of the argument founded on apprehensions of the power of the Bank of the U. States.

This whole argument rests on the as=sumption that if the deposites are withdrawn the Bank of the U. States will be absolved from the obligation to give the necessary facilities for transferring the funds of the U. States from place to place, as is provided for in the fif=teenth Section of the charter. It is very clear that if this obligation on the Bank continues in force after the deposites have been withdrawn there can be no just ground to fear its power. Because as soon as the notes payable at the Branches come into the possession of the State Banks as a special deposite for the pub=lic, the Government would have the right to place them in the Bank of the U. States and to require these funds to be transferred to any place or places where the Secretary of the Trea=sury might direct. And thus the Bank would have the burden of transferring

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the public funds without having any advantage from the deposites- It would for example be obliged to transfer to New York the Branch notes received in Philadelphia or Baltimore, and to place the fund to the credit of the U. States in good and available money- And in like manner they might be compelled to trans=fer to Philadelphia or Baltimore or elsewhere at the pleasure of the Government the Branch notes received at New York- If therefore this obli=gation will continue on the Bank after the De=posites are withdrawn, that institution will be at the mercy of the Government and the Government will not be at the feet of the Bank.

Will the withdrawal of the deposites release the Bank from this duty? May they lawfully refuse to afford the facilities for transfering the public funds as soon as the deposites are taken from them?

The right to withdraw the deposites for any cause which the government may deem sufficient is given in plain and un=limited terms- They may be taken away in part or altogether- permanently or for

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a time - and there is no restriction upon this power in favour of the Bank. If the Secretary of the Treasury direct it to be done, and Congress do not by law order them to be restored, then by the provisions of the charter itself the Bank is to be no longer entitled to them during its existence, unless the government should think proper to restore them. Does the withdrawal of the Deposites repeal any clause in the charter or in any respect alter the provisions of that instrument? Certainly not. The change of the place of deposite is nothing more than the exercise of a power secured to the Government by the charter. - The rights of the parties remain in every respect the same that they were before. For the exercise of one right cannot be the forfeiture of another right, unless it is made so by the charter - And the charter annexes no condition whatever in favour of the Bank upon the removal of the deposites. - How then can it be supposed that while all the other rights of the Government & of the Corporation are admitted to continue notwithstanding the withdrawal of the deposites - this one clause securing to the Government the right to the transfer of its funds, is to be considered as erased from the Law?

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The Deposites are withdrawn in pursuance of the provisions of the act incorporating the Bank, and not in opposition to them. The withdrawal does not by the terms of the act of incorporation, change in any respect the rights of the parties under the charter as originally granted. And it might as well be contended that it would deprive the Government of the right of appointing Directors & of requiring statements of the condition of the Bank as of the right now under consideration.

It may be said that the Bank took upon itself the obligation to transfer the public funds, in consideration of the advantages it would derive from the deposites, and that the loss of these advantages would therefore in justice release them from the burthen of making the transfer. - To this argument there are two answers either of which appear to me conclusive.

1st The argument is not warranted by the language of the charter. It does not say that the duty to transfer shall depend on the continuance of the deposites and cease as soon as they are withdrawn. Nor are there any words in

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the act of incorporation which can be construed to mean that the obligation to transfer was undertaken in consideration that the public money should be de-posited in the Bank. And it would violate one of the first and plainest principles in the construc-tion of laws, & render all legislation vague & uncer-tain, if a condition should be engrafted on a statute by conjecture & surmise when the lan-guage of the law does not imply it.

2. If it were allowable to go out of the words of the law in order to ascertain the meaning of the parties and to employ ourselves in conjecturing what may have led the government to require this duty from the Bank and induced the Bank to undertake it, there is an obvious reason for the provision altogether independent of the public deposites.-

The obligation to make the transfer is imposed upon the ~~Bank~~ corporation by the 15th section of the act incorporating the Bank. By the section which immediately precedes it, (the 14th) the Govern-ment engages to receive the notes of the Bank in all payments to the United States unless otherwise directed by act of Congress. This obligation on the part of the government (to

to receive the notes of the Bank was a most valuable one to that institution and made their notes current every where in the U. States and gave to that corporation many great and decided advantages over the state Banks. But in consideration of this agreement on the part of the Government it became indispensably necessary for the public security that the Bank should be bound to make their notes available funds wherever the government might require the money. The U. States must pay their debts in gold or silver if it is demanded. And the government could not without manifestly sacrificing the public interest, have obliged itself to receive the notes of the Bank payable at the distant Branches, and at the same time take upon itself the burthen of rendering them ~~[illegible]~~ equivalent to gold and silver in other places where the exigencies of the public might require the money to be used. It could not have been expected that the Government would bind itself to receive at New York for example the notes payable at the Branches of New Orleans or Louis-

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or Louisville and also take upon itself the expence of converting these notes into gold & silver or into funds that would be equal to gold or silver in Boston and other places where the money might be required. The obligation of the Government to receive such funds created the necessity for the corresponding obligation on the part of the Bank to transfer them from place to place according to the wants of the government. And hence in the section next following the one in which the U. States agrees to receive the notes, the Bank agrees to make the transfer. And if we go out of the words of the law and con=strue it upon speculative notions as to the motives which led to the introduction of this pro=vision into the charter we see a very natural and sufficient reason without recurring to the deposites. The propriety of this reasoning is also confirmed by the manner in which the 16th section relating to the deposites is framed.– The same clause which gives the deposites reserves the right to withdraw them.– And the power of deciding on that point is vested in the Executive Department in the first instance and (does

does not as in the case of the notes require the previous sanction of an act of Congress.- It is impossible to imagine that the charter intended that the obligation on the part of the Bank to transfer the funds should cease as soon as the Secretary of the Treasury withdrew the deposites or any part of them,- while the U. States ~~continued~~ were to continue bound to receive the notes of the Bank no matter where payable. It is manifest that the government would be still obliged to receive the notes after the Deposites were withdrawn by the Secretary. Could it have been intended that the obligation to receive them should remain upon the public when the Bank was absolved from the duty of transferring the public funds. These two obligations are obviously correlative in their nature and intended to stand together.- The deposites had nothing to do with them.- They were to continue or not to continue at the pleasure of the Government, and the power over them was therefore vested in the first instance in the Executive Department.

It may perhaps be said that

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the Bank cannot afford the facilities for transferring the public funds unless the deposites remain with them & that the performance of the duty must therefore be dependent on the continuance of the deposites.

It is true that the Bank cannot make the transfer required without possessing the particular fund intended to be transferred. And whenever the government possesses a fund in the notes of the Bank payable at its Branches and desires to have it transferred to any particular place these notes would as a matter of course be placed in the hands of the Bank. The government would neither expect nor desire to retain the notes due from the Bank & at the same time require the Bank to place a similar amount to the credit of the public in some other place. The notes due from the Bank & payable at its Branches would necessarily be placed in the possession of the Bank when the transfer was demanded. But there would be no necessity for depositing with them other funds which the government did

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not desire them to transfer and which were already in such a place and a shape that they could be used without loss and without the aid of the Bank.

If it should be supposed that the Bank would probably refuse to make any transfer unless the deposites are continued whatever may be the construction of the charter and that difficulties may arise on that account, the answer is a plain one. Such an act on the part of the Bank would be a palpable forfeiture of its charter & the government would have a right to protect the interest of the public by refusing to receive its notes and the power reserved to Congress to forbid their receipt would unquestionably under such circumstances be promptly exercised. Besides it might as well be said that the Bank will refuse to make the transfers, unless the Government consents at once to renew its charter or to adopt any other measure which the corporation may please to dictate. The Government cannot suffer its course to be directed by such considerations. It is sufficient for us to know that the deposites may be lawfully withdrawn and that their withdrawal does not by the charter discharge the Bank from

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the obligation of giving the necessary facilities for transferring the public funds from place to place.

Upon the whole I do not perceive any reason for apprehending the hostility of the Bank, sufficiently strong to deter the Government from withdrawing the deposites. And adhering to the opinion I have heretofore expressed on that measure

I have the honor to be Sir
with the highest respect
yr. obt. St.
R. B. Taney

To
The President.

Attorney General
U. S. on the char=
=ter, & deposites, and
transfer of the funds.

—

R. B. Taney

Attorney General's Office
Apr 5 1833.

Sir,

In obedience to your directions I have the honor to state my opinion upon the different points to which you have called my attention in relation to the Deposite of the public money in the Bank of the United States.

1. The facts before you at the commencement of the late session of Congress were in my judgment sufficient to create strong doubts whether the Bank continued to be a safe depository for the public money, and nothing has since happened to remove that impression. On the contrary it has been strengthened and confirmed by the evidence furnished by the report of the committee of the House of Representatives.

The majority of the committee have indeed drawn a different conclusion from

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this testimony & their opinion has been sanc=
=tioned by the House. But there is nothing
in these proceedings sufficiently decisive
to govern the conduct of the Executive
Branch of the Government in relation
to the Deposites. The question whether they
ought to be continued or withdrawn appears
to me to be still open & yet to be deter=
=mined. And the Executive having all the
facts before it which were elicited by the
late and former investigations must now
regulate its action on this subject by the
dictates of its own judgment.

It is evident upon the face of the
report made by the majority of the com
=mittee, that their attention was mainly
if not exclusively occupied by the en=
=quiry whether the affairs of the Bank
were in such a condition as would ena
=ble them to meet their pecuniary engage
=ments. The facts stated by them in
their report- the evidence they refer to-

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- the arguments they offer & the opinions they express are all directed to this point. And the resolution proposed by them and adopted by the House of Representatives looks entirely to the same object.

It can be demonstrated I think that the inferences drawn from the testimony by the majority of the committee are erroneous & that the report of the minority exhibits a true and faithful picture of the present situation of the Bank. And if more time had been allowed in the House for the examination and comparison of the evidence the resolution proposed by the majority of the committee would probably have been otherwise disposed of. Yet a decision made under any circumstances by the House of Representatives is entitled to respect and cannot be altogether disregarded by the Executive. The investigation in this case was invited by the President in his messages. And when the examination has been

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made accordingly, and an opinion after=wards expressed by the House I admit that their judgment upon the point to which their attention was directed ought to have a strong influence on the conduct of the Executive when acting on the same evidence unless it were manifest that some imposition or deceit has been prac=tised upon them. If therefore the deposites are to be continued or withdrawn merely on the ground that the Bank is solvent or insolvent in its circumstances & without reference to any other consideration, the vote of the House of Representatives would per=haps of itself be sufficient to induce the Executive to delay its action for the present & await the results of a future enquiry.

But is the Executive required to act in this business without reference to any other consideration? Is the ability of the Bank to meet its engagements the only

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point of Enquiry? And are the public depo=sites to be continued or withdrawn solely upon the ground that they are safe or un=safe in that particular? I apprehend the question is by no means such a narrow one.- Various other considerations must be regarded & must influence the decision and some of them will be found not less im=portant to the public than that of the solvency or insolvency of the institution.

The corporation was created for the purpose of obtaining a safe and useful agent for the Treasury Department through which the government might more conve=niently collect and distribute the revenue according to the exigencies of the public service. The existence of the Bank is justi=fied & defended solely upon the ground that the agency of such an institution is necessary to enable the government to car=ry on its fiscal operations. It is obvious therefore that to keep the money safely (and

and to secure the public from ultimate loss is but one portion of its duty. It is equally bound to apply the funds entrusted to its care according to the directions of the government and in all other respects to fulfill the obligations contemplated by its charter. The money of the U. States is not directed to be deposited in the Bank for the benefit of the stock holders, but for the safety and convenience of the Government. And when the Executive Department is called upon to decide whether the deposites shall be continued or not the solvency of the institution is but one of the circumstances by which it is required to regulate its judgment. The Bank may be perfectly able to meet its engagements and yet be a very unsuitable agent to be entrusted with the public money. It must not only have the capacity to do its duty. Its fidelity is equally essential.

Suppose for example that important

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money ~~was~~ transactions had been studiously concealed from the public directors for the purpose of hiding from the government the real condition of the Bank? or

Suppose it to have attempted secretly to thwart the measures of the Government in a matter of public concern where the interests of the corporation came into collision with those of the U. States? — In these and in various other cases that might readily be suggested, it would be manifest that the public deposites might be rightfully and lawfully withdrawn & that the government could not be bound to place the money of the U. States in the hands of an agent which had justly forfeited its confidence and shewn itself unworthy of further trust. — The 16th section of the charter gives the power over the deposites to the Secretary of the Treasury in general terms and the language used proves that it was the intention of the law to vest

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the Executive Department with unlimited discre=
=tion in this respect to be regulated only by
the public interest & the conduct of the in=
=stitution and subject only to the revision
and control of the Legislature upon the
report to be afterwards made to them.

I come therefore to the conclusion that
the capacity of the Bank to comply with its
duties is but one of the considerations which
should influence your decision in relation
to the deposites. And if the Corporation
has shown itself in any respect unfaith=
=ful to the duties of its agency and no
longer worthy of public confidence, the
deposites may be withdrawn by the Secre=
=tary of the Treasury and other agents em=
=ployed upon whom more reliance can be
placed. And the proceedings in Congress
before referred to, do not by any means ren
=der it obligatory to suspend the action of
the Executive until further investigations
shall be made or Congress shall again act

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on the subject.

2. To the second question I answer that in my opinion the conduct of the Bank has been such that the Government can no longer rely on it as the agent for carrying into effect its fiscal arrangements and that the public interest requires that other agents should be forthwith provided, and the public money committed to their care.

I do not deem it necessary to enumerate here all of the charges against the Bank which appear to me to be sufficiently sustained by the testimony now before the public. Nor do I propose to enter on a train of argument to establish the facts which I am about to state and on which I rely to justify the withdrawal of the deposites. The evidence collected by the different examinations into the affairs of the Bank is already before you and you will judge whether it warrants the conclusions I draw from it. The corporation appears to me to have

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been guilty of gross and palpable violations of duty to the public in matters sufficiently important to justify the Executive in withdrawing from them its confidence & placing the money of the U. States in the hands of agents more worthy of the trust.

1. When the Government proposed to pay off ~~six~~ about millions of the national debt on the first of July 1832, it was found that although the Bank had then nine millions of the public money in its hands, it had traded so extensively and profusely upon it for its own benefit and to answer its own objects that the government was compelled to postpone the payment for three months longer than it originally contemplated.—

I am aware that in this instance the Bank professed to be ready to meet the call and asked for the delay on the ground of the embarrassment & risk it might produce to the mercantile community.— But I do not perceive that the

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reason suggested by the Bank alters the case
or lessens the force of the charge against it.—
Why would the payment of this sum of
money by the Bank in discharge of the na-
-tional debt bring distress on the mercantile
community?— It was because the Bank had
been trading for its own benefit on the pub-
-lic money to the full amount of the depo-
-sites as if they had been a part of its own
capital— and it would have been obliged
"abridge the facilities" it had been in the habit of affording
to ~~contract its business~~ in order to meet the
call of the public— or in other words to curtail its business. Is it within the legi-
-timate scope of its agency thus to use the
public money for its own benefit? I admit
that the Bank may to a certain extent rely
on the government deposites as well as others
to meet its engagements in the ordinary trans-
-actions of business— and may trade more
largely for its own advantage on the faith
of these deposites.— But this right has
its limits— and must be regulated by
the principles of justice and a due regard
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to the interest of the public. The money they receive from the government is the money of the people. It is in the hands of the corporation as one of the agents of the people to be used for the public benefit. It is held by the corporation as a trustee for the real owners. And its duty requires it to be always ready to pay when payment shall be required at its hands. It is a gross abuse of its agency and trust, so to employ the money of its principals that it cannot be repaid when called for, without inflicting distress on a large proportion of the very people to whom the property belongs & for whose general benefit it was committed to the hands of the Bank. No agent of the Government whether a corporation or an individual can thus be permitted to deal with the public money for their own benefit. If they can be allowed to use it at all without a violation of duty, it must be so sparingly that it can be repaid

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at any time without producing public inconve-
-nience.- There is in truth no warrant in the char-
-ter authorizing the Bank to trade for its own
benefit on the public money. The deposite is not
a loan to the Bank. They pay no interest and
give no consideration for it. It is placed there
for safe keeping and to await the wants of the
Government.- And nothing can justify any
use of it by the selected agent and trustee
of the public which will subject the govern-
-ment or the community to injury or inconve-
-nience.

2. The sudden and enormous increase of the loans
of the Bank in 1831, is immediately connected
with the subject just mentioned, and shews
that the unjustifiable overtrading which occa-
-sioned the difficulty in meeting the calls of
the Government in July was occasioned by
motives still more reprehensible than even the
love of private gain.

At the session of Congress which commen-
-ced in 1831 the corporation petitioned for a
renewal of its charter. And the reason assign-
-ed for the application was that unless the
renewal was probable, it would be necessary

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for the corporation to proceed at once to wind up its concerns in order to avoid the general distress and ruin which a sudden attempt to call in its immense loans would unavoidably produce.

The reason given by the Bank was true or it was not true. If the reason assigned by the corporation for its application at that time was not the true one and if it sought to obtain from Congress at that time a further extension of the period of its agency by false representations & statements, then the attempt of a public agent to mislead & deceive its principal, is of itself sufficient to forfeit all title to confidence, and would make it proper for the government to dismiss it at once from its employment.

But if the reason given was the true one how can the immense increase of its loans in the year 1831 and immediately preceding its application be accounted for? In that one year its loans were increased more than twenty millions of dollars, being a sudden and unprecedented increase of fifty per cent. on its previous accommodations. The corporation

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was perfectly aware it seems that the renewal of their charter was at least doubtful & therefore made this early application. It was equally a=ware as it stated of the necessity of beginning at once to wind up its concerns in order to save the community from the distress and injury which a sudden pressure at the close of its charter for the whole amount of its vast loans would unavoidably produce - And they could not fail to understand that the hasty and immense increase of its loans would greatly enhance the evil which by their application to Congress they professed to be so anxious to avoid. What then induced the corporation to adopt a mea=sure which according to their own shewing was likely to be injurious to themselves & greatly distressing to the community? Can any impartial and unprejudiced mind doubt the motive? Was it not to enable the Bank to obtain a position by which it could exercise a controlling influence over the action of the government in relation to its charter? Was it not to compel the people - to continue its monopoly and pri=vileges - not on account of the benefits conferred by it - but to escape from the suf=

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=fering which the corporation had the power to in=flict? And if the loans made in the year 1831 immediately preceding the application to Congress could find any reasonable justification what can be said in defence of the additional seven millions of dollars which the Bank showered upon the people between the first of January & the first of June 1832 while the application for a renewal of its charter was actually pending before Congress? – and pressed too upon the Legislature – on the ground that a decision was necessary at that time to enable the corporation to prepare for winding up its affairs if their application should prove unsuccessful?

In a case where such great interests are at stake we are not permitted to shut our eyes against the light of evidence – or to fancy that a good or innocent motive may have existed for an action where no such probable one can be assigned. Charity itself cannot suggest a justifiable inducement for this flood of Bank accommodation suddenly poured out upon the people at the very time when the corporation itself admits that it felt the necessity of looking to the approaching termination

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of its existence and of preparing gradually to close its vast and wide spread concerns. - And when the heat and passions of the time shall have passed away & the prejudices which warm party contests never fail to engender, shall be dissi=pated I am convinced that many of those who at this day advocate the Bank and vin=dicate its conduct will be ready to acknow=ledge the delusions under which they are now acting. A fiscal agent which has thus endeavored to fasten itself upon the body politic, & to perpetuate its monopoly and exclusive privileges by the lash of its po=wer is no longer worthy of the confidence or employment of the government.-

3. Independently of the two considerations before mentioned the conduct of the Bank in relation to the 3 pr. ct. stocks of the U. States is of itself a sufficient reason for refusing further to con=fide in it as the fiscal agent of the govern=ment.

The deep interest which the people of the U. States have in the prudent and upright administration of the affairs of the Bank, both as stockholders and depositors made it neces

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=sary that the government should be regularly advised of all of its important operations — And for this purpose the right of appointing five directors is secured to the U. States by the charter and statements of the affairs of the corporation are required to be furnished to the Secretary of the Treasury. And any attempt of the private stockholders in the Bank or of their agents to conceal its transactions from the government is a direct violation of duty and renders the corporation unfit to be further trusted with the public money. Has this part of its duty been performed by the Bank? Has it frankly made known to the Government the course and condi=tion of its business — or has it endeavored to conceal any of its important pecuniary transactions? The conduct of the officers of the Bank in relation to the three per cents is too well understood to need com=ment — One of its greatest money operations, in which the interests of the public were deeply and closely concerned, was carefully and indus=triously concealed from the officers of the Government and the public interests seriously and injuriously committed by the agents of

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the Corporation, before the transaction came to the knowledge of the government. Nor is this the only instance in which the Bank has endeavored to hide its proceedings from the eyes of the officers of the U. States. It is abundantly proved that its business has been so arranged by the agency of committees & the powers vested in particular officers of the corporation, that it habitually and systematically deprives the government of that knowledge of its affairs which the charter intended to secure; and which was supposed by the legislature to be necessary for the safety of the public interests which it directed to be placed in the care of the Bank. The government has been left to find out as well as it can by direct and rigorous scrutiny many of the most objectionable proceedings of the ~~Bank~~ corporation and its officers. Is the agent worthy of further confidence when ~~[illegible]~~ it is ascertained that pains are taken to conceal his contracts & proceedings from his principals? In the case of individuals would any prudent man place his funds in the hands of such an agent? The regular and systematized arrangements which have been made to hide its proceedings from the government are not

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only indicative of unfairness & misconduct, but at the same time deprives the government of that super=vision and knowledge of the concerns of the insti=tution which the charter intended to secure and which was given for the protection of the public property placed in the hands of the Corpora=tion.

4. There is another reason still more cogent to my mind than those I have already stated for withdrawing the Deposites.- There is abundant evidence to shew that the money of the corpo=ration has been employed to influence the press & to enlist newspapers in their service. The attempt of a great monied institution like the Bank of the U. States to exercise an influence over the press of the country by the mere power of money, is pregnant with so much evil that it cannot be too severely and pointedly reprobated.- And to continue towards it the confidence of the government after the proofs which have been exhibited on this head would be giving the sanction of public approval to its conduct.- It is due to the government and to the purity of

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our institutions, to mark it with the strongest tokens of disapprobation: And the withdrawal of the Deposites & the refusal to employ it as the Agent of the public, would be nothing more than a proper rebuke for the unjustifiable means it has used to obtain influence & power over public opinion.

Waving therefore various other considerations which are calculated to strengthen the opinion I have formed on this point, and which are clearly and forcibly put forward in the report of the minority of the committee I respectfully advise that the deposites be not continued in the Bank of the U. States but that other agents be employed upon whose conduct towards the public more reliance may justly be placed.

3. Upon the third point which you have proposed for consideration, the principles already stated will shew the opinion I have formed. I think the renewal of the present charter ought not to be assented to under any circumstances or with any modifications.

The abuses of its power to which I have already referred furnish abun-

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:dant reasons for refusing to continue the char:ter to the present Bank even if the consti:tutional objections stated in the veto message could be surmounted. And if it could be de:monstrated that a Bank chartered by the U. States was authorized by the constitution and essentially necessary for the purposes of the General Government, I should still think that the charter to the present corporation ought in no event whatever and under no circum:stances to be continued. There is evidence enough to satisfy any unprejudiced mind that it has profusely lavished its money to obtain political power. It was openly in the field as a political ~~party~~ partisan at the last election of President, using the vast power which it feels that it possesses in order to influence the decision of the people. Such abuses of the privileges and franchises conferred upon it not only deprive it of all claim to public favor, but make it a fit subject for some striking mark of public reprobation.

4. On the fourth question the result of

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my reflections may be stated in a few words.- I think the reason suggested by you on this point is entirely conclusive. A Bank of the U. States cannot be justified under the constitution if the fiscal operations of the government can be carried on with safety and convenience without it.- And a full and fair experiment ought to be made before the General Government can be warranted in assuming that a Bank chartered by the U. States is a necessary and indispensable agent of the Treasury.- The history of the financial concerns of this Government by no means prove the necessity of such a Bank.

Indeed the necessity must be very apparent that would reconcile me to the establishment of a Bank of the U. States with the power of branching in the different states under any limitations. The experience we have had with the present Bank shews very clearly the dangers to be apprehended from moneyed monopolies with a large capital. And however its privileges might be restricted in the first instance or whenever the mother Bank

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might be located, yet its capital would un=
=avoidably be a large one and its power propor=
=tionably great. It would be the point on
which the moneyed aristocracy would concen
=trate ~~its~~ their power, and the instrument by which
they would exercise a combined & corrupting
influence on the government. And if a
Bank of that description should be engrafted
on our institutions & be considered as a
settled & permanent establishment to be
renewed by charter from time to time it
would be constantly and silently seeking to
advance its own interests & to remove res=
=trictions which it found to be inconvenient
or troublesome. The history of the present
bank and the dangerous and formidable
political power it now possesses will shew
us what may be apprehended by a mo=
=nied institution of large capital without
a rival – which feels that money gives it
power – and that power will bring it
money. –

5. The remaining enquiry is what system ought
to be adopted for the deposits & distri=
=bution of the revenue?

The one you have proposed appears to me to be the best - and I think on experiment will be found to be quite as safe and convenient as the Bank of the U. States without being attended with any of the evils and dangers which must always arise out of an institution of that description. - The State Banks judiciously selected and arranged will I have no doubt be able to perform all the duties of fiscal agents & to furnish a general currency as wholesome & stable as that of the U. States Bank.

I forbear to present at this time a detailed plan on this subject - because before such a scheme could be finally arranged the points where deposites are needed by the Treasury and disbursements are likely to be made must be carefully estimated so that the State Banks which are selected as agents may be prepared to meet the calls of the government. But I am convinced that there will be no difficulty in perfecting the plan as soon as the necessary information is obtained - and that the pledge of the Government to receive in payment of its dues every where the notes of certain designated Banks, would afford to the (community

community a currency as sound & healthy and as little liable to fluctuation in amount and value as that now provided by the Bank of the U. States.–

Upon the whole I respectfully advise that measures be taken to select and designate the State Banks who are to be employed as agents for the Treasury, and to make the proper arrangements with them– And that as soon as this is done, further deposites in the Bank of the U. States be discontinued & the reasons which lead to this decision be reported to Congress according to the directions of the charter.

I do not conceal from myself the fierce & desperate struggle which the Bank will make to maintain its monopoly and procure a restoration of the deposits.– Nor am I insensible of its power.– But I sincerely believe that the purity of our institutions & the best interests of the Country call for prompt firm & decisive measures on the part of the Executive & I rely for support on the intelligence & patriotism of the people.– & I am Sir with the highest

respect yr. obt. st.

R. B. Taney

Att. Genl opinion
on the subject sub-
mitted - Bank of the
U. S. & Deposits

L. McLane.

Treasury Department
May 20th 1833.

To the President

Sir,

The President has been pleased to require the opinion, in writing, of the Members of his cabinet upon the following points,—

1. "Whether any thing has occurred to lessen
"the expression at the commencement of the last
"session of Congress, as to the safety of the Bank
"of the United States, so far as regards the public
"deposites?

2. "Whether the management of the institution
"be such that the Government can rely upon it as
"an agent in carrying into effect the fiscal
"arrangements of the Treasury, as well as whether it
"has been heretofore a faithful agent in that respect.

3. "The propriety of acquiescing in the renewal

of the Charter of the present Bank, under any
"circumstances, or with any Modifications? And
"if with any Modifications, what ought they to be?

4. "The propriety of assenting to the establishment
"of a new Bank - and if a new Bank, when
"and in what manner ought the suggestion of any
"views ~~to be ...~~ to be made on the subject - and upon what
"principles, under what limitations, and with
"what privileges ought a new Institution to be
"formed?

5. "What system ought to be established for the
"true disposition of the public moneys, so far
"as relates to the places for their deposite, and the
"manner of their distribution? And if the deposites
"be withdrawn from the Bank of the U. S. would
"it be necessary to receive the public dues in the notes
"of all the Banks, or to limit the payments to
"the notes of those Banks that may be selected
"as the places of deposit, and the agents of the
"fiscal concerns of the Government?"

The

The President has at the same time, been pleased to observe that the results of his own reflections are:

1. "That the Charter of the present Bank ought "under no circumstances and upon no conditions "whatever to be renewed.

2. "That the ground gained by the veto ought to be firmly "maintained, and that my assent ought to be "withheld from any bill authorizing a Bank out of "the District of Columbia.

3. "That if my assent is given to the establishment of "a new Bank, it ought to be one located in the "District of Columbia, having the right to establish "branches in the different States and in such places "thereof only with the permission of the different States, "upon the application of the Bank for that purpose, "under such restrictions as the States may think "proper to impose: and even with these restrictions "that the Government shall have the right to appoint "the President and as many Directors of the "principal bank and the branches thereof, as "will secure fidelity and a thorough knowledge "by the proper officers of the Government of its

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transactions: And also that Congress should retain "the right to repeal or modify the charter from "time to time as it may deem proper, as a "security against the corruptions and evils which "are now ~~apprehended~~ experienced from the uncontrollable "authority of the present Bank.

4. "That such an institution ought not to be "recommended until a full and fair "experiment has been made to carry on the "fiscal affairs of the Government without a "National Bank of any description.

5. "If this last view of the subject be adopted "it will be necessary now to devise and settle "a system for the deposit and distribution of "the public funds through the agency of the "State Banks, to go into operation at such "time as shall upon a careful examination "of the subject be thought most advisable."

The undersigned ~~I~~ considers the intimations with which the President is pleased to accompany the questions as a frank explanation of his own prepossessions, for the purpose of free examination

and

and discussion, and not to preclude or embarrass the investigation which is necessarily invited by the questions proposed.

In this view, ~~I~~ the undersigned has bestowed upon the whole subject that attention to which the respect which he ~~owes to and which~~ he entertains for the President no less than the importance of the subject entitles it: and, though he has to regret, that in some of the opinions it becomes his duty to express, he may not coincide with the views entertained by the President, his duty will nevertheless be best performed by candidly submitting, for ~~his~~ the President's enlightened consideration, the dictates of ~~my~~ the undersigned's own judgment.

Viewing the 1st. 2nd. & 5th. questions as relating to different views of the same matter, and involving the same considerations, ~~I~~ the undersigned proposes to consider them together: and that ~~my~~ his observations may be more intelligible, he reserves them for the last, and proceeds in the first place to express ~~my~~ his opinion upon the 3rd. and 4th. questions, and in the order here mentioned:—

On

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On the 3rd question he has to observe that recent developments of the management of the present Bank of the U. S., both in its private concerns, and in its relations with the Government, have changed the opinion he formerly entertained in regard to its claims to a further extension of the monopoly conferred by the present charter; and he cannot advise the President to acquiesce in the renewal of the charter of the present bank under any circumstances, or with any modifications.-

The 4th question embraces a greater variety of considerations, and is involved in greater difficulties as to details, and cannot in the opinion of the Undersigned, be at present satisfactorily disposed of.

Of the constitutionality of a bank of the U. S., the undersigned, while he sincerely respects the doubts of others, frankly confesses he himself entertains no doubt. Of the

usefulness

usefulness of such an institution, surrounded with proper safeguards, as well to the Government as to the community he has as little doubt: and, upon both points his opinions have been long formed and publicly pronounced. He is free to confess that greater safeguards should be provided for the future than have been deemed necessary in past times: and though as to the details his opinions have undergone some change, they remain as to the general principles unshaken. The conclusion, as to such an institution in the general, to which his mind was brought by reasoning founded upon well established principles of political oeconomy, as applicable to the circumstances of the United States have been fully sustained and strengthened by the experience of the Country, both with and without such an institution, and by the closer knowledge which his official station at the head of the Treasury has enabled him

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him to acquire. The subject, however, under all its aspects, has been so ably discussed, from the time ~~the same~~ when it was first presented to the continental congress, during the revolution, until the present moment, as well in reports from the heads of this department, as in Congress, in the courts and in the press, — that it is unnecessary to enter upon it here. For the purposes of the present inquiry, it may be sufficient to state, as the conviction of the undersigned, that a bank, or some institution established upon similar principles to those which have already been incorporated, but with greater limitations upon the powers of the institution, and greater controul in the government over its proceedings, affords, for the purpose of aiding the government in safely and conveniently collecting, keeping, and disbursing the public moneys, throughout the

the United States, certainly the best, and of preserving both for the government and the people a currency of uniform value in which all payments may be made, and all dues collected throughout the United States, perhaps the only means. The undersigned does not wish to be understood as asserting that the first of these purposes may not be accomplished, especially in time of peace, through the agency of the local banks (if a national bank were not actually existing) established upon the same principles, - which he not only admits, but if it were not so, would have cause to lament, - but expresses his decided preference for the more pointed out.

In reference to the object of securing a uniform currency, however, the undersigned begs to offer a few observations and explanations.

When the constitution was formed, the

the exclusive power conferred on Congress to coin money and regulate the value thereof was sufficient for the maintenance of a general circulating medium of uniform value in all parts of the Union. But the general introduction of Banks throughout the United States has rendered the power inoperative for that object; for the currency no longer consists of coin, but of bank-notes which serve in lieu of money, and which are issued and regulated, not by Congress, but by hundreds of different banks, acting without concert, almost without control and responsibility of any kind, and totally without control and responsibility to Congress.

In providing, at the same time, that all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States, the Constitution also secured an uniform rate of contribution to the wants of the Government by the people in all parts of the Union, so long as such contributions were paid in coin; because coin, being issued by

Congress, and its value fixed by Congress, would be uniform throughout the United States. But the substitution of bank-notes as a currency, and they not being of uniform value throughout the United States, has destroyed in fact the uniformity of value received by the Government in duties imposts and excises throughout the United States.

In these two essential matters, therefore, matters deemed so essential as to be specially provided for in the fundamental law of the ~~nation~~ Union, the introduction and use of banks in the manner and to the extent in which they are carried on in the United States, may counteract the objects of the Constitution. There is scarcely any duty which a Government owes it more to the People to fulfil than that of preserving a uniform medium of circulation, a general standard, acceptable to all, by which the value of all the labor and property of the people are to be estimated and regulated.

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direct means of securing this important object have now passed out of the hands of the government; for it is impossible, without a degree of suffering which the people would not and could not bear, to go back to a currency composed wholly of coin, - to reduce the money of the country, or what serves the purposes of money, though of unequal value in different parts, from ~~thirty~~ eighty six millions to twenty millions, and thus to diminish, in the same ratio, the ability of every debtor in the United States to fulfil his engagements. But if this uniformity can be otherwise maintained by the employment of means which are legitimately within the powers of the government, an object so important is justly entitled to be presented as one of the great advantages to be derived from the institution by which those means are afforded; and it is with this view that it has been associated, by the undersigned, in his examination of the subject, among those great objects

objects in reference to which the present question is to be determined.

If these be not merely beneficial objects, but, as the undersigned believes them to be, essential to the government and to the people, and if they can be best accomplished by means of a bank, it follows that in his opinion the assent of the Executive should be given to the establishment of a new bank.

It is to be observed, however, that having on several previous occasions communicated his views in relation as well to the present bank as to what he thought would be a proper substitute, the President, at the commencement of the first session of the twenty second Congress, again renewed the subject, and, after reenforcing the views previously submitted, referred the whole subject, – and in the opinion of the undersigned with manifest propriety, – to the investigation of the people & their representatives.

From

From this ground the President has not subsequently departed, and has only interposed either to disapprove the measures presented for his consideration, when he could not consistently with his judgment give them his sanction, or to invite the attention of the legislature to new facts connected with the management of the present institution. Although the observations of the President in his message of the 6. of December 1832, are not to be considered as final, or as in any manner precluding the Executive from recurring to the subject when in his judgment the public interest calls for his interference, yet, on a full view of this part of the subject, the undersigned is not prepared to advise that any further suggestion should be made by the President, at least for the present.

As it respects the last part of

this

this question, the undersigned professes himself unable, at this time, to give an answer entirely definite and fully in detail. Upon the general principles, both as to the constitutionality and utility of a bank his opinion has been already stated. The details, however, and more especially the limitations upon the powers and privileges to be conferred, depend so much upon the state and circumstances of the country and the wants of the Government at the time when such an institution is to be organized, - and which cannot now be sufficiently foreseen, - as to make it impracticable to present, with any certainty, a detailed scheme of such a bank as it would be judicious to recommend and establish.

The undersigned, however, is not ~~entirely~~ prepared to concur in the suggestion of establishing the principal bank in the District

District of Columbia, though his objections to that measure, if other schemes in his view more expedient, should from any cause be impracticable, would not be insuperable; and he does not doubt that an institution having its principal location at Washington, with branches properly distributed, might be constructed so as to answer all the purposes contemplated. He is of opinion, however, that it would be inexpedient and unwise to make the authority of the Government for the establishment of its branches in the several States dependant upon the consent of the State Legislatures - especially in those parts in which the purposes of the Government would most urgently require their agency. without adverting to other objections, He thinks, moreover, that the consequences to be apprehended from the ^ perpetual dependance of such an institution upon the will of the Legislatures

legislature would make it inexpedient to retain in Congress ^the right^ to repeal or modify the charter from time to time as they may deem proper. Such a dependence would be too apt to offer temptations to an improper exertion of the power by the bank, dangerous equally to the legislature and the people, and render constant and active that proneness to abuse and those evils which can now only be apprehended towards the close of the charter.

It appears to the undersigned that equal security on the points suggested by the President might be attained by other means more secure in themselves:- by granting the charter for a shorter period, and leaving Congress at liberty to grant a new charter to another bank during the same period; by more clearly defining its powers and duties and making the accountability in the

management

management of the institution stricter & more rigid; by specifying and defining those acts, which, if proved may be deemed violations of the charter, and grounds for revoking or repealing the charter at any time by Congress; by vesting in the Government the power of appointing the President of the principal bank and of each of the branches, and of appointing a proper number of the directors in the principal bank and the branches; and by better regulating the mode of conducting the business, ensuring for the Government directors a more just and equal participation in the management of the institution.

In the opinion of the Undersigned it, though he desires to be understood as not advising, but merely as suggesting it, might be practicable also to create an institution founded wholly upon the funds & capital of the Government, upon such principles and in such manner as to ~~[illegible]~~ obviate all

all the main objects already indicated as necessary to be attained by a bank. This might be done by the creation of a stock of sufficient amount reimbursable at the pleasure of the Government at any time after a given number of years, and by a sale of the stock at the best price and for specie. The specie thus obtained would remain as the capital of the bank, and the business to be conducted by directors appointed by the Government. It is proper to observe that this stock might and probably would, and with great advantage, be purchased by foreign capital and the specie, for the most part, be drawn from abroad.—

On this part of the subject, however, the undersigned is constrained to confess his embarrassment in making any suggestion of a new bank, arising from the position occupied by the

President

President in his veto Message.

Although the undersigned deems it his duty to observe that he cannot concur in all the doctrines advocated in that document, he feels, nevertheless, too much respect as well for the sincere conviction & patriotic motives with which they are urged, as for the public commitment of the Executive which they involve, to do more than respectfully advise a revision of the subject at the proper time, in the hope, that, as far as may be compatible with the President's constitutional scruples, they may be adapted to the exigencies of the public service.

On this and the other grounds intimated, the undersigned abstains, for the present, from any more detailed observations upon this branch of the subject. —

The 1st. 2nd and 5th questions remain to be considered. — Each

Each of these questions directly involves
both the authority and expediency of directing
the deposites of the money of the United States
to be made in other places than in the Bank
of the U.S. and in the branches thereof; and
are, in the view of the undersigned, for the
present at least, of greater magnitude, and,
in relation to his own position, of greater
delicacy, than any other part of the subject.
It is proper to observe, and with a full sense
of the kindness and confidence manifested
by the President, that some time before the
commencement of the last Session of Congress,
the undersigned had accepted the invitation
of the President to become the Secretary of
State, and that the final arrangements for
that purpose have been delayed only by the state
of public affairs in the interval. Circumstances
of urgency, however, requiring the immediate
departure of Mr. Livingston on his Mission to
France

France, it is finally understood that the undersigned will enter upon the duties of the Department of State on or before the 1st of June next. For all practical purposes, therefore, he is now to treat this subject as if he were, in fact, in that department.

The order or direction, if any such shall at any time be given, for placing the money of the U. S. in other places than those designated by law, can be made only by the Secretary of the Treasury. For such order that officer alone is responsible; and while delicacy towards his colleagues might prevent him from involving them in his acts, his responsibility could not be lessened, but might be rendered more serious, by an attempt to divide it with others. It is certainly true, that, by the constitution the President is authorised to require the opinion in writing, of the principal officer in each of the Executive departments

upon

upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices; but, it is nevertheless presumed that a special authority, similar to that conferred by the bank charter upon the Secretary of the Treasury, can only be exercised in obedience to his sense of public duty, independently of the opinion of his colleagues, to whose offices the subject does not relate.

It is from no insensibility to these relative duties, but with the most perfect respect for the wishes of the President, that the undersigned proceeds to state, without reserve, his opinions of the matters involved in these questions.

As the terms of the first question might imply, that, at the commencement of the last session of Congress, there had been the expression of an opinion that the bank was an unsafe depository of the public moneys, it is necessary, in order that the following observations may be properly appreciated, to enquire into the precise

import

import of that expression.

In his Message, at the commencement of the last Session, the President observed:—

"It is my duty to acquaint you with an arrangement
"made by the Bank of the United States with a
"portion of the holders of the 3 per cent Stock, by
"which the Government will be deprived of the
"use of the public funds longer than was
"anticipated. By this arrangement, which will
"be particularly explained by the Secretary of the
"Treasury, a surrender of the certificates of this
"Stock may be postponed until October 1833,
"and thus the liability of the Government, after
"its ability to discharge the debt, may be
"continued by the failure of the Bank to perform
"its duties."

"Such Measures as are within the reach
"of the Secretary of the Treasury have been taken, to
"enable him to judge whether the public
"deposites in that institution may be regarded
"as entirely safe; but, as his limited power
"may prove inadequate for this Object, I
recommend

"recommend the subject to the attention of "Congress, under the firm belief that it is worthy "of their serious investigation. An inquiry into "the transactions of the institution, embracing the "branches as well as the principal bank, seems "called for by the credit which is given "throughout the country to many serious "charges impeaching its character, and which "if true, may justly excite the apprehension "that it is no longer a safe depository of the "money of the people."

It will not escape observation that the Message recognizes the want of safety in the Bank as the only ground upon which the money of the United States could be placed elsewhere, under the order of the Secretary of the Treasury. It does not, however, positively express the opinion that the bank is unsafe; but referring to its improper transactions in Europe in regard to the three per cents, and the

serious

serious charges impeaching the character of the institution, observes merely that these, if true, might justly excite an apprehension that it is no longer a safe depository of the money of the people. It neither asserts that the charges are true, nor that the mere apprehension which they and the three per cent transaction might justly excite, would of itself be sufficient to incur the hazard of changing the place of deposite. But, it is respectfully submitted, the Message on the contrary distinctly implies that such apprehension would be insufficient, unless the inquiry directed by the Secretary or that which Congress was invited to make, should result in shewing that it was well founded. The course of the Executive in abstaining from any change in the place of deposite without inquiry is in all respects consistent with this interpretation of the Message, if indeed it can be reconciled with any other.

With

with the views expressed in the message those in the annual report are in all respects coincident. In that document it is stated that "it is apparent, however, that the apprehensions arising out of the three per cent arrangement, as it is understood to have been concluded by the agent of the Bank, and of the consequences to which it might lead, more especially should the parties in Europe insist upon its fulfilment; not less than the great amount of the Bank's transactions in its western especially branches, together with other matters connected with its dealings, which have occupied the attention of one branch of the legislature since the last annual report from this department, have tended to disturb the public confidence in the management of the institution; and those taken in connection with the necessary arrangements in anticipation of finally closing its business, have suggested an inquiry into the security of the Bank as the depository of the public funds. The report further asserts that a change in the deposites would be inexpedient without such

such an examination into the actual
condition of the Bank as justice to the
institution not less than to the community
at large required.

In addition to the causes suggested
in the Message, as implying doubts of the safety
of the Bank, and as enforcing the expediency
of changing the deposites, the report adverts
to the necessary arrangements in anticipation
of finally closing its business. This consideration,
however, though it must and will be important
at the proper time, can have no influence on any
immediate step, and need not, therefore, be now
considered.

If the views here presented of the true
import of the expression at the commencement
of the last session be correct, then it is believed
that occurrences which have subsequently taken
place upon the weight of that expression so
far as regards the change of the public
deposites.

The grounds on which the apprehension
alluded

alluded to in the Message was founded are, —

1. The serious charges in regard to the management of the institution.

2. The arrangement in Europe in respect to the three per cents; and

3. The amount and condition of the Western debt.

Neither these grounds nor the apprehensions arising from them were sustained by the report of the agent appointed by the Treasury to make the investigation. That agent, on the contrary, expressly reports that neither the security of the public moneys nor the solvency of the Bank can in his opinion admit of a doubt, and in regard to the debt due to the Bank in the Western country, though he professes not to give an opinion that can be relied on with certainty, referring to the information obtained, and adding thereto his own knowledge of the business in the Western Country, he considers the debt in a safe and wholesome state. It is proper to observe, however, that the

investigation

investigation made by the agent was not as minute and extensive as it ought to have been, and is on that account unsatisfactory and inconclusive. It is, nevertheless, entitled to the respect due to the opinion of a man of considerable knowledge and experience in business, and of unquestioned integrity.

It is believed, therefore, that a Secretary of the Treasury would be required to present sufficient facts, not founded in conjecture, to impeach either the accuracy of the report or fidelity of the agent, in order to warrant a measure expressly discountenanced by the official investigation and decided opinion of his own officer. In this instance it does not appear to the undersigned that any such grounds exist.

The proceedings in Congress are, however, of greater importance, and, in the opinion of the undersigned, must have a greater influence in lessening the force of the exposition at the commencement of the last session.

It is true that Congress did not deem it proper to institute the investigation into the

management of the Bank, suggested by the Executive, nor thoroughly to investigate the state of the western debt: and it may, therefore, be admitted that the proceedings in the House of representatives are not conclusive as to the facts of the case. It must be observed, however, that such investigation may not have been directed, because, in the opinion of Congress, such inquiry was not necessary to the formation of their judgment; and it is certainly true that with the facts connected with all the points suggested in the message the Members of the last Congress possessed a general acquaintance, and were in possession of the same information as that upon which the Executive made his suggestions. The most, if not all the charges of mismanagement had been developed at the previous session, in the report of the Committee appointed by the House of Representatives, and must have been understood. The nature and consequences of the three per cent transaction were fully investigated and unequivocally and unanimously condemned by the Committee of Ways & Means; and in respect to the western debt, it is to be presumed that as much was known to the Members of the

House

House of Representatives as can be accurately known to any other department.

However this may be, after these investigations, and with the information in their possession, the House of Representatives by a vote of <u>one hundred and nine members</u> to <u>forty six</u> passed a resolution declaring "that the government deposites may, in the opinion of the House, be safely continued in the Bank of the United States." It is a circumstance in no small degree calculated to increase the influence of this large majority, that it is made up in part of those members who are known to be opposed to the present Bank, as well on constitutional grounds as on those of expediency.

It is to be presumed that those grounds of apprehension as to the safety of the Bank, which, before this vote, were merely doubtful, and so doubtful as not to authorize the removal of the deposites without a full investigation into their truth, cannot be less free from doubt now, after a partial inquiry only has been made, and after one hundred and nine members

of the

of the House of Representatives as have deliberately declared that they do not suspect the safety of the Bank.

The measure of the Executive, which, at the commencement of the session, would have been in opposition only to the interests of the Bank, must now be opposed ~~must cease~~ also to the declared opinions of the Government agent, and of a large majority of the House of Representatives: and a measure which would not then have been warranted because the grounds were doubtful, would have now to depend, for its justification, upon grounds still less probable.

The influence which such a vote ought to have upon the future conduct of the Treasury cannot be sufficiently appreciated without considering the spirit and object of the charter. The power conferred on the Secretary to change the deposits is not absolute, but is possessed by him in common with Congress and subject to its control. It is the terms of the [illegible] [illegible] a part of the contract [illegible] with the Bank, that, in consideration of the [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible], the public money shall

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be placed in it, unless the Secretary of the Treasury
shall otherwise order and direct. It is only
because circumstances may arise in which
the safety of the public funds will not admit
of delay, that this authority can be properly
conferred; and, to guard against any arbitrary
order for this purpose, the grounds of the
proceeding must be immediately reported to Congress.
But, as this obligation to report to Congress would
be altogether unnecessary, unless the order
should be liable by them to be revoked, the
inference appears to be irresistible, that, in case
Congress should disapprove the order of the Secretary,
he would be bound, if not by the law, certainly
out of proper respect for the legislature to rescind
his direction. And, although the decision of one
branch of Congress might not be sufficient for this
purpose, yet it appears to be unequivocal, that,
after the deliberate expression by the House of
Representatives of their opinion of the safety of the public depositories, an
order to change them without the concurrence
of

of any new facts or of such as could not have been known, would be such an arbitrary exercise of authority as would not be warranted by the charter.

It is presumed, moreover, that the principal, if not the only justification of the Secretary of the Treasury in making this order is his just sense of responsibility for the safety of the public money; and it must therefore be admitted that when the House of Representatives by so large a vote have declared the money to be safe in the Bank of the United States, no such responsibility would well exist.

In connection with this part of the subject, it becomes important to consider the character and import of of the report of the minority of the Committee of Ways and Means to whom this subject was referred in the House of Representatives.

The ability of that document will be conceded, and the labor and knowledge of the subject it displays are entitled to great respect. Even that report, however, does not assert the insecurity

insecurity of the Bank, or ri commence a change
of the deposites. It asserts only that there is ground
to doubt the entire safety of the funds in the
bank, and declares expressly that to solve
these doubts would require time and means
which are not at the disposition of the committee,
and that nothing short of a personal, impartial
and thorough examination of the books and
affairs of the principal bank and many of
its branches can develope its policy and
management, the security of its debts and
soundness of its condition. It is therefore, clear from
this declaration of the report, that to change the
deposites without such examination and a resort
to the means recommended it would be to proceed
upon grounds of doubt and conjecture merely.
The report moreover, refrains either from denying
the correctness of the conclusion of the report of the
majority or itself expressing the opinion that the
funds are unsafe and ought to be changed.
It concurs

It concurs only in the doubts previously expressed of the Executive, and states that whether existing facts are sufficient to justify the Executive in taking any step against the bank, authorized by the charter, is a matter for the decision of the proper officers, acting upon their own views & responsibility." In the opinion even of the Minority of the Committee, therefore, there existed only ground to doubt the entire safety of the public funds, and that doubt could only be solved by an investigation which there was then no time to make.

In the opinion of the Undersigned those grounds of doubt are not sufficient to justify the proper officers, at least without the proper inquiry for the purpose of solving them, to issue the order authorized by the charter, in opposition to the opinion of so large a Majority of the House of Representatives that the government deposites may be safely continued in the Bank of the United States. And he owes it to himself to say

that

that this opinion of the Majority, taken in connection with the failure of the Minority of the Committee to express in their report any opinion on the subject, and with the silence of the other branch of the Legislature, has materially lessened, in his mind, the weight which previously to the last Session of Congress he had attached to the circumstances then existing.

If, however, these considerations and those which will be offered in answer to the 4th question should fail to convince the mind of the President, and it should be deemed expedient to change the place of the public deposites earlier than may be required by the expiration of the charter of the present bank, the undersigned respectfully suggests that previously to an order for that purpose measures should be taken to procure such an enquiry as is alluded to in the report of the minority of the Committee; or, which in his opinion would

be

better, to recommend such an inquiry to Congress at the commencement of the session; accompanied with a distinct communication that unless such an inquiry be speedily granted and prosecuted, the Executive should feel it to be his duty, from a proper regard to the safety of the public funds, to direct them to be deposited in other places than in the Bank of the United States. This would present the issue, both to the Bank in a manner more favorable to the Government than any other, and with proper respect to each of the other Departments. In the mean time the necessary steps ought to be taken to ascertain the condition of the same local Banks, and the facilities they would have it in their power to afford the Government in the management of its fiscal operations.

In the foregoing observations the undersigned has confined his remarks to the 1st question, and to the effect which official proceedings subsequent to the commencement of the last session of Congress should have upon the Executive action. Some

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Some of these observations, however, are also applicable to the 2nd & 5th questions, which embrace, also, a wide scope; and he feels it his duty at the hazard of some repetition and even of tedious-ness, to present, in his answer to these questions, the grounds of his opinions upon the several matters which are involved in them.

The Undersigned has already observed that he cannot advise that the present Bank should be rechartered. The institution, however, is existing under the sanction of law, with rights as well as duties; and it would seem to the Undersigned to be his duty, so far as the public welfare is confided to his hands, to take care, that, as long as the Bank exists, the government and the people shall be deprived of none of the advantages they are entitled to derive from it,— unless incompatible with some greater good.—

It is

It is moreover, to be borne in mind that the act chartering the bank is a part of the law of the ~~law~~ land: and that so far as the Undersigned is charged with the administration of the laws, he is bound by his duty to advise that that as all the other laws should be executed in good faith, in such a manner as to give full effect to all its provisions so as to promote the objects for which it was enacted.

It is by this double sense of duty - moral & political, - that in the opinion of the undersigned, the action of the Government towards the bank should be regulated.

In further explanation of his views on this branch of the ~~subject~~ inquiry, the Undersigned would add, that regarding the Bank as an institution not formed for the benefit of the stockholders, but as intended for the accomplishment of high public objects, in which the operation of private stockholders was only assigned the

auxiliary

auxiliary, he does not countenance the idea of punishing the bank, by withholding the public deposites or in any other way withdrawing or lessening the means which the Charter intended the bank to use as instrumental to those objects, as an idea further to be entertained by him in considering the policy of the Government in its action towards the Bank.

Among the chief means which the charter has provided as necessary to the purposes for which the Bank was established, is the possession of the public deposites. To this the Bank has an exclusive right in all places where it has a branch, unless the Secretary of the Treasury should otherwise command and direct. But this control of the Secretary, as has been already remarked, is to be exercised under a direct responsibility to Congress. It is made his duty to state the reason of any such order and direction which he may give, immediately if Congress be in session and if not immediately on its assembling. It is, therefore, under a high responsibility that the Secretary of the Treasury would act in withholding the public deposites; and he must take care that it be done

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sufficient cause, and with a view to the public good;
for it is not to be doubted that, if it should turn
out that this measure would frustrate in great part
the important objects for which the Bank was
instituted, that it would incommode the public
service, and embarrass the community, and, as may
also be apprehended, that it would produce serious
disorders in the currency and ruin the business of the
country, neither Congress nor his fellow citizens
would excuse him for risking those consequences
without some strong necessity affecting the public
welfare.

The principle question to examine, then, is
whether such necessity exists.

1. As it regards the safety of the public money, after
what has been already observed in regard to the
proceedings of Congress and the report of the
special agent, it does not comport with the
relation in which the undersigned stands towards
that body nor with the respect he bears it, to treat
the the acts of either branch as proceeding from
unworthy motives, or as adopted without a proper
understanding

understanding, and in the face of these acts to assert that the public moneys are insecure without stronger proofs than actually exist.

2. Has the Bank been a faithful agent in carrying into effect the fiscal arrangements of the Treasury?

The undersigned is constrained from a proper regard to truth to remark that, with the exception of its conduct in relation to the three per cents, it has fulfilled its obligations in this respect. The public moneys have been safely kept, and out of 440 millions which have been deposited with it, nothing has been lost. By the aid of its numerous branches and the circulation it maintains, the government is enabled to collect and disburse the public moneys in all the principal parts of the U. S. in a currency every where equal to gold & silver, and with great convenience, to all who have moneys to pay to or receive from the government. The funds collected at places where they are not required are promptly transferred

to those where they are needed; and, that upon
the mere call of the Government, without waiting
for the time required to make the actual transfer.

In ~~a complete transaction~~ the instances of the exaction adverted to the Bank
has not done its duty. Its conduct in relation to
the postponement of the 3 per cents is too well known
to need any detail here. It is sufficient to say that
in disapproving of that transaction the President and
the department have been sustained by the House
of Representatives and, as it is believed, by the
People. In connexion with the removal of the
public deposits, however, it is to be observed
that the fault is one, which, from the nature of
things, cannot occur again; and that there is
no ill consequence to flow from it which a
withholding of the deposits is necessary to prevent
or to remedy.

If, however, this subject should be seen
in a different aspect, and if it be decided that
it is necessary to withhold the public deposits,
-necessary for the [illegible] purposes, then, whatever
may be the consequences, they must be met; and
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it would be useful to inquire what they may be, only for the purpose of being prepared for them. But, if no such necessity exists, and if it be merely decided that sufficient cause exists for withholding the deposites provided that measure be deemed expedient, the probable consequences of such a proceeding are to be examined, to see whether the good or evil predominate, or whether the evil be not, in fact, of such magnitude as altogether to discourage the attempt. To this inquiry the undersigned proposes to direct his observations.

It may be true that the permanent injury which the credit of the Bank has hitherto suffered from the supposed disfavor of the government has not been great, but it may well be supposed that it would be much more seriously affected by this more bold and decisive manifestation of the hostility and want of confidence on the part of the government, accompanied as it would be with

such

such an unquestionable diminution of its means of carrying on its business to advantage. In foreign countries, where much of the stock is held, this would most probably be the consequence[.] Those who do not fully understand the nature of our institutions and the relation in which the bank stands towards the government, would be alarmed for the value of their stock; and those who look upon the bank as the great connecting link between all the money affairs of the country would see the danger to be apprehended from all the other investments of capital from a measure which might interrupt or embarrass its operations. Hence the injury of the credit of the Bank abroad would be followed by a diminution of the pecuniary credit of the country abroad, and by a general depreciation in the value of all other American stocks held abroad. The consequence would be a return of those stocks, not only bank stocks

large

debtors, to this country. A recourse to such an extent for payment would produce an extraordinary demand for foreign remittances. An unfavorable rate of exchange would necessarily follow; and, to that, would immediately succeed a demand for silver for exportation. The banks would endeavor to provide against this by a general curtail of their business; which, if met on the part of the borrowers, would lead to great embarrassments and numerous bankruptcies, and, if not, would be followed by a suspension of specie payments by the banks. For, such is the extension of the business of the banks beyond their specie means, that, taken as a body, independently of the Bank of the United States, they could not sustain themselves under any unusual and considerable foreign demand for specie.

Such an effect upon the credit of the bank at home, as is here anticipated abroad, may also be apprehended from this measure. In that case the first and immediate consequence would be, in a greater or less degree, a call on the bank for the payment of its notes and deposites,— in other words a run upon the bank. This would be met by a corresponding call by the bank upon its debtors, for

for payment of their loans; and, in proportion as this call was either too great or too sudden, would be the distress to them and the loss to the bank. This would produce a general want of confidence in regard to private credit, as well among banks as individuals.. At a time of pressure upon the bank of the United States the local banks could not venture to interpose any effectual relief. So far as they increased their accommodations to the public, they would relieve the bank; but the debts which would thereby have been paid to the bank will be due to them, and they, without any adequate increase of means, would have to meet the general pressure which the shocks given to the credit of the bank will have produced.. The local banks, however, could not be expected, at such a moment, to enlarge their accommodations. On the contrary, already too much exposed by the extension of their business beyond their specie resources, and conscious as they must be of their hazardous condition, they would find themselves compelled by a regard for their own safety, to meet such

169 a pressure by a corresponding reduction of their present loans

loans. So far, therefore, from affording relief, they would suffer with the Bank. If the bank fell under the pressure, they would fall with it; if indeed, as is more probable, they were not, from their greater weakness, the first victims. For, although it would be possible for the bank to sustain itself, amidst a considerable overthrow of the local banks, the latter would inevitably be overwhelmed by the failure of the bank of the United States. What would become of the public deposites, and what of those benefits which the government and the people now enjoy in regard to the currency and exchanges of the country, amidst the general destruction of credit, distress, bankruptcies and suspension of specie payment, it is unnecessary to inquire.

But although the credit of the bank should sustain no injury either abroad, or at home, from the proposed measure, still it could not fail to produce to the public service great inconvenience, and to the community many disadvantages, and perhaps the most disastrous consequences.

consequences.

To the government the disadvantage would be twofold: 1. the loss of a circulating medium of equal value throughout the U.S. in which the public dues might be collected and the public payments made in funds that are every where equal to gold & silver; and 2. the want of the facilities necessary in transferring the public moneys to the points where the public service might require. To these must, also, be added the risk of loss in the deposites.

The first of these losses is, must be admitted, the local banks cannot supply. Their credit is necessarily limited; whatever may be their solidity, and within this limit, not only the public finances, but the interests of other local banks confine them: hence no local bank can circulate its notes out of its own proper sphere without encroaching upon that of some other. If this be so, payments to the U.S. made within any particular district will be made chiefly, if not wholly, in the notes of the banks within that district; and if payments are

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to be made by the U. S. within that district they will also be made in the same notes. Though the nominal value of these notes will be the same as gold or silver, within that district yet their exchangeable value without the district will vary according to the prudence or the improvidence with which they may have been issued: and in addition to the difference of value to the government as a general medium of receipts & payments of the bank notes of different districts resulting from the state of trade between those districts, there will be another resulting from the good or ill management of the banks by which they were issued. From these causes, payments to be made by the U. S. &c. to persons within certain districts, will be often, if not generally asked for in other districts, and the government must, in such cases, either decline a compliance, or incur the expence of transferring the funds from the least to the more favorable district. At present, the Treasury pays at almost any branch of the U. S. bank which the party may desire, which it is enabled to do, not

merely

merely out of the public moneys collected there, but by means of the transfers which the bank is obliged at all times to make upon its request of the public funds in its possession elsewhere. But, though the government may, at present, not happen to have funds where the party wishes to receive payment, yet as payment, where made, is made in notes of the bank of the U. S. which circulate every where, the party sustains no possible inconvenience. Without the bank this could not be so. If the government had not funds where the party desired them, payment must be made where it had them. Such payment being in local bank notes would not be available to the party elsewhere; and, to make it so, he must either pay those notes subject to the discount at which they would be received at the desired place of payment, or he must incur the expense of remitting them by exchange where exchange can be had, which however is not always the case.

In illustration of this branch of the subject, it may be mentioned that before the establishment

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of the Bank, it was not inexpedient for parties
making contracts with the U.S. to stipulate as
to the kinds of funds to be received; and in proportion
as funds at particular points were desirable to
them, the receiving of these was one of the considerations
which entered into the contract, and of which the
U.S. derived the benefit. It frequently happened, too,
that funds required for disbursement at different
points could not be had there; and warrants
have remained in the Treasury partially satisfied,
waiting their final payment, until funds which
could be used at the desired points were under
the control of the Treasury. And payments of
warrants to individuals have also been paid
partly at one place, & partly at others, as the
wants of the party and the means of the Treasury
could be best reconciled. It is a fact, which all
must recollect, that, before the establishment
of the Bank, the notes of the local banks of
different parts of the Union varied greatly in
value; so much so, that, even between the cities of
Washington & Boston, the loss was 25 per cent.
The

The Government, then, transferred its burthens as it best might; providing for the most necessary objects in such funds as were required, and dealing with the others as it could.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to enquire whether the local banks which might be selected as depositories of the public moneys, could by any arrangement among themselves obviate this inconvenience?—

The first mode that might suggest itself is a system of mutual credits, by which those banks would agree to receive each others notes whenever desired and honoring each others drafts whenever drawn, in receipts or payments on public account. This, however, if practicable, would only afford a partial remedy. But it is believed to be impracticable. If an association of local banks were to be formed, they selecting their associates and agents, a sufficient number might, perhaps, be united, who would to a certain extent, and under

many

many restrictions, place this confidence in each other. But the government could, by no possibility, give up the right, and the exclusive right, of selection, with safety to itself. To do so, would be to build up a power which would control it, and voluntarily to surrender itself to its mercy. Even with the entire power of selection, the government might apprehend some difficulty from the associations of those banks. If they could be brought to act together among themselves, they might, on occasions, offer serious embarrassment to the treasury; and, though the government might & could, promptly free itself from such a combination, yet it might not be until after some inconvenience had been experienced both in the public service and in the community.

It would not, therefore, be the policy of the government to combine it so formidable a body, too closely by ties of a common & exclusive interest, especially if there were no national bank to present a counterpoise. It is certain, also, that no arrangement among the selected banks

limited

remitted as the Government should desire, would be
sufficient to remedy the inconveniences resulting
from the want of a general circulating medium.

It may be supposed that the Government might
attempt a remedy by authorizing the selected
banks to receive in payments to the Government, the
notes of all banks in good credit, without regard
to the place of issue, and to place to their
account such of them as the banks of deposite
would not credit as cash; the Government taking
upon itself the transfer of them to the places where
they may be used or available. The consequence of
such a plan would be that the Government would
receive, every where, the worst paper in circulation
in such place. Banks would issue notes for the
purpose, and even upon the condition that they
should be put in circulation at a distance; and
they might do so with success, since, under such
a plan, these notes would always find currency
in payments to the U. S. Such an arrangement,
however, would of necessity be soon abandoned;
as in all probability, the Government would be left,
with the exception perhaps of a few [illegible]

places,

places, receive funds available at any given place of sufficient amount for the public payments at such place. And, as there would, in such case, be but little money that could be used until it was transferred to the places where it ~~was~~ would be available the government would be subject to a serious risk of delay in making the transfer, and, unless there was a great surplus in the treasury, might be exposed to serious inconvenience for the want of its funds in the meantime.

Another course which might be suggested is to designate the notes of certain banks, — the banks of deposit for example, — which should be received in payments generally ~~[illegible]~~. This, however, though it would lessen the inconvenience to which the last mentioned mode would be subject, would be liable, in a great degree, to the same objection. For those designated notes, though freely received by the United States, would be received in payment from the U. S. only when they could be made available. This course would, also, be liable to the additional objection that it could not fail to be

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ill received by all banks whose notes are not on the favored list, and would therefore excite their resentment both against the selected banks and the government.

It would seem, then, that whether the notes only of the place or district were received, or the notes of the selected banks, or the notes of all the banks in good credit, still a great portion of the public receipts would probably have to be transferred before they could be made available: and, hence while the government would be deprived of the facilities afforded by the Bank in making the transfers, it would have increased occasion for them.

The ability of the Bank to make transfers for the government and exchanges for the community depends upon the employment of all the means which such an institution possesses, in the distribution of its branches at all the great points of business throughout the country, in the universality of its circulation, in the extent of its credit, and in its power to direct and control and shape the business of all the branches, in such a manner as may best accomplish its purposes. All the branches are but

parts

parts of a whole; and if the general policy should impose burthens or require sacrifices of any as may occasionally be necessary, yet as it would be for some greater good to the whole, the interests of the stockholders at the place where such branch may be, are not affected, since they are common stockholders in the whole establishment. With the local banks, however, all is different. All their interests are separate and distinct, and each will naturally adopt that course which best promotes them. If they were disposed to act together for the purpose of making transfers and effecting exchanges, they are without the necessary means. And if, with all the disadvantages to which they would be necessarily subjected, they were to make the attempt, it is most probable, that, whenever the time arrived for adjusting, equalizing, and distributing the loss or gain of the transaction, their conflicting interests and pretensions would terminate the arrangement.—

But, if the local banks alone were able to make the transfers required by the Government, it would necessarily be at the expense of the Government. The

the banks themselves would have no direct interest in it; and as it would be for the convenience or advantage of the government, alone, the government would be expected to bear the burthen. There being at present no appropriation out of which such a charge could be defrayed the banks must be indemnified by some indirect means. These would probably be, and none other is now perceived, as they have formerly been, the certain use of the moneys transferred, or to be transferred, for so long a time as would enable the bank making the transfer to pay itself for the risk & expenses incurred in doing so, by lending out the money on interest. For such an arrangement, however, it would be necessary, that there should be a considerable surplus revenue, to be used while the sums to be transferred were thus unavailable to the Treasury. The present policy of the government, however, does not admit of large surpluses; it being intended to bring down the revenue to the expenditure. During the present year, at all events, no surplus is looked for. And to place out of reach any considerable amount of public moneys, during the time necessary for

for transferring them, would be a serious embarrassment to the operations of the sinking fund. There being no debt redeemable before the 1. January next, the sinking fund can be applied in the mean time only in the purchase of Stock; and, to do that to advantage, the public moneys should be in a situation to be promptly available, so that advantage may be taken of any favorable changes which from time to time may occur in the Stock Market. This, such an arrangement would defeat.

The extent to which transfers of public moneys have been found necessary, or convenient for the public service, is probably greater than would be supposed, inasmuch as it would seem that the great bulk of payments would be made in the great commercial cities, where, also, the great bulk of revenue is collected. Within the last four years, however, the transfers of public moneys have exceeded fifty two millions of dollars. (This will appear by a statement from the Register) The payment of the public debt, will no doubt remove the occasion for many transfers which

otherwise

otherwise would be necessary. But, on the other hand, as all payments will probably be made in local notes, — from causes which will (the diminution of the circulation) presently be stated, — if the agency of the bank be dispensed with, a new occasion for transfers will thereby be created, which will probably make up for the cessation of the other.

It may be supposed, that in regard to the western receipts, which ~~will~~ would be the most difficult to transfer, no transfer need be made, as they might be absorbed in payment to the Indians and for the troops. It is believed, however, that the funds required for the Indian service have hitherto consisted chiefly of specie. If the notes of the Western banks only are to be received in payments to the U.S. in the West, the Western banks will of course have ~~to~~ furnish the required specie; if other notes are received, it must be supposed by a double transfer, — first, of the notes received, to the place where they are issued, and next of the specie to the places where it is to be disbursed. In the military expenditure it has been found that western

western notes alone will not suffice; contractors require others; and it probably comes to the same result as to cost, whether the contractors receive payment at a diminished price, at the places where they desire, or at an increased price, where they do not want payment. In one case the U. S. pay more for supplies, and in the other they pay for the expense of the transfer of the funds. It will scarcely be proposed that the officers and soldiers who are exposed to the hardships and dangers of frontier service, should receive their pay in any other than the best funds in the possession of the Government.

To the government, however, the inconveniences and disadvantages resulting from the want of a general circulating medium and of the facilities of transfer, will be but small compared with those which the people at large will experience. Indeed it is but reasonable to suppose that there will be the same disproportion between them as there is between the extent of the business of the government and that of the community. Every traveller, every person in extensive business, in short every one who has

has money to pay or to receive elsewhere than at where he may happen to be, will find the want of those accommodations. Having notes of uniform currency, a traveller may pass from one extremity of the union to the other with money which is equally current every where. An individual having occasion to transmit money to a distance encloses such a note by mail, and the party who receives it, wherever he may be, has money which is as good where he is as it was at the place from which it was sent. For larger transactions, the man of business is able for a small commission to transmit any amount in safety, by means of a post note, or bill of exchange to any of the principal parts of the union: and, by the agency of a general institution, he is able to receive payments at the same places, and transfer them to the place of his business. Of the extent of the accommodation afforded by such a circulating medium, every man may judge by his own case. And the extent of that afforded by transfers is shewn by the fact stated in the bank report to the last triennial

meeting of the stockholders, that the amount of drafts drawn by the bank of the U. S. and its branches upon one another within the year ending on the thirtieth of June 1831 exceeded <u>forty two</u> millions; and this exclusive of the notes and drafts sent through it for collection.

These accommodations the local banks are unable to furnish. The universal circulating medium they cannot supply at all, and the transfers, remittances and exchanges but partially, and at such disadvantages as will subject the parties to a serious charge.

Until it can be conveniently supplied from other sources, both the government and the community might desire that the bank should keep up its circulation. If it looked for nothing but amicable dealings with other banks, & meant nothing else, it might do so with great profit to itself. But it is scarcely to be expected, under the circumstances, that such a relation should long be kept up: and though they get our bills

no hostile dispositions towards each other, they would probably be soon brought into collision. It might, therefore, become a part of the policy of the bank to reduce its circulation. A portion of its notes would, however, remain even against its wish to call them in. Persons in extensive business, and those who deal in exchange would find it to their interest to make special deposits of them to be returned in kind; and even the Government and its disbursing officers might find it convenient to adopt a similar course. The bank, however, though already safe and stronger in specie in relation to its circulation than the local banks, might deem this measure proper for the purpose of placing itself entirely beyond the reach of any hostile combination; and the curtailments, which, without too great a pressure on its debtors, it might make in the course of a few months, would reduce its circulation to that point.

The undersigned deems it necessary now to consider the question of the safety of the public deposits if placed in the local banks.-

It is

It is the opinion of some who have good means of information, and who have studied the subject closely, both in theory and practice, that the local banks have extended their credits and issues so far beyond their specie resources, as to be constantly exposed to hazard, and indeed unable to meet any extraordinary pressure arising either from foreign or domestic demand. From data furnished by the testimony taken before the Committee of Ways and Means in the late inquiry into the affairs of the Bank, it appears that while the amount of the specie of the Bank of the U. S. is more than half the amount of its circulation, that of all the other banks throughout the U. S. taken aggregately is less than 1/6th. In the State of Massachusetts it is less than 1/7th in the State of New York it is less than 1/6th, in the State of Pennsylvania it is less than 1/3rd and, even in the city of Philadelphia, where the pressure of the Bank of the U. S. is constantly felt by the local banks, their specie is but little more than 1/3rd. of their circulation.

To afford the same accommodation throughout the U. S. to those who have moneys to receive of or pay to the Government, in regard to the places of deposite,

and

and to distribute the public deposits among the banks in the large cities, in such a manner as to prevent too great an accumulation in any, it will probably be found necessary to employ twenty or thirty banks, or perhaps a much larger number. If these banks are selected exclusively with a view to their pecuniary safety the greater part of them will doubtless be safe banks. When compared with the bank of the U. S. as depositories of the public moneys, however, the whole must be taken together as one bank. With the bank of the U. S. it cannot happen that a loss will be sustained at any branch, because the bank is answerable as a whole. But, the local banks would each necessarily be separately and individually responsible for the deposits placed with it & no more. Though generally safe, it might happen, and the experience of the Treasury well justifies the apprehension, that some one of them would prove otherwise. Indeed, it is not to be expected, that, with the temptations to extend their business which the possession of the deposits

(would)

monied agents, with the chance of mismanagement to which such institutions are always liable, and with the hazard of loss to which they are ordinarily exposed, and their inability to withstand any extraordinary pressure, a loss should not occur in some one of all the selected banks, during the three years that remain unexpired of the bank charter, in which time not less than fifty millions may pass into their possession.

In connection with this part of the subject, it may be proper to remark, that by a statement published by Mr. Gallatin, it appears, that of the banks, which were in operation at different periods between the 1st of January 1811 and the 1st July 1830, 165 failed or discontinued their business; and of 129 of those, the aggregate capital exceeded 24 millions of dollars.

There is, however, another danger, which, in contemplating the consequences of the proposed measure, is to be taken into view. It is but too probable that the Bank of the U.S., viewing this

measure

measure as an act of hostility towards itself,
would be excited to meet it in a similar spirit.
This it could only effect through the local banks
selected by the government to supply its place;- the
comparative strength of the bank of the U.S. &
of the local banks, which has been already
exhibited, shews which is less able to maintain
a conflict. It is even apparent that if the bank
of the U.S. were to pay over the whole of the
public moneys in its possession, as well those of
the treasurer & other public officers as those for
the public debt,- amounting in the whole to 8 or
9 millions,- by increasing its circulation; it would
still be stronger than the banks of any of the
commercial cities, even than those of Philadelphia.
Its probable course, however, would be to reduce its
business by the amount of the public moneys
withdrawn from it. Even this would to a
certain degree embarrass the other banks,

and

as it would produce a pressure upon the community, which would react upon them. Those who were not so fortunate as to procure a portion of the deposites, would also curtail their business, in proportion as they were weak or cautious. The selected banks might think themselves protected from the necessity of a corresponding curtail by the possession of the deposites; if they were prudent, however, they would not extend their business, for it is evident, from the exhibition above presented, that even the possession of these deposites would not do more than place their present business in a safe condition. As they could not relieve the pressure which these curtails on the part of the Bank of the U. S. and the other local banks would produce, they would of course be subject to individual losses, resulting from the pressure in common with other banks. If they attempted to relieve it, even to the extent of the public deposites, they would be in a worse situation than the other banks; because their other business, which, but for the possession of the deposites, they would have reduced in common with the other local banks, still remain subject to all the hazards resulting from its undue extension.

So far

so far, however, these embarrassments will not have been produced by any hostile operation of the Bank of the U. S.; they will have been merely those incident to the proposed change.

The business of the bank reduced so far as it may deem necessary and perhaps its circulation withdrawn to the same degree, the bank is then wholly out of the reach of danger from the selected banks, even if combined for that purpose. On the contrary, it will then stand in the relation of a great creditor to them all; its contracts and all its receipts will be in specie or in notes of the local banks, which will give it the power to call on those banks for specie; and by postponing for a time the object of immediate gain, and using its means with a view to resent what it would allege to be the hostility of the government, upon the selected banks, it would soon drive them to curtail and finally to suspend their business.

In looking to the consequences of a contest between the bank of the U. S. and the selected banks, it is proper to take into view the advantages it has in its great capital, distributed at all the principal points throughout the union, but controlled by one head, and able to be concentrated and brought into activity to a tremendous degree, either for offence or defence

at any given point. If a pressure exists upon any particular point, it relieves itself by means drawn from other points, extending its calls throughout all the strong points of its establishment until it has relieved the particular pressure by distributing it throughout its whole establishment. So, on the other hand, where it is disposed to make a pressure upon any local banks, by concentrating its means at a favorable moment, it would have it in its power to overwhelm almost any bank whose business is extended as that of the local banks is known to be. These banks, too, have no external resource. Each must depend on its own means; for others would be afraid to risk their own safety by attempting to sustain it against such a pressure; and if the pressure was general each would be obliged to look to its own safety.

To the community the consequences of such a conflict could not be otherwise than embarrassing, bringing distress to many and ruin to others. The curtailment of their business, which the banks would be obliged to make, would depress the commerce of their accustomed ~~and~~ accommodations. The weak would be the first to sink under it, but in proportion as it was extensive, & extensive it would probably become,

would

would be the embarrassment, until it would be forced to effect as well the payments of the duty bonds as the fulfilment of individual engagements.

In such a conflict, when the credit and the very existence of the local banks would be in jeopardy, and in such a state of commercial distress as would follow, it would be in vain to consider the public deposites as safe.

Against any such abuse of its power, the bank would under ordinary circumstances be restrained by the public opinion. Indeed its interests, which are best promoted by recommending itself to the country for its usefulness & for that only, would forbid it. But, if a pretence were offered it for deeming its prosperity and safety aimed at by the measures of the Government, and could be able to persuade the country that it was persecuted, the public opinion, or at least a great portion of it, would not be apt to condemn the bank for the consequences of any measures necessary to an effective self defence. Besides, the embarrassments which are here alluded to would soon be felt, and those sufferers who traced them to the measures of the government, would not merely sympathise

sympathies with the bank, but entertains, with it, a common feeling of resentment.

It is not probable, however, that these embarrassments ~~which~~ would be of long continuance or that they would be permitted, where both the banks and their debtors had a common interest in preventing it, to proceed to that extremity which would involve so many in ruin and produce great suffering to the community. The debtors being unable to make the required payments to the banks, the banks would be without the means of discharging their obligations, and a common necessity would not only sanction but call for a suspension of specie payment as the remedy against the dangers to which all were exposed. Though a resort to this would postpone the evil for a time, it would be only to give them greater extent for a future period. It is not to be supposed that the nation at present or the national interests will long submit to a depreciated currency of bank paper irredeemable with the [illegible] this has already been tried, and abandoned; but at what cost! The sufferings experienced by this

community

community in returning to a specie currency after the general suspension during the war, are too well remembered to be more than alluded to here. Any measure which would probably lead to a similar state of things could only be justified by some strong necessity affecting the public safety.

The responsibility of the proposed measure, arising out of the proceedings in Congress has already been adverted to; but that responsibility would also be encreased by the probable state of the public opinion, at the time when the Secretary of the Treasury would have to ~~present~~ account to Congress for its exercise. The inconveniences or evils which it is calculated to produce, will then have begun to be felt; and, in all countries, public measures are judged more by their results than by the reasonings which may have recommended them.

But that responsibility would be encreased vastly more, if, in addition to the inconveniences to the ~~[illegible]~~ and the mischiefs to the community, which the undersigned apprehends from it, it should have

183 happened, that, before the meeting of Congress, some

some one of the many banks selected for the public depositories would have proved insolvent or insecure, and a portion of the public money thereby lost. The Undersigned is free to confess, that, amidst all the hazards to which they would be exposed, he fully apprehends such a result.

In the views hitherto presented on this subject, the Undersigned has not adverted to the interests of the U. S. as a stockholder, which may be affected by this measure. As the U. S. own one fifth of the whole stock, whatever diminishes the business of the bank takes so far from the public revenue, and whatever subjects it to losses that break in upon its capital, diminishes in the same degree the public property of the nation. The care of those interests is, therefore, among the duties of those to whom the people have confided the care of their other interests; and for the faithful discharge of that duty they are accountable to the country. This stock was the contribution which the people were willing to make in order to secure themselves against the evils which

which they experienced as well in their public as
in their private business, for the want of a
circulating medium of universal credit throughout
the Union and every where equal to gold & silver,
and for the want of a safe and convenient agent
for receiving, and keeping, and transmitting the
funds of the government and those of the public at
large wherever their interests might require. This
capital, however, of 7 millions of dollars, was
paid out of the industry of the country, and now
yields nearly half a million of dollars annually
to the public revenue; thus relieving the people from
taxation to that amount. Though mere pecuniary
interests are not to be put in competition with the
public safety, yet where no such paramount
necessity puts them aside, so large a capital, &
an income derived from it sufficient for defraying
the compensation of all the public officers at the
seat of government and more than double the
amount of the expenditures on account of the
intercourse between the U. S. and foreign nations,
are of sufficient importance to justify the possessors
in requiring a proper regard for their preservation.

by

If it be hoped by transferring the deposites from the bank of the U. S. to fiscal agents, who, though less able to serve the government, will be better disposed to do, is it probable, when the organization of these institutions is considered, that the local banks will prove so? The bank of the U. S. is created by and dependant upon the federal authorities. Giving the fullest weight to the hostility imputed to it in regard to any branch of those authorities, such hostility has not been particularly manifested by it in its official transactions with the government. In addition to all the means of control over it which the law has placed in the hands of the government, in the appointment of directors, the examination into its affairs by the Secretary of the Treasury, and still more by Congress, and finally the proceedings in the Courts, the government has also the same means of control over that bank which it would have over the local banks, the removal of the deposites; and it is to be remembered, this is the only control it could have over

over the local banks. Whatever facilities in the way of business the government may require of them, it must obtain by a previous bargain: if at any time the public service requires funds of a particular kind or at a particular place, unless it was previously stipulated for them, it must ask them as a favor. It is certainly not for a government voluntarily to put itself in a situation to ask any thing: and if it obtains them otherwise, it will be for an equivalent which, perhaps, may not be adjusted without a bargain of which the government can have no desire to engage in. On the other hand, the relation of the government to the Bank of the U. S. in all such matters is settled by law.

It is necessary to inquire, however, whether the government could rely upon the continued good disposition of the local banks? If the selection be made entirely with a view to their safety as places of deposite, it may well happen that some will not be under the management of persons not politically friendly

to the administration. Putting aside the danger
there is that the local banks might use the
increased means which the public deposits
would give, of gratifying private or political
partialities or resentments, or of pressing upon
other & less favored institutions, - since these are
evils to be estimated whatever may be the prudence
& preference of the directors, - is there no danger to
be apprehended from the occasional prevalence ~~[illegible]~~
of unfriendly feelings in particular portions of
the Union? Would it be safe for the United States
to trust their funds exclusively to local
institutions, which of course are subject to the
control of the State authorities from which they
derive their existence, and to the influence of the
communities in which they are placed and by
which they are supported? The embarrassments which
might result from an unfriendly feeling of this kind
may well be imagined; and after the experience
the government has had, it should require a greater
necessity than is believed to exist, to justify it in subjecting
the

its pecuniary interests to such a hazard.

In considering the proposed measure merely on the ground of expediency, it may not be amiss, among other and more important matters, to speak of the difficulties to which the Department might be subjected in the transaction of its business with the local banks. With the bank of the U. S. the principles and conditions on which the public business is to be carried on are settled by law; the details have in the course of long experience received the best practical arrangement. With the local banks the adjustment of the terms must be a matter of bargain, varying necessarily in some degree according to particular situations & circumstances, and differing in other matters according as the banks might be liberally or otherwise disposed; and even in the manner of transacting the business among them it would not be easy to establish the necessary uniformity. Their separate interests would necessarily produce jealousies, ill will and even contention among them

them; complaints would sometimes be made that
some enjoyed too much while others had too
small a share of the benefits of the deposits,
mutual discontents would also arise from the
transfer of funds; and the Treasury would have
no little and no very agreeable occupation in
explaining its own course and preventing
misunderstandings and bickerings among them.

In respect to all these matters, and to many
others which may be anticipated, if the banks
did not act with perfect good faith towards
the Treasury, and towards the receivers and
depositors of public money, as well as towards each
other, the Department is not without some
experience, which encourages the apprehension of
them of similar difficulties. The Department
would also have to encounter the care, which the
present facilities now render light, of providing for the
proper distribution and constant mobility of funds
for the public service, at all the points throughout
the

union where they may be required: a task which, without a surplus of revenue, and with an expenditure at no place fixed would not be without its difficulties. Burthened as the Department is with extensive & heavy duties, the prompt performance of which is essential to so many private as well as public interests, it has need of all the facilities that can possibly be afforded.

It has been urged against a national bank that it would be an instrument of power in the hands of government, to be used for political purposes; and in adjusting the charter of the present bank it was endeavoured to guard against such abuses. ~~[illegible]~~ The danger of improper influence is, however, as much to be apprehended from the employment of the local banks. Those to whom the power of selection would be confided, could not of themselves possess that particular knowledge of distant or any local banks which would be necessary to guide them. And in listening to the representations and recommendations of others, it

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would be difficult, if not impossible to escape error or mischief.

It is possible that the ill consequences which are herein set forth as among those that may be apprehended from the proposed measure may not be realized. All experience shews that the laws which govern human events are not sufficiently known to enable us to trace with certainty the consequences of any measure. Counteracting principles which do not appear to us may be in activity, and may disappoint the results which the best reasoning may deduce from any event. In looking to the future, therefore, we can look only at probabilities; and in judging of the effects of any measure, we must sometimes find sufficient grounds for deciding for or against its adoption if we can be satisfied whether the public good or evil will predominate. Viewing the subject, therefore, in this general aspect, the Undersigned, though he may be mistaken as to the extent of the evil, entertains no doubt that the ill consequences to be expected

outweigh

outweigh all the good to be hoped from it.

It has been already observed that the bank enjoys a portion of the public confidence. Many of the President's best friends are among those who desire its continuance with such modifications as shall be found necessary; and among those of them who do not, it is believed, there are a number who do not desire to see any interruption ~~[illegible]~~ offered by the government to the safe winding up of its affairs. Hence it is that it has been found that, with the exception of the tariff, the bank question is the only distracting question that has been presented among the friends of the Administration. Essential, and as it would ~~seem~~ seem irreconcileable, differences exist on this point among those who agree on all others; and while this question is unnecessarily agitated, the opportunity always exists for those who hope, to profit by their divisions. So far from seeking the adoption of measures which

which would serve to widen these differences, it cannot be doubted that if the opinion of those who have so many honorable motives to act together for the public good could be heard on this occasion, it would enjoin upon us to act that spirit of mutual and liberal concession which lies at the foundation of all our institutions and which regulates our policy on all other matters, be exercised also on this subject. To restore harmony throughout the country seems now all that is left to complete the President's patriotic labors. His civil administration has been marked with a success worthy of the brilliancy of his military career; under his guidance, the pure principles of the Constitution have been restored to their paramount influence in the conduct of all our public affairs: In our foreign relations, the justice which was so long withheld, has been finally accorded to us, and with all the bonds

of

family have been strengthened: and finally in our domestic system, those sacred principles of union, upon which the prosperity and liberty of the whole American people depend, have been by him not merely asserted and maintained, but more firmly & permanently established. The undersigned would respectfully observe that it remains for the President still further to carry out those noble and just principles of public policy, which his own patriotism & wisdom have suggested, and, in support of that union which he so deeply cherishes, to bind still closer in patriotic concord, the people of this great republic who owe him so much for his services, and to whom he owes so much for their confidence and affection.

Entertaining these views of the whole subject the undersigned submits as his opinion that no ~~step~~ system should be ~~taken~~ established for the future disposition of the public deposits ~~[illegible]~~ nor any change in the places of deposite of the ~~of the~~ public money sooner, than the expiration

of the charter of the present bank may render
necessary; and that in the mean time no
measure be taken to change the relation which
the present bank stands towards the government
except for the purpose of investigating its transactions & detecting abuses;
by interfering with its privileges or duties; ~~[illegible]~~ and
unless upon such investigation the bank should prove to be unsafe ~~[illegible]~~
that, it be suffered to proceed in its business in
the manner authorized by the charter. The winding
up of its concerns without embarrassment to the
country, is under the most favorable circumstances,
rather to be hoped than expected. It is not for the
government to add to the inherent difficulties of
the task, but rather to aid in obviating them; —
<u>not for the sake of the bank, but that of the</u>
<u>community</u>; — ~~[illegible]~~

I have the honor to be, sir,
with the highest respect,
your obedient servant,
Louis McLane
Secretary of the Treasury

May 20/53
Lewis McLane

There are some strong points in this
view — all [illegible] described it. I —

1833, June 26

Copy of a letter to Mr Duane from the President of the United States sent on the 26th of June 1833 from Boston

Sir

The President of the United States deems it proper to submit to you a full developement of the policy which he thinks it his duty to pursue in relation to the Bank of the United States and the future management of the public revenue as far as it depends on his action or authority.

In his first message to Congress in December 1829, he expressed his doubts of the constitutionality and expediency of the present Bank of the United States, and called the attention of his fellow citizens as well of Congress as of the country at large, to the question of its recharter, or the substitution of a new Bank upon different principles.

In his message of December 1830, he repeated

his doubts on this subject and threw out for consideration some suggestions in relation to a substitute.

In his message of December 1831 he referred to the opinions expressed in his preceding annual messages and declared that he left the subject to the consideration of the people and their representatives.

At that session of Congress the Bank petitioned for a renewal of its charter and the representatives of the people and of the States, in Congress, by a majority of both Houses, passed a Bill granting their request. Upon this bill the President deemed it his duty to put his constitutional veto. The President was then a candidate for reelection. His veto of the Bank bill brought the subject directly before the people who were about to express their opinion upon his official acts. By both parties in the contest the principal issue was joined upon the Bank veto, and by a decisive majority the people condemned the bill passed by Congress and approved the act of the President declaring

the Bank to be both inexpedient and unconstitutional. To this decision given by the highest power known on earth it was hoped that the Bank and its advocates would cheerfully submit. To the public functionaries who are now called upon to act on the subject, it seems to the President, that it ought to be a rule and guide next in authority to the constitution itself, because it was given by a majority of the states and a majority of the people who make the law makers, and have a right to direct them. He therefore considers it a settled question so far as public sentiment is concerned that the present Bank of the United States is not to be rechartered.

Thus far no suggestions of any particular substitute seem to have been received with favor by the great community. To most of the projects which have been thrown out the same constitutional

and other objections exist which have induced the people to condemn the present Bank. In the Presidents view any Bank created by Congress authorised to exercise corporate powers or transact private business out of the district of Columbia without the consent of the states would be unconstitutional, and it is questionable whether any Bank whose corporate powers should be limited to the district would succeed in making such arrangements with the state Governments as would enable it to act efficiently under their jurisdiction as the agent of the general Government in the management of its fiscal concerns.

There is just ground to fear that in the creation of a substitute as great danger, if not greater, may be incurred as that which now threatens the American people. A corporation of individuals deriving its powers from Congress, pervading every section of the union, will, in the general, by controlling the currency

and leading men of the country, be more powerful than the Government, and may seriously thwart its views and embarrass its operations. This is one of the dangers of the present Bank. But any substitute which should concentrate the same or a like power, and be put entirely under the control of the general Government, might, by the union of the political and money power, give the administration of the Government more influence, and the Government itself more strength, than is compatible with the safety of the States, the liberties of the people and the purity of our republican institutions.

Having considered the subject in all its bearings the President has come to the conclusion that all idea of any substitute for the present Bank, in the shape of a new institution, ought to be abandoned at least for the present.

The President having adopted this opinion as the guide of his future conduct it becomes

the bounden duty of the Executive branch of the Government to make a different and seasonable provision, as far as it has power to do so, for this branch of the public service. The state institutions are in his opinion competent to perform all the functions which the U S Bank now performs or which may be required by the Government. At the same time that they cannot so effectually concentrate the money power - they cannot be so easily or effectually used for individual political or party purposes as a Bank of the United States under any form and of any character. It is therefore the desire of the President that you should immediately turn your attention to the making of such arrangements as will enable the Government to carry on all the its fiscal operations through the agency of the State Banks.

Connected with this subject is the question of

a discontinuance of the public deposits in the Bank of the United States and the substitution of the State Banks for that purpose. That such a change must at length take place is admitted by all those who acquiesce in the decision of the American people at the last presidential election. The question is merely one of time.

The embarrassments that would unavoidably result from an omission to make this change until the expiration of the charter of the Bank of the U. States are too apparent to require explanation. The least reflection and the slightest acquaintance with the subject will suffice to satisfy all disinterested and unprejudiced minds that unless the President looks either to a renewal of the charter of the present Bank or the establishment of a new one (from either of which views he is precluded by his declared opinions) he would best discharge his

duty by putting the plan which he proposes in operation in sufficient season before the expiration of the charter to afford a satisfactory test of its practicability when that time arrives. The charter of the present Bank expires on the 3^d^ day of March 1836. With the best exertions on your part it will not probably be in your power to complete the arrangements with the State Banks so far as to enable you to commence the deposits in them until the middle of September. From that time to the expiration of the charter is upwards of two years, a period which will not be more than sufficient to test the efficacy and propriety of the substitute he wishes to have adopted. The President is therefore of opinion that it would be a just and wise exercise of the discretion in the matter conferred by law on

the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the public deposites to be made in the State Banks from and after the 15th of September if the arrangements to be made with them should then have been completed. The President has no doubt that the proposed experiment will serve to satisfy the people that a National Bank can be dispensed with without serious injury or embarrassment to the public service or to the substantial interests of the country. If the result be otherwise it will then become the right and duty of the Government and people to decide between enlarging the authority of the Federal Government and the exercise of that which it possesses within the District of Columbia.

The only objections that can be made to so early an exercise of the authority conferred upon

the Secretary of the Treasury over the public deposits must have their foundation either in the interests of the Bank and the supposed claims of that institution upon the favor of the Government; or in a supposed capacity and disposition on the part of the Bank to impair the public credit and embarrass the pecuniary affairs of the country in case of a disregard of their wishes; and in an apprehended deterioration of the currency.

The President does not find any insuperable obstacle to the proposed measure in either of these considerations. The Bank has now no right to invoke the favor of the Government. Whatever may heretofore have been its claims in that respect they have, the President regrets to say, been forfeited by the unjustifiable and high handed manner in which its affairs have been administered — an administration

in many important respects unfaithful as an agent of the Government, and which in the opinion of the President proves it to be an unsafe one. So far as the interests of the Bank are identified with those of the public, and as it respects a careful observance of the public faith by securing to the Bank the full enjoyment of all the legal rights which are conferred by its charter, the Government will doubtless perform its duty. Further than this the Bank has no claim upon its favorable consideration.

It is the duty of the Bank to wind up its concerns in such a manner as will produce the least pressure upon the money market. This duty is rendered imperative as well in consideration of the extensive exclusive privileges which it has so

long enjoyed as by the best interests of the stockholders. But if on the contrary it be the pleasure of those interested in the management of its affairs, in revenge for a refusal of the Government to comply with its wishes, by continuing to it privileges after all moral as well as legal rights to them have ceased, to mark its dissolution by such an abuse of the national trust, the country must abide the issue. To succumb to the demands of the Bank upon such pretences and under such a menace would be a virtual submission of the Government productive of more immediate dishonor and ultimate detriment to the best interests of the nation than can possibly arise from the adoption of any other course.

The President is however happy to believe that for reasons hereinafter given there is no solid foundation for the alarm which has been sounded on this subject. That the currency of the country could be better preserved by means of a well regulated and honestly conducted national Bank is very possible, although it is quite certain that the difference between a circulating medium supplied by such an institution and that which is furnished by the State Banks in the present prosperous condition of the country is greatly exaggerated. But if the apprehended derangement of the currency should take place it will be for the people to say whether they will seek redress for the evil by conferring constitutional power on Congress to establish such a Bank.

No good citizen, it is hoped, will desire to have

it done in violation of the constitution. If the evil was upon us we should not seek an exemption from it at such a sacrifice, much less ought we to involve ourselves in it upon the mere anticipation of inconveniences which may never happen, and which the President firmly believes are not to be justly apprehended. He will state the facts upon which these opinions are founded - facts which he believes to be incontrovertible; and he will accompany that statement with such observations as are in his judgement called for by the occasion and fully justified by the nature and character of the transactions referred to.

At the beginning of the year 1831, the aggregate debt due the Bank of the United States was $42.402.304. Although it was well

aware that the Government designed shortly to call out nearly all the large deposit it then had in Bank for the purpose of paying the public debt, and that its charter would expire in a few years, it nevertheless proceeded to increase its loans in such profusion that in May 1832 the debt due to it was $70.428.070, showing an increase in sixteen months of $28.025.766, equal to about sixty six per cent.

The *motive* of this enormous extension of loans can no longer be doubted. It was unquestionably to gain power in the country and force the Government through the influence of the debtors to grant it a new charter.

The *effect* of the extension was to put it out of the power of the Bank promptly and faithfully to pay over the public money received by it upon the demand of the Government in discharge of the public

debt. The expedients to which it resorted to sustain itself under this unprecedented extension of its business and the pretences by which it has attempted to justify them, have proved it to be unworthy of the confidence of the Government.

It will be recollected that the greatest extension of the business of the Bank was in May 1832. It has since been proved by its official acts and correspon-dence, that in March 1832, two months before the extension had arrived at its maximum, a negotiation was commenced with agents representing about $1.700.000 of the three per cent stocks held in Holland and about $1.000.000 held elsewhere, with the object of relieving the Bank from its payment for one or more years after it might be required to be paid by the Government. After this negotiation had been commenced, a notice from the Treasury Department that the Government intended to pay off one

half of the three per cent stocks on the first of July succeeding, brought the President of the Bank to Washington for the purpose of soliciting a postponement of that payment until the first of the succeeding October; upon his representation that in case the payment were required in July the Bank would be unable to accommodate the debtors of the Government especially in New York, as it had done and desired still to do, and upon his undertaking on the part of the Bank to pay the interest for the quarter, his request was granted. By developments since made, it appears that not even the usual indulgence had been or was thereafter extended to the debtors of the Government or others at New York or elsewhere, their accommodations having been largely curtailed; and that the only conceivable motive of the

Bank in asking the indulgence and agreeing to pay for it, was its own inability, with convenience or safety to pay over a portion of the large public deposit on the 1st. of July.

The relief obtained by this indulgence of the Government was not as extensive as the condition of the Bank seems to have required. The negotiation with the agent of the Dutch holders of the three per cents was continued: and early in the month of July, when the Bank understood that the Government intended to pay off the whole of the three per cents in the latter part of the year, a mission to England was projected with the view of secretly negotiating with the holders of those stocks residing abroad and inducing them by the payment of an interest equal to that paid by the Government, or greater if necessary, not to present their certificates for payment for one

Year at least.

The agent of the Bank sailed for Europe in July, instructed to make the arrangement at all events, and on the 2d. August entered into an agreement with the house of Baring, Brothers & Co. by which, in consideration of the payment of all expenses and a commission of one half per cent by the Bank they undertook —

1. To invite the holders of the three per cent stock of the United States to retain their stock until October 1833, the Bank paying the interest quarterly —

2. To buy up the said three per cents on behalf of the Bank, the Barings retaining the certificates and passing their amount to the debit of the Bank which undertook to pay any interest they might be obliged to pay.

3. To give the Bank a credit in addition to its running credit for a sum sufficient to make up $5.000.000, if the purchased and deferred stock should fall short of that sum, charging the same interest as in their running account with the Bank - their whole advances to be reimbursed by the Bank in October 1833.

The first item of this agreement was in direct violation of the duty of the Bank to the Government, inasmuch as it was an interference without its knowledge or consent to prevent the payment of the national debt at the period when it was required, the stockholders being permitted as one article of the contract with them to retain their certificates. This was the less excusable in the Bank, because the amount required to be paid on the 1st of October was less than $9.000.000, when the public deposits at

the time the agent was sent to England and the agreement was formed exceeded $11.600.000, and on the first of October had increased to $13.661.193.

The second item of the agreement was a direct violation of the charter of the Bank which forbids the purchase by it of the public stocks of the United States.

The substance of the three items of this agreement, specifically set forth, was received by the President of the Bank in a letter from the agent about the first of October 1832, the time at which the payment of two thirds of the three per cent stocks was required by the Government to be made. This arrangement relieving the Bank from the necessity of making payment in October and the succeeding January to the amount of $5.000.000

or providing means to meet them other than the usual resources of the Bank, enabled the institution at the time of its receipt, to change its policy, measurably suspend its curtailments and in some quarters extend its accommodations. These steps taken immediately upon receipt of the substance of the agreement, indicate that the Bank sanctioned the act of its agent and did not then contemplate any disavowal or change of its terms.

This negotiation had been commenced and consummated without the knowledge of the Government. The agreement formed was even concealed from the directory of the Bank and they were induced by other considerations urged by the President to change the policy of the institution. About the 12th of October thro' the publication of the circular sent out by the Barings in

pursuance of this agreement with the Bank, the Government and directory obtained the first information of this transaction. It was now evident that all its features must come to light; and three days afterwards the President of the Bank wrote a letter to the Barings disavowing so much of the agreement as related to the purchase of stocks and proposing a new arrangement in relation to the deferred stock which should at the same time relieve the Government from its responsibility and the Bank from the payment of the money at least for one year.

From that time forward the Bank has been struggling to retrace its steps and rid itself of its first secret and unauthorised agreement. It has procured most of the certificates, and surrendered them to the Government; but has made new arrangements avoiding the payment of money for them to a large amount, thus

confirming the inability of the Bank to pay over the public money on deposit when it was required. If the new arrangement proposed in relation to the purchased stock and other stock which the Barings were requested to purchase under certain circumstances, has been carried into effect, it is in fact as much a purchase and as much a violation of the charter as the first transaction.

The President thinks the conclusion cannot be resisted, that it was the purpose of the Bank or its chief managers, to carry into effect the illegal contract with the Barings, and that this result was prevented only by the publicity casually given of the transaction; and he does not consider that any confidence is due to an institution which is ready to violate its charter and thwart the payment of the public debt, provided the means and manner by which it operates can be concealed

from the Government and the Country. Nor does it
recommend itself to public confidence when it
alledges as reasons for these various negotiations
and arrangements a desire to accommodate the
public debtors which it never did, and to avert
the evils of a pestilence which had neither appeared
nor was anticipated when they were first originated.
Least of all can the Government place any
confidence in it when it has attempted without
the least foundation in fact, to attribute its
own illegal and unauthorised acts to suggestions
made by the Government itself.

The President looks upon these transactions
as conclusive proof of the inability of the Bank
during the year 1832, to respond to the Government
its public deposits for the payment of the public debt,
as it was its duty to do. And he considers the

pretences and misrepresentations by which it has attempted to conceal the true cause from the Government and country, as proving it to be unworthy of public trust.

Not the least obnoxious part of these transactions is the object for which the Bank sought to retain the public deposit and postpone the payment of the public debt. It had used the money of the people in extending its loans $28.000.000 in sixteen months, for the purpose of bringing the people within its power. It had secured to its interest editors and presses by extraordinary loans upon unusual terms. By the same means it had sought to procure the friendship and support of public men who might have an influence on a vote upon the question of its recharter. By the use of the public funds as well as its own, it was

attempting to control public opinion and overawe the Government. It begged indulgence of the Government that it might retain its own funds as the means of controlling it, and when those funds could no longer be retained with its consent, it sought to keep them without its consent by secret arrangements with the public creditors residing in Europe, and when detected in this effort resorted to direct loans from foreigners to enable it to accomplish the same end.

It was when its loans and accommodations were approximating to the highest point that the Bank came before the Government for a recharter, and they reached their maximum while the subject was under consideration in Congress. With debtors to the amount of seventy millions of dollars, it threw itself into the political arena

and submitted its case to the people of the United States. Its presses poured forth their arguments and predictions of mischief from the veto of the President. It expended its money in the publication and distribution of political essays affecting the question of recharter and impeaching the acts of the executive. The most direful evils were anticipated by its advocates from its destruction – and every effort which money could command or zeal render, was made to secure in its favor the verdict of the American people. In this struggle it was sustained not only by its own friends but by a public deposit of $12.000.000. It was to be expected that after being defeated in a conflict so tremendous it would have acquiesced in a decision which it had sought and provoked, and without further exerting its power or spreading its corruptions would have been

content quietly to wind up its concerns. Contrary to this just expectation its organs and advocates declare it to be again in the field, seeking to overrule thus an act of the agents of the people the solemn decision of the people themselves. It has been increasing its accommodations to the managers of the press and favoring public men with extravagant loans for unusual terms and on doubtful security. The chief business of the Bank instead of being performed by "not less than seven directors" as required by the charter and in accordance with the rules has been done by committees whose proceedings are concealed from the board. To cut off all channels of communication with the Government in relation to its acts and abuses not one of the five government directors was at the commencement of the present year appointed

upon a single committee. And when those directors sought to reform this abuse and restore the business of the Bank to the Board according to law and its own rules, that Board, instead of changing the practice to conform to the rule, changed the rule so as to conform it to the practice, thus not only in practice but by a positive rule violating, repealing, and setting aside an express and material provision in the act of congress which gave it existence. Although at a more recent period and by an unusual remodelling of the committees, a part of the Government directors has been placed upon some of them, yet in the exchange committee, through which most of the extraordinary loans referred to have been made, the Government is still wholly without representation.

The allegation recently so often promulgated

that the Treasury of the United States was exhausted and insolvent, when it has not within the last and present year, had less than six millions of public money in its vaults, might have been passed over as a harmless misrepresentation; but when the Bank seeks by substantial acts to impair the credit and depreciate the honor of the country at home and abroad, the affair assumes a different aspect. A bill was drawn by the United States on the Government of France for about $900.000 being the amount of the first instalment then due under the late treaty of indemnity. The Bank became the purchaser of the bill, and it was accompanied as required by Treaty with an order of the President formally executed authorizing the cashier of the Bank or his assignee to receive the proceeds. But

the money for which the Bill was sold instead of being drawn out by the Government remained in the Bank. The French Government contrary to all calculation, suffered the bill to be protested, and it was paid out of the funds of the Bank by their agent in Paris. The Bank without having incurred any damage save a trifling expense and a trifling disappointment, have claimed of the Government, without law and contrary to right fifteen per cent for damages amounting to about $135.000 with interest. This it does although it has had the use not only of the proceeds of the Bill, but of a public deposit equal to seven or eight millions of dollars during the whole time free of charge. This claim and the spirit in which it is presented, ill became an institution which was created for the convenience

of the Government; has had for ten years an average public deposit of near nine millions of dollars which it has used without charge in loans and exchanges at great profit, and even now has thus in use about eight millions of public money.

By these misrepresentations and acts on the part of the Bank the President thinks it has forfeited all claim to the confidence of the Government and ought not to be longer retained in its service

In his message at the opening of the last session of Congress the President recommended an enquiry into the transactions of the institution, embracing the branches as well as the principal Bank with a view of ascertaining whether

it was any "longer a safe depository of the money of the people".

The apprehension then intended to be expressed was not that upon a final settlement of all its concerns the Bank would not be able to pay the Government the amount of its deposit, but simply that it was unable or unwilling to pay over that deposit when demanded by the Government for the public service, in either of which events it must be pronounced unsafe.

The committee of ways and means of the House of Representatives to which the subject was referred, did not make the general investigation recommended by the President. They confined themselves chiefly to the transactions relative to the three per cent stocks and elicited many facts tending rather to increase than diminish the apprehensions previously entertained. In the slight attention

found by them to the general concerns of the institution several important facts of the same tendency were disclosed, particularly in relation to the means by which it had kept up the appearance of great strength during the year 1832 and the character of its western debt. In the facts developed by the committee, the President finds cause rather of increased apprehensions for the safety of the public interests, if the connection between the Government and Bank be further maintained, than of any abatement of those expressed in his message. It is true that the House of Representatives without having an opportunity to examine, on account of the lateness of the session and their not being printed, ~~[illegible]~~ the report of the minority or the evidence upon which the views of

either the majority or minority were maintained, declared, by a large majority, that in their opinion the public deposits were safe in that institution. That expression of opinion, though entitled to much respect, is neither conclusive nor obligatory upon the Executive Department, if the state of its information leads to a different conclusion. It is deemed of the less weight now, because the subsequent conduct of the Bank has evinced its determination to persist in and perpetuate the abuses which have heretofore given just cause of complaint, to misrepresent its own condition and that of the Treasury and to impair the credit of the Government itself.

But the insecurity of the public deposits is not the only reason which will justify their removal from the Bank of the United States. The President thinks that the use of

the means and power which they give to corrupt the press and public men, to control popular elections, to procure a recharter contrary to the decision of the people and to gain possession of the Government which it was created to serve, are substantial reasons requiring their removal. He thinks that reasons equally conclusive may be found, in the exclusion of the Government directors from all participation in the principal business of the Bank, performing in secret committees that which should be done in full board, and cutting off, as far as possible from the Government all knowledge of its material transactions and the condition of its debt. But the strongest and controlling reason in the mind of the President is that

which has been before referred to and which consists in the necessity of organizing a new scheme for the collection, deposit and distribution of the public revenue, based upon the State Banks and making a fair experiment of its practicability before the expiration of the charter of the existing Bank, that the country may have a fair opportunity to determine whether any Bank of the United States be necessary or not.

The President has weighed with great care the reasons which have been urged from all quarters against severing at present, the connection between the Bank and the Government

A leading objection is, that the Bank of the United States has the power and in that event will have the disposition, to crush the State Banks, particularly those which may be selected by the Government as the depositaries of its

funds, and thus cause wide spread distress and ruin throughout the United States. If this apprehension be well founded, it proves two things of fearful import. First that the Bank of the United States has the power to accomplish the ruin of the State Banks and cause general bankruptcy and distress among the people: and secondly, that there is a disposition to exercise that power, unless its forbearance be purchased by that of the Government. A conviction that these things are so, instead of inducing the President to forbear, would only make him the more determined, by all the legitimate means in his power, to resist a corporation which, altogether irresponsible to the people, already holds in its hands their interests and their

211 happiness. If this disposition be now partially

fixed upon the country; a struggle must be made to cast it off, or our people will be forever enslaved; and that struggle can never be made with less distress to them or under more favorable auspices than at the present moment

But the President as already stated looks upon all these apprehensions as destitute of real foundation. The same language was held before he put his veto upon the recharter of the Bank as well as subsequent to that important act. Time has shown, that the curtailment of the accommodations and circulation of the Bank produces no sensible effect upon the business of the country. The establishment of new state banks and an extension of the old, fills up the space from which the U S Bank withdraws, and the great commu-

-nity is scarcely sensible of the change. Such will be the progress of events until the Bank has wound up its concerns and ceased to exist, when its absence will neither be felt nor regretted by the people.

+ It is the President's opinion, that the power over the state Banks which the Bank of the United States now possesses, is derived almost wholly from its receipt of the public revenue. It is chiefly thro' the moneys thus received that it obtains, directly, or indirectly, the paper of the state Banks and raises ballances against them. If its receipt of the public revenue shall cease, its means of raising those ballances will cease. If the state Banks become the receptacles of the public revenue they will be instantly enabled to raise like balances against the Bank of the

United States and its branches. That Bank will not only be deprived of power, but that power will be transferred into the hands of the State Banks, thus producing a double effect on both parties. The State Banks being without branches, have but one point to guard, and all their concerns are under the eye of one directory: but the Bank of the United States, being divided into twenty six offices or Departments, scattered thro' the union, has twenty six points to guard, and not knowing at which an enemy may strike must be fortified at all. If it make war upon the State Banks selected as the agents of the Government what can prevent the latter from accumulating in the receipt of the revenue the notes of any one of the interior

branches to an amount larger than their specie on hand, and without notice presenting them at their counters for payment? How could the Bank of the United States in case of a contest with the State Banks guard against the stoppage by this process of all their interior branches in detail, especially when it is considered that the notes of all its branches, in consequence of being received in payment of revenue duties, naturally concentrate at Philadelphia and New-York where they constitute in fact, as shown by the Bank reports, almost the entire currency in which those duties are paid? By this tendency of the currency large ballances now accrue in the principal Bank, and Atlantic branches of the U S Bank against the interior branches, the

inconvenience of which is not seriously felt because they are all parts of the same institution But the state Banks when in receipt of this paper, will not permit them to accumulate; and if they choose to make war on the interior branches, may with perfect ease break them up, one after another, by throwing back the circulation in masses which they will not be prepared to redeem.

× It has been urged as an argument in favor of a Bank of the United States as well as not disturbing the present Bank by a removal of the deposits that great injury will accrue to the country from a loss of the general currency every where of equal value, now alledged to be furnished by the Bank of the United States.

The only currency known to the

constitution of the United States is gold and
silver. This is consequently the only currency which
that instrument delegates to Congress the power to regulate.
A general paper currency, being unknown to the
constitution, does not come within the scope of any
of its provisions, and cannot be regulated under
its authority. To prove its usefulness or necessity
might prove the expediency of enlarging the powers
granted in the constitution, but not of exercising
a power not granted.

× But it is not the fact that the Bank
of the United States furnishes a currency of equal
value throughout the country. The notes of one
Branch are not cashed at another, nor are they
taken on deposit, nor generally even in payment
of debts. So far as its own business is concerned,
as independent of that of the Government, the

notes of each branch are now a local currency and their credit confined to its vicinity. But the Government by receiving all those notes in payment of duties and taxes throughout the United States gives the general credit they possess in opposition to the policy of the Bank. If the favor of the Government were withdrawn and branch notes no longer received in payment of public revenue, the present policy of the Bank would make them as much a local currency circulating only in the immediate vicinity of the branches whence they issued, as are now the notes of the State Banks. And it is in the power of the Government at any moment to give a general credit to the notes of twenty six or any other number of State Banks, by announcing that they will be received in payment of public dues

throughout the United States. It is not the Bank, therefore, which furnishes the general currency but the Government. The Bank only stamps the paper and puts it in circulation; but it is the Government that gives it a general credit. When the U S Bank shall cease to be, we shall still have such a general paper currency, consisting of the notes of State Banks receivable in payment of the public dues. It will be, as it is now, the act of the Government, and that only, which will give it a general circulation and an equal value. On that score, therefore, no serious inconvenience will arise to the Government or the people.

× As an argument that the present Bank ought not to be further molested and that its charter ought to be renewed or another

Bank established to take its place, reference is frequently made to the disasters of the last war and the derangement of the currency which grew out of them. The President is satisfied that had the old Bank of the United States been continued in existence during that period, instead of aiding the Government in carrying on the war, it would have compelled it to make peace on ignominious terms. Not only was a large portion of its stock held by the subjects of the British monarchy, but they had a right to vote in the choice of directors, and much of the domestic stock is believed to have been held by men who were equally disposed to embarrass the prosecution of that war. So far from aiding the Government itself it would

undoubtedly, not only have opposed it, but prevented the State Banks from rendering that aid which was actually received from them.

× It is unjust to the State Banks to attribute to them the embarrassments of the Government and country which led to the suspension of specie payment and a depreciated paper currency. All those evils are attributable to other causes. In consequence of combinations among men of wealth opposed to the war the requisite loans of money could not be procured, disasters overtook our arms for the want of the necessary supplies of funds and others were threatened. If patriotism ever actuated Banks, it was felt in the operations of many of the local banks at that gloomy period. At the hazard of their existence, they furnished the

means of raising armies and maintaining them in the field. and it was in their efforts to sustain the Government that they so far crippled themselves as to be obliged to suspend the payment of specie. If the Bank of the United States had then existed, it must have done as the State Banks did, or it would have effected nothing in support of the Government. If it had not joined the combination against the Government it could not have furnished the funds which the exigencies of the country required without suspending the payment of specie. Instead of hostility and persecution the Government owed the State Banks gratitude and support. Their credit during the whole war was as good as its own, and without their aid the Treasury must have

stopped payment. But no sooner had peace arrived and a profusion of revenue begun to flow in, than the Government not recollecting that it was impossible for the State Banks at once to bring down their business and redeem themselves from the difficulties into which they had thus been led, insisted upon an immediate resumption of specie payments; and because a demand so unreasonable was not forthwith complied with, created a new Bank of the United States to coerce them. There is not a doubt in the mind of the President, that had not this institution been created, all the State Banks which were sound, would have been compelled by public opinion to resume the payment of specie as soon as

they were able and that in a short period every section of the Union would have enjoyed a sound currency. And is it not evidently fallacious to anticipate now, in a time of profound peace and unexampled prosperity, the same results which then flowed, not from the destruction of the old Bank, but from a desolating war, the suspension of commerce and universal embarrassment? We are often told of the alleged difference of exchange between the northern and southern states at that period, and it is attributed to the state Banks. Those Banks in the north which looked coldly upon the great contest and gave no aid or support to the Government, were enabled to maintain the payment of specie

while more patriotic institutions were compelled to stop. Their paper consequently depreciated; and that which is now so often spoken of as difference of exchange was in reality a difference in the value of the currency, which could never again arise but under similar circumstances. And who believes that public opinion will now sustain the Banks in any quarter of the Union in refusing to redeem their notes in a time of profound peace and general prosperity?

No such result is to be anticipated. There will be only a difference of exchange, which can never much exceed the cost of transporting specie, and by arrangements among the Banks, may be less. ___

Par. × (It is frequently boasted that the Bank of the United States is largely beneficial to the country in effecting domestic exchanges at a low rate. There are two sorts of exchange business carried on by the Bank of the United States. The bona fide exchange, in which the merchant or trader deposits his funds in one branch of the Bank and takes a check or draft on a distant branch near the spot where he wants to use them, or draws and sells to the Bank a draft on a fund deposited to his credit in a distant branch or

which —

or which he verily expects will be, is undoubtedly beneficial to the country.

But that kind of exchange business which is carried on by drawing and redrawing to enable speculators to raise funds and, men in desperate circumstances to sustain their credit, is a source of much mischief to the country.

It is evident from developements heretofore made, that a large portion of the exchange business now done by the Bank of the United States, is of this description. If that Bank should cease to exist, there is no reason to suppose that the bona fide exchange will not be carried on by arrangements among the State Banks on terms nearly if not quite as favorable as it is now. That which is profitable to one great institution carried on through many

branches-

Branches, must also be profitable to small institutions who may take their places. ___

Merit is often claimed for the Bank of the United States, because it has faithfully transferred the public funds without cost to the Government.

The transfer of the public funds is known to be a source of profit to the Bank instead of a burden, and the more distant the transfer the greater the profit. The exchange is always in favor of the Eastern cities where the revenues are principally collected, and bills drawn on those points in the distant south or west to transfer the public funds or for other purposes, are sold at a premium. ___

___ At the same time the Bank has the use of an average public deposit of near nine millions, the employment of which at the

five per cent, must yield about $450.000 per year. It would be bad management indeed, which should so completely dissipate this profit and all the means and stock of the Bank as to cause a loss to the government of any portion of its deposit. –

× But the Government has once lost as a stockholder, & never as a depositor. On the seven Millions of stock subscribed, it long paid the Bank an interest of five per cent, the subscription having been in five per cent Stocks of the United States, and from January 1819 to July 1822, the Bank either declared no dividend or ~~declared~~ one less than five per cent, so that the amount paid to the Bank during that period exceeded the amount received from it about $822.500.

~~The losses in the State Banks after the close of the~~ war were remarkably small considering the immense amount collected by the government =during

during that period and the convulsions produced by the arduous contest in the business of the Banks and the country.

No inference can be justly drawn from them favorable to the United States Bank which has encountered no such difficulties, or unfavorable to the State Banks in their future career.

On the whole the President thinks the same advantages may be secured to the government and country from the employment of State Banks as from a Bank of the United States, without any of the dangers. He sees no serious difficulty in transferring the Public deposit at an early period from the one to the other, as the first step, in an attempt to dispense with a national Bank. It is not the desire of the President that the deposit should be drawn suddenly so as to embarrass the —

the operations of the Bank of the United States or create any shock in its relations with its debtors or the community. To make the desired change in as gentle a manner as possible, it may be expedient not to require any actual transfer of funds from the Bank of the United States, but to leave the money now on deposit in that institution to be drawn out gradually by the usual Treasury warrants for the public service, and direct the future deposits to be made in the State Banks. This plan seems to be recommended by the double advantage, that it will give the State Banks time to digest their plans of operation before any call shall be made upon them and leave to the Bank of the United States no cause to complain of the hardship of the government. No just ground of hostility towards the State Banks will be left to it, and if its affairs

affairs have been as well managed as has been represented, it will be under no necessity to make oppressive calls upon its debtors.

In the accomplishment of the object in view there are some points which must be particularly regarded.

The safety of the public deposits in the State Banks employed, must be secured beyond a doubt. They must undertake to remit to any part of the United States and there pay in gold and silver or their equivalent, such portion of the public monies received by them as may be required, without expence to the government. They must undertake to perform if required, without compensation, any other duties or services which the government may now lawfully require of the Bank of the United States.

 They must agree to make reports of

of their business and condition to the Secretary of the Treasury at least once a month, and as much oftener as he may require.

They must agree to subject themselves to a critical investigation of their affairs by the Secretary of the Treasury in person or by any agent duly authorized by him.

They must agree to pay any expenses which the government may incur in making the new arrangement, or employing any agent, temporary or permanent, to look after that portion of the public interest which may be intrusted to their care and management.

In fine, the government must be placed on a footing, both in relation to convenience and expense, at least as favorable to its interests as that which now exists.

It will also be expected of the State Banks which may be employed by the government, that they will facilitate bona fide domestic exchanges for the interests of commerce and the convenience of the people, - grant reasonable facilities to the payers of the public revenue, - exercise the utmost liberality towards the other State Banks, - and do nothing unnecessarily to embarrass the Bank of the United States.

The great object being to rid the country of the dangerous and irresponsible power necessarily concentrated in that Bank, care must be taken not to raise up another equally formidable

Perhaps such a result is impossible by any organization of the State Banks, as they are amenable to the State Governments on which they depend for their existence. But to prevent even an apprehension in the public mind of such a result, it will be expedient to interfere with the Banks employed as little as possible, and to require and exercise no other or further control over them than is absolutely necessary to secure the public deposits and ensure a faithful performance of the duties incident to their transmission. If the Banks selected shall, jointly, or any one of them, separately, be detected in using their power to favor one man or set of men ~~and~~ oppress another, to accomplish any political purpose whatever, it is the determination of the President that they shall be no longer

employed by the Government, so far as he has the power to prevent it. So far as the Government is concerned, they must confine themselves to collecting, safely keeping, and faithfully paying the public money whenever and wherever required. It is the President's desire, wholly and forever, to separate the control of the currency from the political power of the country and from every question which may hereafter be agitated in the congress of the United States. And he deems it equally important to take that control from an institution which is not responsible to the States or the people, and has already attempted, as it may again, to subject the Government to its will. As fearful as would be the commingling of

a controlling power over the currency in the hands of the Executive; it is not more so than its concentration in a Bank which aspires to direct the Legislation of Congress. To obviate both dangers, he wishes to see the action of the General Government on this subject confined to the grant in the constitution which only authorises Congress "to coin money and regulate the value thereof".

The President is sensible that his own ease and comfort, as well as the quiet of his administration, would be promoted by leaving to others the whole subject of the Bank of the United States and the public deposits. But he deems it so important to the present and future interests of our country, to the purity of our Government and the liberties of the people, that

he cannot permit any personal considerations to persuade him to silence or inaction. Had he no other motive to impel him, he should find a sufficient one in gratitude to the people, who, as he conceives, selected him to the exalted station he now holds, chiefly for the purpose of carrying into effect the principles of his veto message.

As the subject of this letter belongs principally to your Department, the President has thought it proper to communicate to you in writing the course of policy appertaining to it which he desires to have pursued, as well to enable you thoroughly to understand it, as to take upon himself the responsibility of a course which involves much private interest and public considerations of the greatest magnitude.

Exd. Andrew Jackson

Gen Jackson to Mr. Duane
on the removal of Deposites
26th June 1833

Treasury Department,
July 10. 1833.

To the President of the United States:

Sir—

I. On the first of the present month, the undersigned had the honor to receive, the letter, which the president addressed to him, from Boston, on the 26th ult. transmitting a detailed statement of his views "upon the subject of a discontinuance of the government deposits in the bank of the United States, and the substitution of certain state banks, as the fiscal agents of the United States, so far as those duties are now performed by that institution."

If, when, early in December last, the desire of the president, that the undersigned should assume the station, which he now holds, was communicated to him, it had been intimated, that a cessation to deposit the public monies in the bank of the United States, without any legislation upon the subject, was to constitute a part of the executive policy, and that the undersigned would be called upon to carry the measure into effect, upon his own responsibility, it would have been in his power to consider, whether he ought to enter into office or not, and he would not have been compelled as he now is, either to incur the censure of congress, or to commence his service by acting in opposition to the president's wishes: But, as no intimation of any kind was given, and as the undersigned was thus to come into office, in a manner as honorable to the President's liberality, as it was flattering to [illegible] favor, but still

resolved to [illegible]

as to merit public confidence, justify the president's choice, and preserve that invaluable treasure his own self-respect.

If, when, on the 30th of January last, the undersigned consented to serve, and before he had entered upon the duties of his station, he had known that a change of the depository of the public money, notwithstanding the decision of the house of representatives, was a part of the president's policy, and very anxiously discussed in the cabinet, it would still have been his pleasure, as well as duty, to consider the questions involved, carefully: but, although late in the month of March, the president intimated, that he was agitating the subject himself, the undersigned had no conception, that it was with a view to any proceeding prior to the meeting of the new congress.

It was not, indeed, until the evening of the day, or of the day after, the undersigned entered into office, that he was informed, that a change, of the depository of the public money, had been the subject of cabinet discussion, and that upon the undersigned would rest the responsibility. [redacted]

It will not surprize the president, therefore, to learn the sentiments of the undersigned now, for the first time; or that he may fail to present such an exposition of his views, as, under different circumstances [illegible] would at least have attempted to prepare. When, [illegible] to the first of June, the president confirmed the representations of Mr Whitney, he was so good as to say, that he [illegible] send to the

This not correct. I cautioned him of [illegible] — A. J.

allusion to Mr. Whitney not.

undersigned the opinions of the members of his cabinet, with his own views, to be deliberately reflected upon, with a view to a frank declaration of the opinions of the undersigned to the president, on his return from his eastern tour: those documents were received on the first instant, and the president returned on the 4th. so that the brevity of the interval, and other circumstances interfering, will, he trusts, be regarded as adequate apologies for imperfection: whilst, however, he regrets the imperfection, he is consoled with the knowlege, that he is but a gleaner in the field of enquiry, after officers, superior to the undersigned in all the advantages of experience, and with whom he will not assert an equality, except in purity of purpose, and in regard for the chief magistrate, who has made him their associate.

II. In the conclusion of the president's letter, he has the goodness to say, that, whilst he frankly avows his own opinions and feelings, he does not intend to interfere with the independent exercise of the discretion, committed to the undersigned, by law, on the subject; and that the undersigned may adopt, on the president's responsibility, the sentiments expressed by him, in his letter, as the basis in part of his own decision. The undersigned, therefore, concludes, that he has not received the direction of the chief magistrate, to perform an act of executive duty; but, that the president believes, that congress had a right to direct, and hold responsible, an executive agent; and, accordingly, without expressing a doubt on that point, that might be thought presumptuous, the undersigned will decide on his responsibility to congress, and that decision shall be the same, as if he had received an executive order: this, however, will not, for a moment, be regarded by the president, as indicative of the least abbreviation of the respect and attachment, which, on many accounts, he entertains for the president; the expression is

 used, in order to evince the perfect sincerity of the undersigned in

the matter referred to him; it is used, in order to make known to the president, that, however grateful to him the undersigned may be, and however unwilling to incur the risk of separating from him so soon, a separation so likely to expose the undersigned to the shafts of envy or of malice, if such exist, such considerations are overcome, by a sense of the high duties imposed on him as a public agent.

It is not more consistent with the principles of the undersigned, to pay a homage to the president, than it would be the desire of the president to receive it: but since it is so soon his fate to differ in opinion with the president, the undersigned boldly says, that no one could have been called to the station, now filled by him, who could have had a more anxious desire than the undersigned had, to render the evening of the presidents life as tranquil as its noon had been glorious: It is very painful to him, therefore, to be obliged to decline, to adopt the course described in the presidents letter: he has the consolation, however, that the very opposition establishes a claim to the presidents respect, and is a sure guarantee of sincerity.

Trusting, therefore, to that magnanimity, on the part of the president, which is inseparable from the purity of his own intentions, the undersigned will frankly state some of the reasons, that have drawn him to the conclusion, at which he has arrived. In doing so, he will present the results of brief but anxious reflection, and incidentally such observations as a perusal of the president's letter demands.

III. With regard to the bank of the United States, even if the undersigned did not consider it unauthorised by the constitution, he avows his deliberate and unbiassed belief, that the renewal of its charter would be inconsistent, with the duration of the happiness and liberties of the people: these sentiments are not formed as a potter moulds his

his clay, to suit the fashion of the times, or the order of a customer: they are not the sentiments of a man, who has
X a latent grief to assuage, or an injury to avenge: they are the opinions of an individual, who, although bowing to the law, as every good citizen should do, and respecting the opinions of others, has never omitted a fair occasion to utter his dispassionate belief, in opposition not only to the present, and to the former, bank of the United States, but to all such monopolies.

Without any desire, therefore, to arraign uncharitably the motives of others, the undersigned is satisfied, that many of the acts of the bank, that are complained of do but justify his uniform apprehension of such institutions: he conceives that the bank has forfeited all claims to favor, and that, if chartered, with such a weight of complaint against it, the charter might almost as well be perpetual as limited.

But, whilst these are the sentiments, that he entertains, and whilst as an individual he might, in every fair way utter and publish, in language becoming a freeman, his strong remonstrances and upbraidings at the 3 per cent. transaction, and others, he does not consider it proper, as a public officer, to pursue any other than an open, decided, and authorised course: he is persuaded that vindictive justice is so much at variance with the best feelings of the human heart, that a resort to a measure of that kind

would, by the repugnance that it would create, tend to merge the more essential consideration of the future destinies of the country.

At present the bank stands, if not convicted, arraigned before the country: it has put itself in the wrong; and the stock-holders have not manifested an inclination even to enquire into the causes of complaint against the directors: Public opinion is unfavorable to the continuance of the institution; it is obviously the conviction of dispassionate men, that no modification can control an institution, that has the elements of evil in its composition and existence: the dictates of prudence and policy, therefore, demand, that nothing should be done against the bank, that might altogether conceal justice under the veil of sympathy.

The main question was put to the people by the president and left to them, in such terms, and in such forms, as to absolve him from all accountability: in this, as in other instances, posterity will do justice to the purity of his purposes, and the vigor of his acts; and there is no occasion, either for the present or the future, to adopt a course different from the open and manly one heretofore pursued: it is not requisite, in order to prevent a renewal of legal life, to resort to measures, that might be regarded as extreme if not utterly needless.

IV. The undersigned is persuaded, that the measure would be regarded as extreme and arbitrary, for these reasons:

1. The charter is the law of the land; it is a contract, that cannot be dissolved or altered without mutual consent, or forfeited without enquiry: the public deposits are a benefit to the bank, for which it has paid a consideration; and their continuance is a part of the contract:

× Has the undersigned a right to rescind this contract?

It certainly is true, that he has the power to change the depositary, but he is bound to give his reasons: What reasons can the undersigned give? he must not rely on the reasons of others, unless he adopts them as his own: he must be satisfied, that the measure is sound in itself and defensible.

If, indeed, there were not other tribunals, before which acts involving forfeiture might be enquired into, and acts involving forfeiture were apparent, there might be some apology for an exercise of extraordinary power by an individual: But if there has been such misconduct in the corporation as warrants a forfeiture of its charter, or if there have been such acts done by the directors or officers, as bring them within the penalties of the act of incorporation, what reasons can be given, for visiting the sins of the officers upon the stock-holders; without a × trial by jury, or other judicial proceeding? how could the undersigned justify himself before congress,

even if his opinions were sound, in declining a judicial enquiry, and in condemning the accused unheard?

If the president is satisfied, that there has been misconduct,
× such as would warrant punishment by judicial agency, why has it not been, why may it not yet be, resorted to? but if no such step has been taken, or can be sustained, how can the undersigned justify the assumption of the powers of jury, judge, and executioner? is he to punish unheard, at his own pleasure, and without being able to assign to congress reasons for such an arbitrary act? is it consistent with the principles of justice, or the genius of our institutions, that any man should be able to constitute himself a dic-
× tator, in matters affecting the character of the country, the welfare of the people, and the fame of men, who are entitled at least to the rights of felons?

The undersigned has been, like other men, under excitement, in relation to the bank of the United States, and upon public grounds has been desirous to see its existence closed, yet he would not under excitement exercise such a power as is now conferred upon him; much less will he, now in a high station, and under the guidance of deliberate reason, do any act, that has not the stamp
× of manliness upon its front; he does not think that the end justifies the means, or that there is any distinction between moral
× and political integrity. No doubt, the president believes the proceeding under consideration, to be fair, manly, and sound; the undersigned has learned not to say dogmatically that he is right, and that another is wrong; it is sufficient for him, that, whilst he sincerely respects the sentiments of the president, the undersigned cannot at his pleasure change his own convictions, or present to congress reasons for an act, that he believes to be arbitrary and needless

It is true, that congress gave to the undersigned the right to use this arbitrary power; but for what purposes? surely not

to enable him to usurp executive or judicial authority: it is the right of the president to arraign, and the right of the judiciary to try, the bank; upon what pretext can the undersigned wrest these powers from the legitimate organs? Or can it be fancied, that congress transferred to the undersigned powers possessed by them=selves? What, then, is the fair conclusion, in the absence of all explanation, as to the motives of congress? surely, that dictatorial power was conferred on the secretary of the treasury, for occasions demanding sudden and extreme action, or as a salutary check × upon the bank, or a mean to promote the conclusion of its affairs: it never could have been conferred to enable an individual, whose appointment has not yet been confirmed by the constitutional × advisers of the president, to execute vindictive justice. ×

Is there, then, any cause for sudden and extreme action? the undersigned admits, that the views in the president's letter, are very striking; they must, if presented to the people or their re-presentatives, have a powerful influence upon the question of the renewal of the charter; but he does not believe that they war-rant the undersigned in resorting to the proposed measure; it must be a very strong case, indeed, that would justify the nul= × lification of a contract, made by all the departments of govern-ment.

2. The measure would be considered extreme and arbitrary, be=cause the last congress acted, upon complaints against the bank, and because the next congress may follow the example of the last. It cannot be pretended, that, the last congress doubted the ability of the bank to meet its engagements; the house of representatives by a vote, 109 to 46, decided that the bank was a safe place of de=posit; and one of the last acts of congress authorised the secretary of the treasury to lend a million of dollars to the bank, without se-curity: what has since occurred, that should warrant the

undersigned, in treating these evidences of confidence with contempt? What reasons could the undersigned give for reversing the judgment of those, of whom he is the mere agent? What has occurred, since the last session of congress, to change the ground then held? If any thing occurred, prior to the entry of the undersigned into office, on the first of June, why was not his predecessor called upon to act? and if nothing occurred prior to that time, what has since happened, that could justify the undersigned, who has not yet become acquainted with his duties, or been above forty days in office, in exerting powers, affecting not merely the bank, but the whole community? is he to take it for granted that the last house of representatives was ignorant, or corrupt? or is he to conclude that there has been fraud or mismanagement on the part of the bank? he does not pretend, that an adequate investigation was made by the last house of representatives, but that house decided on the evidence produced: it was not competent for any agent to furnish adequate proofs; the minority of the committee of investigation declare that, a full and protracted enquiry by congress is necessary to the developement of truth; and yet it is expected that the undersigned shall either have faculties, superior to those of congress, or hardihood that disregards their censure; it is supposed, that although a body with power to send for persons and papers, were unable to come to a decision, unfavorable to the bank, or even to express a disbelief of its safety, the undersigned, without any such enquiry, or power to enquire, is first to do what congress would not do, and then refer to the reasons of the president as a justification: such a reference would not, and ought not to, answer as a defence; the undersigned is thrown

× on his own reasons, and, if he has acts and none, he must stand in a posture before the world not more honorable to the president than grateful to himself: it would, in these malevolent times, be said, that

the president had purchased the conscience of the undersigned, and that the undersigned had basely sold for office, the only inheritance that he may have to leave to his children, the unblemished integrity of their father.

If it does not become the undersigned, to treat with disrespect the decision of the last congress; why should he refuse to await the interference of the next? any proceeding now, especially in the absence of adequate reasons, would seem to arise from an apprehension, that the representatives of the people are incompetent or corruptible — and that the people themselves are incapable of preserving the institutions of their country, in the event of a general depravity of their agents. The undersigned is not willing, by any act on his part, to give sanction to heresies, as groundless in themselves, as they are pernicious in their tendencies: he would despair of all that is calculated to cheer and exalt mankind, if he could fancy that his act, or the acts of any man even if endowed with intelligence, or crowned with glory, were essentially necessary to save the people from themselves: he cannot have the arrogance to think, or to give colour of conjecture that he thinks, that he can save the republic, or that without him it will be lost: it is his duty, on the contrary, to follow the president's own example, who, instead of proceeding, as he might have done, by scire facias, against the bank, waited until the representatives of the people assembled, and submitted his complaints to them: In the absence of peril, the undersigned does not consider it his duty to forestal the opinion of congress; if there is just ground for complaint, it is consistent with our love of our institutions, and our jealousy of their purity, to believe that an enquiry, if made, will be fairly conducted; and that the representatives of the people will act,

act in consonance with their duty to Heaven, their country and themselves. But, if, contrary to the lessons of experience, the representatives of the people should be faithless, the bare suggestion of which the undersigned regrets to utter, the people have the inclination, as well as the power, to change them; and to annul any act, that may have been the progeny of fraud or corruption: have they not the inclination, as well as the power? if not, then the boasted excellence of our institutions must be a phantom; but, if it is a substance and not a shadow, as the undersigned thinks it is, it does not become him at least to decide upon a

× supposed imperfection, and substitute means, justifiable only in an insurrection or a siege.

With great deference, therefore, for the presidents opinions, the undersigned concludes, that it would be arbitrary and needless to adopt the proposed measure at this time.

V. But, suppose, that the undersigned had reasons, to submit to congress, to shew that the measure was not arbitrary or needless—ought the substitutes for the present fiscal depositary to be accepted?

× the undersigned respectfully conceives that he has not authority, and that it would be unwise, to adopt the scheme proposed:

Undoubtedly, if the undersigned were to cease to deposit the public monies in the bank of the United States, it would be his duty to direct its deposit to the credit of the treasurer, in some safe place: but, at the threshold he is met with the question, what would be a safe place? does it become him to judge of the solidity of any institution by hearsay? but, even if he chooses to take that responsibility, has he any right to go further? the plan suggested by the president ~~proposes~~ a contract with divers banks; according to which certain service is to be rendered by one party, for the privilege of trading upon the money of the other; has the undersigned authority to create a sort of charter? has he a right, in any way, or for any time, to bind the United States? have the local banks any right to bind themselves? if they have, what is the security, and who is to judge of it? has

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the undersigned a right to contract, that certain banks may contract with other banks unknown to him? has the undersigned any right, or is it discreet, to leave to any agent the right, to decide, in the course of two months, upon the condition of all the banks, that may be necessary for the operations of the government? if there is no law, granting powers needful in doubtful cases, can the undersigned discreetly take them on his own responsibility? can it be, for one moment, fancied, that, besides the summary power, to take away, the legislative power to authorise a disposition of the public money, was conferred upon the undersigned? is it to be believed, that a section of a charter, obviously meant for extreme cases only, authorised the undersigned, in the absence of any necessity, to take the public money from a bank, over which there is a control, and distribute it amongst institutions, over which no control exists? the 16th section of the United States bank charter directs that the public money shall be deposited in that institution, unless the secretary of the treasury shall direct otherwise; but so jealous were congress of the power, to withhold, thus conferred, that the secretary is enjoined to give his reasons immediately to them, obviously shewing, that congress considered themselves alone competent to judge of the necessity of a removal from one agent, and the propriety of the substitute: so that the undersigned deems it proper to use extreme caution on ground untrodden.

The undersigned is, indeed, aware, that certain local banks are now, from a supposed necessity, used as fiscal agents, and that several of his predecessors, as an act of ministerial duty, or supposed necessity, at various times and under various circumstances, made arrangements with state banks, (the particulars of which he cannot now ascertain, owing to the destruction of the treasury office) but he also knows, that, under those arrangements the country lost between one and two millions of dollars, whilst of upwards of four hundred millions, from

 time to time in the custody of the United States bank, not

one cent has been lost: the undersigned does not use this as an argument in favor of a renewal of the charter, to which he is opposed, but he states the facts, to shew, that he ought to have very strong reasons, indeed, to present to congress, for exchanging a certainty for an uncertainty: he repeats, an uncertainty — for, if one of his predecessors was justified in saying, in 1814, that "the "multiplication of banks, in the several states, has so increased "the quantity of paper currency, that it would be difficult to cal-"culate its amount, and still more difficult to ascertain its value," how much more doubt should the undersigned entertain at the present day?

Besides, the undersigned pleads the authority of the president himself, in the letter now under consideration, as ground for hesitation. The president does not pretend, that the proposed scheme will answer, he barely says he thinks it will: no doubt, he thinks so, and possibly in some measure upon premises presented by local institutions: but even upon such representations the president does not rely, for he does not suggest a plan for actual or continued operation, but merely as an experiment: has the undersigned a right to make experiments upon such important matters? did congress, in allowing him to retain, out of bank, the public money, confer on him legislative and executive power united? as already alluded to, the anxious care, that the undersigned should at once report to congress, after resolving to retain the money out of bank, shews that it was not meant that the undersigned should make experiments. As it is clear, therefore, on the presidents own view, that he is in doubt as to a substitute, that he is prepared for a test only, and as the power of the undersigned will end on his report to congress, can it surprize the president, that the undersigned is in doubt also? If an experiment must be made, is it not at least courteous to those, of whom the president considers the undersigned [redacted] in this case the agent, to await their instruction? have not the constitutional

holders of the public purse the only means, that can be safely used for making such trials?

But if congress should not interrupt an experiment, and the experiment should fail, as the undersigned thinks it would, is he then to make another? will not a failure, of any precipitate, undigested, and unsanctioned scheme, give vigor to the claim of the U.S. Bank for a renewal of its charter? will it not be urged, that the inade-quacy of the president's own project proved the necessity of retaining an organ, that, for fiscal purposes, had such obvious advantages over local Banks? The president, besides, seems to think, that time will be necessary to test the project, and desires that the trial may be made, so as to meet the dissolution of the U.S. Bank: this rests on the presumption, that congress will not interfere, whereas the undersigned believes, that the operations will have scarcely been commenced, ere the apparatus will be demolished; an occurrence, which, for the sake of the president, as well as himself, the undersigned desires not to witness.

Then, is it likely, that banks of any solidity will embark in such a project, when they know that it may, and probably will, be arrested by congress? is there the least reason to suppose, that banks of good standing will guarantee the acts of banks in remote parts of the union? — would the undersigned be prudent in allying the country, with banks willing to make such a common cause? So great were the difficulties of the Bank of Pennsylvania, and so great were the losses, arising out of transactions with distant Banks, after the dissolution of the old Bank U.S. that it declined to be accountable to the union for the public money placed in those Banks. Does not the president see, that, however selfish the U.S. Bank may be, the local Banks have not more extended principles of action? will not the anxiety to make money, the ignorance, or the imprudence of, particularly remote, local Banks, tempt them so to extend their loans, and trade upon the public money, that when that money shall be called for, they may either fail to pay it, or ruin their debtors by demanding its return? upon whom would reproach, in such events, be cast? — not on the Banks, but on the secretary of the treasury, as an oppressive, or perhaps party, measure. Is it not manifest, that the welfare of the people de-

demands, that, instead of being a partner of either, ~~it~~ government should be independent of both United States and local banks.

VI. If the president knew certainly, that the charter of the U. S. bank would not be extended, would he advise a change of the depository of the public money? would he urge the undersigned to execute articles of co-partnership between the good people of the United States and divers banking companies, that may be very well conducted, but whose solvency materially depends upon the solvency of each other, and the solvency of the whole upon events beyond the control of any or of all? as the corporations, who have so long enjoyed a profitable share of the sovereign power, who have had an opportunity to amass fortune, and who have not been free from abuses, to which monopolies are liable, are soon to cease their operations; does it not become the duty of the representatives of the people, whose lives, liberty, and happiness are more or less affected by such institutions, to consider whether the fiscal operations of the government cannot be conducted without such agency? could the enquiry be made at a more propitious moment? is it wise to make entangling alliances, either with a bank, not authorised by the constitution, or with local banks, that interfere with, derange, depreciate and banish the only currency known to the constitution, that of gold and silver? Is it not inconsistent with the dignity of the government to be obliged to grant favors, or exclusive privileges, to particular descriptions of persons, that would not be otherwise granted, merely to secure a safe receipt and disbursement of the public revenue? Is it consistent with the public spirit

and

and intelligence of the representatives of the people, to suppose, that they cannot devise a method to escape such thraldom? But, if, in the wisdom of congress, no such mode can be found, as will enable the government to conduct its fiscal operations without the aid of a bank, then, it is respectfully suggested, whether some constitutional provision should not be made, to insure all the advantages, with as few as possible of the evils, of a bank?

Although the undersigned extends these questions, to the mere want of the government, it is not because he thinks these the only questions worthy of consideration; on the contrary, an enquiry into the state of the entire currency, if not now demanded, must soon be required: but it is not to the agents of banks that resort may be safely had, in enquiries of this nature: good and useful as those agents may be, and no doubt are, in all the private relations of life, they are not so free from bias, as voluntarily to develope the nature and results of their operations: the laboratory of the people is preferable, their representatives the manipulators.

The enquiry, that must at last be made, and for which preparation may be necessary, is not, which of two descrip-

tions

tions of monopolies, alike at variance with the sovereign attributes of the United States, and the general good of the people, is the least pernicious, but how their abuses, and the consequences of those abuses, may be gradually corrected and averted. Such a scrutiny would be worthy of the wisdom of congress: it might be so conducted, as not to affect injuriously, by its results, any interest: and an opportunity might be presented, to the union and the states, gradually to limit, or remove, institutions, which, whilst they have some uses, are yet so partial in their operations, and so liable to be perverted, as to affect seriously the morals, to impair the earnings, and endanger the liberties of the people. Those institutions are now so powerful, and have such a common interest — men in companies are so prone to do, what as individuals they would scarcely think of — that any change affecting them will be stoutly resisted: can they be resisted at all, if their power shall have no check ere long? or is the evil only to be remedied, by one of those convulsions, in which, as in wars, the ruin usually falls on those, who ought to escape?

But, if there is any illusion, in this suggestion of a general enquiry, at least there can be none in the particular, or preliminary, enquiry first suggested: The fiscal operations of the government should be safely, steadily and speedily conducted — how shall they be so conducted? what shall be the machinery? who the agents? the undersigned, in the voice of experience, cannot err, in saying, that local banks are not the best.

VII. Supposing, that, in adopting the proposed measure, the faith of the country would not be violated, that contempt to the last and the next congress would not be evinced, that the power to contract with state banks exists, and that it would not be unwise to make the contract, still the question presents itself, what would be the effect upon society? would the operations of the government, or of the commercial world, be facilitated? would confidence between man and man be promoted? would the facility to stand a shock, in the event of a war in Europe, for instance, be given to the local banks?

These questions, and others of an analogous character, need not be discussed by the undersigned; for his predecessor, on all accounts so much more competent to advise the president than he is, has placed this part of the subject especially in a point of view, that cannot, he respectfully thinks, be overlooked by a chief magistrate; so anxious, as the president has proved himself to be, to protect the mass of the community from embarrasment. From want of experience or information, the undersigned may not anticipate evil so extensive as that apprehended by his predecessor; but his fears are still so strong, that he is quite unwilling to be the one, who is to put the match to a train, the end of which he has not the sagacity to discern: Even, if he doubted whether the U. S. bank could meet every demand of government, as made upon it, he would hesitate whether it would not be his duty to forbear, rather than to increase the evil, by abridging the power of the bank to surmount its difficulties: so that, in the absence of all doubt of the kind, the undersigned would be at a loss for an excuse, were he to produce, by an act on his part, the very mischief that is apprehended. Credit, like female fame, is of ~~[illegible]~~ such a peculiar nature, that its blossoms may be blighted even by the breath of enquiry; what, then, might not be the consequence of the blast of the indignation of government, against an agent, in whose interest it was itself so deeply concerned? much more trivial changes, than that proposed by the president, have produced great commercial convulsions: Such a measure, as is urged, would be regarded by the bank so decidedly hostile, as to afford it an excuse to shake the fabric of credit, for the purpose of throwing odium on the government, and producing a persuasion, that in the extension of the charter would be found the only remedy for the mischief: that it would not hesitate to do so, the president believes — that it ought not to have an excuse for doing so, the undersigned is certain —

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It is, indeed, mentioned, in the letter of the president, that the United States bank will not be able to effect any such purpose: but the undersigned is not satisfied, that an institution, with so large a capital, with branches at so many important points, acting with one accord, and for a single end, with specie equal to half its ~~capital~~ circulation, has it not in its power to affect the operations of local banks, with specie equal to about a sixth of their ~~capital~~ circulating money: if the bank really is so harmless as this part of the president's letter supposes, then the alarm that the undersigned has at all times entertained, at the existence of such a power is, unfounded, and one of the most serious objections to the renewal of the charter is obviated: but the undersigned is not able to arrive at such a conclusion; he is convinced, that it is in the power of the U. S. bank, so organised and so secured, grievously to affect the local banks and community: the undersigned thinks, that the trial ought not to be made.

Beyond doubt, the power of the U. S. bank to control the local banks, and, through them, masses of the people, and through those masses, some of the constituted authorities of the country, is of such a character and tendency, as to excite alarm: but the very existence of such a power teaches extreme caution: such an adversary should gain no advantage from an abortive experiment to limit its influence. The struggle to be made, is not to see, which can do the other the most harm, the government or the bank: the government has but one duty to perform, to inform the people and their representatives of the apprehended danger; it is not called upon to maim the bank, lest the bank should master the country; in any attempt to maim, the agents of the bank would be those most likely to escape, the wound would be felt in the cottage

of the farmer, rather than in the palace of the banker.

On the other hand, if the suggestion of the president is sound, that the U.S. bank dare not operate oppressively, because the state banks, having government deposits, might run upon the branches, then there is a check, at all times, in the hands of the government; and the bank, during its legal existence, will be careful not to do or omit, what might warrant a total removal of the deposits.

So that, the U.S. bank is represented, by some of the state banks as an engine so powerful as to be an object of universal alarm; and, the next moment, so utterly feeble, that by the simple operation of a treasury order, the entire branches may be broken up one after another, and the paper flung upon them in masses, which they will not be prepared to redeem: Which of these is the true picture? if a treasury order has such talismanic influence, can there be a better pledge for the safety of the public deposits? but, if it has no such power, is it discreet to commence the war? In all such calculations, as those referred to, the flinging back masses of bank paper, and breaking up the branches, are items, that seem to have caused no compassion for the ultimate sufferers; it appears to have been forgotten, that a large portion of the good and brave people of the land would be ruined—and why ruined? because the government of their country had put the power to ruin them into the hands of corporations, intent alone upon their own aggrandizement. Whether it is wise to make such experiments, the undersigned, with confidence, respectfully submits.

He submits, with confidence, because he knows the purity of the president's purposes, and that he will not press for a

measure, to say the least of it, of doubtful and portentous character. He is not at all surprised, that excitement should exist; it was almost unavoidable on the part of those, who were pure themselves, and who sincerely believed that they saw impurity in others; its existence is even honorable to those, who, to avert a catastrophe really apprehended, are content to incur some risk on their own part: no one can imagine, that the president can have had, or can now have, any other than the purest intentions; his apprehensions are sincere, not factitious: but, still the apprehensions, that are entertained, warrant those measures only, which will bear the cool examination of the future historian, rather than the test of contemporary feeling: it is of such measures as are now proposed, that history will be the record; it will be to the adoption, or the rejection of them, that public men, in after times, will look for examples; it is all important, therefore, that the most exalted ground should be taken, when about to direct movements, that will be compared with the past, that will affect the present, and be an enduring guide in future.

The president, indeed, seems to think, that he is but obeying the will of the people; he believes that his veto message became the deciding as well as dividing point at elections; but the undersigned is unable to concur with him, that his election was the result of a contest on that point; in many parts of the union, the bank question formed no part of the materials of dispute; in others, many friends of the bank voted for the president; and, every where, thousands voted, for the same reasons, that had induced them to call him from his farm, they knew his services to be glorious and his patriotism to be greater still.

But, if it is true, that, when the president said he left the

question to the people, they really took it up, then the undersigned respectfully asks, whether it was ever supposed, that the secretary of the treasury was to be the champion? was it not rather the design of the President, that the people should send to congress agents, who would be true to their trust? surely this is the constitutional and the patriotic course, & if it shall not answer, then the undersigned thinks that the days of the republic are counted: but, he does not so think, neither will the President so think, if he shall reflect upon the career of his country; on the contrary, the undersigned is persuaded, that, as the sun of the President's eventful life shall be setting, he will see his country in the full enjoyment of all the liberty and happiness, which he has done so much to transmit unimpaired to posterity.

VIII. It may, perhaps, be asked, whether the power, conferred, by the U. S. bank charter, upon the secretary of the treasury, is to remain a dead letter upon the statute book? in the first place, it may be replied, that, if it should so remain, it may be honorable to the country as well as beneficial; for it will appear, that arbitrary principles are not resorted to, whatever may be the force of extraneous excitement — it will appear, that the power given was not exercised as a substitute for the constitutional prerogatives of the legislature or judiciary. In the next place, it by no means follows, that, because the undersigned is unwilling to enter into an alliance with divers banks, that have interests adverse to each other, and no common interest but to make all the money they can out of the treasure of the country, he is to be perfectly passive, in all other respects: it is the opinion of the un-

undersigned, that the public deposits will not constitute such a fund, as to warrant extensive operations on the part of any bank; if the revenue of the present year shall meet the demands upon the treasury, it does not seem to be probable, that the surplus will be considerable; it is the present policy of the constituted authorities to keep down the income to the wants of the government; the results of legislative proceedings, of late adopted, cannot be very clearly anticipated: So that, it will behove the U.S. Bank to regulate its operations accordingly: But, it will be the duty of the bank, whatever may be the amount of deposits, to reduce gradually the circle of its business, [illegible] in order to avoid the pressure, upon the community, arising from a sudden suspension, a pressure ruinous to the bank, as well as to the public and the government; and the undersigned thinks, that the country, as the proprietor of one-fifth of the capital, and upon general principles also, has a right to call on the bank so gradually to abridge its business: If the bank should not do, what any prudent private banker, in the certain assurance of an early death, or any incorporated local bank destined to close its business, would do, then, it will be the duty of the undersigned to consider, in what way he may so exercise the power vested in him, as to cause a reduction of its business: The welfare of the country, the convenience of the government, and the interests of the bank itself, demand, that all concerned should so co-operate, as to prevent any of those evils, which flow from sudden changes in the character or amount of a circulating medium. It may, besides, be in the power of the undersigned, without any risk of censure, to resort to means, that would be productive of benefit to all concerned, or at

least not prejudicial to any. Whatever may be deemed best, should be done cautiously, gradually, and with a regard to the rights and interests of the weak as well as the strong.

IX. The undersigned might proceed, in a more extended discussion of the questions, under consideration, if such were necessary: he has tried to shun the paths, already beaten by those, whose opinions the president has availed himself of: he has, indeed, consulted his own heart and head as his arbiters; he has appealed to the aid of common sense, as well as of official intelligence, and will here close his remarks. Nothing but a profound conviction of being in the right, could have induced the undersigned to take his first step in opposition to what is so obviously the president's sincere desire: The undersigned has too ~~high~~ a respect for the judgement of the president, and too little confidence in his own, dogmatically to say, that the president is mistaken, and that the undersigned cannot be so: happily, if the proposed measure really is essential to any great or good end, it is not in the power of any man, much less of the undersigned, to set himself up successfully against a chief magistrate, to whom the country owes so much: far from seeking such celebrity, the undersigned is prepared to make any personal sacrifice, except an acquiescence in a measure, that he positively believes to be at variance with his obligations to the country, the president, and himself.

In any event, no change can be made in those sentiments of sincere respect and attachment, which will ever be entertained for the president, by his obt. st.

W. J. Duane.

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Duane

On removal of deposits

10th July 1833.

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Notes on Treasury opinion

1833?

Page 6.– Condemns the Bank in toto.–

His opinion is charged against rechartering on any terms – yet for the present deems it safe notwithstanding the "recent developements" by which in his estimation it forfeits all claim to a charter. ———

Page 10.– The power "to coin money & regulate the value thereof" given by the constitution, cannot be converted into a power to create a Bank & issue a paper currency, because the use of a Bank note currency has been subsequently introduced by a change of circumstances – It is an argument for a change of the constitution, but not tend to prove that the constitution is the creature of circumstances & is altered because the times have changed. ———

Page 11. The President "with manifest propriety" referred the whole subject to the people and their representatives. ———

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In selecting Genl. Jackson to represent them in the Executive Department after the Veto, they elected him to carry out the principles of that Veto, as their representative.—

Page 18th— Some of the means to limit the power of the Bank, (proposed) are calculated to make it more dangerous to the liberties of the people.— By giving power to appoint the President of the Bank or in other words, giving power to the Executive to preside himself by Deputy, the monied prerogative would be in effect transferred to the chief Magistrate to perpetuate his authority & render it irresist=able— we should never again have an Executive opposed to the abuses of the Bank, — & of course never have a Bank opposed to an Executive.—

Page 25th The question of the removal of the Deposits is here taken up.— The opinion of the Secry at the threshold lays down false premises for the basis of his argument.—

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1st The application to Congress on the part of the Executive is not to obtain the opinion of that body as to the safety of the Deposits, but to make an Enquiry into certain charges which the "limited power" of the Secretary of the Treasury was inadequate to make.—

2ndly The Executive does not express the opinion that "if the many serious charges impeaching the Character of the Bank" are true, it would not justify the withholding the Deposits— From the declaration in the Message that "if true (the facts) may justly excite the apprehension that it the Bank is no longer a safe Depository of the money of the people", the inference is clear, that the Executive meant to intimate to Congress, that a state of case exciting just apprehensions for the safety of the Deposits would be good reason for their removal.— It seems a perversion of the Message on the part of the Secretary to say that "the Message on the contrary distinctly implies that such an apprehension would be insufficient to justify the removal— to wait until events proved the apprehension to be well founded" would be to=

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4/ "would be to lose the opportunity to make safe, that which the facts alluded to in the Message, if true, satisfied the Executive was put in jeopardy - and which it is his duty to secure -

3rd. The application on the part of the Executive to Congress was not to exert its concurrent power to withdraw the Deposits and relieve the Executive Department from the responsibility of doing what it might deem its duty in that respect - but it was to obtain the aid of the Legislative body in prosecuting an enquiry into the charges, which if true, or so found, the Executive meant to make the ground of the movement in relation to the Deposits - The Secretary is in error in supposing "that the power conferred on the Secretary to change the deposits is not absolute," but "subject to the control" of Congress - The Deposits are to be placed in the Bank" unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall otherwise order & direct" - There is no authority any where given in the Charter to control or set aside that order - Nor is there any other check upon the arbitrary use or abuse of the power conferred upon the Executive Department, but the necessity of reporting the reasons for the act,

act

5/ act, and the power of impeachment and removal given to Congress if the Officer shall be deemed guilty of acting from improper or corrupt motives—

4thly The Secretary is not consistent with himself in putting the removal of the Deposits upon the mere point of their probable safety—

In his report to Congress he indicates as the basis of the then contemplated movement—"apprehensions arising out of the 3 per cent arrangement"— "the great amount of the Bank transactions especially in the Western Branches."

—"Other matters connected with its (the Banks) dealings, & which have tended to disturb public confidence"

Here the Secretary distinctly suggests, that the great & leading points alluded to tending "to disturb public confidence" would be relied upon by him to justify if established the withdrawal of his confidence as an officer from the Bank. But he brings into view another & very important ground which should have decisive weight with an Executive who had put a veto upon a law rechartering the Bank. It is the suggestion of

6/ It is the suggestion of "the necessary arrangements in anticipation of finally closing its (the Bank) business."

The general enquiry has been, why does not the Bank prepare for the close of its Charter and prepare the country for it? Why does not the Bank curtail its loans instead of extending them? Why does it multiply its Branches? Have not the people an equal right to enquire why a President who has vetoed the Bank does not make "the necessary arrangements in anticipation of finally closing its business" to have some other system in operation to supply its place in the management of the fiscal concerns of the Government?

5th. The Secretary says, that the action of the last Congress upon the suggestions of the Message & Treasury report, with regard to an enquiry as to the ~~circumstances~~ circumstances pointed out affecting the confidence reposed in the Bank, "has materially lessened in his mind the weight which previously to the Last

7/ last session of Congress he had attached to the "circumstances, then existing" — with deference to the Secretary the whole exposition he makes in connexion with the report of the Minority as well as the Majority of the Committee, contradicting the conclusion to which he comes. — He admits that the 3 per cent transaction is condemned by both reports — & facts elicited show that the Managers of the Bank not only acted in bad faith & without authority in reference to this matter, but attempted to palm a deception on congress to obtain a color for their conduct at the expense of the Treasury Department. The Western Debt was shewn to be enormous, and to be founded on the most ~~[illegible]~~ doubtful of all securities (viz) Race horse bills — and the other matters connected with its "dealings" were =

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were rendered still more doubtful and suspicious — and in every respect more of a character "to disturb the public confidence" by the refusal of the friends of the Institution to assent to the demands of the President & permit an investigation into its concerns generally — or even an investigation into the state of the principal Bank, beyond the 3 per cent transaction, and the Western debt as exhibited on the Books of the principal Bank —

private note
on J. report to
the P— for his
decision #3.

1. **Notes on Treasury Opinion** [1833?] Francis P. Blair 5

page 6. Condemns the Bank in toto — He is changed his opinion against rechartering on any terms — yet for the present seems to suspend notwithstanding the "recent developments" by which in his estimation it forfeits all claim to a charter

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and "the other matters connected with its dealings" were rendered still more doubtful, & suspicious — and in every respect more of a character "to disturb the public confidence" by the refusal of the friends of the Institution to assent to the demands of the President & permit an investigation into its concerns generally — or even an investigation into the state of the principal Bank, beyond the 3 per cent transaction & the Western debt as exhibited on the Books of the principal Bank —

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Notes on the
view of Mr. L.
Bank, & Deposits —

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Amos Kendall's

Concurring in the resolution recently adopted by the House of Representatives, that the Deposites of public money ought not to be restored to the Bank of the United States, I beg leave to call the attention of Congress to the expediency of some legislation in relation to its future security.

By the constitution, the appointment of all officers of the United States whose offices may be established by law, is vested in the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, with the exception of those of an inferior grade. Offices of Collectors and Receivers of public moneys under various names, have been created by law and filled by the President, according to the constitution.

The office of Treasurer of the United States was created by the act of Sept. 2d 1789, and whose duty it was declared to be, "to receive and keep the money of the United States" &c. He was required to give bond for the faithful performance of his duties in the penalty of $150.000. This office has also been filled from time to time

by the President in conformity with the constitution.

The responsibility of the officers ~~to~~ whose duty it is to collect, receive and keep the public money, to their superiors in the executive Department and to Congress through an impeachment, together with their bonds office, their high character and such regulations as have been from time to time adopted in the Treasury department, have constituted the only safeguard of the people ~~public~~ for the security of the public moneys prior to their being drawn from the Treasury for disbursements.

The Secretary of the Treasury from the origin of the government down to the year 1816, as the superior of the Treasurer, had directed in what places the public moneys should be kept without any legislative direction. ~~or control~~. The act of that year establishing the Bank of the United States, while it vested with the legislative control over the subject, still left with the Secretary of the Treasury ~~him~~ the power to order and direct the deposites to be made elsewhere, reporting his reasons to Congress. Having now been removed from the Bank of the United States and made in other institutions, the power of the Secretary as it existed prior 265 to 1816, again reverts in full force to be exercised

3,

as it was from 1789 up to that date,
in the same manner and under the same responsibilities.
At the same time and by ~~The removal of the deposits~~ the same act, the power of Congress, ~~over the subject~~ which was parted with in the act establishing the Bank, has been restored in its full force, and no obstacle exists to a regulation of the whole subject by law.

Although ~~While~~ the custody of the ~~public~~ money in the treasury is by law in the Treasurer of the United States, subject to the supervision ~~control~~ and control of his official superiors, ~~and must of necessity be~~ remain in him or some officer created by legislative authority ~~Congress~~ ~~law~~ to take his place, yet may Congress ~~prescribe the~~ direct in what places ~~in which~~ he shall keep them, ~~and restrict and~~ and prescribe such regulations as shall prevent any portion of them from being removed from those places except for disbursement according to appropriations made by law. These directions and prescriptions, it will be the duty of the President of the United States to take care shall be faithfully executed like all other laws.

The principle is incontestable, that Congress may establish, regulate and abolish all executive offices not created by the constitution, ~~of the United States~~ and that the President, after filling them as directed in that, must see that their duties are discharged according to the laws which give them existence and power. ~~It is desirable as well as the course of principle~~ Apart from the legislation of Congress, he has no power over the public money or property; for it is legislation which furnishes him with officers through whom he can act and objects to act upon. ~~If no law exist~~ over the public ~~executive; if there be not~~ department ~~of the government~~ should be restricted as far as the public money,

interests and the regular operation of the government, will admit. The possibility of their being used for other purposes than those of a public and legitimate character, should be cut off. It should be made manifest to the country by the guards thrown round the Treasury and the penalties to which any breach of trust shall be exposed, that the moneys of the United States are not to be used as a means of promoting the aggrandizement of any particular individual, interest or party.

I therefore earnestly urge upon Congress the propriety of passing such laws as may restrict the power of the Executive Department in selecting places of deposite, make it impossible for any executive officer from the highest to the lowest, to use for his own benefit or the benefit of others any portion of the public moneys, regulate transfers from one place of deposite to another and declare the purposes for which they shall be made. But as regulations taking from the officers of the executive department all responsibility for the safe keeping of the public moneys, may tend to lessen

267 their security, it seems proper that the Bank

or other institutions in whose vaults they may be kept, shall be required to ~~give security~~ make such returns of their condition as may be necessary for the information of the ~~executive~~ Treasury Department and of Congress, and give such collateral security as shall secure the government against danger of loss. Neither in the former arrangement of the Treasury Department, nor in the act of Congress chartering the Bank of the United States, does there seem to be that degree of precaution on this score which it may now be expedient to exercise.

~~[illegible]~~ The actual custody of the public money may be then placed in ~~[illegible]~~ the Bank or other Agency (in the possession), as well ~~[illegible]~~ as constitutionally, for contemplation of law, in the custody of the Treasurer of United States —

1833? [Francis P Blair]

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Sep 1833

[illegible]

Roger B. Taney

~~It has been generally known for some time~~ past that the propriety of withdrawing the public deposites from the Bank of the U States was under consideration & engaged much of the attention of the President and the different members of his Cabinet, all of whom had been called upon by the President to assist him in his deliberations on this subject. — After a very full and careful examination of the subject the President came to the conclusion that the public deposites ought to be changed to the State Banks — and his opinion was communicated in writing to his cabinet on Wednesday last, at a meeting held specially for that purpose & the facts and reasons on which it was founded — As public attention has been drawn to this subject it is

in order to prevent misunderstanding or misrepresentation it
is deemed proper to lay before the people the
communication made by the President
as above mentioned and
~~[illegible]~~
a copy has been furnished to us for that
purpose which we now proceed to
publish

Read to the cabinet on the 18th Sept 1833

Donelson

Having carefully and anxiously considered all the facts and arguments, which have been submitted to him, relative to a removal of the public deposites from the Bank of the United States, the President deems it his duty, (as well to prevent misconceptions as to put them in durable form) to communicate in this manner to his cabinet the final conclusions of his own mind and the reasons on which they are founded, in order to put them in durable form and to prevent misconceptions.

The President's convictions of the dangerous tendencies of the Bank of the United States, since signally illustrated by its own acts, were so overpowering when he entered upon the duties of Chief Magistrate, that he felt it his duty, notwithstanding the objections of the friends by whom he was surrounded, to avail himself of the first occasion to call the attention of Congress and the people to the question of its recharter. The opinions expressed in his

17 Sep 33

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annual message of December 1829 were reiterated in those of December 1830 and 1831, and in that of 1830 he threw out for consideration some suggestions in relation to a substitute. At the session of 1831-2 an act was passed by a majority of both houses of Congress rechartering the present Bank upon which the President felt it his duty to put his constitutional veto. In his message returning that act he repeated and enlarged upon the principles and views briefly asserted in his annual messages, declaring the Bank to be, in his opinion, both inexpedient and unconstitutional, and announcing to his countrymen very unequivocally, his firm determination never to sanction by his approval the continuance of that institution or the establishment of any other upon similar principles.

There are strong reasons for believing that the motive of the Bank in asking for a recharter

at that session of Congress, was to make it a leading question in the election of a President of the United States the ensuing November, and all steps deemed necessary were taken to procure from the people a reversal of the President's decision. Although the charter was approaching its termination and the Bank was aware that it was the intention of the Government to use the public deposits as fast as it accrued in the payment of the public debt, yet did it extend its loans from January 1831 to May 1832 from $42.402.30 to $70.428.07, being an increase of $28.026.760 in sixteen months. It is confidently believed that the leading object of this immense extension of its loans was to bring as large a portion of the people as possible under its power and influence: and it has been disclosed that some of the largest sums were granted on very unusual terms,

to conductors of the public press. In some of these cases the motive was made manifest by the nominal or insufficient security taken for the loans, by the large amounts discounted, by the extraordinary time allowed for payment, and especially by the subsequent conduct of those receiving the accommodations.

Having taken these preliminary steps to obtain control over public opinion the Bank came into Congress and asked a new charter. The object avowed by many of the advocates of the Bank was to put the President to the test, that the country might know his final determination relative to the Bank prior to the ensuing election. Many documents and articles were printed and circulated at the expense of the Bank, to bring the people to a favorable decision upon its pretensions. Those whom the Bank appears to have made its debtors for the special occasion, were warned of the ruin

which awaited them should the President be sustained: and attempts were made to alarm the whole people by painting the depression in the price of property and produce, and the general loss, inconvenience and distress, which it was represented would immediately follow the reelection of the President in opposition to the Bank.

Can it now be said that the question of a recharter of the Bank was not decided at the election which ensued? Had the veto been equivocal or had it not covered the whole ground — if it had merely taken exceptions to the details of the Bill or to the time of its passage — if it had not met the whole ground of constitutionality and expediency, then there might have been some plausibility for the allegation that the question was not decided by the people. It was to compel the President to take his stand that

the question was brought forward at that particular time. He met the challenge, willingly took the position into which his adversaries sought to force him, and frankly declared his unalterable opposition to the Bank on [as being both unconstitutional and] the ground of unconstitutionality, and [inexpedient] inexpediency. On that ground the case was argued to the people, and now that the people have sustained the President, notwithstanding the array of influence & power which was brought to bear upon him, it is too late, he confidently thinks, to say that the question has not been decided. Whatever may be the opinions of others the President considers his reelection as a decision of the people against the Bank. In the concluding paragraph of his veto message he said:—

"I have now done my duty to my country. If "sustained by my fellow citizens, I shall be grateful

"and happy: if not, I shall find in the motives "which impel me, ample grounds for contentment and "peace".

He was sustained by a just people, and he desires to evince his gratitude by carrying into effect their decision so far as it depends upon him.

Of all the substitutes for the present Bank which have been suggested, none seems to have united any considerable portion of the public in its favor. Most of them are liable to the same constitutional objections for which the present Bank has been condemned, and perhaps to all there are strong objections on the score of expediency. In ridding the country of an irresponsible power which has attempted to control the Government, care must be taken not to unite the same power with the Executive branch. To give a President the control over the currency and the power over individuals now possessed

by the Bank of the United States, even with the material difference that he is responsible to the people, would be as objectionable and as dangerous as to leave it as it is. Neither the one nor the other is necessary, and therefore ought not to be resorted to.

On the whole, the President considers it as conclusively settled that the charter of the Bank of the United States will not be renewed, and he has no reasonable ground to believe that any substitute will be established. Being bound to regulate his course by the laws as they exist and not to anticipate the interference of the Legislative power, for the purpose of framing new systems, it is proper for him seasonably to consider the means by which the services rendered by the Bank of the United States are to be performed after its charter shall expire.

The existing laws declare, that "the deposites

"of the money of the United States, in places
"in which the said Bank and branches thereof
"may be established, shall be made in said Bank
"or branches thereof, unless the Secretary of the Treasury
"shall at any time otherwise order and direct, in
"which case, the Secretary of the Treasury shall
"immediately lay before Congress, if in session, and if not,
"immediately after the commencement of the next
"session, the reasons of such order or direction."

The power of the Secretary of the Treasury over the deposites is unqualified. The provision that he shall report his reasons to Congress is no limitation. Had it not been inserted, he would have been responsible to Congress had he made a removal for any other than good reasons, and his responsibility now ceases upon the rendition of sufficient ones to Congress. The only object and effect of the provision

are to make his reasons acceptable to Congress and enable that body the more readily to judge of their soundness and purity, and thereupon to make such further provision by law as the legislative power may think proper in relation to the deposit of the public money. Those reasons may be very diversified. It was asserted by the Secretary of the Treasury without contradiction as early as 1817 that he had power "to control the proceedings" of the Bank of the United States at any moment" by changing the deposites to the State Banks", should it pursue an illiberal course towards those institutions; that "the Secretary of the Treasury will always be disposed to support the credit of the State Banks, and will invariably direct transfers from the deposits of the public money in aid of their legitimate exertions to maintain their credit"; and he asserted a right to employ the State Banks when the Bank of the

United States should refuse to receive on deposit the notes of such state banks as the public interest required should be received in payment of the public dues. In several instances he did transfer the public deposites to state Banks in the immediate vicinity of branches for reasons connected only with the safety of those banks, the public convenience and the interests of the Treasury.

If it was lawful for Mr. Crawford, the Secretary of the Treasury at that time to act on these principles it will be difficult to discover any sound reason against the application of similar principles in still stronger cases. And it is a matter of surprise that a power which in the infancy of the Bank was freely asserted as one of the ordinary and familiar duties of the Secretary of the Treasury should now be gravely questioned and attempts made to excite and alarm the public mind as if some new and

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unheard of power was about to be usurped by the executive branch of the Government.

It is but a little more than two and a half years to the termination of the charter of the present Bank. It is considered as the decision of the country that it shall then cease to exist, and no man, the President believes, has reasonable ground for expectation that any other Bank of the U. States will be created by Congress. To the Treasury department is entrusted the safe keeping and faithful application of the public money. A plan of collection different from the present must therefore be introduced and put in complete operation before the dissolution of the present bank. When shall it be commenced? Shall no step be taken in this essential concern until the charter expires and the Treasury finds itself without an agent, its accounts in confusion, with no

depository for its funds and the whole business of the Government deranged? or shall it be delayed until six months, or a year, or two years before the expiration of the charter? It is obvious that any new system which may be substituted in the place of the Bank of the U. States could not be suddenly carried into effect on the termination of its existence without serious inconvenience to the Government and the people. Its vast amount of notes are then to be redeemed and withdrawn from circulation and its immense debt collected. These operations must be gradual, otherwise much suffering and distress will be brought upon the community. It ought to be not a work of months only but of years, and the President thinks it cannot with due attention to the interests of the people be longer postponed. It is safer to begin it too soon ~~rather~~ than to delay it too long.

It is for the wisdom of Congress to decide upon

the best substitute to be adopted in the place of the Bank of the U. States: and the President would have felt himself relieved from a heavy and painful responsibility if in the charter to the Bank Congress had reserved to itself the power of directing at its pleasure the public money to be elsewhere deposited and had not devolved that power exclusively on one of the Executive Departments. It is useless now to inquire why this high and important power was surrendered by those who are peculiarly and appropriately the guardians of the public money. Perhaps it was an oversight. But as the President presumes that the charter to the Bank is to be considered as a contract on the part of the Government it is not now in the power of Congress to disregard its stipulations: and by the terms of that contract the public money is to be deposited in the Bank during the continuance of its charter unless the Secretary of the Treasury

shall otherwise direct. Unless therefore the Secretary of the Treasury first acts Congress have no power over the subject for they cannot add a new clause to the charter or strike one out of it without the consent of the Bank; and consequently the public money must remain in that institution to the last hour of its existence unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall remove it at an earlier day. The responsibility is thus thrown upon the executive branch of the Government, of deciding how long before the expiration of the charter, the public interest will require the deposites to be placed elsewhere. And altho according to the frame and principle of our Government this decision would seem more properly to belong to the legislative power; yet as the law has imposed it upon the Executive Department, the duty ought to be faithfully & firmly met, and the decision made and executed upon the best light that can be obtained and the best judgment

that can be formed

that its means of information will enable it to form. It would ill become the executive branch of the Government to shrink from any duty which the law imposes on it, to fix upon others the responsibility which justly belongs to itself. And while the President anxiously wishes to abstain from the exercise of doubtful powers, and to avoid all interference with the rights and duties of others, he must yet with unshaken constancy discharge his own obligations: and cannot allow himself to turn aside in order to avoid any responsibility which the high trust with which he has been honored requires him to encounter and it being the duty of one of the executive Departments to decide in the first instance subject to the future action of the legislative power, whether the public deposits shall remain in the Bank of the U. States until the end of its existence or be withdrawn some time before, the President

has felt himself bound to examine the question carefully and deliberately in order to make up his judgment on the subject; and in his opinion the near approach of the termination of the charter, and the public considerations heretofore mentioned are of themselves amply sufficient to justify the removal of the deposites without reference to the conduct of the Bank or their safety in its keeping.

But in the conduct of the Bank may be found other reasons very imperative in their character, and which require prompt action. Developements have been made from time to time of its faithlessness as a public agent, its misapplication of public funds, its interference in elections, its efforts by the machinery of committees to deprive the Government directors of a full knowledge of its concerns, and above all its flagrant misconduct as recently and unexpectedly

disclosed in placing all the funds of the Bank including the money of the Government at the disposition of the President of the Bank as means of operating upon public opinion and procuring a new charter without requiring him to render a voucher for their disbursement. A brief recapitulation of the facts which justify these charges and which have come to the knowledge of the public and the President, will, he thinks, remove every reasonable doubt as to the course which it is now the duty of the President to pursue.

We have seen that in sixteen months, ending in May 1832, the Bank had extended its loans more than $ 28.000.000, although it knew the Government intended to appropriate most of its large deposit during that year in payment of the public debt. It was in May 1832 that its loans arrived

at the maximum, and in the preceding March, so sensible was the Bank that it would not be able to pay over the public deposit when it would be required by the Government, that it commenced a secret negotiation without the approbation or knowledge of the Government with the agents for about $2.700.000 of the three per cent stocks held in Holland, with a view of inducing them not to come forward for payment for one or more years after notice should be given by the Treasury Department. This arrangement would have enabled the Bank to keep and use during that time the public money set apart for the payment of these stocks.

After this negotiation had commenced the Secretary of the Treasury informed the Bank, that it was his intention to pay off one half of the three per cents on the first of the succeeding July

which amounted to about $6.500.000. The President of the Bank, although the committee of investigation was then looking into its affairs at Philadelphia, came immediately to Washington, and upon representing that the Bank was desirous of accommoda-ting the importing merchants at New York, which it failed to do, and undertaking to pay the interest itself, procured the consent of the Secretary after consultation with the President to postpone the payment until the succeeding first of October.

Conscious that at the end of that quarter the Bank would not be able to pay over the deposites and that further indulgence was not to be expected of the Government, an agent was dispatched to England secretly to negotiate with the holders of the public debt in Europe and induce them by the offer of an equal or higher interest than that paid by

the Government to hold back their claims for one year during which the bank expected thus to retain the use of $5.000.000. of public money which the Government should set apart for the payment of that debt. The agent made an arrangement on terms, in part, which were in direct violation of the charter of the Bank, and when some incidents connected with this secret negotiation accidentally came to the knowledge of the public and the Government, then and not before, so much of it as was palpably in violation of the charter was disavowed! A modification of the rest was attempted with the view of getting the certificates without payment of the money and thus absolving the Government from its liability to the holders. In this scheme the Bank was partially successful but to this day the certificates

of a portion of these stocks have not been paid and the Bank retains the use of the money.

This effort to thwart the Government in the payment of the public debt that it might retain the public money to be used for their private interests, palliated by pretences notoriously unfounded and insincere, would have justified the instant withdrawal of the public deposits. The negotiation itself rendered doubtful the ability of the Bank to meet the demands of the Treasury, and the misrepresentations by which it was attempted to be justified as clearly proved that no reliance could be placed upon its allegations.

If the question of a removal of the deposits presented itself to the Executive in the same attitude that it appeared before the House of Representatives at their last session their resolution in relation to the safety of the deposits would be entitled to higher respect altho' the decision of the question of removal has been confided by law to another Department of the Government.

But the question now occurs attended by other circumstances and new disclosures of the most serious import. It is true that in the message of the President which produced this inquiry and resolution on the part of the House of Representatives it was his object to obtain the aid of that body in making a thorough examination into the conduct and condition of the Bank and its branches in order to enable the Executive Department to decide whether the public money was longer safe in its hands. The limited power of the Secretary of the Treasury over the subject disabled him from making the investigation as fully and satisfactorily as it could be done by a committee of the House of Representatives and hence the President desired the assistance of Congress to obtain for the Treasury Department a full knowledge of all the facts which were necessary to guide his judgement. But it was not his purpose as the language of his message will shew to ask the Representatives of the people to assume a responsibility which did not

belong to them, and relieve the executive branch of the Government from the duty which the law had imposed upon it. It is due to the President that his object in that proceeding should be distinctly understood, and that he should acquit himself of all suspicion of seeking to escape from the performance of his own duties, or of desiring to interpose another body between himself and the people in order to avoid a measure which he is called upon to meet. But although as an act of justice to himself he disclaims any design of soliciting the opinion of the House of Representatives in relation to his own duties, in order to shelter himself from responsibility under the sanction of their counsel, yet he is at all times ready to listen to the suggestions of the Representatives of the people whether given voluntarily or upon solicitation and to consider them with the profound respect to which all will admit that they are justly entitled.

Whatever may be the consequences however to himself he must finally form his own judgment where the constitution and the law makes it his duty to decide and must act accordingly. and he is bound to suppose that such a course on his part will never be regarded by that elevated body as a mark of disrespect to itself — But that they will on the contrary esteem it the strongest evidence he can give of his fixed resolution conscientiously to discharge his duty to them and to the country.

A new state of things has however arisen since the close of the last session of Congress and evidence has since been laid before the President which he is persuaded would have led the House of Representatives to a different conclusion if it had come to their knowledge. The fact that the Bank controls and in some cases substantially owns, and by its money supports, some of the leading presses of the country is now more clearly established. Editors to whom it loaned ex—

-travagant terms in 1831 and 1832, on unusual time and nominal security, have since turned out to be insolvent, and to others apparently in no better condition accommodations still more extravagant, on terms more unusual and sometimes without any security, have also been heedlessly granted.

The allegation which has so often circulated through these channels that the Treasury was bankrupt and the Bank was sustaining it, when ~~at no time~~ for many years ~~has~~ there has not been, on an average, less than six millions of public money in that institution, might be passed over as a harmless misrepresentation; but when it is attempted by substantial acts to impair the credit of the Government and tarnish the honor of the country such charges require more serious attention. With six millions of public money in its vaults, after having had the use of from five to twelve millions for nine years without interest, it became

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the purchaser of a bill drawn by our Government on that of France for about $900.000, being the first instalment of the French indemnity. The purchase money was left in the use of the Bank, being simply added to the Treasury deposit. The Bank sold the bill in England and the holder sent it to France for collection, and arrangements not having been made by the French Government for its payment it was taken up by the agents of the Bank in Paris with the funds of the Bank in their hands. Under these circumstances it has thro its organs openly assailed the credit of the Government and has actually made and persists in a demand of fifteen per cent or $158.842.77 as damages, when no damage or none beyond some trifling expense has in fact been sustained, and when the Bank had in its own possession on deposit several millions of the public money which it was then

284 using for its own profit. Is a fiscal agent

to the Government which thus seeks to enrich itself at the expense of the public worthy of further trust.

There are other important facts not in the contemplation of the House of Representatives or not known to the members at the time they voted for the resolution.

Although the charter and the rules of the Bank both declare that "not less than seven directors" shall be necessary to the transaction of business, yet the most important business even that of granting discounts to any extent is entrusted to a committee of five members who do not report to the board.

To cut off all means of communication with the Government in relation to its most important acts, at the commencement of the present year not one of the Government directors was placed on any one committee and although, since, by an unusual remodelling of those bodies some of those directors have been placed on some of the committees, they are yet entirely excluded

from the committee of exchange through which the greatest and most objectionable loans have been made.

When the Government directors made an effort to bring back the business of the Bank to the Board in obedience to the charter and the existing regulations, the Board not only overruled their attempt, but altered the rule so as to make it conform to the practice, in direct violation of one of the most important provisions of the charter which gave them existence.

It has long been known that the President of the Bank, by his single will, originates and executes many of the most important measures connected with the management and credit of the Bank, and that the Committee as well as the board of directors are left in entire ignorance of many acts done and correspondence carried on in their names and apparently under their authority. The fact has been recently disclosed that an unlimited discretion has been and is now vested in the

President of the Bank to extend its funds in payment for preparing and circulating articles and purchasing pamphlets and newspapers calculated by their contents to operate on elections and secure a renewal of its charter. It appears from the special report of the public directors, that, on the 30th November 1830, the President submitted to the Board an article published in the American Quarterly Review containing favorable notices of the Bank and suggested the expediency of giving it a wider circulation at the expense of the Bank; whereupon the Board passed the following resolution: viz.

"Resolved, that the President be authorised to take such "measures in regard to the circulation of the contents of the "said Article, either in whole or in part, as he may deem "most for the interest of the Bank"

By an entry in the minutes of the Bank dated March 11th 1831, it appears that the President had not only caused a large edition of that article to be issued, but had also, before the resolution of 30th November was adopted, procured to be printed and widely circulated

numerous copies of of the reports of Gen. Smith and Mr. McDuffie in favor of the Bank, and on that day he suggested the expediency of extending his power to the printing of other articles which might subserve the purposes of the institution - Whereupon the following resolution was adopted - viz

"Resolved, that the President is hereby authorised to "cause to be prepared and circulated, such documents and "papers as may communicate to the people information "in regard to the nature and operations of the Bank".

The expenditures purporting to have been made under authority of these resolutions during the years 1831 and 1832 were about $80.000. For a portion of these expenditures vouchers were rendered, from which it appears that they were incurred in the purchase of some hundred thousand copies of newspapers, reports and speeches made in Congress, reviews of the veto message, and of ~~speeches~~ reviews against the Bank &c &c (~~including~~ printing, folding, packing, distributing, and postage.) For

another large portion no vouchers whatever were rendered, but the various sums were paid on order of the President of the Bank making reference to the resolution of the 11th March 1831.

On ascertaining these facts and perceiving that expenditures of a similar character were still continued, the Government directors a few weeks ago offered a resolution in the Board calling for a specific account of these expenditures, shewing the objects to which they had been applied and the persons to whom the money had been paid. This reasonable proposition was voted down.

They also offered a resolution rescinding the resolutions of November 1830 and March 1831. This also was ~~voted down~~ rejected.

Not content with thus refusing to recall the obnoxious power or even to require such an account of the expenditure as would shew whether the money of the Bank had in fact been applied to the objects contemplated by those resolutions as obnoxious as they were, the Board renewed

the power already conferred and even enjoined renewed attention to its exercise by adopting the following in lieu of the propositions submitted by the Government directors: viz:

"Resolved, That the Board have confidence in the
" wisdom and integrity of the President and in the propriety
" of the resolutions of 30th November 1830 and 11th March
" 1831, and entertain a full conviction of the necessity of
" a renewed attention to the object of those resolutions, and
" that the President be authorized and requested to continue
" his exertions for the promotion of said objects."

Taken in connection with the nature of the expenditures heretofore made as recently disclosed, which the Board not only tolerate but approve, this resolution puts the funds of the Bank at the disposition of the President for the purpose of employing the whole press of the country in the service of the Bank, to hire writers and buy newspapers, and to pay out such sums as he pleases, to what persons and for what services he pleases,

without the responsibility of rendering any specific account. The Bank is thus converted into a vast electioneering engine with means to embroil the country in deadly feuds, and under cover of expenditures in themselves improper, extend its corruption thro' all the ramifications of society.

Some of the items for which accounts have been rendered shew the construction which has been given to the resolutions and the way in which the power it confers has been exerted. The money has not been expended merely in the publication and distribution of speeches, reports of committees or articles written for the purpose of shewing the constitutionality or usefulness of the Bank. But publications have been prepared and extensively circulated containing the grossest invectives against the officers of the Govern--ment: and the money which belongs to the Stockholders and to the public has been freely applied in efforts to degrade in public estimation those who were

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supposed to be instrumental in executing the wishes of this grasping and dangerous institution. As the President of the Bank has not been required to settle his accounts, no one but himself yet knows how much more than the sum already mentioned may have been squandered and for which a credit may hereafter be claimed in his account under this most extraordinary resolution. With these facts before us can we be surprised at the torrent of abuse incessantly poured out against all who are supposed to stand in the way of the cupidity or ambition of the Bank of the U States? Can we be surprised at sudden and unexpected changes of opinion in favor of an institution which has millions to lavish and avows its determination not to spare its means when they are necessary to accomplish its purposes? The refusal to render an account of the manner in which a part of the money

expended has been applied gives just cause for the suspicion that it has been used for purposes which it is not deemed prudent to expose to the eyes of an intelligent and virtuous people. Those who act justly do not shun the light, nor do they refuse explanations when the propriety of their conduct is brought into question.

With these facts before him in an official report from the Government directors, the President would feel that he was not only responsible for all the abuses and corruptions the Bank has committed or may commit, but almost an accomplice in a conspiracy against that Government which he has sworn honestly to administer, if he did not take every step within his constitutional and legal power likely to be efficient in putting an end to these enormities. If it be possible within the scope of human affairs to find a reason for removing the Government deposits

and leaving the Bank to its own resources for the means of effecting its criminal designs, we have it here. Was it expected when the moneys of the United States were directed to be placed in that Bank that they would be put under the control of one man, empowered to spend millions without rendering a voucher or specifying the object? Can they be considered safe with the evidence before us, that tens of thousands have been spent for highly improper if not corrupt purposes, and that the same motive may lead to the expenditure of hundreds of thousands and even millions more? And can we justify ourselves to the people by longer lending to it the money and power of the Government to be employed for such purposes?

It has been alleged by some as an objection to the removal of the deposits that the Bank has the power and in that event will have the disposition to destroy

the State Banks employed by the Government and bring distress upon the country. It has been the fortune of the President to encounter dangers which were represented as equally alarming and he has seen them vanish before resolution and energy. Pictures equally appalling were paraded before him when this Bank came to demand a new charter. But what was the result? Has the country been ruined or even distressed? Was it ever more prosperous than since that act? The President verily believes the Bank has not the power to produce the calamities its friends threaten. The funds of the Government will not be annihilated by being transferred. They will immediately be issued for the benefit of trade, and if the Bank of the United States curtails its loans, the State Banks strengthened by the public deposits will extend theirs. What comes in through one Bank will go out through others, and the

equilibrium will be restored. Should the Bank for the mere purpose of producing distress press its debtors more heavily than some of them can bear, the consequences will recoil upon itself, and in the attempts to embarrass the country it will only bring loss and ruin upon the holders of its own stock. But if the President believed the Bank possessed all the power which has been attributed to it, his determination would only be rendered the more inflexible. If indeed this corporation now holds in its hands the happiness and prosperity of the American people it is high time to take the alarm. If the despotism be already upon us and our only safety is in the mercy of the despot, recent developments in relation to his designs and the means he employs, show how necessary it is to shake it off. The struggle can never come

with less distress to the people or under more favorable auspices than at the present moment.

All doubt as to the willingness of the state Banks to undertake the service of the Government, to the same extent, and on the same terms, as it is now performed by the Bank of the U. States, is put to rest by the report of the agent recently employed to collect information: and from that willingness their own safety in the operation may be confidently inferred. Knowing their own resources better than they can be known by others, it is not to be supposed that they would be willing to place themselves in a situation which they cannot occupy without danger of annihilation or embarrassment. The only consideration applies to the safety of the public funds if deposited in those institutions. And when it is seen that the

directors of many of them are not only willing to pledge the character and capital of the corporations in giving success to this measure, but also their own property and reputation, we cannot doubt that they at least believe the public deposits would be safe in their management. The President thinks that these facts and circumstances afford as strong a guarantee as can be had in human affairs for the safety of the public funds and the practicability of a new system of collection and disbursement through the agency of the State Banks.

From all these considerations the President thinks that the State Banks ought immediately to be employed in the collection and disbursement of the public revenue, and the funds now in the Bank of the United States drawn out with all convenient despatch. The safety of the public

moneys, if deposited in the State Banks, must be secured beyond all reasonable doubts: but the extent and nature of the security in addition to their capital, if any be deemed necessary, is a subject of detail to which the Treasury Department will undoubtedly give its anxious attention. The Banks to be employed must remit the moneys of the Government without charge as the Bank of the United States now does; must render all the services which that Bank now performs; must keep the Government advised of their situation by periodical returns; in fine in any arrangement with the State Banks the Government must not in any respect, be placed on a worse footing than it now is either in accommodation or specie. The President is happy to perceive by the report of the agent, that the Banks which he has consulted have in

general consented to perform the service on these terms, and that those in New York have further agreed to make payments in London without other charge than the mere cost of the Bills of exchange.

It should also be enjoined upon any Banks which may be employed that it will be expected of them to facilitate domestic exchanges for the benefit of internal commerce, to grant all reasonable facilities to the payers of the revenue, to exercise the utmost liberality towards the other state Banks, and do nothing uselessly to embarrass the Bank of the United States.

As one of the most serious objections to the Bank of the U. States is the power which it concentrates, care must be taken in finding other agents for the service of the Treasury not to raise up another power equally formidable. Although it would probably be impossible to produce such a result by

any organization of the State Banks which could be desired
yet it is desirable to avoid even the appearance. To this
end it would be expedient to assume no more power
over them and interfere no more in their affairs than
might be absolutely necessary to the security of the public
deposit and the faithful performance of their duties as
agents of the Treasury. Any interference by them in the
political contests of the country [whether by the application
of their funds in ~~[illegible]~~ unusual accommodations
to influential partisans, or the printing of documents
or papers] with a view to influence elections [or by the
granting or refusing usual loans to individuals on
account of their party predilections] ought, in the
opinion of the President, to be followed by an
immediate discharge from the public service

It is the desire of the President that the
control of the Banks and the currency shall [as far
as possible be entirely separated from the political

power of the country as well as wrested from an institution which has already attempted to subject the Government to its will. In his opinion the action of the general Government on this subject ought not to extend beyond the grant in the constitution which only authorises Congress "to coin money and regulate the value thereof". all else belongs to the states and the people and must be regulated by public opinion and the interests of trade.

In conclusion the President must be permitted to remark that he looks upon the pending question as of higher consideration than the mere transfer of a sum of money from one Bank to another. Its decision may affect the character of our Government for ages to come. Should the Bank be suffered longer to use the public moneys in the accomplishment of

its purposes with the proofs of its faithlessness and corruption before our eyes, the patriotic among our citizens will despair of success in struggling against its power, and we shall be responsible for entailing it upon our country forever. Viewing it as a question of transcendent importance both in the principles and consequences it involves, the President ~~would~~ could not, in justice to the responsibility which he owes to the country, refrain from pressing upon the Secretary of the Treasury his view of the considerations which impel to immediate action. Upon him has been devolved by the constitution and the suffrages of the American people the duty of superintending the operation of the Executive departments of the Government and seeing that the laws are faithfully executed. In the performance of this high trust, it is his undoubted right to express to those whom the laws and his own choice have

made his associates in the administration of the Government, his opinion of their duties under circumstances as they arise. It is this right which he now exercises. Far be it from him to expect or require, that any member of the cabinet should, at his request, order or dictation, do any act which he believes unlawful, or in his conscience condemns. From them, his own officers and from his fellow citizens in general he desires only that aid and support which their reason approves and their conscience sanctions.

In the remarks he has made on this all important question he trusts the Secretary of the Treasury will see only the frank and respectful declarations of the opinions which the President has formed on a measure of great national interest deeply affecting the character and usefulness of his administration: and not a spirit of dictation, which the President would be as

careful to avoid as ready to meet. Happy will he be if the facts now disclosed produce uniformity of opinion and unity of action among the members of the administration.

The President again repeats that he begs his cabinet to consider the proposed measure as his own, in the support of which he shall require no one of them to make a sacrifice of opinion or principle. The responsibility every way is and shall be his. It is assumed after the most mature deliberation and reflection as necessary to preserve the morals of the people, the freedom of the press and the purity of the elective franchise, without which all will unite in saying that the blood and treasure expended by our Forefathers in the establishment of our happy system of Government will have been vain & fruitless.

Under these convictions he feels that a measure so important to the American people cannot be commenced too soon: and he therefore names the first day of October next as the period for the change of the deposits, or sooner provided the necessary arrangements with the state banks

Andrew Jackson